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IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 64: THE PHOTO TOUR 20 BREAKWATER ANCHORAGE Since the Neu Hafen was, more or less, built from scratch – it was better arranged than many of the old, established harbors. Wilhelmshaven, for example, was an “old” harbor, and was more than adequate to handle the early beginnings of the Imperial Navy. But by the end of the 19th Century the docks and basins were becoming crowded with an ever expanding fleet of steel battleships. Later, as the larger dreadnoughts began to join the fleet, it was often necessary to anchor entire battleship divisions offshore in the scarce deep water areas like the Vareler Deep. In Cuxhaven, the Panzerkreuzer (battlecruisers) were assigned permanent berths along the outer breakwater on the opposite side of the roadsted. This suited Hipper perfectly. It kept the big ships separated from the hustle and bustle of the rest of the harbor, thereby avoiding distractions and allowing the sailors to concentrate on their work. This is an overview of the western half of the breakwater. It was originally intended that each battlecruiser should have its’ own berth, but as the number of cruisers grew, it became necessary to moor some of them inboard and outboard of each other. This shot also gives you a partial view of the rest of the activity in the harbor – tugs, lighters, barges, and cranes – all busily going about their assigned tasks. This is a view of the first two battlecruisers in the breakwater mooring line. SMS Moltke is on the left, and the immortal Seydlitz on the right. The “Uki” breakwater is plopped at the very edge of the 30 meter harbor floor. Beyond the breakwater, the seabed drops off rather precipitately. Looking back on it, I probably should have dropped the seabed to 40 meters and been done with it. (Unfortunately, if you want to get the “whale automata” you have to go considerably deeper than that – and I’m a “sucker” for the whales.) This scene was created with five separate lots – two for the mooring points, one for the battlecruiser, one for the motor launch, and one for the boat boom and small boats. Again, this is the “modular” concept at work. By utilizing four different models which can be used in a variety of different scenarios, I avoided making a single large lot that would only be good for a single use. The mooring points built adjacent to the breakwater were made by “Mattb325” as a request and then uploaded to the STEX. I took his basic model and modified it with sailors, lighting, and rope coils. The idea was for the sailors to act as a “mooring party” securing the ship. Each mooring point is an individual lot plopped, roughly, one square apart. They were patterned after those found along “Battleship Row” in Pearl Harbor. In retrospect, the mooring points should have been made about half their size. The beautifully detailed battlecruiser is courtesy of @AP. (Full details on SMS Moltke can be found in Chapters 17 and 18.) This is SMS Seydlitz at her berth. This scene was also constructed with five modular lots. There are two lots for the mooring points, one for the battlecruiser, one for the boat boom and small boats, and one large one for the replenishment operation off the port quarter. Just for the record; with the exception of the mooring points (Mattb325), the breakwater (Uki), the steam tug (WolfZe), and the crane on the barge (PEG Trash Lot) – EVERYTHING in the picture was modeled by @AP. This view gives you a better look at the details of the mooring point. Unfortunately, they are both exactly the same. I should have made at least two different arrangements so the pieces would not be duplicated, but in my stupidity, I was trying to cut down on the number of custom lots I was putting into my Plugins folder. (When I first started out, I foolishly thought I could get away with a couple of hundred new lots – go figure.) And, again, the beautifully detailed model of Seydlitz is by the talented “AP”. (Details on the battlecruiser can be found in Chapters 21 and 22.) This gives you a little better view of the replenishment operation. I wanted something a little bit more complicated than just a couple of lighters, so I decided to go with a larger and more intricate lot. This lot is 5x2, and includes the barge crane, lighters, tugs, and small boat you see in the picture. All of these props have been placed on the lot in such a manner as to be “flush” against the battlecruiser, while overhanging the other three sides of the lot. “Overhanging props” takes advantage of the smallest possible lot space to accommodate the largest possible number of visual props. This is a better view of the “replenishment lot”. Due to the unique nature of the lot, I would probably not use it twice on the same map tile, but as a “modular lot” it can be placed against docks or any of the large ships in the game. This close-up, yet again, allows you to see the amazing level of detail “AP” has built into his models. These models are so good, so realistic – they actually “inspire” and motivate the creation of life-like scenes. This is an overview of the next two battlecruisers moored along the breakwater – SMS Derfflinger on the left, and Hindenburg on the right. Almost everything in the picture has already been discussed on several different occasions, and should be familiar to you. But down in the lower right of the picture, you can just make out the steam tug Goliath towing what was at the time, the world’s largest floating crane – “Langer Heinrich”. (See Chapter 14 for details on “Langer Heinrich”.) SMS Derfflinger is moored along the breakwater in the same basic fashion as the other battlecruisers. Like the other ships, she has her boat boom extended and is also preparing to take aboard stores and fresh provisions. Derfflinger model kindly provided by @Barroco Hispano. In this close-up, you can examine the fine detailing of the warship as well as those of the accompanying ships. In the upper left, a cutter is standing by the mooring point while the sailors prepare to tighten the slack in the mooring hawsers. At the port side boat boom, sailors are unloading some small boxes from another cutter, with a dinghy trailing astern. Lastly, the paddle tug Sophia is standing by with two lighters loaded with ship’s stores and assorted fresh provisions. The cutter at the mooring point is a stand-alone 1x1 plopped next to the platform. The boat boom and small boat is also a 1x1 designed so that it can be plopped alongside any larger ship. The paddle tug and lighters are a 2x1 lot with the props positioned to overhang the lot. Many people can create new lots or re-lot and improve an old game lot. But learning how to use overhanging props can add an entirely new dimension of reality to the game. Once again, let me call attention to the brilliant level of detail in the small boats, boat boom, paddle tug, and lighters by “AP”. Moored along the breakwater, just astern of Derfflinger, is SMS Hindenburg – the last active duty battlecruiser designed and built by the Kaiserliche Marine. As the last flagship of Scouting Forces Hochseeflotte, the flag of Vizeadmiral Hipper flies at her forepeak. Being an “improved” version of the Derfflinger Class, she was “the best of the best”. Appropriately enough, the model is scratch-built by @AP -- and may well be his finest work yet. This shot shows all the magnificent detail built into “AP’s” battlecruiser, and it is well worth a few minutes of close examination. The two steam launches tied-up at the boat boom are courtesy of Barroco Hispano, while the small boats and boat boom are by “AP”. The beautiful little harbor tug Thor – pulling alongside with a lighter of fresh provisions – is also the work of “AP”. NEXT TIME…… CUXHAVEN: THE PHOTO TOUR 21 MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful warship models. SPECIAL THANKS to my friend and partner, @AP, for his talents, meticulous models, colorful imagination, and extreme dedication. If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496

IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 63: THE PHOTO TOUR 19 MAIN TUGBOAT STATION “Way back in the Day”, SC4 hardly paid any attention to tugboats. In fact, there was only one tugboat set of any note in the game – the distinctly “Japanese” set by “Somy”. All of the “Somy” lots and ships were extremely well done, but the Japanese tugs were rather small and obviously not of European design. When “WofZe” made the gift of a small white steam tug, it opened up a whole range of opportunities. I modified the “Somy” tug docks (as mentioned in previous chapters) and was able to replace the Japanese tugboats with the “WolfZe” model. Eventually, @AP generously offered his considerable talents and created an entire line of wonderful tugboats to add realism and authenticity to our harbors. Tugboats, in general, are sorely neglected -- in games, movies, literature, and even in the history books. But without them, harbors simply could not function. They tow lighters out to ships -- loaded with supplies, stores, and fresh food. Tugs moved large barges loaded with machinery and fabricated parts for the ships. And – they were the only method of moving the big ships around in the harbor. They were small – but vital to the smooth operation of any harbor. This is an overview of the Main Tugboat Station in the Neu Hafen. Built at the head of “Pier 01”, it was originally intended to be the only tug station in the harbor and is the largest station yet built. The angular, flat-roofed building on the right is a machine shop used for the repair and maintenance of the tugboat fleet. Each dock has two storage sheds that double as warehouses and workshops. And each has a fuel oil storage tank. The more modern Passat Class tugs were equipped with supplemental oil-firing for their coal-fed boilers. The Quonset Huts are used for various purposes: some are partitioned into office space, others are partitioned into sleeping quarters, and at least one is used as a “junk shed” where bits of this and that are stored (with a Friday night card game in one corner). This is another example of the wooden landings created by @AP. It is, I think, my favorite landing model. It reminds me of the many aging wooden piers I saw along the shores of Hampton Roads in my younger days. Used in combination with “AP’s” sailors and small boat models, you can create almost any scene you might imagine. The weathered look of the pier decking is superb and the detailing of the pilings is equally good. The upturned dinghy on the pier is a sight common to almost any pier or landing. You might be surprised to learn that all through history, a great many sailors were unable to swim. The dinghy and “life-preserver-rings” were always found on docks and piers in the event someone fell in. One more view of these wonderfully versatile props. This is a closer detail shot of the tugboat station. If you have been following the previous chapters, you will already know where all the props came from, and might even know the names of the tugboats. You will also have heard several speeches about the value and flexibility of “modular lots”. This demonstrates, once more, how easily a tug station can be enlarged, and configured to fit the available space. You also have a glimpse of the surrounding landscape. This is the tug station from a different angle. Once I have laid out a particular scene – like the tug station – I always check it from all angles before declaring it “finished”. There are usually small details that become more obvious from different angles. This is a view of the offshore anchorage at the tug station. You will immediately notice the pair of Odin Class tugs nested along the breakwater at right – and the four Passat Class tugs moored to buoys in the center. They are among many diagonal models “AP” has included in his prop packs to add variety and realism to your harbors. Same view – different angle. In the lower left corner, you can see how I managed to get the breakwater end onto the shore. The portion of the breakwater “on land” is actually an overhanging portion of the “Uki” model – the “base” portion is planted on the harbor floor. On the far right is the County Class heavy cruiser HMS Dorsetshire entering through the East Entrance of the breakwater. I’m not sure you will find this of interest, but any of the ship lots in the game should be plopped over a completely flat surface. “Somy” models, for example, when plopped over an uneven ocean floor will look fine until you save and close the game. When you reopen the game – that model will likely disappear, or even sink to the ocean floor – which is entirely due to the uneven sea bottom. If an “AP” raised-prop model is plopped on an uneven seabed – it simply does not look right, and you will end up bulldozing the lot. So – make sure the entire seabed is flat wherever you plan to plop ships – any “bumps” will cause trouble. I settled on a harbor depth of 30 meters, mainly due to the transparent properties of the “PEG Brigantine” water MOD. The harbor is just shallow enough to see vegetation on the seabed, but deep enough to make it a bit “murky”. At 30 meters, there is a bit of an offset from the base of the lot and the model on the surface – you plop it “over here”, and it shows up “over there”. It sometimes takes a bit of work to get the plopped model in the right position, but the results are always worth learning the technique. A final view of the fine model of HMS Dorsetshire, courtesy of @Barroco Hispano. Here you see three motor launches and four tugs – two Passat Class, and two Nordwind Class. Two motor launches are “tail moored” to the breakwater and are standing by as part of the security detail. One motor launch is waiting to put to sea on anti-submarine patrol. If it should run into any sort of trouble, the other two will be summoned in support. Even in peacetime, foreign submarines might be found snooping around – although that was unlikely in the shallow inshore waters of the North Sea. From a different angle – the tugs are preparing to take Dorsetshire under tow as soon as she clears the harbor entrance. This shot also provides a pretty good view of my experiment with the “NBVC Corals”. Technically speaking, you would not find corals in the cold waters of the North Sea – but I wanted to play around with them and see how it turned out. NEXT TIME…… CUXHAVEN: THE PHOTO TOUR 20 MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful warship models. SPECIAL THANKS to my friend and partner, @AP, for his talents, meticulous models, colorful imagination, and extreme dedication. If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496

IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 61: THE PHOTO TOUR 17 THE EAST BASIN 03 This installment begins at the head of “Pier 2”. This pier is constructed with the same 8x1 base lot as the others. The advantage possessed by “Piers 2 through 6” lay in the construction of one long, continuous pier. Any number of ships, of various sizes, could be accommodated along its length. “Pier 1” was the first set of mooring piers constructed, and it was based on a series of individual docks capable of handling only a single vessel. One other point: This installment deals primarily with “heavy cruisers”. Battle fleets of The Great War Era were composed of battleships, battlecruisers, sometimes armored cruisers, and light cruisers. The Royal Navy continued to deploy armored cruisers with the Grand Fleet in a scouting capacity, even though they were recognized as obsolete. The Kaiserliche Marine, more realistic about the life expectancy of an armored cruiser in a fleet engagement, reassigned them for service in the Baltic Sea. For all practical purposes, “heavy” cruisers did not exist during WW I. The “heavy cruiser” was, in fact, the offspring of the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922. Both the British and the Americans, to varying degrees, had overseas interests requiring naval support and protection. After the financial strains of The Great War, neither country was particularly interested in sending battleships to such far flung outposts as Dar es Salaam, Sri Lanka, or even Manila. But, by the same token, something with more “muscle” than a light cruiser was required. The answer was not the obsolete armored cruiser or its capital ship replacement, the battlecruiser (limited by the treaty) – but the concept of a modern “heavy cruiser”. The Washington Treaty did not limit total “cruiser tonnage”, but it set an upper limit on ship size – no more than 10,000 tons with guns no larger than eight inch. (A later London Naval Treaty further subdivided cruisers into “heavy” and “light” categories. Light cruisers were approximately 7,000 tons with guns no larger than six inch.) So the heavy cruiser was born between the wars, more out of the need to save money than anything else. Moored at the head of “Pier 2” is HMS Exeter, the second and last of the York Class heavy cruisers built for the Royal Navy. Displacement: 8,390 tons – Length 575 feet – 32 knots – 6x8-inch guns – 6x21-inch torpedo tubes – Belt armor 3 inches. This view shows her long, slender lines which contributed to her speed. This close-up shows you the marvelous and intricate detailing on the model. The York Class cruisers were handsome and impressive vessels – somewhat unusual for Britain’s peacetime construction. The cruisers were built with the square, block-like forward superstructure that soon became standard on British warships. HMS Exeter put in a dogged performance against KM Admiral Graff Spee at the battle of the River plate in 1939 and was under repair for nearly a year after the battle. In early 1942, she was transferred to the Far East and was sunk by four Japanese cruisers on 1 March 1942, during the Second Battle of the Java Sea. Model courtesy of @Barroco Hispano. A little further along the pier we see two paddle steam tugs maneuvering a lighter loaded with timber into position against the pier. The towing tug, Esmeralda, holds her position, while the tug Helena nudges the lighter against the dock. This is another view of the tugs and lighter at work alongside “Pier 2”. @AP has crafted these wonderfully detailed tugs after much research into the type, and the level of detail is truly amazing. You can even see the furled canvas along the yardarms and on the mizzen gaff. If the tug’s engine failed while at sea, they would be able to make port under sail. The timber lighter, alone, is a work of art. You will note Helena is a diagonal model. “AP” made the extra effort to include many diagonal versions of his models for the game. “Grid-busting” is a long and admirable tradition in the SC4 community, and we have tried to add to the realism it brings to the game. Along with the other traditional naval powers, the United States built “treaty cruisers” between the wars. Here you see USS Northampton, name ship of a class of six heavy cruisers built between 1928 and 1931. Additional ships were originally planned, but budget cuts during The Great Depression killed the overly ambitious program. Displacement: 9,050 tons – Length 582 feet – Speed 32.5 knots – 9x8-inch guns – 8x5-inch guns – 4 float planes – Belt armor 3.75 inches. This view shows the clean lines of the fast cruiser. With a 9 to1 length to width ratio, they were fast enough to keep up with the fast carrier battle groups that would eventually dominate WW II in the Pacific, and were prominent in the cruiser/destroyer night actions in the Solomon Islands. This beautifully detailed model by “Barroco Hispano” shows the midships handling area for her aircraft catapult (port side) and the aircraft hangars beneath the rear superstructure block. The Northamptons were handsome vessels with a long, low profile, a raised forecastle for sea-keeping in rough seas, and a classically beautiful raked “clipper bow”. These cruisers were quite popular among serving officers and were followed by the nearly identical Portland Class heavy cruisers. Three of the Northamptons would be lost in the Pacific war – USS Houston, Northampton, and Chicago. This is yet another of the several old, wooden landings provided by “AP”. Instead of raising the landing up to the top of the seawall, this one lowers the dock closer to the water and includes stairs. Just one more example of the variety found in such a simple prop. The landing has been “dressed-out” with a wide selection of “AP’s” sailors and small boats. Contrary to what you might think, it is not possible in these large harbors to row a boat up and step ashore wherever you please. “Landing piers” are found in many locations in a harbor, but because they are relatively scarce, each one becomes a focal point of activity. Here you see personnel coming and going, some boats loading small quantities of supplies, others carrying mail, etc, etc. This is HMS Devonshire, one of 13 County Class heavy cruisers built between 1928 and 1930. This large class of ships was typical of the “treaty cruisers” Britain built between the wars. Large and sturdy, they were multi-purpose vessels designed to handle commerce protection and colonial support. Due to the large number of ships in the class, there were minor design changes made during construction, but they generally conformed to certain particulars: Displacement: 9,840 tons – Length: 595 feet – Speed 32.25 knots – 8x8-inch guns – 8x4-inch guns – 8x21-inch torpedo tubes – Belt armor 3.5 inches. HMS Devonshire is high-sided with enough freeboard to stay at sea and – if need be – to fight in heavy sea states. Her three funnels indicate a large number of boilers to generate high speed. The County Class heavy cruisers were considered good sea boats and performed well under wartime conditions. HMS Norfolk and Suffolk detected KM Bismarck passing through the Denmark Strait in May 1941, and HMS Dorsetshire fired the last four torpedoes into the German battleship. Later, Dorsetshire and HMS Cornwall were lost to Japanese carrier aircraft in April 1942, while HMAS Canberra was sunk in the night action off Savo Island in August 1942. Highly detailed model of Devonshire provided by “Barroco Hispano”. Here is a close-up view of the individual docks used to construct the “Pier 1” facilities. There are four 12x3 docks – each one lotted differently -- and spaced-out along the quayside to handle a heavy cruiser. These docks are different from my usual dock pattern in that they do not have “WMP Seawalls” fitted as “bumpers”. The idea was to show these births as the oldest in the harbor, and therefore less modern. The dockside cranes are by “AP” with various props used to dress-out the dock itself. The five red-roofed warehouses on the right are from the “PEG SNM Naval Series”, while the black-roofed warehouses on the right are from the “NOB 1905 Naval Series”. Each dock is separated from its neighbor by a 3x2 lot with storage tanks, fronted by a 1x1 water tower and two 1x1 lots with parked trucks or trailers. Across the road from the dock area are the trackside loading docks. These 3x2 dock pieces were repurposed directly from the “PEG CDK Industrial Docks Series” without any modifications. Upon reflection, I should have re-lotted them and “dressed” them with props suitable to the pre-WW I era. Unfortunately, this part of the map was put together early in the process and then largely overlooked (note the ubiquitous shipping containers). The 3x2 space between the two docks was filled-in with a combination of 1x1 and 1x2 modular lots. The trackside crane here is borrowed from the “PEG SNM Dry Dock Lot”. Above you see the heavy cruiser RM Zara moored at her berth. The Zara Class comprised four heavy cruisers – Zara, Fiume, Pola, and Gorizia -- built for the Italian Regia Marina (RM or “Royal Navy”) between 1929 and 1932. They were a substantial improvement over the preceding class of cruisers with much improved belt armor. The Zara’s were, in fact, among the most heavily armored “treaty cruisers” built between the wars. It is not commonly known that the Italians were only able to achieve acceptable guns, armor, and speed by deliberately violating the Washington Treaty limits. Displacement: 11,326 tons – Length” 589 feet – 32 knots – 8x8-inch guns – 16x3.9-inch guns – 34 AA guns – 2 seaplanes – Belt armor 5.9 inches. With an 8 to 1 length to width ratio, the Zara Class ships were a bit wider in the beam than most foreign cruisers, which would have provided a more stable gun platform. But even with the wider beam and heavier armor, they still exceeded their rated 32 knots. You can see the hull lines are smooth and graceful, with a widely flared bow and raised forecastle deck to keep her “dry” at high speeds. The Zara Class heavy cruisers were among the most handsome cruisers ever built – as “Barroco Hispano’s” superbly detailed model clearly demonstrates. The raised forecastle forward, steps down to the main deck level abaft the bridge structure and runs “flush” to the stern. The cruisers are long, and low with sharp “raked” bows designed to slice through the waves. The four cruisers served well during the early years of WW II, but Gorizia is the only one to survive the conflict. Pola, Zara, and Fiume were all sunk at the Battle of Cape Matapan, in a night action against the British battleships Barham, Valiant, and Warspite (27-29 March 1941). NEXT TIME…… CUXHAVEN: THE PHOTO TOUR 18 MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful warship models. SPECIAL THANKS to my friend and partner, @AP, for his talents, meticulous models, colorful imagination, and extreme dedication. If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496

IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 60: THE PHOTO TOUR 16 THE EAST BASIN 02 We’ll pick up where we left off – at the head of “Pier 4”. The long piers are pretty much the same as those in the previous chapter. The only real differences are the moored ships and a bit of variety in the dockside activity. In reality, the number of light cruisers assigned to the Hochseeflotte varied according to circumstances – maintenance, special duties, wartime losses, etc, etc. Normally there would be five light cruisers with each of the 2nd and 4th Scouting Groups, with another three assigned as torpedo boat flotilla leaders. Other light cruisers might be assigned duty as minelayers or escorts for minesweeping operations. Still others might be temporarily assigned to duty in the Baltic Sea. But no matter the reason, one thing is certain: like the pre-World War US Navy, the Kaiserliche Marine was woefully short of light cruisers. Add to this the potential for heavy losses and the Hochseeflotte could easily find itself unable to scout the enemy or screen the battle fleet. But that need not bother us for game purposes. I am, indeed, fortunate to have quite a few excellent cruiser models generously provided by @Barroco Hispano, so I have chosen to include several foreign cruisers as well as a few of historical note from the WW II period. All the models are, however, superbly detailed and should be of interest. At the head of “Pier 4” is the Italian light cruiser Raimondo Montecuccoli. Built between the wars, she was part of the third batch of Condottieri Class light cruisers. The Marina Regia had opted for cruiser warfare in the narrow seas of the Mediterranean, with a medium-sized battle fleet to supply a respectable amount of muscle. Montecuccoli was larger, much longer, and better protected than her predecessors. Model courtesy of Barroco Hispano. Raimondo Montecuccoli was commissioned in 1935: 7,523 tons – 37 knots – 8x6-inch (QF) guns – 4x21-inch torpedo tubes – 2 aircraft – belt armor 2.4 inches. Extremely fast, with a respectable main battery, these cruisers were more than capable of interdicting trade at any of the various “choke-points” in the Mediterranean. Raimondo Montecuccoli survived WW II and served in the Italian Navy until decommissioned in 1964. This is another overview of the light cruiser berths in the basin. Left of center are three of four Kolberg Class light cruisers – SMS Kolberg, Mainz, and Coln. Kolberg survived the war, but Mainz and Coln were lost at the First Battle of Heligoland Bight in August 1914. Right of center are the two light cruisers of the Pillau Class – SMS Pillau and Elbing. Elbing was lost during the night action at Jutland when she was accidentally rammed by the battleship SMS Posen – and later scuttled. Pillau survived the war, was ceded to Italy as war reparations, and was sunk by US Army bombers in 1943. The Pillau Class conformed to the German light cruiser standards – roughly 4,400 tons – 27.5 knots – 8x5.9-inch guns. But they started life at the Schichau-Werk, Danzig, as a pair of light cruisers destined for the Imperial Russian Navy. When war broke out, the German government confiscated the pair and finished them for the Kaiserliche Marine. Pillau was commissioned in December 1914, and Elbing in September 1915. (Model by “Barroco Hispano”). This is a close-up of the Kolberg Class light cruisers nested along the quayside. Originally armed with twelve 4.1-inch guns, Kolberg was later modernized (1916) to carry eight 5.9-inch guns. At 25.5 knots, the ships had a fair turn of speed and Kolberg was frequently used on minelaying operations. Model by @Barroco Hispano. Once again, I apologize for the use of modern shipping containers, but when these docks were laid out there were few alternatives. It actually took quite a long time to track down suitable props to fill-out all the modular lots required to build massive quays and docks. I actually made an effort to phase the containers out as the map construction progressed – especially in the planned Bremerhaven map -- but they will tend to turn up from time to time. This is the Italian light cruiser Duca degli Abruzzi – another of those interesting foreign cruisers I mentioned. Duca degli Abruzzi Class light cruiser: commissioned 1937 – 11,350 tons – 34 knots – 10x6-inch guns – 8x4-inch guns – 6x21-inch torpedo tubes – 4 aircraft – belt armor 4 inches. Like all Italian warships, these were handsome vessels, with sleek lines and extremely high speed. In WW II, these ships were employed rather conservatively, but once in combat – they were handled aggressively and the Royal Navy was wary of them. In this close-up, you can see the main armament was deployed in two triple and two double turrets – a method primarily used in the Italian Navy (though the British employed a similar arrangement on their King George V Class battleships in 1937). Naval architects, serving naval officers, and historians have debated the efficiency of the Italian main battery turrets. In particular, the US Navy, thought the barrels were grouped too closely to one another – an opinion also held by Royal Navy designers. When a shell leaves the barrel of a gun, it creates air turbulence along its flight path – much like a boat leaves a wake. The US Navy, based on theory – and the Royal Navy, based on combat experience – were of the opinion that “shell air turbulence” caused Italian salvos to land in an erratic pattern. This, of course, would have put them at a disadvantage during combat. But – it is worth noting that not all “experts” agree on the theory. Here’s a shot of the lower end of this basin. The very end of this type of basin always tends to be a “catch-all”. If some tug captain wasn’t exactly sure where to put something, it usually wound up at the end of a basin. Lighters and barges that have been unloaded – but not removed right away – get shoved out of the way and dumped at the end – usually by a new tug towing loaded lighters. A parked crane barge with a tug stands by, while a Sophia Class paddle tug adds one more lighter to the jumble. The lighters, small boats, and tug are by “AP”. Lighters were (and still are) a common sight in all harbors – and most especially in large harbors. Old photographs of Hamburg and the Port of London show dozens of lighters servicing cargo ships, while dozens more have been emptied and left to collect in odd corners of the docks. We have done our best to recreate the extensive use of lighters in our harbors. This is a close-up from a different angle – mainly so you can get a good look at the superb craftsmanship of “AP’s” models – and – it’s a great angle on the paddle tug Esmeralda. The small boat crews have come alongside to secure the new lighter to the other two. As the growing battle fleet occupied more and more space in Wilhelmshaven, it was decided to create a salvage tug station in Cuxhaven. This might not seem crucial to the operation of the battlecruisers, but during the war, more than one was torpedoed and required immediate assistance – and this was especially critical after the Battle of Jutland. Due to the already crowded nature of the Cuxhaven anchorage, the salvage tugs have had to share berthing space with the warships. This is their “station” – squeezed onto the lower end of “Pier 3”. The old wooden control tower can be seen on the right – adjacent to an anchor maintenance facility. This is a close-up of the Langeoog Class salvage tugs (named after one of the Frisian Islands). The model is meticulously detailed and based on the famous “SS Foundation Franklin”. Even the two massive towing winches can be seen directly aft of the second funnel. This is, perhaps, my favorite of all the fine models (so far) created by @AP. If you look in the upper right of the picture, you will see a variety of dockside activity in progress. The old wooden control tower (extreme right of picture) was borrowed from the “SimCoug Historic Harbor Series”. Again, I used a wide selection of props to make 1x1 custom lots allowing flexibility and much greater variety with far less repetition. The superb small props by “AP” contributed greatly to this – and his “Imperial sailors and officers” come in many poses and are crucial to the concept of the “busy harbor”. “Nesting” at a berth was quite common in most navies of the period – especially in crowded harbors, with smaller vessels. On the left you see SMS Konigsberg – 1907 and Stuttgart – 1908. In the early months of The Great War, Konigsberg was hunted down by the British and sunk in the Rufiji River delta of German East Africa. Stuttgart survived the war, was awarded to Britain as war reparations, and scrapped in 1922. On the right are SMS Karlsruhe – 1912 and Rostock – 1912. Karlsruhe was lost east of Barbados due to an internal explosion in November 1914, while Rostock (a torpedo boat flotilla leader) was heavily damaged at Jutland and later scuttled. Here you see a pair of Leander Class light cruisers – HMS Ajax (1935) at left, and Achilles (1933). Built under the terms of the Washington Naval Treaty, these ships were scaled-down from the York Class heavy cruisers, in an effort to build more numerous, small, cruisers within the limits of Britain’s cruiser tonnage allowance. The German Panzerschiffe KM Deutschland and Admiral Scheer had thrown a scare into the British and they were trying to increase their cruisers for commerce protection purposes. Displacement: 7,270 tons – length 555 feet – 32.5 knots -- 8x6-inch guns – 8x21-inch torpedo tubes – no armor to speak of. The Leander’s generally exceeded their speed ratings and were well liked by their crews. Though very lightly armored, they turned out to be rugged ships capable of standing up to extended periods of service between maintenance, and quite capable of exceeding their designed speeds in emergencies. Both Ajax and Achilles preformed heroically in action against KM Admiral Graff Spee at the Battle of the River Plate in 1939. Achilles was sold to India in 1948 and served until 1978. Light cruiser models courtesy of “Barroco Hispano”. At the end of the mole, we find yet another of AP’s old wooden landings. I have, over the years, wanted an old wooden landing to use on a lake or a river for kayaks and boating – but I had little to choose from and had to improvise something. “AP” has provided a variety of different wooden landings that could be used in almost any situation you might imagine. Just for the record – these are, for the most part, simple wooden landings – no frills. This one has been modified with many different props. NEXT TIME…… CUXHAVEN: THE PHOTO TOUR 17 MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful warship models. SPECIAL THANKS to my friend and partner, @AP, for his talents, meticulous models, colorful imagination, and extreme dedication. If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496

IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 56: THE PHOTO TOUR 12 THE DRY DOCK Not all harbors have dry docks. There are large and busy harbors around the world that are strictly dedicated to commerce -- but well established ports are usually found with a government naval installation, and possibly a private maritime construction yard. Either of them will almost always have one or more reasonably modern dry docks and possibly more than one floating dry dock of medium to large size. Permanent in-ground dry docks are traditionally built by digging a hole along the shore line to a desired depth below sea level. The bottom and sides of the hole are usually lined and sealed with a suitably erosion resistant stone (often granite), with the seaward end closed off by swinging steel lock gates. (Think of it as a large bath tub with a door at one end.) A pumping system is used to either fill or empty the dock of seawater. Once the dock is full, the gates may be opened, and a ship can be brought into the dock. The pumping system then removes the water and repairs or maintenance may be preformed on the lower hull. When the work is done, the dock is again flooded and the ship can be returned to the sea. The concept behind the dry dock is quite simple and makes difficult work much easier. But permanent dry docks take up a lot of space, obviously cannot be moved, and are very expensive to build and properly equip. Sometime in the late 18th Century, the idea of a “floating dry dock” was proven to be feasible and by the mid-1800’s had come into common use. A floating dock was much cheaper to build than a permanent dry dock, and often cheaper than building a ship. The dock was built as a double-hull (similar to the double bottom on a ship) and had a flat bottom with high sides – but no ends. The double-hull construction allowed for tanks that could be flooded to submerge the dock. A ship was moved inside the submerged dock, the tanks were pumped dry, and the ship and dock were lifted above sea level. Repairs or maintenance was carried out, the dock was submerged again, and the ship floated out. Floating docks could be very elaborate, with machine shops, boilers to provide steam for pumping, and electric dynamos. The floating dock could be placed at any convenient location in the harbor, and had the advantage of being able to be towed from harbor to harbor as needed. The Imperial Navy considered them quite “hi-tech” for their day and built numbers of them to service their growing battle fleet. This is an overview of Cuxhaven’s single dry dock. This dock was capable of serious repair when necessary, but complicated or large repair jobs were meant to be carried out at either the builder’s yard, or the extensive specialist docks in Wilhelmshaven. Cuxhaven’s dock was largely for temporary emergency repairs, light modifications to onboard equipment, or simple bottom cleaning and painting. The latter job, alone, would considerably relieve the congestion in the Wilhelmshaven docks. As you can see, the dry dock basin has the lock gates in place – but it is full of water. At the time this part of the harbor was laid-out, we had not yet solved the conundrum of how to make a dry dock without water. We did eventually resolve that issue, but for the time being, you’ll have to let your imagination remove the water. Anyone following the various chapters already knows how my landscape is “painted’ and which props I use. And anyone who knows the German North Sea Coast is well aware there are some fair-sized sand dunes, very few hills to speak of, and absolutely no mountains. But mountains and low hills extend across the rear of the Cuxhaven naval base – as clearly seen on the right of this picture. I had been wanting to try my hand at mountain landscapes for some time – and watching the positive mastery of @The British Sausage encouraged me to go ahead. There are not a lot of mountains on the Cuxhaven map – just enough to satisfy myself that I could “pull it off”. Once again, my THANKS to “The British Sausage” for his inspiration and encouragement. Looking at the above picture -- rail lines on the right side of the basin bring in parts, supplies, and large pieces of equipment. The cranes are set up in two lines on either side of the basin. On the right hand quay, 150-ton cranes unload trains and move the cargo/parts dockside, where the larger 250 ton-cranes pick them up and move them onto the ship as needed. On the left hand quay, the inboard crane line has one 250-ton crane to do heavy-lift work over the ship. The outboard crane line consists of one 150-ton crane and one 250-ton crane. The smaller crane lifts light cargo – pipe bundles, boxes, crates, etc, etc, while the larger crane can lift heavy sections of armor plate, gun tubes, and even pre-assembled steam turbine sets. Note the quay on the right has only rail access and the left quay receives all equipment and cargo via ship or barge (usually only the large objects that cannot be transported any other way). The 150-ton cranes are from the “PEG” SNM Dry Dock Series, while the impressive 250-ton cranes are by @AP. Another view. On the left of the picture, you can see the mountain looming over the dry dock area. At the bottom of the picture you can see a “half flotilla” of Italian Leone Class destroyers graciously provided by @Barroco Hispano. This is a closer view of the “crane lines” on either side of the dry dock. Each of the “crane lines” are set up with one line working inside the basin and the other line working outside the basin. The dual crane line in the foreground is designed to bring in large prefabricated items – such as machinery or gun tubes. The large crane immediately behind it is positioned to take those items and work them onto the ship. The crane line on the opposite side is serviced by a rail line. The crane lines were assembled from a wide variety of props on a 12x2 lot. The concrete surfaces of the dry dock area are composed of textures from the “Paeng Grunge Concrete” lots, “PEG SNM Series”, and the “NBVC Container Port”. “NBVC Marinas” provided the seawalls, and the suitably weathered lock gates are, of course, by @AP. This is a close-up of the barges delivering their loads. I have placed several sets of steam turbines in the shot so you can get a good look at them. There are ships in SC4 – but not very many. And there is a “boiler works” lot in the game. But very little attention has been paid to the propulsion plants of ships. “AP” has very skillfully created a set of high-pressure steam turbines (left on the barge) and low-pressure turbines (on the right). Each turbine has a cylindrical gearing unit on the end. A 250-ton crane is lifting a small auxiliary engine from the barge. It is to be installed up forward in the Capstan Flat to replace an engine with too little horsepower. This scene is “busy” and cluttered – many sailors and workmen running about in a maze of barrels, crates, cases, rope coils, hoppers, boxes, anchors, and winches. To the right of the steam turbines on the quay, you see a detail of sailors performing winch maintenance. Notice the detail on the back of the crane...”CUX 4 – 250t”. That is but one example of the degree of historical detail “AP” has researched and incorporated into his models. The barge, turbines, engine, gangway, rope coils, sailors, anchors (on the quay), cranes, Atlantic fenders, and winches – all by “AP”. The cargo barge on the right is from the “PEG Pier One Seaport”. The two white harbor steam tugs were “gifted” by “WolfZe”. Here is a view of the head of the Dry Dock Basin. The basin pumping station is in the center (a “borrowed” Maxis pump house). The powerful pumps housed underground are responsible for emptying the dry dock basin. The water towers were taken from the old “Maxis Reward Movie Studio”. The four water towers in the dry dock area actually have nothing to do with the operation of the dry dock -- they supply running water to the buildings and docks and are primarily for fire-fighting. To the left of that is a fenced area where old anchors are refurbished (30-ton crane by “AP”). To the right of the picture is a group of small lighters, loaded with boxes and barrels, tied-up at “mooring dolphins (by “AP”). The old barge crane on the left is also by “AP”. Here you see boilers (by AP) being unloaded from rail flat cars onto the port side quay. These are being readied for the next warship to enter the dock. Note the sailors on the flat cars preparing to hook up the crane hoist. To the left are other sailors inspecting and preparing auxiliary engines – two of them to replace under-powered steering motors. It was not uncommon for naval architects to specify certain auxiliary engines (capstan engines, steering engines, ventilator fan motors) that proved to be under-powered and had to be replaced with engines/motors of greater horsepower. This is a close-up of the area where they are unloading the boilers. If you examine the picture closely, you will find a number of individual vignettes being acted out. There are sailors working on auxiliary engines, preforming winch maintenance, refurbishing anchors and, of course, unloading boilers from the train. These are the more common cylindrical-type boilers, rather than the angular, custom-made boilers used by the Kaiserliche Marine. (“AP” also included the angular version boilers in the prop pack.) When making the cylindrical boilers, we thought it would be interesting to include a bit or history. Everyone who has seen the movie, or seen any of the picture books, will be familiar with these boilers. You will notice there are three circular coaling doors on the front of the boiler, with detailed gauges – just like those on the RMS Titanic. This scene shows one of many small landings found scattered around harbors and naval bases. Here you see small boats coming and going from the nearby destroyer flotillas -- odd bits of cargo and equipment laying around the landing – even a motor launch that brought senior engineers to hurry along Goeben’s repairs. The landing, small boats, motor launch, and the bulk of the odd bits on the landing are all by “AP”. This is a look at the rear areas of the dry dock facility. It is, appropriately, a small area, since the main work is done around the basin. The two warehouses were re-lotted from one of the “PEG Seaports. The fenced roadway along the rail line is from the “NBVC Container Port” kit. The remainder of the paved areas are “Paeng Grunge Concrete”. With the exception of the two warehouses and the Pumping Station”, the entire area was created using custom-made 1x1 and 1x2 modular lots – almost all of which are “standardized” and can be used in many other locations and scenes. Just to the right of the Dry Dock area, there is a Passat Class tug tied-up at “mooring dolphins” with an Asgard Class and Odin Class tug “nested” along the diagonal section of the seawall. (Note: diagonal models!) This green storage shed is just one of the “perfect” storage buildings I stumbled across after a good deal of searching. This allowed me to seriously curtail the continued use of the “IRM” filler lots with shipping containers. (Since I found these sheds rather late in the map building process, you will still see the “IRM Shipping Containers”, but they were eventually phased out in all new “mapping”.) The storage shed and “balk” timber are from “SimCoug’s Historic Harbors”. The large warehouse on the left is from a “PEG” seaport. The concrete areas are Paeng Grunge lots modified with a variety of props. The sailors, small boats, rope coils, Atlantic fenders, “dolphins”, and beautiful little tugs are by “AP”. Here we have a close-up view of the back of the warehouses. This is a classic example of how much activity can be added to a scene by using custom-made modular lots. The warehouse sits on a 3x2 lot and has limited space for additional props, and hardly any room for vehicles. You could make the lot bigger and add all sorts of activity to it – but that would limit its usefulness, or it would become repetitive. By leaving the warehouse on the smaller lot with limited props, you can then use any number of different 1x1 lots to create scenes tied to the building. And here we have the masterpiece of the whole dry dock scene – repairs to Goeben’s turbines – in progress. (For background details, see Chapter 19.) The work gangs and cranes have already removed the steel plates of the Upper Deck, Battery Deck, and the layer of armor pate over the machinery, to create a sufficient opening down to the starboard engine room. The heavy locking bolts have been removed from the massive mountings securing the turbines to the “Hold Deck” in the bottom of the ship. And the ship’s boat boom has lifted out one of a series of steam transfer pipes running above the turbines. Only five sections remain to be removed. The way will then be clear for the 250-ton crane on the quay side to lift out the damaged high-pressure turbine. SMS Goeben had two steel decks above the engine rooms, while the height of the engine room extended down four more decks. In effect, in this shot, you can see six decks down – into the very bottom of the warship. You can see workmen on the inner deck levels – if you look carefully. (These are Hi-res pictures. If you download the image, you can enlarge it and see much more detail.) From this angle you can see the five remaining sections of steam transfer pipes that have to be removed. The workmen have been augmented by technicians specially sent down by Blohm & Voss to supervise the work. Three work gangs have been organized and will work round the clock. Admittedly – not a good angle, but there are many points of interest in the picture. You will notice there are sailors and workmen – both above deck and below. I firmly believe the scenes we create in SC4 are more realistic when “peopled”. I go to great lengths to put figures in every conceivable location – doing things sailors and workmen would do. Dockyards are busy places – and work is done by gangs or “details” – not by individuals. Building a warship at the turn of the century might employ up to 3,000 men. “Fitting-out” a launched hull could require 2,000 men. And repairs were handled on an “as needed” basis. If the repairs were extensive – a large work force would be used. If the repairs were minor – perhaps only 50 men. My philosophy is to bring realism and life to the scenes by including the people. Show me a picture of a 1910 dockyard without workmen – and I’ll show you a dockyard on a Sunday morning, during peacetime, when Congress or the Parliament failed to appropriate sufficient funds! Now – I cannot possibly compliment @AP highly enough for this ground-breaking modeling effort. His first-hand knowledge of ships and the sea – and his tireless quest for authenticity has made it possible to create models representing history/ real-life at a level yet unseen in SC4. I can research it – and write about it – and explain it – but “AP” can bring it to life. I can create the game lots and make scenes like this. But my talent at “showcasing” this ship pales in comparison to his “landmark” work. This has to be a “first” for SC4 – and if anyone deserves a “medal” – it is “AP”. He skillfully crafted this battlecruiser – then disassembled it and created this view down into the bowels of the ship. A truly commendable achievement. NEXT TIME…… CUXHAVEN: THE PHOTO TOUR 13 MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful warship models. SPECIAL THANKS to my friend and partner, @AP, for his talents, meticulous models, colorful imagination, and extreme dedication. If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496

IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 55: THE PHOTO TOUR 11 THE INNER BASIN Most large harbors have something similar to an “Inner Basin” – especially in military/naval anchorages. This is a designated area where difficult or lengthy tasks are performed. These tasks could include repairs to a ship’s hull in a dry dock, or a simple bottom cleaning and painting job, also requiring a dry dock. Installation of new weapons systems – guns, or perhaps, fire control devices. Capital ships were constantly undergoing repairs to the engine condensers and replacement of the water tubes in their boilers. Even modernization of older warships can be a quite lengthy process. And, in addition to the regular “refit” and repair cycles of warships – construction slips were frequently found in the secluded Inner Basin. Since Cuxhaven was only a small harbor with limited facilities, only one permanent dry dock had been built for quick repair jobs or hull cleaning and, of course, there were no construction slips. In this overview, moving counter-clockwise from the Repair Docks, there is an Inner Basin tug station, with a minesweeping station just below that. And around the corner from the Minesweepers we have the large Munitions Pier. In the center bottom of the Basin is the single Dry Dock, with berths for two destroyer flotillas to the right. The Inner Basin tug station is one among many, but you may notice that each one is unique – either in composition or layout. Tug stations are a necessary working element of every harbor in the world – but they rarely get first crack at the “prime real estate”. All of the basic components should be familiar to you by now, but the layout has been improvised to fit the available space. The station can accommodate eight tugs at the piers, with berths for six more along the seawall. Since this is the only tug station inside the Inner Basin, it was imperative to have enough tugboats to handle the traffic to the Repair Docks, the Munitions Dock, and the tricky entrance and exit of the Dry Dock. The two white harbor steam tugs were gifted by “WolfZe”, while all the remaining tugboats are the impeccable work of @AP. The tug station from another angle. This gives you an excellent view of the basic layout of the station. The “Somy Tugboat Piers” are modified 2x1 lots with the overhanging pier props, the Quonset Hut is a custom-made 1x2, and the “control tower” is a 1x2 lot borrowed from the old Maxis Airports. The remainder of the base is composed of custom-lotted 1x1 modular pieces. This is a close-up of the details worked into the tiny tugboats. Researched for authenticity, the tugs are magnificent models of what every good tugboat should look like. These models would be useful in any harbor scene up through the 1960’s – and most especially in industrial scenes around oil refineries or bulk terminals for coal or grain. Top to bottom – Midgard, Thor, Passat, and Nordwind. (The models are available in “AP’s” Historic Harbors 1900 Series – Volumes 14 and 16). Simce I needed berthing space for additional tugs, I opted for “parking space” along the diagonal seawall which, otherwise, would have been useless space. I modified a diagonal section of the “NBVC Marina Seawalls” and double-nested the tugs on the new lot. The NBVC seawalls take a bit of “tinkering” to get the correct distance and height for the tug models, but the results are quite flexible and well worth the effort. Left to right, the diagonal models are – Passat, Odin, and Asgard – and are also available in the above mentioned prop packs. “AP” has gone to great lengths to try and provide as many diagonal models as possible – the “diagonals” provide more flexibility, authenticity for your harbors, and will greatly enhance your “grid-busting” efforts. MINE WARFARE Floating mines had been around since the 14th Century -- believed to have been introduced by Imperial China during the Ming Dynasty. But science and technology was unable to live up to the potential of an unmanned, floating, explosive device until some 500 years later. Explosive naval mines were “toyed” with during the Napoleonic Wars, and the Crimean War of 1854 actually produced some positive results. But it was not until the American Civil War (1861-1865) that floating mines (or “torpedoes”) became effective enough to sink warships with any degree of regularity. Over the centuries, every conceivable type of water-borne explosive device was tried. Some naval mines were “floating” -- either on the surface or just below the water – while others were placed on the seabed in water just deep enough for large ships. Some were detonated by a burning fuse, some by a clockwork mechanism connected to the workings of a flintlock weapon, and still others were detonated by an electric charge sent through an underwater cable from a storage battery ashore. It was not until the late Victorian Era that “contact” detonators (Hertz Horns) became practical. By 1904, the floating mine remained largely unproven in battle – but the Russo-Japanese War changed all that. Several ships on both sides were damaged by mines at one point or another during the brief conflict, but the Russians lost one battleship to mines, while the Japanese lost two of their six battleships, four cruisers, two destroyers, and a torpedo boat. The Russians may have started out with little experience in “offensive mining”, but they learned quickly. When war crept across Europe in 1914, the lessons of the Russo-Japanese naval conflict had been studied, digested, and transformed into military doctrine. Both Britain and Germany understood the concepts of “offensive” and “defensive” minefields; “offensive” mines were laid off enemy harbors and along their sealanes where ships could be sunk, while “defensive” mines were laid to protect one’s own harbors and sealanes against enemy intrusions. This seemingly simple and straightforward “mission statement” resulted in active mine warfare in the Mediterranean, the Baltic, and especially in the North Sea. Quite literally “millions” of mines were laid in hundreds of minefields scattered “willynilly” across the North Sea. Eventually, as protection against German submarines, the British laid massive mine barriers from Scapa Flow to Norway to close the north end of the North Sea, while an equally dense mine barrier closed the English Channel. Whether or not these millions of mines were actually effective has been debated for the last hundred-plus years, but the immediate problem in 1914 was how to remove enemy mines from your “sea space” to allow your own shipping and battle fleet to function. The answer to the problem was the creation of entire fleets of hundreds of small craft – “minesweepers” – to keep lanes “swept” and clear of mines to allow deployment of the battle fleets. And thus was born the concept of the “minesweeper”. This is Cuxhaven’s minesweeper station. You will notice it is larger than the usual tugboat station. The minesweepers are somewhat larger than the seagoing Passat Class tugs, and I wanted at least six vessels to represent a minesweeping force – so I had to add at least one more pier to the arrangement. In reality, the six large, deep-sea tugs would have been used as “flotilla leaders”, backed-up by 30 or 40 smaller vessels. The smaller vessels would have been deployed to either beam of the “leader” in one long line – or possibly two lines – one following the other. The British had a small force of purpose-built minesweepers in 1914, but they very quickly realized they did not have enough sweep vessels to deal with German mining activity. Every sort of small craft capable of deep water work was pressed into service – privately owned motor launches, river steamers, small English Channel packet steamers, and a bewildering variety of fishing vessels. (Eventually, a militarized version of the standard English fishing trawler was settled upon and built in mass quantities.) By the time I hit on the idea of including minesweepers in the CJ, it was too late to redesign the harbor to accommodate 40 or 50 minesweepers – so I settled on six vessels. The piers and steel sheds were modified and re-lotted from “Somy’s Japanese Tugs”. The pier is actually an overhanging prop, which makes it easy to “plop” any tugboat alongside. The Quonset Huts are from the “SNM Naval Series”, and are being used as one administrative office and two workshops. The barracks building is re-purposed from Mattb325’s “UC Sydney” lot, and is provided for the civilian crews contracted to operate the minesweepers under the direct supervision of a naval officer. The expanded size of the station and different layout would have been impossible if my tug stations had been modeled in a single, standardized lot. But the use of custom-made 1x1 and 1x2 modular lots provide a range of “mini-scenes” that can be used over and over in a variety of different situations – and they can be worked into whatever space you have available. I chose a model of the French steam tug Goliath (coutyesy of @Barroco Hispano) for use as a minesweeper “flotilla leader” because of its particular characteristics and historical background. Launched in 1903 from the Penhoet shipyard in Saint Nazaire, Goliath was a 1,200 ton ocean-going steam tug. She was approximately 160 feet in length, with 1,400-ihp triple-expansion engines capable of 13 knots. During the 1915 Allied attack on the Dardanelles, Goliath formed part of the support forces and actually doubled as a part-time minesweeper. Goliath, courtesy of “Barroco Hispano” is a superbly detailed model and a joy to behold. She has a small raised forecastle deck designed to reduce the amount of water taken over the bow in rough seas. Larger and more powerful than the average tug of her day, Goliath was used for ocean-going work as well as for heavy hauling. Conversion to minesweeping duties was relatively quick and easy. Minesweepers had heavy wire cables (called “paravanes”) permanently attached to the fore-foot for sweeping operations. The cables would be paid-out on either beam and a “Paravane Kite” was attached at the end, then lowered into the water. The “kite” is that greenish object on the aft deck, shaped like a torpedo with wings. As the sweeper gathered speed, the kite would glide below the surface at a designated depth and pull the cables out until they formed a large inverted “V” to either side of the sweeper. The paravane cables would cut the anchor cables on the mines, which then floated to the surface and were destroyed by rifle fire. Primitive, but effective. To the right of the Minesweeper Station, you see another “lighter basin”. Sometimes a lighter basin came about by accident – simply an empty spot off to one side where lighters could be “parked” to get them out of the way. You can see the crowded nature of the area – with the lighters squeezed in around the minesweepers. Occasionally a harbor was laid out with areas designated for lighter storage, but harbor space was usually scarce. As lighters collected in the basin, the Harbor Master ordered the installation of a few mooring dolphins to control the clutter, but it was not successful. The lighters in the center have simply been roped to one another and tied off on other lighters. Other lighters have been squeezed in at odd angles, and even an improvised floating crane for light cargo work has been left along the seawall. This shot provides an excellent look at the detail and texturing “AP” has built into each of these tiny gems. In this view, the harbor tug Odin has put a small boat in the water and they are hauling a tow line from the tug to the two large lighters on the left. The tug will eventually hook-up all four of the lighters and move them to the Munitions Dock. The four lighters are carrying “bagged powder charges”. We tried to make the bagged charges appear circular –as they are in real life -- but several attempts turned out unsatisfactory due to the small scale of the objects. So we settled on this arrangement. In the event of a minor accident, there are crewmen on each barge to see to the safety of the explosive cargo. (Of course, “no smoking” is permitted.) These little beauties are Esmeralda Class steam paddle tugs moored to “barrel buoys”. Steam Paddle tugs were used all over the world from the early Victorian Era right through to the mid-1950’s (and some even longer). Though not as powerful as more modern tugs, they were cheap to build and operate, carried small crews, and were the real workhorses of any harbor. If cargo lighters or sailing vessels needed to be moved, the ”paddlers” were the first choice. Thoroughly researched for authenticity, they were based on a WW I era English working tug. (See previous chapters for details.) The level of detail for these small vessels is simply magnificent. Each tug was plopped as a separate lot, as were the barrel buoys. The buoy lots were specifically designed to be plopped in front of any ship as desired. (The paddle tug props are available in AP’s “Historic Harbors 1900” series – Volume 12.) In Cuxhaven, the main Munitions Complex is set up with a connection to the main rail line and to the munitions distribution docks. Munitions can be brought to the storage bunkers either by rail or by sea, and are trans-shipped to the Munitions Docks for distribution. This is an overview of the distributions quays. Left to right you have the Italian heavy cruiser RM Zara, the US destroyer Clemson, and the battlecruiser KM Scharnhorst. You will note the rail line behind the quays has been arranged so that all three replenishment points can be accessed at the same time without traffic jams. This very fine model of Scharnhorst is provided courtesy of @Barroco Hispano and shows her as she would have appeared upon commissioning in January 1939: 32,100 tons – 31 knots – 9x11-inch guns – 12x5.9-inch guns – 14x4.1-inch AA guns – 16x1.5-inch AA guns – 6x21-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 13.8 inches – 1 catapult and 3 Arado, Ar-196A-3 float planes. There has long been a debate as to whether Scharnhorst was a battlecruiser or a battleship – but her design was based on the final plans of the Imperial battlecruiser Ersatz Yorck, which was never completed. The pedigree seems clear enough to me – so I absolutely had to work her into the CJ somewhere! In essence – she was the last battlecruiser ever commissioned by the German Navy. She was armed with an “improved” 11-inch gun – for political reasons. In the mid-1930’s, it was feared 15-inch guns might cause the British to “get the wind up”. In this close-up of the dock activity, you can see the working parties unloading main gun ammunition from the shuttle locomotives to the quay for delivery to the warship. There are masses of people bustling about – unloading shells, checking them for imperfections, cleaning the rounds, and hauling them about with hand-trucks, or loading them into cargo racks to be hoisted aboard the battlecruiser. In real life, docks are seldom quiet places, and we have tried hard to recreate the hundreds of crew and working parties involved in servicing a capital ship. The docks are re-lotted from the “PEG SNM Series” Battleship Quays, and were constructed in three 11x3 sections – each section just large enough for one capital ship, or two smaller vessels. Since the whole structure would have been built at the same time, I did not make architectural changes to any of the dock sections – but altered some of the scenes and props on each one for variety’s sake. This is a rear view of the quayside. The large dockside cranes were borrowed from the “PEG Trash Removal” lots and resized to better fit the surrounding models. The 100 ton cranes trackside are by “AP”. The ammunition shuttle locomotives and “rolling stock” were modeled by “AP” from old pictures of equipment on German WW I period military railroads. The Great War would not have been possible without railroads. Artillery battery commanders, in particular, were shocked to find out just how many shells could be fired-off in only a few hours. Going into the war, the British thought they had enough reserve artillery ammunition to last through a “short war” – perhaps a year. More than half of it was expended in the first two weeks of actual combat. Military railroads were essential to keeping the vital artillery batteries properly supplied with ammunition. Various props have been used to “dress-out” the scene, but the many “specialized” props were created by “AP” – sailors, shells, etc, etc. Here a Clemson Class destroyer is preparing to take aboard a full load of torpedoes. The Clemson’s were a large class of destroyers built by the US Navy over a number of years. The early versions of the extended class served during WW I, while others were completed between the wars. Under the “Lend Lease” agreement, 20 Clemson’s were among the 50 US destroyers doing yeoman service with the Royal Navy in WW II. Characteristics: 1,215 tons – 35.5 knots – 4x4-inch guns – 1x3-inch AA gun -- 12x21-inch torpedo tubes – no armor. USS Clemson is by “Barroco Hispano”. The 100 ton cranes quayside and the 20 ton cranes trackside are by “AP”, as are the shuttle locomotives, rail cars, and torpedoes. This is the Italian heavy cruiser RM Zara: Commissioned 1931 – 11,326 tons – 32 knots_8x8-inch guns – 16x3.9-inch guns – 34 AA guns – 2 seaplanes – belt armor 5.9 inches. As with all Italian warships built or modernized between the wars, they were quite handsome, with sleek lines and high speed. She is preparing to top-off her magazines with 8-inch shells and powder charges. In this shot, you can see the powder charges in brass cases stacked in rows on the quayside. Next to them are the 8-inch shells – ready to be hoisted aboard and stowed in the magazines. Again, the shuttle engines and ammunition cars are by “AP”, along with the shell and powder stacks – and, of course – the sailors and 20 ton cranes. You will notice the large numbers of sailors and dock hands engaged in stacking and moving the shells, with others preparing them to be hoisted aboard the cruiser. Work details would have been sent ashore from the cruiser to speed up the process. This rear view of the quay gives a good view of the ammunition handling parties and the ammunition trains. NEXT TIME…… CUXHAVEN: THE PHOTO TOUR 12 MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful warship models. SPECIAL THANKS to my friend and partner, @AP, for his talents, meticulous models, colorful imagination, and extreme dedication. If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496

IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 54: THE PHOTO TOUR 10 THE REPAIR AND REPLENISHMENT DOCKS Repair and replenishment of warships was an everyday task, and they were – perhaps – the two most important duties aboard ship. Regularly scheduled maintenance was necessary to keep these huge steel machines functioning smoothly, but there was always the unanticipated break-down to deal with. If you stop to think about the systems on a battleship or battlecruiser – electrical, hydraulic, freezer systems for frozen goods, boilers, turbines, turret machinery – they wouldn’t be there if they were not vital to the function of the ship. If the necessary repairs did not require the ship to be taken out of the water (a dry dock), then the Repair Dock was just the ticket. Mooring the ship to a large, permanent dock provided stability for big jobs, and easy access to machine shops and repair materials ashore. Replenishment, on the other hand, was an entirely different ballgame. Keeping 800 to 1,200 men properly fed, clothed, and housed on a daily basis was an enormous job, requiring close cooperation between a number of different departments aboard ship. If managed properly, ships at anchor could bring aboard small amounts of fresh provisions and ship’s stores from lighters alongside. It was relatively clean work, and a lighter could be emptied and the goods stowed away in less than two hours. If your Kapitan disliked lighters coming and going daily, then as little as two deliveries per week could be arranged. When the ships were deployed on extended maneuvers, the larders, bins, and freezers were packed full before departure and over the course of several weeks, the meals would dwindle down to brown “Brotchen” and canned meats and vegetables. Upon returning to harbor, the cupboard would be bare, so getting a berth at the Replenishment Dock was an absolute necessity. This is an overview of the Repair and Replenishment Docks (the berthing spaces could be used interchangeably). The docks were constructed at a right angle across the mouth of the Inner Basin. The docks were convenient to the ships in the Roadsted, and would separate the activity in the Inner Basin from ship traffic. To the right of the docks is yet another tug station. This one is very small compared to the others, but fits into the tiny space available – thanks to the “modular” components. Same station – different view. The “Paeng” grunge concrete overhanging prop pieces really came in handy to fill in along the railroad line. The tugs are – front to back – one Nordwind, two Thor Class, an Asgard, and three steam harbor tugs from “WolfZe”. Here you see an Ersatz Yorck Class battlecruiser moored to the dock. While undergoing her final speed trials, a vibration was noted in her port high speed turbine. A team of mechanics from Blohm & Voss is below decks making the necessary adjustments. A machinists barge has been brought alongside to deal with the more delicate aspects. The old steam tug Goliath is standing by the barge. The docks are from the “PEG SNM Battleship” series – considerably modified. They are 10x2, with the front lined by “WMP” seawalls acting as wooden buffers. The three tiles between the docks and the rail line are filled in with a wide variety of custom-made 1x1 fillers, many of which were modified from the “IRM Industrial Filler” set or the “NBVC Container Port” kit. The machinists barge was put together with two warehouses from the “NOB 1905” naval series, a barge created by “AP”, and filled out with some of “AP’s” sailors, barrels, and other assorted props. The steam tug Goliath is courtesy of Barroco Hispano, while the small boat coming alongside is by “AP”. The fabulously scratch-built SMS Ersatz Yorck is the flawless work of “AP”. The featured scene at this end of the dock is a work detail preforming maintenance and repair on a group of deck winches. Most capital ships were equipped with deck winches for any number of reasons. If one broke down or burnt-out (electric motors), they were sent ashore to be repaired or replaced with one that was functional. On this 1x2 custom-made lot, “AP” has provided a 10-ton steam crane with a winch ready to be lifted, a basic winch model, and the sailors gathered around working on them. The docks are dressed-out with a great many props of all sorts – anything that looks like it might be found on a working dock. In keeping with the “busy harbor” theory, I have tried to make the dockside scenes just as busy. The train preparing to unload cargo is a “PEG Tank Engine” modified for steam, with a cargo consisting of steam pipes, crates, and two diesel engines – which were used to power the electric dynamo’s aboard ships. Since Ersatz Yorck’s repairs are estimated to take two weeks, a harbor watch will be left aboard while others will be allowed either 24-hour “liberty passes”, or ten days leave – depending upon their supervising officer’s evaluation. About a quarter of the ship’s company has been mustered ashore to either receive their reward – or wish they were that lucky. This is the heavy cruiser USS Houston. She is not German, nor is she from the WW I era, but the model is a faithful recreation of some of the most handsome cruisers ever built for the US Navy (the Northampton Class). Commissioned in 1930, under the terms of the Washington Naval Treaty she was a bit light on armor, but qualified as a “heavy” cruiser because of her nine 8-inch, 55 caliber guns. Houston was capable of 32.7 knots and was a personal favorite of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who cruised aboard her several times during the years between the wars. Assigned as the flagship, Asiatic Squadron, she was known far and wide as “The galloping ghost of the Java Coast”. Houston was sunk by the Japanese Navy at the Battle of Sunda Strait on the night of 28 February 1942. The Northampton Class cruisers were long and sleek, with a clipper bow, and capable of outrunning many contemporary destroyers. This shot provides a close-up of the excellent detail on the model provided courtesy of @Barroco Hispano. At center top of the picture, you can see an anchor maintenance enclosure, with a 10-ton steam crane, both new and rusty anchors with chains, and sailors chipping the rust and sanding them down. Crane, anchors, and sailors by “AP”. Next to the anchor enclosure, an Admiral is being greeted by a “side party” from Houston. He will lunch with the Kapitan and officers before their 2pm sailing time. Sailors and Admiral by “AP”. This is a close-up of the detail down at the end of the dock, next to the channel into the inner Basin. Most of the props should be familiar to you by now, but the 100-ton cranes on the docks are by “AP”, and on the left is a propeller maintenance pad. The lot is a custom-made 1x2 with a handful of old Maxis industrial props scattered around a 10-ton steam crane by “AP”. The bronze propellers, seamen, and workmen are also by “AP”. The battlecruiser SMS Mackensen would have been a slightly heavier and longer version of SMS Derfflinger – if she had ever been commissioned. (See Chapter 42 for details of the ship.) As battlecruisers got longer, they suffered from steering problems at low speeds and in shallow water (harbors). Mackensen has two tugs up forward, towing – two tugs astern “working drag” – and a tug on either beam in case she veers off course. The tugs and battlecruiser were all “plopped” individually. This view clearly shows the width of the Inner Basin channel, and on the right is the receiving pier where commercial goods are brought into the naval base. The Pier is re-lotted and modified from the “PEG Pier One” set. At the time this pier was assembled, models of merchant vessels were in short supply, so I had to use a model of the SS Red Oak Victory, a “Liberty Ship” commissioned into the US Merchant Marine in 1944 (Courtesy of “Barroco Hispano”). Here is an overview of the rear of the Repair and Replenishment Docks (inside the Inner Basin). Repairs of an extensive nature are usually made at the docks inside the Inner Basin, where there is less ship traffic. Three docks were “re-lotted” from the “PEG” materials, in 12x4 sections, and can be “plopped” in any sequence required. On the right end of the dock, the tug Thor has moved a lighter loaded with barrels against the dock. Once unloaded, the barrels will be moved to the warehouses at left for storage. These docks were taken from one of the “PEG SNM” series (can’t remember exactly which one), but just for the sake of variety, I did not face them with the “WMP Seawalls” as usual. The small white warehouses are from the “NOB 1905” naval series. You will note the transparency of the “Brigantine” water MOD allows you to see the seabed at 30 meters, so there is some barely discernible landscape down there – mostly “Girafe” cattails, feather grass, and some “NBVC” small rocks. The steam paddle tug Esmeralda has pulled a lumber lighter alongside the dock and the paddle tug Sophia is nudging it into place for unloading. Balk timber is always carried aboard warships for use in emergency repairs – plugging shell holes, shoring-up weak bulkheads, and patching holes in damaged decks. With heavy repair work, as performed at the docks, quantities of timber was used to build scaffolding for overhead work above decks, while timber could also be used to support weakened overhead decks while bulkhead partitions were repaired or replaced. Timber was just as essential to workmen as their hammers. Note the beautiful detail work on “AP’s” lighter and paddle tugs. It is a true pleasure to work with such fine models. This is a depiction of the extensive repair work done on SMS Seydlitz after the Battle of Jutland (See Chapter 38 for full details). Both aft turrets on the battlecruiser were burned out during the engagement. The floating crane is lifting out the damaged turrets and trunk apparatus and placing them on the adjacent barge. A machinists barge is alongside, and standing off, is a motor lighter with a new turret to be installed. From left to right, there are – two tugboats – the Langer Heinrich crane – a working barge with tugboat – a machinists barge with tugboat and small boat -- the Motor Lighter Ajax – and the battlecruiser. The two tugs and the crane were “plopped” as individual lots. The adjacent barge and tug were another lot. The machinists barge, tug, and small boat was a single lot. And the motor lighter and battlecruiser were also individual lots. Much like a jig-saw puzzle, all the lots were created for other purposes, but could also be assembled to create one large scene. The steam tug Goliath, standing by the machinists barge, is courtesy of “Barroco Hispano”, while all the remaining ships and boats visible in the picture are by @AP. This is a shot of the Motor Vessel Rian – typical of hundreds of small coastal trading vessels plying the waters of Europe in 1910 -- still numerous today. Easily maneuvered in small harbors and shallow channels, they require only a small crew to operate, and still perform invaluable service moving cargo to overlooked destinations. MV Rian by “Barroco Hispano”. Coastal trading vessels are much like hand-crafted Italian shoes – they come in all shapes and sizes, and fit the owner like a glove. The slightly larger MV Seeadler can be seen “working cargo” at the end of the dock, using her own cargo booms to hoist the goods ashore. If you look closely, you will notice the crewmen in the hold, rigging the crates. Yet another detailed model by “AP”. A close-up view of the docks, warehouses, and some of the activity. This is an overview of the area just beyond the docks. The Munitions Pier can be seen in the lower left. In the center of the picture, there is a group of ships moored to “dolphins”. Docks were very expensive to build and there were never enough to go around. It was not uncommon for large harbors to have rows of mooring dolphins constructed out in the open areas where ships could be moored without tying-up the available dock space. Our “dolphin row” was inspired by those found in old photos of the port of Hamburg. This is a first effort at this type of scene – and it will get better with practice. This shows the close-up detail of a “dolphin row”, with a Nordwind tug (right, outboard) – a Passat tug (moored inboard) – two Sophia Class steam paddle tugs – and a pair of sailing luggers. The first step to creating the dolphin row is to create a “base lot” with two pairs of dolphins, spaced slightly apart, in the middle of the lot tile, and overhanging the opposite sides of the tile. There are always empty mooring dolphins in a harbor, and you will need this lot to fill-in gaps between dolphin lots with moored ships. My harbors are 30 meters deep, so my dolphins are elevated 30 meters above the lot tile. Oddly enough, that is just adequate to cover the slanting bases of the dolphins with water. This is a slightly expanded view of the dolphin row, with a Prometheus Class collier in the foreground, and a Proteus Class collier in the background. Note the line of empty dolphins (base lots) trailing astern of the two ships. The next step is to populate the dolphin row with ships. The small paddle tugs only require a 1x2 lot – one tile for the centered dolphins, and one tile for the paddle tugs. ALWAYS use your “base lot” as the starting point for your “lot scene” – that way the dolphins will always match-up with each other. This shot gives you a view of the continuous dolphin row. If you tried to make this in one big lot – it would measure roughly 17x3. Anyone who has ever opened the Maxis “Lot Reader” to change the “lotconfigproperty” on a lot that size – usually winds up in a “rest home”. Make the row lots modular – one for paddle tugs -- one for luggers – others as single ships. All of the @AP models are well balanced with tight “LOD’s” and can always be lotted as overhanging props. Smaller ships (tugs – lighters) can be lotted as 1x2’s. Larger ships are usually 2x2’s – and no more than a 3x3 – unless you want more than one ship per lot. You can make big, complicated lots – but I highly recommend modular lots that can be assembled into a larger scene on the map tile. NEXT TIME…… CUXHAVEN: THE PHOTO TOUR 11 MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful warship models. SPECIAL THANKS to my friend and partner, @AP, for his talents, meticulous models, colorful imagination, and extreme dedication. If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496

IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 52: THE PHOTO TOUR 08 THE COALING DOCKS In this chapter, we will pick up our tour where we left off. But first, I thought I’d re-orient you with the map tile (picture above). On the extreme left (west) of the picture is “Battery Scharnhorst” – and just around the corner is the Neu Hafen (main Cuxhaven anchorage). Just inside the entrance to the breakwater are the coaling and fuel oil replenishment docks. Easing into the harbor is the battlecruiser Von der Tann, with two Nordwind and two Passat Class tugs waiting to guide her to a berth. Two patrol boats (motor launches) can be seen “tail-moored” to the breakwater, while an Erie Class gunboat (previous chapters) is anchored just outside the breakwater, pulling guard duty. This is a close-up of the magnificently detailed Von der Tann model, graciously provided by @Barroco Hispano. (See Chapters 14 & 15 for details.) The battlecruiser is leaving the deep water channel and crossing into the shallow waters of the roadsted. I was interested in working with the “NBVC Corals”, and used them to cover the seabed to delineate the deep water boundary. You can see them spread around the bow of the ship and they extend down the sloping bottom until they disappear into the deeper water. This view also gives you a good look at the excellent textures and detailing of the “Uki” breakwaters. This is a detail shot of the tugs waiting to assist Von der Tann to her berth. The two on the left are Nordwind Class sea-going tugs, based largely on a class of tugboats built by the Hamburg-America Steamship Line to handle their large ocean liners. Around 1903, Kaiser Wilhelm was much impressed with their power and asked the Director of the shipping line (Albert Ballin) to build a variation of his tugs for handling large Imperial warships. (Ballin was a close personal friend of Wilhelm and his home included the addition of a suite of rooms built specifically for Royal use during visits to Hamburg.) You will notice Nordwind has an open navigation bridge (quite common in those days), and twin funnels – indicating up to eight boilers to provide steam for her powerful engines. The two tugs on the right, standing-by to assist, are Passat Class – a more modern and improved version of the original, with an enclosed wheel house and slightly larger engines. Both models are meticulously detailed and superbly textured – courtesy of “AP”. The two ships moored to the “barrel buoy” are from the “PEG Scows” pack. These ships have no historical relevance to the Dreadnought Era, but they were among the early custom content introduced to SC4 for maritime purposes. They are interesting little ships in their own right, nicely modeled and textured, with a minimum of detail and an abundance of “grunge”. For a long time, they were the only “bulk haulers” in the game. These are, in fact, “Ore Scows” – but as you can see – they easily pass for coal scows. I confess...I included them mostly as an “homage” to “The Good Old Days” of SC4. As discussed in previous chapters, coal-fired boilers were the primary means of propulsion for warships at the turn of the century, and a battleship – no matter how many guns she carried – could only carry those guns as far as full coal bunkers would take her. The Royal Navy possessed an enormous advantage in having numerous colonies – and coaling stations -- scattered all over the globe. A large fleet could be deployed from Portsmouth to Hong Kong without need to rely upon neutral ports or foreign coal stocks. The Kaiserliche Marine, of course, had no such far flung empire upon which to depend. But German warships in German harbors made full use of the facilities. Cuxhaven’s Neu Hafen was constructed with a medium-sized coaling facility. The coaling docks can accommodate four battlecruisers, or six smaller cruisers at a time. But having a dock available could not be allowed to delay the replenishment of coal bunkers. A “first-rate” Kapitan would move Heaven and Earth to ensure his ship was “combat-ready” at all times. If all the docks were busy, coal lighters could be laid-on and towed out to the ships at their berths. This is an overview of the coaling docks and the fuel oil “replenishment point”. On the right you can see the docks where coal and oil can be brought into the naval base by commercial shipping – or dispensed to the warships of the fleet. On the left you see the large, concrete coal storage complex, and the much smaller oil storage “tank farm”. These facilities were located in the west end of the harbor area primarily due to their large “footprint” – they take up a lot of space. Also, their purpose is to refuel ships, which quite naturally generates a great deal of traffic. Placing the docks at the far end of the harbor provided room for the towing, turning, and berthing of the big warships. This is a closer view of the “business end” of the coaling docks. This general arrangement was inspired by a similar set of docks operating in Cardiff, Wales in the late 1920’s. Since the game has none of the usual mechanized devices or elaborate structures for handling coal – especially for warships – I had to devise a reasonably workable method of moving coal. I ran a rail line down the center of the docks, raising the ground level behind the coaling points, and connecting them with the “NAM 32” viaduct pieces. (Yes – I’m a “dinosaur” – I still run NAM-32.) The locomotives push loaded coal cars along the viaduct until they reach the dump point. There the doors in the bottom of the gondolas are opened manually and the coal slides down the concrete slope to the large pile at the bottom – a “gravity feed” delivery system. The coaling docks can accommodate four ships at a time. The pier portion of the docks were borrowed from the “PEG SNM Cruiser Lots”. Two cruiser piers were rotated and pushed together to form one long dock. The piers were arranged as overhanging props so the front end would be in the water. The coal piles were (I believe…) from the Polish Power Station lot. (But I could be wrong about that.) Two stacks were arranged to slightly overhang each other, and the lot, so the coal would appear to be piled up against the concrete slide. A third stack was placed in the middle of those, and the prop was elevated until it gave the appearance of a much taller coal pile, while still “meshing” with the others. The coaling lot is 13x4, and various warehouses, water towers, and 1x1 custom lots were used to fill in around the edges. I dislike large, “set-piece” lots, but using the “cruiser piers” imposed certain restrictions, so it became necessary. With the exception of the shipping, everything else in the picture has been pieced together by re-lotting or re-purposing elements already in-game. SMS Lutzow is seen tied-up at the coaling dock, preparing to “coal ship”. She is the second of three Derfflinger Class battlecruisers. The elegant model is courtesy of @Barroco Hispano. (See Chapters 23 & 24 for details on the ship.) The coaling cranes dockside were borrowed from the “PEG Trash Disposal lots” and down-sized a bit for use. This shot provides a good view of the “stacked” coal piles. At this point, I should probably mention that “coaling ship” was an “all-hands” – “round-the-clock” evolution. Once coaling was started, the operation did not stop until the bunkers had been filled. The “Duty Watch” personnel (for the most part) would remain on “Watch” for as many hours as it took. Coaling went on day or night, though the sailors did not like working under flood lamps -- the powerful lights alternated between blinding glare and casting long dark shadows in other places. Once the coal was taken aboard, the backbreaking work was not over. The ship still had to be moved back to her berth, the decks scrubbed down, and the crew cleaned up before they could catch a quick bite to eat and fall into their hammocks for well-deserved sleep. Needless to say, “coaling ship” was the least enjoyable part of a sailor’s life. Right next to Lutzow, a Sophia Class paddle tug is towing two empty lighters out of the crowded coaling basin. Note the fine detail modeled into the paddle tug and the lighters. Moored at “dolphins” along the seawall is an elderly Nordwind Class tug (left). Astern of her is a more modern Passat Class – an improved “second generation” of Nordwind. The tugs are standing by to maneuver full lighters into a berth, and haul empty ones away. The tugs, lighters, and mooring dolphins are by “AP”. The concrete seawalls were borrowed from the “NBVC Marina” kits. This is the Motor-Lighter Ajax. She is a unique vessel used to transport large or heavy pieces of equipment from shipyard factories or assembly sheds to dry docks or construction slipways. Her bridge is placed forward of the cargo area and elevated to give a good view ahead as well as being able to see over large cargoes carried amidships. Steering commands are passed by hand-set or speaking tubes to the wheelhouse atop the aft superstructure. Her twin funnels are placed side-by-side – an uncommon feature even in the early 1900’s – but the machinery spaces are comparatively small so it was necessary. On a good day, she can make all of 8 knots, and she is shallow draft and rides low in the water. Ajax was never meant to go beyond a harbor, estuary, or shallow coastal waters. On her midships cargo deck are a pair of massive three-cylinder, triple-expansion, steam engines (found in “AP’s Propulsion Prop Pack). They are destined to be installed in “Grosse Kreuzer E”. The engines are just one of the many historically accurate props “AP” has provided to enhance the realism in SC4. And each new prop opens up a whole world that can be investigated and portrayed in the game. The motor lighter, itself, is a single prop. The sailors, rope coils, and engines are additional props added to the model in the “lotting” process. This is only possible because “AP” put a lot of effort into keeping his “LOD’s” tight on the cargo deck. This is a close-up of a Thor Class tug standing-by to take two coal lighters under tow. This should give you yet another example of the high quality models and the enormous amount of detail worked into them by “AP”. Thor looks every bit the “worn-out work-horse” she is meant to be. You can almost see the individual lumps of coal in the lighters. And even the empty lighters moored along the near side of the basin are pure perfection. Thor will shortly move the lighters out to the roadsted and the waiting warships. This is SS Gotha, a Norddeutscher Line collier leased by the Kaiserliche Marine to accompany a squadron of ships on their journey to the Far East. Germany and Great Britain possessed fairly large fleets of commercial colliers and preferred “leasing” over building naval colliers. Only the United States chose to build Fleet Auxiliary Colliers rather than trust commercial vessels. During wartime, foreign colliers were often unavailable for “political reasons” – even neutral vessels could not be relied upon. This gorgeous model by “AP” is an absolute “work of art”. Note the surrounding activity going on n the lower part of the picture – another example of our “busy harbor” theory. Here we see a Thor Class tug maneuvering a full coal lighter into a mooring. SS Gotha will be casting off soon and room will be needed to move the collier out of the basin. Coaling basins are often crowded with tugs standing-by to undertake tows, and numerous empty and full lighters. Some small boats have tied up alongside the lighters and crewmen are “working the coal” – possibly leveling it to “stabilize the tow” – or even raking through it for foreign debris. Here again, you can see the wonderful high-def models in all their detailed glory. Even the mooring dolphins lining the seawalls are superb. This scene is typical of “busy harbors” – especially coaling basins. Numerous lighters are moored to dolphins – single, double, and even triple moorings – with small boats milling about, and tugs maneuvering the lighters into position. This is the battlecruiser SMS Mackensen taking on coal -- as she might have appeared at her planned commissioning in 1919. A major improvement over the Derfflinger Class, Mackensen would have had a much greater displacement and a larger caliber main battery armament. The first ships were laid down in January 1915, and some were actually launched. But none would ever see service. (See Chapters 42 for details of this ship.) This magnificent model is courtesy of Barroco Hispano. As you can see in the picture, I had to fill in details on and around the coaling docks with whatever props I could find. Some were actually too modern (shipping containers) but they were pressed into service anyway. I thought it better to “stretch” the historical timeline on the props, rather than wind up with mostly empty dockside scenes. SMS Hindenburg, the “third sister” of the Derfflinger Class, is moored at the coaling docks and preparing to “coal ship”. This fantastic model was scratch-built by @AP, who has generously devoted much time and effort to this project. It should be noted – for the record – warship models are larger, far more complicated, and enormously time-consuming compared to the average ship model. And -- “AP” goes well beyond the “Call of Duty” to build-in so much more detail than most other 3-D modelers. (For specific details about the battlecruiser, see Chapter 41.) On a somewhat related theme – I would like to offer a small apology for the lack of variety found on the coaling docks. The main reason for the repetitive nature of the lots is the simple lack of suitable in-game props. I have been haunting this website for a little over a decade, and there has never been a concerted effort to create a working product chain for coal. There are very small and primitive coal mining lots, a “coking” plant, coal-fired power plants, some very simplified coaling docks, and the occasional inadequate effort to create a loading “hopper” device. BUT – there has never been enough attention paid to the props and machines needed to move coal from the mines to a destination, then load it or unload it. Mostly, I was forced to use rather convoluted methods to move coal to a dock and get it aboard a ship. You see bulldozers on the docks – but they did not exist in that form in 1905. And you see “bucket cranes” loading and unloading both rail cars and ships. Bucket cranes are suitable for loading a rail car – but totally unsuited to unloading one. And bucket cranes are used to deposit coal onto a warship’s deck, where the crew shovels it down “coaling chutes” into the bunkers below. It is a primitive method – but the only one I could devise with the props available in the game. Actual coaling stations had elaborate rail/trestle structures with mechanical overhead hoppers that lifted the coal from the cars by conveyor buckets, then funneled it down a long chute to the ship. The end of the coal chute had a long canvas sleeve that connected to the bunker chutes, thereby avoiding dumping coal on the ship’s deck. (I’m certain “AP” could have modeled something suitable, but he was already working overtime to make the other props for the game – so we never got around to it.) But – that’s my reason for the less than efficient means of moving coal around, and for using modern props. “Mea Culpa”. (BTW – under these primitive arrangements, the average ship’s crew could load around 60 tons of coal an hour – perhaps 70 tons.) This view shows the coaling docks in the upper right of the picture and the main coal storage facility in the bottom center. The storage facility consists of two large, open-air concrete pads directly behind the coaling docks. Commercial coal is delivered to the storage facility via the main rail line visible at the bottom of the shot. The coal is then loaded into cars and shuttled via the railroad viaduct to the coaling docks. This is a closer view of the receiving, storage, and distribution system. Commercial coal is delivered by rail from the main track to the right. The loaded cars are backed onto the dumping ramps, the doors in the bottom of the coal gondolas are opened, and the coal slides down the concrete slope onto the waiting piles at the bottom. The facility is set up to unload as many as four trains at one time, and may operate day and night, as necessary. From the delivery chute, the coal is loaded into dump trucks and moved across the lot to the distribution pad. The piles on the left of the picture are waiting to be loaded onto rail cars to be sent out. As you can see, there is a wide variety of structures and equipment that have been used to portray the operation. Anyone familiar with industrial lots in SC4 will recognize the props immediately. They have all been re-purposed to move coal to the warships in the harbor. As mentioned above, I have used many modern elements that were not available in 1910. Trucks – absolutely necessary to a functioning naval base – were primitive in those days, and there are, of course, no such props in SC4. So the bases will always be a strange mix of “early” and “later” 20th Century furnishings – again -- my apologies. This is the distribution point where the coal is loaded into gondolas and shipped to the coaling docks. The coaling cranes were borrowed from the “PEG Trash Removal” lots, reduced in size, and lotted onto 1x1 modular pieces. The water towers (mostly for fire fighting) were taken from the old Maxis Movie Studio. The chain link fences and most of the concrete roadways were taken from the “NBVC Modular Seaport” – they are largely 1x1 lots and very flexible in use. I used “Paeng” grunge concrete in places to fill in difficult angles, or to simulate older, patched areas in the larger pad. Several other 1x1 and 1x2 custom-made lots used various props and a variety of small liquid tanks, warehouses, and various trucks and cranes to fill in the working areas. This is a close-up of the east side distribution point (the coaling docks are to the left of the picture). The coaling lot was arranged in this manner so that two trains could be loaded at the same time – thereby ensuring a steady flow of coal to both sides of the coaling docks. While these two trains are loading, two more trains are out on the docks dumping their load. When they are empty, they return via the center track and wait below the switches. When the loaded trains have departed for the docks, the two waiting trains take their place. In this manner, a continuous supply of coal can be shuttled to the docks. The locomotives in the picture are the “Peg Shuttle Engines” – modified for steam -- and the rolling stock in the picture is most likely “PEG” as well. I believe the 1x2 segment of vertical wall on the dumping ramp (right of picture) was repurposed and re-lotted with railroad signal boxes. If I remember correctly, “Mattb325” originally created the vertical walls as roadside parking/parks area built on a slope. NEXT TIME…… CUXHAVEN: THE PHOTO TOUR 09 MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful warship models. SPECIAL THANKS to my friend and partner, @AP, for his talents, meticulous models, colorful imagination, and extreme dedication. If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496

IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 50: THE PHOTO TOUR 06 THE WEST LOCH – Part 06 This chapter will wrap-up our tour of the West Loch – with a look at the permanent berths along the breakwater. There are, basically, two types of harbors in the world – “natural” and “man-made”. The natural harbor is just that – a terrain feature created by nature that is large enough and deep enough to accommodate large ships, while sheltering them from the ill-effects of stormy seas. Examples of a natural harbor might be Oslo, Norway, the Thames Estuary, or New York. A man-made harbor is usually found on an open, exposed stretch of shoreline with no surrounding land features to block the wave action caused by heavy seas. An offshore breakwater has to be constructed to provide an area of calm water behind it. That is exactly what was done in the West Loch. The original shallow bay was too small to accommodate numbers of large ships, so the breakwater was constructed offshore to create a sufficiently large safe anchorage. This is a clear view of the breakwater constructed to form the renovated West Loch anchorage. The engineers saved a few Marks by using the only natural island as part of the breakwater. It was later decided to add permanent mooring points along the breakwater to accommodate the growing numbers of armored cruisers. The Kaiserliche Marine traditionally favored permanent mooring arrangements, usually at quays and docks, but could not afford the expense of building numerous new docks – so “mooring points” became the alternative. (By contrast, the Royal Navy, long before Nelson’s day, chose to anchor far offshore -- in the Solent and the Thames Estuary. Unbelievably large numbers of British tars could not swim, so it was a simple means of preventing sailors from “jumping ship”.) Here is a closer look at the join between the breakwater and the island. As already mentioned, these breakwaters are by “Uki”. It is a Japanese website, but the lots are in common usage in SC4 and should be readily obtainable. I tested every available breakwater set and settled on these because they were (for the most part) easy to work with and are certainly the most realistic available. You will notice two light cruisers have been moored at a temporary buoy just off the island. Moored at the buoy offshore of the island are the light cruisers SMS Karlsruhe and her sister ship Konigsburg. They were commissioned in 1915 and were among the most modern in the Hochseeflotte. German light cruisers were widely known to be handled aggressively, and at 27.5 knots and packing eight 5.9-inch guns – they were fast with a formidable “bite”. The cruiser models were generously provided by @Barroco Hispano. This is the same scene from a different angle. This gives you a close-up detail shot of how the island has been put together. The basic land mass was created by raising the land level some 15 meters above sea level (about 45 meters above the seabed). I gave the island an irregular shape to make it more “natural”, then used the “God Mode” tools to lower some of it below sea level. Once the rough shape was achieved, I used the “softening tool” to give it a smooth, rounded look with gently sloping sides that ease down into the water. I then applied a scattering of various bushes and ground cover. This was followed by MMP trees by @Girafe. The “earthen” areas were painted with “Heblem” brown sand, and the light gray sand – which actually looks more like loose gravel. Finally, I dotted the underwater areas with “Girafe” cattails and feather grass. It took the best part of an afternoon and evening to finish the island – very tedious and a lot of “trial and error” – but I think it was worth it. The most difficult part of building the island and the breakwater was finding a way to bring the breakwater ashore. The “Uki” set does not include a specialized piece that merges the breakwater with the shore line. Apparently he thought offshore breakwaters were sufficient and there was no need to attach them to land. The “Uki” pieces are placed at sea level – no higher, and no lower. If you try to bring it ashore on a raised land area – it jumps up and towers over the other breakwater pieces out in the ocean. So the secret is to lower the land below sea level (like digging a small trench) where it comes ashore – while matching the height of the offshore breakwater pieces. Then you can cover the “watery ditch” with large rocks, small stones, and overhanging trees that will cover up the “join area”. It’s not a perfect solution to the visual problem – things always look different when you change camera angles – but it was the best I could do. The rocks and stones are by either “PEG” or “NBVC” – I think – I could be wrong about that. One last view of the island. This is the armored cruiser SMS Yorck (not to be confused with the later battlecruiser class). You will notice there is a “change-of-command” ceremony in progress on the forecastle deck. You will also notice the boat boom and small boats deployed on the port quarter. The boom and boats were lotted as a stand-alone lot designed to be plopped alongside any warship you like. Model by AP. (Complete details on the armored cruiser can be found in Chapter 06.) The armored cruisers SMS Prinz Adalbert and Friedrich Carl. (For full details on the armored cruisers – see Chapter 05.) This beautifully rendered model of SMS Furst Bismarck is being nudged into the berth by two tugs – Nordwind on the left – and the more modern Passat on the right. All three are the meticulous work of @AP. (Details on Furst Bismarck are in Chapter 03.) SMS Hertha and Hansa, both painted in “foreign station” livery. The two protected cruisers spent most of their service life on the China Station. You will note Hansa is lowering a manned cutter over the side, while a small dinghy is unloading boxes of supplies up forward. Cruisers by “AP”. (Details can be found in Chapter 02.) Another view of the protected cruisers. NEXT TIME…… CUXHAVEN: THE PHOTO TOUR 07 MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful warship models. SPECIAL THANKS to my friend and partner, @AP, for his talents, meticulous models, colorful imagination, and extreme dedication. If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496

IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 49: THE PHOTO TOUR 05 THE WEST LOCH – Part 05 This chapter will cover some of the activity out in the roadsted of the West Loch. Like most harbors -- even small ones – there are assigned berths, usually around the edges of the open water areas. Out in the open waters there will always be mooring buoys for ships temporarily assigned to the squadron, just arrived and needing replenishment before berthing, or those preparing to sail. This overview shows the open water area in the center of the roadsted. The six ships moored to temporary buoys are part of an eight ship squadron being assembled for transfer to the German East Asiatic Squadron. The two Dresden Class light cruisers tied-up at the repair dock also belong to the squadron. The two large armored cruisers (Scharnhorst left – Gneisenau right) are Germany’s newest and most powerful cruisers and will constitute the strongest European cruiser force in the Far East. (See Chapter 07 for full details.) You will notice they have been painted in their “foreign station” livery – white hulls, yellow ochre upper works, and black funnel caps. They are beehives of activity as last minute preparations for sailing are completed. Gneisenau was abruptly recalled from diplomatic port calls to join the squadron and is in the process of taking aboard last minute stores and provisions. The crane barge is transferring cargo from another barge alongside. Forgive me for taking a hasty picture – there should be cargo on the barge – but it’s a “timed prop”, and I forgot. The crane barge and cargo barge were borrowed from “PEG’s Bubba’s Bulk Barge”. The white steam tug was “gifted” by “WolfZe”. The two paddle tugs handling the big cargo barge are the fine work of “AP” – as are the two small boats rowing out to the armored cruiser – no doubt the crews last mail delivery before sailing. Gneisenau is also the impeccable work of "AP". This shot gives you an excellent view of the detail on “AP’s” paddle tug (Esmeralda). I’m really quite fond of these little beauties, and I try to work them into as many scenes as possible. In this shot, you can actually see the cargo on the barge – and you will notice the sailors “working cargo” as they stand atop the crates. I tried to put sailors on the crane barge, but some of those old PEG models have horrible LOD problems. This view of Gneisenau’s fantail shows the crew carrying boxes and crates down the aft hatch – which indicates provisions and supplies for the officer’s wardroom – or possibly the Kapitan’s pantry. This also gives you another view of the excellent detail built into “AP’s” armored cruiser – absolutely flawless. SMS Scharnhorst is the flagship of Konteradmiral Maximillian von Spee, ordered to assume command of the East Asiatic Squadron upon arrival in the Far East. She and Gneisenau constituted a two-ship class. In this shot, a motor launch is alongside to port, while the boat boom is deployed on the starboard side. The mooring buoy, motor launch, boat boom, and small boats are courtesy of “AP”. Port side view. The Scharnhorst Class armored cruisers have been touted by many analysts as the most handsome armored cruisers ever built. But – other analysts claim that honor for the USS Tennessee Class armored cruisers. This a close-up of the magnificent detail worked into AP’s model. Notice the compass platform between the fourth funnel and the aft mast. The motor launch pulling alongside is probably carrying last minute mail for the crew as well as dispatches, directives, and even diplomatic pouches bound for the Far East. Kaiserliche Marine ships transiting to the Far East were often used as “mail” ships, making frequent stops along the way to deliver official correspondence. On Scharnhorst’s starboard side, the boat boom has been deployed. The boom was a common feature of the era and provided a convenient mooring point for small boats going to and from the cruiser – avoiding the laborious necessity of continually launching and hoisting the boats inboard. The boat boom and the boats tied to it are arranged on a single 1x1 lot plopped adjacent to the ship. The two boats approaching the boom are on another 1x1 lot. Moored ahead of the armored cruisers are two French light cruisers of the Jurien de la Graviere Class. I elected to use them in the scenario because the number of German cruiser models available was somewhat limited. The de la Graviere’s were, in fact, active prior to, and during WW I, and are quite interesting in their appearance. The Jurien de la Graviere Class cruisers are indicative of French naval architecture of the period -- distinctive for the numerous funnels aboard their ships – and unique in the way they tended to separate them into groups. (For more details on Graviere, see Chapter 27.) The Jurien de la Gravier model was graciously provided by @Barroco Hispano and you can see the intricate detailing in the level of clutter displayed amidships. The main armament sponsoned outboard from the hull is carefully portrayed with the armored port shields in the “open” position – perhaps a minor point – but very realistic. This is the SS Erlangen, a collier leased from the Norddeutscher Shipping Line, which will accompany the Squadron on their journey to the Far East. (For the back-story and details, see Chapter 27.) This model is a beautiful scratch-built rendition created by @AP and is modeled after the US Navy Prometheus Class colliers. From the weathered hull, to the rusty brown forecastle deck plating, and the soot-smudged funnels – she is every bit a worn and over-worked collier from the early years of the 20th Century. The detail and texturing are simply superb. Though based on a US Navy collier, she has all of the characteristics found in other colliers of the period, and has the fine lines of the original design. Center stage in this shot is USS Proteus, name ship of a class of four colliers built for the US Navy in the early 1900’s as commissioned naval auxiliaries. (For the back-story and details, see Chapter 27.) The Kaiserliche Marine relied almost entirely upon the Norddeutscher Line for collier support, but I chose this vessel to represent “government-owned” colliers, largely because her design is unique among all the colliers. Notice all the activity going on around the moored collier – the berthed cruisers at the top, tugs and lighters coming and going, and small boats moving around the harbor. Again – the theory of the “busy harbor” – taken from old photos of Hamburg, Wilhelmshaven, Rotterdam, and even New York, -- crowded, cluttered, and above all – busy. This is a close-up of Proteus’ aft superstructure, which has a great deal of detail packed into a small area. The main purpose of the ship was to carry a lot of coal, and her designers kept that in mind. Once again, “AP” has created a beautiful scratch-built model based on photos and line drawings – complete with a detailed operational rig of the coaling booms. This model was particularly satisfying for me because “AP” brought to life many of the details photos didn’t, and 2-D line drawings couldn’t. You have, doubtless, noticed the ever-present “seagulls”. I have never found a harbor or an inland waterway without them – so I developed a special 1x1 lot using the Maxis “seagull effect”. The lot can be plopped on the seabed, thereby avoiding the need to place them in fixed locations ashore. This is a shot of the Protected Cruiser SMS Victoria Louise putting to sea through the north entrance of the breakwater. (See Chapter 02 for full details on the ship.) The Victoria Louise Class were small cruisers by later standards, but she made a fabulously detailed model in “AP’s” talented hands. There were five ships in all, and this one is painted in ”foreign station” livery – representing three of the original ships that served overseas. She is equipped with a “stern walk” – indicating her intended use as a foreign station flagship. It is a handsome model with a wealth of faithfully rendered detail. NEXT TIME…… CUXHAVEN: THE PHOTO TOUR 06 MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful warship models. SPECIAL THANKS to my friend and partner, @AP, for his talents, meticulous models, colorful imagination, and extreme dedication. If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496

IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 48: THE PHOTO TOUR 04 THE WEST LOCH – Part 04 In this chapter we take a look at the north end of the West Loch. The overview below shows the north tug station, a “rail stop” behind it, and a lighter basin. This is the north tug station. We already discussed all the component parts and tugboats in previous chapters, but you will notice the station is different from the south tug station. Again, this station is constructed from 1x2 and 1x1 modular lots. Everything you see has either been re-purposed (parking lots) or re-lotted from existing game lots. Another view – showing a different angle and some better views of the tugboats. You should note – the trees beside the Quonset Hut are my custom-made 1x1 Tree Filler Lots. Same tug station – different angle. And one more angle. The modular lots allow you to assemble them in any configuration, on any size piece of terrain – large or small – as you see fit. Notice the small sand hill in the lower left corner of the shot. In this picture, the Quonset Hut is a 1x2 modular lot, while the four lots behind it are “standard” 1x1 lots that can be used in a wide variety of situations – but they look perfectly “normal” as placed. To the right of them is a 1x2 “Winch maintenance Lot”. Here, sailors are preforming repairs and maintenance on the “deck winches”. Warships have several different sized winches installed on the Weather Decks for a variety of reasons. When one fails, it is unbolted and lifted off the deck by crane, then sent her for repair or replacement. The winches, sailors, and small crane are by @AP . In the early 20th Century, lighters were relatively inexpensive to build and were the most common type of “hull” used to transport “short-haul” cargo. They were a common sight in harbors the world over and, like pigeons, they could be found in flocks moored to docks, piers and, most often, jammed together in large jumbled groups. Sometimes they had cargo waiting to be delivered to a given pier, sometimes they were “parked” until needed, and sometimes numerous empty lighters just accumulated in unwanted masses. Some harbors were designed with “Lighter basins” – where lighters could be temporarily “parked”. Two small boats from the tug station have come to “cut out” the lighter with the red barrels. They’ll run a tow line to the tug Helena so the lighter can be moved. Note that two of the lighters have been unloaded and the empty hulls returned to the mooring basin. This shot gives you an excellent view of the mooring dolphins, lighters, small boats, and the paddle tug Helena. “AP” has crafted each one of these models in intricate detail and weathered textures befitting an old towed lighter that has seen better days. Another angle of the lighter basin. I managed to get the breakwater “attached” to the shore – but it was not easy, and I had to “finesse” the final connection with a lot of MMP work. This is the only problem I have encountered in using the “Uki” breakwaters – they are very hard to bring ashore in a smooth join. This is the “Rail Stop” on the north end of the Loch. Once again, the size and shape of the complex differs from others – none of them are “standardized” in any way. Note the small sand hill –lower, left of center. And you can clearly see the sandy hillsides along the left side of the picture. Notice how the sandy terrain blends seamlessly into the heavily forested areas. The rail siding and cars on the left are from “Simmer2” – but I’m not sure where cars adjacent to that actually came from. The two steam locomotives were re-lotted using the “Peg Switcher and Tank Engine” props – modified to show steam. The whole layout is utilitarian, small and compact, and bustling with working figures. Another view of the Rail Stop. Here is a detail shot of the Rail Stop complex. The two small buildings on the right are (I believe) “SFBT Signal Boxes” on a 1x2 modular lot, as is the dispatcher’s building on the left (origin unknown). The base of the complex is made up of Paeng Grunge Concrete slabs modified with light poles, people, and assorted props. Once again, the modular nature of the assembly allows great flexibility in designing the size and shape of the complex. Without modular assembly, this lot would be a large, 10x5 fixed construction – and would have to be repeated over and over on the map tile. Modular assembly allows immense variety and flexibility. This view shows the coastline north of the West Loch – to include the North End Light. This lighthouse was newly built when the Loch was expanded and moderrnized, and you can see that it is much more utilitarian than the South End Light. This stretch of shoreline was landscaped before I had perfected my use of the Poseidon Terrain Brushes, and the results were a bit disappointing. You can see where I used the “Heblem Sands” – white and brown – to try to create a beach front backed by some brown earthen areas – all backed by the Poseidon sand hills (which were added later). A close-up shot of the lighthouse. I know the road here does not look all that good, but it was the only way to link the parking area to the highway – without getting into complicated road MOD’s or changing some of the lot exemplars (either of which I strenuously tried to avoid). This view shows the Lightkeeper’s house and maintenance shed. NEXT TIME…… CUXHAVEN: THE PHOTO TOUR 05 MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful warship models. SPECIAL THANKS to my friend and partner, @AP, for his talents, meticulous models, colorful imagination, and extreme dedication. If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496

IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 46: THE PHOTO TOUR 02 THE WEST LOCH – Part 02 In this chapter we will take a close look at the birthing arrangements of the screening destroyers of the 3rd Scouting Group. First – let me deal with a small historical issue. If you have been following the story line of the CJ, you will be aware the Kaiserliche Marine did not have destroyers – strictly speaking. During The Great War Era, the Royal Navy viewed hostile torpedo boats as a serious threat to their massive battle fleet. Consequently, they chose to increase the gun armament of their torpedo boats, and reclassify them as “destroyers” -- employed largely in a defensive role to protect the capital ships from enemy torpedo boats. On the other hand, the Kaiserliche Marine designed torpedo boats with a heavy torpedo armament and sufficient guns to deal with the British destroyers. The Germans employed their torpedo boats aggressively -- as dual purpose weapons – able to protect their capital ships from submarines and enemy destroyers, while seizing every opportunity to attack the enemy battle line. I just wanted to explain that point before I started showing you pictures of a German harbor – with American destroyers – which played a very small part in the war. Why-? Because I have an excellent model of a destroyer from the period, which was a great design in its’ day. This is an overview of the destroyer berths in the West Loch. You can see they are just across the loch from the Replenishment Docks mentioned in the last chapter. They have their own docks, complete with storage, supply, and administrative infrastructure. Like nearly every naval base during the era, the boats are “nested” by “division” – in this case, a three-ship section. This is the standard German flotilla, composed of twelve boats. I apologize right now for a miscalculation on my part – I made the West Loch too small. Based on the size of the 3rd Scouting Group, it should have two flotillas – one to scout ahead of the armored cruisers, and one to screen them from submarine attack. Another view of the nested destroyers – as seen from the south. In the left top corner, you can see some of the other activity going on out in the harbor. A Helena Class steam paddle tug is towing a lighter loaded with ship’s stores, headed for the warships moored along the breakwater. You will, of course, note the two models are diagonal – another one of our objectives. “AP” and I wanted to add as much diagonal material to the game as possible, though it is often hard to insert diagonal models into what is, basically, an ortho-configured game grid. Fortunately, ships are well suited to diagonal deployment. This view gives you a very good look – end to end -- at the dockside infrastructure. History books tell you all about the ships and their exploits -- and sometimes about the men who manned them – but they never mention the extensive support facilities ashore that provide the day-to-day, mundane, house-keeping facilities that support the ships and crews afloat. In the upper right of the picture, the small freighter MS Mowe can be seen. In this view, you can see how the harbor shore has been carefully re-built to accommodate docks for the destroyers. When torpedo boats and destroyers were first introduced in the various navies of the world, they were new and untried additions to existing fleets. They were an afterthought – and room for them had to be found – somewhere. At first, the few torpedo boats and destroyers built for the fleet were simply moored out in the roadsted, but eventually that became crowded. In this shot, what had been a natural shoreline, was dredged, built-up, lined with seawalls, and backed-up with support facilities for the destroyers. This is a close-up of the steam paddle tug Helena towing a lighter filled with boxes and crates of assorted ship’s stores. @AP has poured his skills into creating this beautiful little tug in great historical detail, and no effort was spared on the lighter. The lighter could have been a simple flat-decked barge, with minimal detailing. But we researched the lighters in use in the early 1900’s and “AP” took the time and put in the effort to make each one of them a tiny “work of art”. In the upper right, you can see two of his small boats rowing out to cruisers moored to buoys in the roadsted. Here is a detail shot of “AP’s” MS Mowe making for the Replenishment Docks to unload her cargo. This small freighter is typical of the hundreds of nondescript coastal traders working European waters between 1880 and into the early 1950’s. They carried every imaginable cargo to every port – large or small – that you could dream of. Now we’re going to go back and look at the destroyer docks in some detail – starting from the right end and working north toward the Repair Docks. This is an overview of the right end, showing the two eastern-most docks, their infrastructure, and the Fender Storage Depot. In the center of the picture, you see several older warehouses given over to the maintenance, repair, and storage of the mooring fenders (sometimes referred to as “Atlantic Fenders”.) If a fender is damaged during use, it is returned to this complex to be repaired – while a new fender is loaded onto a truck and taken to the necessary dock as a replacement. A small mobile crane is used to move the fenders since they can be quite heavy. You can see a variety of large and small fenders, with a work detail preparing to load several onto the back of a truck. Other sailors are at work in the yard, sorting fenders, checking them for wear, and tagging them for repair or refurbishing. Down near the docks, you see a formation of sailors that have come ashore and are being mustered for various work details. Around them sailors are already busy moving barrels and crates, while others are carrying boxes and heading for the dock to take them aboard their ship. On the next pier, we see a variety of details. The small office on the right is an administrative office – each destroyer division has one. The O.O.D. (Officer Of The Day) has a duty station here while the Division Commander has an office. Next door is a small warehouse/work shop with balk timber stacked in front. (You would be surprised to know just how much wood was carried aboard ships for temporary repairs at sea.) A detail of sailors is sorting it out for use by the ship’s carpenters. Across the road, a variety of crates and canisters have been stored next to a lot littered with boxes, barrels, fenders, and the odd spare anchor. Near the water tower, a work detail is transferring boxes from a truck to a jeep, which will distribute them to the various docks. First – let me apologize for the modern shipping containers – especially the one with the “P&O” logo. I was using the “IRM Industrial” filler lots and it was handy. I would have substituted small wooden storage sheds, but I had considerable difficulty locating any. It was only much later that I stumbled across the perfect storage building. In the upper right, you can see a work crew loading trucks with lubricating oil. Much like the big steam locomotives of the era, the propulsion machinery in warships had hundreds of moving parts and required copious amounts of lubricating oil. Among the engine room gang there were numbers of men specifically assigned as “oilers”. Just left of center, you can see VIP’s arriving at the dock. Their jeeps are parked in the road with the drivers and officers milling about. A “side party” of sailors has been laid on to greet the dignitary, while the ship’s “presence board” is displayed near the road, and their “ceremonial Kisbee” is set up on the left side of the dock with two sailors standing at “parade rest”. The Admiral commanding Scouting Forces and his staff are approaching the dock to inspect the ships of the 2nd Destroyer Division. In this scene, you can see a detail of sailors taking boxes off a truck to be carried aboard ship. Another detail is using a forklift to move crates around beside the water tower. And, there are not one – not two – but three Quonset Huts visible in the picture. The first Quonset Huts were, oddly enough, deployed in Quonset Point, Rhode Island, in 1941. They are not WW I era buildings – but they are nearly identical to the “Nissen Hut” prefabricated kits built in Great Britain for use on the Western Front during The Great War. USS CLEMSON CLASS Destroyer Displacement: 1,215 tons – Length: 314 feet – Beam: 31 feet – Draft: 9 feet – Propulsion: Geared Steam Turbines – Speed: 35.5 knots – Range: 4,900 miles – Complement: 8 Officers, 8 Chief Petty Officers, 106 enlisted men – Armament: 4x4-inch guns – 1x3-inch Anti-aircraft gun – 12x21-inch torpedo tubes. This is a close-up look at the destroyers. The US Navy Clemson Class ships were descended through a long line of development beginning around 1903, with the preceding Sampson, Caldwell, and Wickes Classes being very similar in appearance and actually seeing service in WW I. The 156 ships in this class were built in nine different shipyards, from Mare Island, San Francisco. to Bath Iron Works in Maine. They were lean and fast ships mounting four funnels, with a heavy torpedo armament – often referred to as “flush-decked four-pipers”. In 1940, about 20 of these ships (The total deal was for 50 destroyers.) would be transferred to Great Britain in the “Destroyers For Bases Agreement” and were renamed “Town Class” ships. The Superb Clemson model courtesy of @Barroco Hispano. Another view of the offshore traffic in the West Loch roadsted. Another view of the Admiral’s party approaching the 2nd Destroyer Division dock. NEXT TIME…… CUXHAVEN: THE PHOTO TOUR 03 MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful warship models. SPECIAL THANKS to my friend and partner, @AP, for his talents, meticulous models, colorful imagination, and extreme dedication. If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496

Laid down in 1912 for the Imperial Russian Navy, the Borodino Class battlecruisers would have been contemporaries of the Ersatz Yorck Class. At 32,500 tons, with twelve 14-inch guns, the Borodino’s were slower and considerably less well armored than the German ships, but could have been formidable opponents. Borodino (seen here on the builder’s slip) was eventually launched, but the October Revolution of 1917 put an end to her construction, and she was finally scrapped in 1931. IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 43: THE PIPE DREAMS “Pipe Dream”…...“A fantastic notion or vain hope”. In the early 20th Century, it was often said such fanciful dreams were “born in the bowl of an Opium pipe”. GROSSE KREUZER - 1915 Three weeks after the keel was laid for SMS Mackensen, and the details had been settled for her three sister-ships, the topic of discussion turned to the remaining three ships in the class. These ships were to be named Ersatz Yorck, Ersatz Gneisenau, and Ersatz Scharnhorst, and the contracts were awarded to Germania Werft Kiel and Blohm & Voss Hamburg, in April 1914. The contract for Ersatz Yorck was awarded to AG Vulcan Werft Hamburg, and her keel was laid in July 1915. With the war nearly a year old, there was remarkably little haggling about the cost. The three ships would be authorized under the “replacement clause” of the Naval Law, to cover armored cruisers already lost in combat. The money would come from the “Wartime Extraordinary” budget. And work moved along, wartime priorities notwithstanding. On 17 March 1916, Admiral Eduard von Capelle replaced Grossadmiral Tirpitz as Secretary Of State for the Navy. In the blink of an eye, some twenty years of continuity in thought and policy was wiped away. The old admiral had dominated and directed every aspect of the Imperial Navy -- and he brooked no opposition. Now everything seemed open for discussion, and the old departmental debates returned with renewed vigor. The Construction Department stood firmly against merging the Grosse Kreuzer with a battleship, unless technological advances could be made in all weight groups – and the Kaiser’s desire for 15-inch guns would involve a considerable increase in displacement. At a 19 April 1916 meeting, Construction presented three new designs for the Grosse Kreuzer – GK-1, GK-2, and GK-3 – all mounting 15-inch rifles and varying in displacement between 34,000 and 38,000 tons. Much of the increased tonnage went to speed – larger and more powerful engines and increased length for boilers – adding as much as 2 knots more than the Mackensen design. The oil-fired boilers were increased to 12, but von Capelle wanted to retain the coal-fired boilers and their protective coal bunkers to offset retaining Mackensen’s armor suite. The new State Secretary agreed to dismiss the draft limitations placed on previous designs because of the shallow channels along the German coast. This had not been of great concern as long as ship displacement did not exceed 31,000 tons, but the new design proposals were another matter. (Anything deeper than a 32-foot draft would require expensive and time-consuming dredging of harbors and deep-water channels.) The Flottenchef, Vizeadmiral Scheer, favored design GK-2, which was, of course, the largest and fastest design at 29.5 knots. Konteradmiral Hebbinghaus (General Navy Department) was of the opinion the two types of warship could not be merged under the existing Navy Laws – although the development of the two types should be given a certain degree of leeway. Secretary von Capelle (who had written the Naval Laws) pointed out...”We can no longer afford the luxury of two highly developed types.” This is the problem von Tirpitz had tried so long to avoid – fearing the Naval Laws would have to be redrafted. The laws had been designed to benefit the Navy on every possible point – but redrafting might give the Reichstag the opportunity to decrease the number of ships – in view of the ever-increasing costs. Konteradmiral Hebbinghaus, in effect, wanted to “have his cake – and eat it, too”. He wanted to develop the battlecruisers to work as fast-battleships – while developing the battleships into fast-battleships – and maintain the fiction that the two types were separate. He argued the Mackensen Class should not be built, criticizing them on the grounds they were a pre-war design and incorporated no experience gained in the first year of combat – therefore – they would be obsolete at launch. Admiral von Capelle then suggested all work on Ersatz Yorck, Ersatz Gneisenau, Ersatz Scharnhorst, and even Furst Bismarck should cease – and design GK-6 should be pursued. GK-6 mounted eight 15-inch guns and displaced 36,500 tons with a speed of 28 knots. Admiral Scheer then criticized this design as sacrificing speed for armor. Whereupon, the meeting broke up. In the 24 August 1915 meeting, State Secretary Capelle reconfirmed the seven ships would be built to the Mackensen design after all. Vizeadmiral Schrader (Director of Construction) justified this to avoid construction delays and unnecessary cost increases. Schrader stipulated Mackensen’s speed was equal to the latest British battlecruisers – and the main armament, torpedo armament, armor suite, and underwater protection were considered superior in all respects. He was convinced the seven Mackensen’s would...”undoubtedly represent a valuable addition to the fleet in 1919”. Later in the month the subject of changing the design of the last three ships was raised yet again. It seems the US Navy had sent unofficial observers to Britain, and based on everything they could discover, the United States had now decided to build their own battlecruisers. The new information merely confirmed the train of thought – it would be unwise to risk naval funding at this point by trying to introduce a “merged” ship-type. It was also decided to change the composition and number of ships in the fleet “building goals”. Instead of 41 battleships and 20 Grosse Kreuzer – a more reasonable and attainable number was fixed at 25 battleships and 15 battlecruisers. In mid-June 1916, the design guidelines and type decisions for the immediate future were given to Vizeadmiral Scheer for comments and suggestions – in view of his recent engagement at Jutland. Scheer, of course, with a fleet of 11-inch and 12-inch-gunned warships, expressed the extreme need for heavier guns and faster hulls. On 31 October 1916, Konteradmiral Hebbinghaus provided new intelligence material and called for a review of the main armament on the “Ersatz Yorck” ships. A report had just come in from England indicating the most recent British battlecruisers – HMS Renown and Repulse would mount 15-inch guns. The same old pattern was repeating itself. Tirpitz had embraced the “D-48” design because of the British 15-inch guns on the Queen Elizabeth and Revenge Class battleships. Then an erroneous intelligence report convinced everyone the British would mount nothing heavier than 14-inch guns – so Tirpitz went off the bigger gun. But now that the British were going to 15-inch guns on a battlecruiser – the subject was once more open to discussion. Rumors were also circulating about the US Navy – they were developing a 16-inch gun. By this time the completion date of the Mackensen Class had been pushed back to 1920 – to accommodate the urgent needs of U-Boat construction. Extending their time frame yet again meant they would have to be “improved” to maintain some sort of parity with the English and Americans. Hebbinghaus now recommended rearming the Mackensen’s with 15 inch guns and – due to increasing construction difficulties – simply canceling the Erstaz York ships. Unfortunately, rearming the Mackensen’s would involve financial problems and a considerable delay while the plans were redrawn. Abruptly canceling the contracts for the Ersatz Yorck Class would also entail legal consequences. The only option was to modify the Ersatz Yorck design to carry 15-inch guns. The barbettes for the 14-inch rifles would only require a slight enlargement to carry the larger gun. But, strangely enough, Vizeadmiral Schrader spoke against the plan – convinced the Royal Navy would not go to the larger caliber. (The reasoning behind this naive belief was never made clear, and was never taken seriously.) In the end, the Construction Department worked for months to redesign the last three cruisers of the Mackensen Class to take eight 15-inch rifles (Mackensen, herself, was too far along). But the complicated sequence of capital ship construction proved resistant to change. Materials had already been assembled for the four ships, and the construction was simply too far along to adapt to a new design that easily. The Mackensen Class would remain as originally designed. ERSATZ YORCK CLASS BATTLECRUISERS Ersatz Yorck Class Ersatz Yorck – Ersatz Gneisenau – Ersatz Scharnhorst 33,500 tons – 747 feet in length – 27.25 knots – 8x15-inch guns – 12x5.9-inch guns – 8x3.1-inch guns – 3x28-inch torpedo tubes – Belt armor 11.75 inches – Crew compliment: 47 officers and 1,180 enlisted men. Ersatz Yorck’s construction had already begun, and materials for all three ships had also been ordered. But work was halted while the new designs were again altered. Redesigning the hull was inevitable because the 15-inch guns would require slightly larger barbettes, and a marginal increase in length to accommodate more storage space in the magazines. The architects made every effort to preserve her basic size and appearance in order to use the stockpiled materials – and especially the armor plate that had already been contracted for. (Forging, bending, and punching hundreds of thick steel plates was not an easy job, and sudden and extensive requests for change would not sit well with Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach – a close friend of His Majesty, the Kaiser.) Vizeadmiral Scheer’s request for higher speed, bigger guns, and more armor would have to wait – all he got was the bigger guns. The armor suite remained largely as it was in the Mackensen Class and the larger gun caliber cost Ersatz Yorck a half a knot in speed. In the final design configuration Ersatz Yorck was to displace 33,500 tons – the 15-inch rifles and turrets requiring nearly 1,000 tons per gunhouse. The new cruiser would be 747 feet in length with a beam of 99 feet-6 inches and a draft of 30 feet-6 inches. The ratios and clean lines of the hull remained approximately the same as Mackensen -- largely because Ersatz Yorck’s midships bottom had already been assembled on the slipway. The torpedo armament was reduced to three tubes – one bow and one on either broadside – now located abaft the boiler rooms and protected by the anti-torpedo bulkhead. Surviving documents indicate the location was chosen to provide more room to handle yet another new torpedo – the J-9 Type – 28 inches in diameter and some 9 meters long, with fifteen reloads. The boiler plant was the same as in Mackensen, with the same arrangement of steam turbines and reduction gearing providing a speed of 27.25 knots. The Fottinger Hydrodynamic Transmission was slated to be used as well. Operational radius was calculated at 6,000 miles at a cruising speed of 14 knots. Unlike the Mackensen Class, the boiler rooms in Ersatz Yorck were not separated by other compartments and were moved forward “en masse” allowing all of them to be trunked into a single funnel. Though less handsome, the single funnel arrangement allowed better spacing between the conning tower, tripod mast, and forward searchlight bridge, which provided a better field of vision from the conning tower – and funnel smoke was less apt to trouble the bridge. Cost estimates at the various stages of design had varied widely, but the final design – with all the changes and wartime inflation figured in – were expected to cost 75 million Marks apiece. (A cost that would undoubtedly have thrown Admiral von Tirpitz into cardiac-arrest!) Ersatz Yorck’s main battery consisted of eight 15-inch rifles mounted in four twin turrets. The SK L/45 38cm gun tube weighed-in around 89 tons and at +28 degrees elevation was capable of hurling a 1,653 lb projectile out to 34,000 yards at the rate of 2.5 shells per minute. The gun fired both high-explosive and capped armor-piercing shells. The main battery gunhouses were the Drh L/C 1916 model, very similar in design to the Mackensen Class turrets – only a bit more robust in the trunnion cradles to handle the greater weight and recoil stresses. In the Ersatz Yorck Class, the secondary battery was the standard SK L/45 (QF) 5.9-inch gun -- reduced from fourteen guns in Mackensen, to just twelve. The anti-aircraft battery was the same as in Mackensen. In most other respects, SMS Ersatz Yorck was to be constructed with the same materials and methods used in SMS Hindenburg – the template for her design. I refer you to Chapter 41 for the most modern innovations prior to the Ersatz Yorck design. CONSTRUCTION The builder’s contract was awarded to the AG Vulcan yards in Hamburg, and was signed on 10 April 1915 – some nine months into the war. The Vulcan yards had already assembled the construction materials and immediately began the prefabrication work. The process encountered several delays, and at least one temporary halt to re-examine the design -- but the ship’s keel was eventually laid in July 1915. In time, the midships portion of the hull bottom was assembled on the slip – but no more than that. Much like the Mackensen Class, Ersatz Yorck’s complicated and specialized materials placed such demands on the strategic supply chain that construction was suspended – and then canceled in 1917 – with the hull requiring 26 months of work before launch. Ersatz Yorck never did slide into the water that was her natural environment -- and was eventually broken up on the slipway. The keels were never laid for Ersatz Gneisenau and Ersatz Scharnhorst. Also canceled in 1917, their diesel dynamos were used in the construction of much more useful U-Boats, and the remainder of their assembled materials were used wherever possible, or simply scrapped. The ships of the Ersatz Yorck Class were the “last gasp” of a dying Empire. The metal bones of the “behemoths” would considerably out-live the Monarchy that bore them. The abandoned keel plates would gather rust on the builder’s slip -- timber balks would twist and warp in the weather -- and strangely shaped metal fabrications would be shoved out of the way to make room for U-Boats. Perhaps the saddest thing of all is that the “last” was the “best”, and they never came to life. Their armor was superior to the British battlecruisers – and their 15-inch guns were arguably as good. Though they were slower than HMS Renown and Repulse, it should be remembered that speed had not figured prominently at Jutland. Hipper’s Panzerkreuzer had not fought at full speed during most of the battle, and Beatty’s desire to engage meant he had to match their speed – not exceed it. The German armor suite, matched with powerful 15-inch guns, could have been decisive. HMS Renown as she would have looked – circa 1920. In yet another ironic twist, the Ersatz Yorck Class were designed as a counter to the 15-inch guns of HMS Renown and Repulse. Within days of finishing their sea trials the British battlecruisers were ordered to Scapa Flow for gunnery exercises. As the two ships steamed into Scapa Bay and moored to their buoys, they looked sleek and powerful – at first. Admiral Jellicoe watched in horror through his binoculars…… “...the two White Elephants displayed two rows of scuttles (portholes) the length of their hull...for all the world to see they had only a thin strip of armor at the waterline…” It is quite true Admiral Jackie Fisher was “midwife” to the battlecruiser – what is not generally acknowledged is that he was also their “undertaker”. Fisher had an absolute obsession for speed – almost a fetish. While German designers added armor to their Panzerkreuzer – Fisher built them bigger and faster, without adding armor. Eight years after HMS Invincible was launched, the Renown Class carried the same armor scheme. He believed “speed equaled armor”. If the ship was fast enough – it could run away from big guns – “armor was not needed”. The British paid dearly for Fisher’s failure of judgment -- in ships and men lost at Jutland. If Jellicoe was not already horrified enough, HMS Renown’s hull was strained during gunnery practice – popped rivets, warped frames, and buckled decks and hull plates. The ships were too “lightly” built, and could not withstand the firing shock of their own guns. Renown and Repulse spent so much time being strengthened and repaired, the British “tars” nicknamed them “Refit & Repair”. The German designers were concerned about the 15-inch guns -- but in reality, the British battlecruisers had only 6 inches of main belt armor and could easily have been handled by SMS Seydlitz or Derfflinger. POST SCRIPT The story never ends with the last word – there is always more – and the story of the German battlecruisers is no exception. The Imperial German battlecruisers ended when the Kaiserliche Marine ended – but the end of the Kaiserliche Marine was merely the beginning of the Reichsmarine. The Reichsmarine of the Weimar Republic struggled through the years after The Great War, strangled by lack of funds and high national inflation, while always burdened with the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty. But the German Navy was determined to survive and carry on their traditions – always looking ahead to better days. An enormous amount of design work had been done following the Ersatz Yorck Class. In 1917 and 1918 alone, the Imperial Construction Department turned out at least 18 design studies. But with the war going badly, everyone knew they were no more than “pipe dreams”. With the fall of the Monarchy and rise of the Republic, a chaotic political period ensued and records were lost or intermingled. During the succeeding Weimar Republic, the Treaty of Versailles prevented any new construction – except to replace ships if they were lost or reached “retirement age” at 20 years. (Four of the old pre-dreadnoughts survived some 30 years – and into WW II – with Schleswig-Holstein firing the opening shots of that war.) During the 15 years of the Republic, as many as six studies a year were carried out – but mostly to keep the design staff trained and to appraise modern developments in foreign navies. But the studies were dutifully filed away in the belief the political situation, and the national finances, would one day be stable enough to make use of them. Deutschland Class Panzerschiffe Deutschland -- Admiral Scheer – Admiral Graf Spee Displacement: 10,600 tons – Length 610 feet – Speed 28 knots – 6x11-inch guns – 8x5.9-inch guns – 3x3.5-inch AA guns – 8x21-inch torpedo tubes (deck mountings, fantail) – Complement: 33 officers, 586 enlisted – Operating Radius: 12,000 miles at 20 knots. The first ship built under treaty limitations was the Panzerschiffe (armored ship) RM Deutschland, built for the Reichsmarine, and commissioned in 1933. She was followed by two sister-ships -- Admiral Scheer in 1934 – and Admiral Graf Spee in 1936. The Versailles Treaty specified any new construction could be no more than 10,000 tons – thereby, effectively preventing Germany from building large capital ships capable of threatening Britain or France. When Deutschland was commissioned, she startled both the Royal Navy and the British Press with her battery of six 11-inch guns on a 10,000 ton displacement – and the British newspapers immediately dubbed her a “pocket-battleship”. (Ten thousand tons would become the standard Allied displacement for the WW II era “heavy cruiser”.) The German designers had set out to see just how much “battleship” they could pack into a 10,000 ton hull, and her modern diesel engines gave her “battlecruiser speed” with an extended operational radius. She was, in fact, an ideal commerce raider – the thing the British feared most. The design was, actually, far more effective than historians have admitted – probably because Graf Spee’s Kapitan handled her poorly off the River Plate in 1939. In 1933, the Weimar Republic all but ceased to exist when the tottering government of President Paul von Hindenburg passed into the control of a new set of actors. But – regardless of politics – the spirit of the Imperial Navy lived on. When the political climate and available finances finally came together, the opportunity to build a descent warship was taken up with enthusiasm. In early 1934 the old plans and specifications for “D-47” and the Mackensen and Erstaz Yorck Classes were pulled out of the files to form the basis of a new capital ship design. Updated with the latest maritime technology and incorporating modern weapons systems and naval practices – the last of the German battlecruisers was born. Scharnhorst Class Battlecruiser (Schlachtkreuzer) KM Scharnhorst – Commissioned: 1939 KM Gneisenau – Commissioned: 1936 Displacement: 32,100 tons – 771 feet in length – 31 knots – 9x11-inch guns – 12x5.9-inch guns – 14x4.1-inch AA guns – 10x20mm AA guns – 6x21-inch torpedo tubes (deck mounted amidships, either beam) 3 Arado Ar-196A-3 float planes – belt armor 13.8 inches. First, let me say there is some debate among analysts and historians about the classification of these ships. They were the first post-WW I ships to be officially classed as battleships by the Kriegsmarine. “Janes Fighting Ships: 1940” lists them as battleships. And the US Navy of that time considered them battleships. The Royal Navy considered them battlecruisers, but changed the classification to battleships AFTER World War II. The noted researcher and author Siegfried Breyer also classified these ships as battleships. However – Herr Breyer is careful to trace their lineage through the battlecruiser “tree” all the way back to SMS Von der Tann. All Imperial Panzerkreuzer were built as fast-battleships – but the battlecruiser classification is accepted without argument. In the final analysis, the only real difference between SMS Hindenburg and KM Scharnhorst – is about 20 years. And to anyone who has ever owned a horse, the “blood-line” is all-important. Battlecruisers sired KM Scharnhorst – and a battlecruiser she shall remain. Two views of Scharnhorst taking on main battery ammunition. Constructed between 1935 and 1939, these were powerful ships – but not as powerful as they could have been. Germany was actively seeking to get out from under the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty and had only recently signed the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935 with the British. The new treaty still had many restrictions intended to keep German rearmament within limits. Consequently, the Government in Berlin did not wish to cause alarm in Britain by appearing to engage in yet another naval arms race. This existing political situation (as well as a shaky German economy) effected several design elements of the Scharnhorst Class. The new ships were designed with a tonnage no higher than the previous Imperial battlecruisers, and the main guns were the old reliable 11-inch rifles – fearing a bigger ship with 15-inch guns might set off alarm bells in London. As built, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were thought of by the British as...“fast but under-gunned...and better suited to convoy raiding”. But the Naval High Command made sure the British never received a vital piece of information. The barbettes and turret machinery in Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had been built big enough and strong enough to accommodate twin gun houses with 15 inch rifles – the same arrangement designed for Ersatz Yorck – but with modern and more powerful rifles. Unfortunately, WW II broke out within months of commissioning, and they never found an appropriate time to install the bigger guns. Model courtesy of "Barroco Hispano" Two views of KM Gneisenau as she would have appeared with the new gun houses and rifles. The commissioning of KM Scharnhorst in 1939 was the last chapter in the story of the German battlecruiser. The Kaiserliche Marine had seen the “heyday” of the ships, while WW II saw the sad end. A year after Scharnhorst was commissioned, the British would attack the Italian battle fleet in Taranto harbor with Swordfish torpedo planes from an aircraft carrier. A year later, the Japanese would bomb Pearl Harbor, as well as sinking HMS Repulse and Prince Of Wales in the South China Sea – the last instance was with land-based aircraft. No longer would events be decided by long, lumbering lines of battleships, battlecruisers, and thundering guns. Now the long lines would simply present the perfect target for massed squadrons of torpedo planes and dive bombers. Though battleships proved useful throughout WW II, the dreadnoughts were no longer the “Queen of the Seas”. Britain retired HMS Vanguard in 1960, and the four battleships of the USS Iowa Class were retired between 1990 and 1992. Having fought in WW II, Korea, Viet NAM, Lebanon, the Persian Gulf, and the 1991 Gulf War, the citizens of a grateful nation preserved them as museum ships. “Big Mo” (USS Missouri) entering Pearl Harbor to be berthed on “Battleship Row” ahead of the USS Arizona Memorial – 22 June 1998. It is only fitting the two ships be anchored together – World War II started on one -- and ended on the other. (USS Arizona is still in commission – her name will never be stricken from the United States Naval Register.) Long before KM Scharnhorst’s hull slipped into the waters of Wilhelmshaven’s Inner Basin, the battlecruiser had fallen out of favor. The face of naval warfare – indeed, the whole world – had been transformed by the all-encompassing ruin of The Great War. An entire generation of young men had been slaughtered in Flander’s fields, the Italian Alps, the Steppes of Russia, and on the craggy cliffs of Gallipoli. Along with millions upon millions of broken lives, three great Monarchies had been swept away by the whirlwind -- and the political face of Europe was changed forever. There would be no return to the lazy, carefree summer of 1914 when the Edwardian Era marched off to war. The surviving “Great Powers” of Europe – “the winners” – were broken and teetering on the edge of bankruptcy. The occupied portions of France had been brutally devastated and fought over through four long years – her industrial areas of the north all but destroyed. Britain now faced a serious shortage of manpower – most of it buried in Belgium and northern France. And her finances were in ruins. The British had built the mightiest battle fleet the world had ever seen. She spent nearly a billion Pounds on battleships and battlecruisers alone – mostly borrowed from America – and with Peace, the bills came due. By the time HMS Hood was launched in 1920, the Royal Navy had already begun to lay-up or scrap the older dreadnoughts to reduce operating costs. The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 had been agreed upon by all the major naval powers with a great sigh of relief. It seemed the only way they could reduce the size of their ponderous and hugely expensive battle fleets. HMS Hood was altered on the builder’s slip to incorporate the lessons of Jutland, and though classified as a battlecruiser, it was clearly understood she had been finished as the most modern fast-battleship afloat. All the naval powers arrived at the conclusion they could no longer afford to build both battlecruisers and battleships – so the ship types were finally merged and a new era of naval design came into being. As the precursor of the fast-battleship, the Imperial Panzerkreuzer had established the pattern with their speed and magnificent armor suite. And, in the process, the Kaiserliche Marine designed some of the most powerful – and certainly the most handsome warships ever built. They were admired and respected in their day, and have become “Legendary” over the past century. They will always be pictured in the mind with great clouds of billowing smoke trailing away as their sharp bows slice through the waves. Their low-lying profile charges ahead, throwing spray as high as the bridge before it settles to the deck and trickles off the massive, squat shapes of the menacing gun turrets. And in your mind, you can imagine the old “Bavarian buccaneer” smiling on Seydlitz’ bridge – confident in his ships and the men who sail them. An artist’s rendition of SMS Hindenburg as she might have looked at sea in 1917. SIDE BAR Since the Ersatz Yorck Class ships were never built, we do not have the benefit of historical photographs. The only known visual representation of the ships are a few plan drawings that miraculously survived the trauma of two World Wars and still exist in the BundesArchive. These drawings alone made it possible to arrive at the basic size and layout of the battlecruisers. These ships were designed in the same time frame as the battlecruiser Hindenburg and the battleship Baden. In order to fill in details that were not obvious from the 2-D drawings, it was only necessary to look back at the previous designs. @AP has generously provided us with a magnificent scratch-built 3-D model presenting SMS Ersatz Yorck in vivid detail – never before seen, to my knowledge – anywhere. I have waited to see this warship in a “physical representation” for most of my life – and it has truly been a pleasure to work with this superb model. I have provided a variety of photos – and hope you enjoy them as well. (BELOW) Four views of SMS Ersatz Yorck nested inboard of Ersatz Gneisenau. The collier SS Erlangen is preparing to transfer “bagged” coal aboard Gneisenau. The breakwater is by “Uki” and the mooring points are courtesy of “Mattb325”, modified for use in the CJ. Top right of the picture is an Invincible Class battlecruiser by @Barroco Hispano, Everything else in the picture is the impeccable work of “AP”. The decks are largely “clutter-free” with the superstructure concentrated amidships between the main battery turrets. With careful examination, you will see the massive 15-inch gun turrets – dominating the silhouette of the warship – have clear and extremely wide firing arcs. Here you see the long, streamlined shape of the hull, which would have contributed to SMS Ersatz Yorck’s high speed. It is also evident from her wide beam and low profile that she was designed to be a stable gun platform, even in high sea states. BELOW are four views of SMS Ersatz Yorck moored at the repair docks with a machinists barge tied-up alongside. They are making adjusts to her turbine machinery. The docks are modified from the “PEG SNM Naval Series” with a wide variety of props from various sources. The workshops atop the barge are from the “NOB 1905 Naval Series. The steam tug Goliath, alongside the barge, is by Barroco Hispano. The battlecruiser, both barges, small boat, barge crane and towing tug, and dockside cranes are all courtesy of “AP”. This is a close-up detail shot of Ersatz Yorck. Most Imperial warships were low-freeboard compared to the high-sided capital ships of the British. This tended to make them “wet” at high speeds or in rough weather but, more importantly, it made them a smaller target in battle. German designers took this concept a step further by shrinking the above deck superstructure into the smallest possible space. The “upper works” on Ersatz Yorck have been reduced to the bare essentials, with as little height as possible, and occupy only 22% of the ship’s overall length. The result is a remarkably small target silhouette, while significantly reducing the unarmored portions of the ship. The single funnel is a notable innovation in design over previous multi-funnel ships. Fewer funnels reduces the overall superstructure area and largely remove the “blind spot” behind the bridge. The sloping base of the funnel is a 5.9-inch armored shield protecting the boiler uptakes and trunking. Note the individual 3.5-inch guns on the upper deck beside the forward bridge, and on the main deck beside “D” turret. More on them coming up. BELOW are four images – depicting what a Battlecruiser Division (4 ships) might have looked like had they ever been completed. The four Erstaz Yorck’s are moored in Schillig Roads as a “reaction force” should British light forces appear in the German Bight. Ersatz Scharnhorst (left) is taking on supplies and fresh provisions from two tugs, with a third tug standing by with more provisions. Ersatz Gneisenau (right) is taking on ship’s stores and coal, with another coal tow standing by. The flagship, inboard of her is Ersatz Yorck, with a motor launch waiting in case the Konteradmiral commanding is required in Wilhelmshaven. (BELOW) Four views of SMS Ersatz Yorck coaling ship. Note the green channel marker buoys inshore marking the limits of the dredged channel. The steam tug Goliath is courtesy of “Barroco Hispano”, while the battlecruiser, motor launch, coal lighters, paddle tug, small boat, and channel buoys are by “AP”. This is a “snap-shot” from “AP’s” modeling program of the German 3.5-inch SK-L/45 Schneklladekanone (quick-firing gun). These guns were originally carried as anti-torpedo boat armament on all capital ships, but were phased out after combat experience in 1914 proved them incapable of causing serious injury to modern torpedo boats and destroyers. With the emergence of aircraft as a weapon of war, Krupp developed a high-angle mounting for the gun with a protective shield. (The mounting was an MPL-CC/13 type.) These weapons were first installed on SMS Derfflinger and would eventually be retro-fitted to all German warships. SMS Ersatz Yorck was equipped with eight guns – four grouped on either side of the forward bridge structure, and four grouped on either side of “D” turret. You might think this to be a small number of guns, but it was more than adequate to “see off” the fragile aircraft of that time. I included this picture as an example of the extreme level of detail included in “AP’s” modeling. Until you have examined his work at length, you cannot imagine the amount of detail and degree of authenticity he brings to his craft. His models never fail to impress and amaze, and are nothing short of magnificent works of art. NEXT TIME…… IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful warship models. SPECIAL THANKS to my friend and partner, @AP, for his talents, meticulous models, colorful imagination, and extreme dedication. If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496

During the early decades of the 20th Century, this would have been a common sight in any of the industrialized nations of the world. Dreadnought battleships and battlecruisers were the largest and most mechanically complex moving objects on Earth – the most deadly that modern science could devise – and only rich and powerful nations could afford such baubles. So immense it took three or four years to build -- by thousands of workmen with heavy machines and specialized tools, who virtually hand-crafted each of the behemoths. And nations measured their wealth, power, and prestige by their possession. IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 42: THE LAST DREAMS OF EMPIRE GROSSE KREUZER - 1914 Nine months before the contract for SMS Hindenburg was awarded to Kaiserliche Werft Wilhelmshaven, there was still great debate as to the direction the Grosse Kreuzer concept should take. At the Kaiser’s request, State Secretary von Tirpitz requested the Construction Department to prepare weight and cost data for a Panzerkreuzer with 8x14-inch guns in twin turrets. To keep the costs down, he specified that in all other respects, it was to be the same as the Derfflinger Class. But Tirpitz was still not convinced of the need for larger guns and increased displacement. In his written reply to the Kaiser, he expressed – for the first time – his reason for opposing the gun caliber increase…… “In my opinion, we cannot retain strong armor, medium artillery and large-caliber guns with the Grosse Kreuzer. We arrive at a ship of over 30,000 tons and largely eliminate the [concept of the] Grossen Kreuzer [by building a fast battleship] and threaten the Fleet Law. Perhaps the costs and ship size of the project will go on absurdum.” Not to put too fine a point on it – while the British were building larger and more powerful warships -- von Tirpitz was unwilling to challenge the Reichstag Naval Law by telling them he needed ships at least as large and powerful as the English. In 1912, Wilhelm, showing an unusual degree of clarity, was more concerned about potential future battles than the politics in the Reichstag. He instructed Tirpitz to bring the project sketches and cost data to Rominten, his East Prussian hunting lodge, on 20 August. The Kaiser, predictably, was quite taken with what was, basically, a slightly longer Derfflinger Class with 14-inch guns. Still not convinced to embrace the up-gunned cruiser, Tirpitz was, nevertheless, obliged to pursue his Sovereign’s wishes – but not with reckless abandon. Again, he ordered the Construction Department to offset the bigger guns and longer hull with tonnage and cost reductions to conform to current “battlecruiser standards”. Herr Birkner, the Chief Constructor, coordinated with the Weapons Department and the General Navy Department, and presented Tirpitz with sketches and rough figures for seven designs of comparable size and power to Derfflinger. The designs had a wide range of combinations involving 13.4-inch and 14-inch rifles, though Birkner thought the 14-inch gun rather expensive. One option included reducing the belt armor to 11 inches, while another suggested reducing the machinery -- thereby shortening the hull and lowering the cost – while sacrificing a third of a knot in speed. Though some insight was gained, the various designs “priced-out” between 54-58 million Marks – and were rejected. But this was only the beginning of a long and convoluted process. This is an early sketch plan for “Grosse Kreuzer-1914”. It most likely represents a variation of the original “A-3” design. (Margin notes on the original document reference “A-3”, but indicate the sketch has been altered – without assigning any particular designation.) The only visual differences between this plan and SMS Hindenburg is a slightly more built-up area on the lower tripod mast – and – the secondary battery has been mounted within the hull on the battery deck. (Hindenburg’s 5.9-inch guns were mounted in the superstructure at main deck level.) In early September 1912, a more detailed design, “A-3”, was worked up and presented. Based on the already confirmed design for SMS Hindenburg, the new design had the same speed, same secondary battery, and same armor suite -- but with an eight-gun 14-inch main battery. (The guns were actually 35cm in bore, which translates to 13.8 inches – but being only 7/tenths of a centimeter short of the mark – I chose “14-inch” to avoid confusion.) As a result of SMS Moltke’s recent Atlantic crossing to the United States, the new ship was designed with higher freeboard aft to keep the fantail free of water. The Chief of Weapons Department had been pushing for a larger torpedo armament and six H-8 Type torpedo tubes were planned, though the arrangement was undecided. Underwater protection was improved by extending the double bottom structure up the side of the ship to the bottom edge of the belt armor. All the additions raised displacement to 31,000 tons. A further change was made to this design and labeled “A-9” – with six guns, removing two boilers, reducing speed by a third of a knot, shortening the hull length, and now displacing 29,000 tons. The Kaiser approved the new design on 30 September 1912. Though the design elements appeared to be settled, not everyone in the Reichsmarineamt was as satisfied as the Kaiser. During the winter of 1912-1913, the Construction Department and Weapons Department jointly queried the Krupp Werft at Essen to ensure an increase in gun caliber would not delay completion of the vessel beyond Spring 1917. Krupp officials could foresee no delays – if the guns were ordered no later than April 1913. The Construction Department was concerned about the 14-inch rifles because the English, Japanese, and Russians were considering building battlecruisers mounting that caliber – while the English were going to mount 15-inch guns on their Queen Elizabeth and Revenge Class ships. The Admiralstab criticized “A-9” as under-gunned with a ridiculously over-blown torpedo armament. The Staff also believed raising the freeboard of the cruiser only created a bigger target while wasting displacement which could be applied to bigger guns and higher speed. Admiral Rollmann produced an 8 March 1913 memorandum declaring...”if the Grosse Kreuzer is to retain the right to exist...the speed of the cruiser must be maintained.” The Admiral also rejected any reduction of armor on the grounds the Kaiser would never approve. (Wilhelm favored merging the Grosse Kreuzer with the battleship -- i.e., the fast-battleship.) But Rollmann’s suggestions fell on deaf ears. Tirpitz merely pointed out there was no provision in the Fleet Law for merged ship types. Other departments again argued for a 15-inch main battery based on trends in the Royal Navy, but a cruiser with four twin turrets would displace over 30,000 tons – so that was rejected. A cruiser with six 15-inch guns in three turrets was suggested, but the majority of staff favored eight 14-inch guns. Then the discussions took an abrupt turn. This model represents the basic design concepts embodied in the proposal for a Panzerkreuzer mounting eight 14-inch guns in twin turrets. Though the design was shelved several times, it was always brought back out and tinkered with – “ad infinitum - ad nauseam”. It was nearly two years before the design reached the keel-laying stage. The picture below shows the intricate planning that went into the original design – though the various details continued to change before being finalized. The superb model of SMS Mackensen is courtesy of @Barroco Hispano. Around May 1913, the Kaiser became aware of discussions concerning 15-inch weapons, and came down strongly in favor of the larger weapon – but eight guns, rather than six. At this point, Tirpitz began to rationalize switching to the big guns. He reasoned the 12-inch gun was sufficient against British battlecruisers, but against a battleship, something bigger might be needed. Knowledge of the development of the British Queen Elizabeth and Revenge Class battleships suddenly seemed to make the need for change even more vital. It was clear the current political temper in the Reichstag would not tolerate the “fast-battleship theory”, and it was equally clear the Grosse Kreuzer were absolutely necessary to the scouting elements of the Hochseeflotte – so a 15-inch-gunned Panzerkreuzer was the only answer. By early June 1913, the first proposals for the big-gun cruiser were presented for open discussion. Designs D-47 and D-48 were, again, based on SMS Hindenburg and were virtually identical in their armor and machinery. Visually, they bore a great resemblance to Hindenburg, with the exception of the main battery turrets. Both designs had three twin 15-inch turrets -- D-47 had two superimposed forward, and one aft – while D-48 had one forward with two aft, spaced in similar fashion to Hindenburg. Both designs were flush-decked, but with a higher freeboard, as seen in previous design iterations. The new tripod foremast with gun control positions was continued, and the six torpedo tubes were also included. At the same meeting, Designs D-50 and D-51 were also presented – with the same main battery turret arrangements, but different placement of the secondary batteries. D-52, on the other hand, had four twin 15-inch turrets arranged as in Hindenburg -- but even without the higher freeboard, this ship would displace 30,300 tons and was quickly rejected as too costly. A file in the BundesArchiv, dated 6 June, showed two other design sketches using triple and even quadruple main battery turrets. But no such turrets had been developed by Krupp, so they could have been no more than mere speculation. Tirpitz strove to keep the displacement and size of the new Panzerkreuzer within limits. Designing a stable gun platform required a certain amount of width (beam) to reduce rolling in a seaway. Making a “fast” ship required additional length to accommodate additional engines and boilers. But von Tirpitz knew, there were limits to size. As Germany’s major North Sea naval base, Wilhelmshaven was subject to the considerable tidal conditions of the Jade Estuary. The harbor could only be accessed via a dredged deep-water channel, and could only be entered or exited through tidal locks designed to keep it at a constant depth of water. Regardless of what Tirpitz wanted – it had to fit through the ship locks. As can be seen, the new design is long and narrow – with a 7 to 1 length-to-beam ratio. Since the Kaiser had already agreed to the up-gunned cruiser designs, a meeting was held on 17 June to chose one. D-48 was chosen quickly (one turret forward, two aft) because it allowed the widest possible firing arcs for the guns. This design also had the aft turrets separated by the aft engine room (as in Hindenburg), which meant the two turrets and their magazines could not be disabled by a single hit. This design also had the lowest displacement – 29,600 tons. The barbette armor was thickened over that of Hindenburg and the increased engine performance was achieved by larger boilers, custom-made to more fully fit the hull spaces – while partially reducing the boiler room bunker space. “D-48a” was priced out at 55.3 million Marks and was approved by the Kaiser on 28 June 1913. (As a matter of interest – design D-47, with two turrets forward and one aft – would be resurrected in 1935 as one of several design studies forming the basis of the battlecruiser KM Scharnhorst, commissioned in 1939.) Less than a week after signing-off on the new design, the Kaiser turned up at the Admiralstab offices and found State Secretary von Tirpitz and Admiral Muller (Chief of the Naval Cabinet) in conference. Wilhelm promptly pigeonholed Muller and asked if Tirpitz shared Admiral von Ingenohl’s opinion that...”modern Panzerkreuzer were as important as battleships…” and...”whether or not in the near future a ‘battleship-Panzerkreuzer’ should be built instead?” Tirpitz – taken aback at this sudden and not so subtle hint about fast-battleships – merely looked at the two men. Rather than vent his exasperation on the Kaiser, Tirpitz looked squarely at Admiral Muller...”Would you have me throw out the Reichstag’s Fleet Law?” The Kaiser’s insistence on a fast-battleship remained in this uneasy limbo until October 1913, when outside events intruded on this thorny issue. The naval attache in London reported recent information indicating Britain was going to reduce the size of its ships in favor of an increased number of ships – all of which were to be armed with 13.5-inch or 14-inch weapons. The Kaiser, of course, took the report at face value and considered this a...”victory without firing a shot”. It was, in fact, a defeat without firing a shot. Tirpitz immediately scrapped all notions of a 15-inch weapon and reverted to the 14-inch gun. All the coaxing that had turned Tirpitz to the larger gun had been undermined by a single report – which turned out to be unreliable. While the design discussions and “delicate political maneuvers” were in progress, the lower levels of decision-making were spending their time in a more productive manner. The engineering branch of the Construction Department had recently designed and installed a successful reduction-geared steam turbine plant in the test-bed steamer Paris. Up to this point, all steam turbine installations on Kaiserliche Marine warships were “direct drive” – which did not make efficient use of the power generated. Steam turbines rotate in the thousands of RPMs, while the most effective marine propellers operate at 300 RPMs or less. In effect, a great deal of coal was burnt to generate power which simply could not be applied through the propeller. By coupling the steam turbine to a set of heavy duty, finely tooled, precision gears – the RPM speed could be reduced to a level compatible with the propeller. Engineering Branch had worked out a system with cruising turbines and reduction gearing for “Grosse Kreuzer-1914”. In each of the low-pressure turbine rooms, there would also be two cruising turbines – one high-pressure, and one low-pressure. Without getting into too many details -- the cruise turbines, linked to the reduction gearing, would power the ship up to 16 knots – after which, the main turbines (direct-drive) would take over for higher speeds. This entailed less wear and tear on the machinery and would reduce coal consumption by 33% at 14 knots, and 15% at 22 knots. The only disadvantages were, unfortunately, the expensive precision gearing and an increase in displacement. This is how SMS Mackensen might have looked upon completion. A Nordwind Class tug is moving toward the bow, while four Passat Class tugs nudge the big cruiser into her quayside berth. At 31,000 tons and 731 feet in length, she would have required five seagoing tugs to handle her in the narrow confines of a harbor. The tugs, and numerous props on the quayside are the fine work of @AP. During a 22 November meeting, by way of a comparison against D-48a, von Tirpitz presented the Kaiser with design study “D-58” – a cruiser with 14-inch guns in four twin turrets, displacing 31,000 tons. (After much “haggling”, the old Admiral had concluded anything they built was going to exceed 30,000 tons.) In one of his less “decisive” moods, Wilhelm deferred making a decision until the spring of 1914. But Tirpitz, supported by Admiral von Ingenohl, had already decided in favor of “D-58”, and instructed the Construction Department to cease all design work on “D-48a”. A week later, von Ingenohl wrote a memorandum comparing “D-48a” with a design mounting eight 12-inch guns. The obvious advantage of six 15-inch guns was the considerably greater penetration and explosive force of the bigger shell – not to mention the gun’s greater range. But there were fewer guns, and only two guns could fire directly ahead – a decided disadvantage for a reconnaissance cruiser. He included a table showing comparative values of British armor and suggested the 12-inch gun was sufficient against existing British battlecruisers, as well as British battleships launched up to 1911. But the gun was not capable of dealing with newer battleships. In terms of hitting power, Ingenohl favored the 15-inch gun – but only three twin turrets presented a problem. With salvo fire, at least three shells were required for spotting the fall of shot, and German gunnery tactics used “pairs” of turrets to produce four shells in a salvo. (You see the obvious problem.) Von Ingenohl concluded neither the 12-inch gun nor the 15-inch gun could be recommended for the new cruiser, and suggested a main battery of eight 14-inch weapons. The 14-inch shell would be more than adequate to penetrate any British armor – four guns could fire directly ahead and astern – and four twin turrets allowed for proper salvo fire. Tactically speaking, “D-58” offered advantages other designs did not. In December, “D-58” underwent further design work. The secondary 5.9-inch guns were, originally, to be mounted in the superstructure at the Upper Deck level – but they were reduced from 18 to 14 – and moved to hull casemates at Battery Deck level. Since the ship had a higher freeboard, the guns were roughly the same level above water as those in Hindenburg. Rather than a straight-line casemate, they were arranged in the “indented” style to provide a wider arc of fire ahead and astern – it also prevented a hit on a single gun from knocking out other guns by collateral damage. A proposal to reduce the main armor belt to 11 inches was flatly rejected, but the main battery turret faces were reduced from 14 inches to 13 inches (not the best idea). All suggestions for a reduction in speed were rejected out of hand, while the proposal for the turbine reduction gear was approved. To obtain a higher speed, the idea of custom-building larger boilers to fit the space available was carried forward. This avoided widening the ship’s beam to create space for additional boilers. The number of boilers was fixed at 16 -- subject to change. To create available space, the boiler room coal bunkers were eliminated, but to maintain the protection level, the coal bunkers along the side were enlarged at the expense of the wing passage voids. Extending the double bottom up to the lower edge of the main belt armor was also carried over. After the meeting, the new cruiser design was designated “D-60”. (Perhaps you are beginning to see how researchers can become confused with all these different plan designations going back and forth.) In March 1914, having studied the new plans at length, the Construction Department suggested the sloping armor (“boschung” in German) of the main protective armored deck could be eliminated. The change could be made without a significant sacrifice of protection, while it would make boiler room access to coal bunkers easier – along with other significant weight savings in altered structural details. Another savings in weight was adopted by removing the stern torpedo tube. After a further, final, meeting on 19 May, “D-60” was finalized and presented to the Kaiser, who signed-off on the design on 23 May 1914. It would be little more than a month before shots disturbed a peaceful Sunday afternoon in far away Sarajevo. This is how SMS Mackensen might have looked in 1917, moored to buoys in Schillig Roads while taking on coal and fresh provisions. Note the green channel marker buoys inshore of the battlecruiser. Mooring buoys, channel markers, tugs, and lighters by “AP”. The design for “Grosse Kreuzer-1914” was not adopted for any particular reason, but for a variety of reasons – technical, financial, and political. Despite all attempts to obtain 15-inch rifles for the new cruiser, she would be built with an intermediate gun of 14 inches, which Tirpitz knew would likely be replaced by the larger gun in the next class of Panzerkreuzer. But the naval budget of 1914 had been passed in February, and the financial resources were already all but exhausted. “Grosse Kreuzer-1914” and her three sister ships were estimated to cost, at completion, some 250 million Marks. Tirpitz knew the time was not “politically” right to raise the gun caliber and push the Panzerkreuzer into the “official” realm of the purpose-built “fast-battleship”. (The political situation would only get worse for the Kaiserliche Marine. Six months into The Great War, the Imperial fleet had delivered no significant victories and the 1915 Naval Estimates were opposed in the Reichstag.) But it was, perhaps, worth all the trouble. “Grosse Kreuzer-1914” was quite a formidable design – high speed – thickly armored – and armed with a new, “state-of-the-art”, 14-inch naval rifle (second only to the British BL 15-inch Mark I). The new cruiser could have easily disposed of any British battlecruisers then afloat and might well have been able to handle the odd battleship. Tirpitz originally planned to build a class of seven ships to this design, but the shipyards already had four battleships of the Bayern Class on the building slips, as well as (by this time) the last Derfflinger Class battlecruiser (SMS Hindenburg). With only four large construction slips available – Tirpitz had to make choices. Four ships were laid down in 1915 – while the design of the remaining three ships was later altered on the drawing board and eventually constituted a later class (Esatz Yorck Class). After the outbreak of war in August 1914, the bulk of the old protected cruisers (Victoria Louise Class) were stricken from the navy list as obsolete, while the early months of the war took its toll on the elderly armored cruisers. These actions, alone, put the Hochseeflotte at a serious numerical disadvantage in cruiser scouting forces. All four of the new “Grosse Kreuzer” were covered by the “automatic replacement” clause of the Navy Law. (It was not at all a bad deal. Old and virtually obsolete ships – no longer reasonably capable of engaging an enemy in battle – were to be replaced by “brand spanking new” Panzerkreuzer.) Various historians have come up with names for the four cruisers – none of which are in total agreement with the others. The “BundesArchiv” has some documentation on the names, but only three of the first four ships were ever christened with their official names…… Ersatz Victoria Louise…...to be named…...SMS Mackensen Ersatz Blucher…………...to be named…...SMS Graf Spee Ersatz Freya……………...to be named…...SMS Prinz Eitel Friedrich Ersatz Friedrich Carl…….to be named…...SMS Furst Bismarck (conjecture, but with documentation) Interestingly enough, the German practice of ordering a warship under an “Ersatz” name, and then christening the ship at launch with her “official” name, has not just been a matter of confusion for historians. British Naval Intelligence reports, declassified some years later (around 1965), show a great deal of information had been collected. It was, in fact, an amazingly large treasure trove of information – considering a good deal of it was obtained after war had been declared. There is no way of knowing how many spies risked their lives – and what cunning and inventive methods were employed to obtain the information – though the PBS series “Reilly: Ace Of Spies” gives us a good idea of spy craft in the Edwardian Era. But one thing is painfully apparent – the British were totally confused. In some cases, the Intelligence people thought there were actually two ships under construction – one named Ersatz Victoria Louise – the other Mackensen. This resulted in as many as 14 battlecruisers estimated to be on German slipways. In other instances, their information had the right ship, but the wrong builder’s yard. In other cases, the “Ersatz” names were not properly matched with their official names. Additional information often cited the new ships as sister ships of the Hindenburg Class – without realizing Hindenburg was actually a sister ship of the Derfflinger Class. Other ship’s data was erroneously cited as having more or fewer main battery guns than actually planned. One Intelligence report, in fact, stated the Mackensen Class was to carry 15-inch weapons. Another, rather lengthy report, reputedly sent via Sweden, listed four Manteuffel Class battlecruisers under construction. Of course, no such class was ever contemplated – but the report did contain actual blueprints of the rejected “D-48” design. And finally – at least two of the Mackensen’s were believed to have joined the Hochseeflotte before November, 1918. As you can see, historians were a good deal less confused in 1968 than the British had been in 1918. (Strangely enough – most subsequent authors have chosen to quote British sources – rather than searching surviving German archives.) MACKENSEN CLASS BATTLECRUISERS SMS Mackensen Class – Plan profile. You will notice the striking similarity to SMS Hindenburg. In essence, the class is an “improved” and more powerful version. The builder’s contract was awarded to the Blohm & Voss yards in Hamburg and was signed on 7 August 1914 – three days after Britain declared war on Germany. Blohm & Voss immediately started assembling the construction materials and began the prefabrication work. The process took a bit longer under wartime conditions, but the ship’s keel was laid on 30 January 1915. In most respects, SMS Mackensen was constructed with the same materials and with the same methods as that of previous Imperial battlecruisers – and since her design was based on the Derfflinger Class, I refer you to Chapters 15, 17, and 23 for full construction details. GENERAL HULL The new cruisers were the longest yet built at 731 feet with a beam of 99 feet, nine inches – and flush-decked like their predecessors. Their size was pushing the limit for ships that could use the III Locks at Wilhelmshaven. Their displacement, at 31,000 tons, also made them the heaviest ships yet designed for the Kaiserliche Marine – and considerably heavier than Tirpitz had originally bargained for. Mackensen’s hull was divided into 18 large watertight compartments by transverse bulkheads, with numerous smaller watertight subdivisions within each section. The new cruiser had a double bottom stretching over 92% of her length – a considerably larger area than previous Imperial warships. The lengthened double bottom was also extended as a “double hull side”, connecting with the lower edge of the main armor belt. (Designed to protect against shells falling short and striking the outer hull below the armor belt, this feature would have been of great value to Seydlitz, Derfflinger, and Lutzow at Jutland.) A surprising innovation was borrowed from the battleship USS Arkansas, commissioned in 1911 -- the “bulbous bow” fore-foot – created by the American naval architect, Admiral David Taylor. When German designers added an aft broadside torpedo flat to Mackensen’s design, they had to move the “A” and “B” main battery turrets forward to balance the center of gravity. Through “towing tank” tests, the Germans found the “bulbous bow” feature improved buoyancy forward without increasing the hull width – which would have created “drag” on the hull form. Following the developing trend, Mackensen was given a 197-foot tripod mast. A spacious fire control position was situated atop the mast legs with an additional 118-foot main mast attached to carry wireless antennas. In the primitive early days of wireless telegraphy, the taller the mast – the better the reception – and the Kaiserliche Marine was exceptionally good at intercepting and jamming enemy signals. This is a 3-D model of SMS Mackensen as she would have appeared in her final design. The battlecruiser is longer than her predecessors, and the most obvious difference from the Derfflinger Class is the Battery Deck carries the secondary battery in hull casemates, and the upper – or main deck -- has been narrowed to expose a small portion of the Battery Deck along the midships section of the hull. ARMOR SMS Mackensen’s vertical (side) armor was based entirely on that of the Derfflinger Class, to include modifications made to SMS Hindenburg, so there is no need to repeat the details, here. The basics were: bow armor 4.8 inches – stern section 4 inches – main belt 12 inches – citadel belt 9 inches – and the casemate strake was 6 inches. There were four transverse bulkheads, also armored with Krupp face-hardened nickel steel. The first armored bulkhead was 7 inches thick and located midway between the stem and “A” turret. The second armored bulkhead of 10 inches sealed the forward end of the main belt armor and fronted “A” turret. The third armored bulkhead of 10 inches was aft, and fronted “D” turret, sealing the aft end of the midships main belt armor. The fourth bulkhead was 5 inches thick, and located midway between “D” turret and the stern. Though the naval architects had, at that time, no combat results to work with, Herr Hullmann had previously pointed out the danger of the battlecruiser’s weak bow armor. Two of the four bulkheads were new additions to try and reduce the threat to the weakly armored ends of the warships. (Such an arrangement might well have saved SMS Lutzow at Jutland.) The horizontal armor on Mackensen was a considerable improvement over SMS Hindenburg, and quite extensive. The naval architects had enough foresight to increase the main gun elevation on SMS Hindenburg on their own initiative – because of the obvious advantages. And the Weapons Department was also smart enough to know the British 13.5-inch and 15-inch guns had considerable range – which meant their shells would be falling on the target from a higher and steeper trajectory – what came to be called “plunging fire”. SMS Mackensen was given a 1.5-inch Upper Deck, a 1-inch Battery Deck, and a 3.1-inch armored protective deck. It was hoped the Upper and Battery decks would be of sufficient thickness to detonate incoming shells before they reached too deeply into the ship’s interior. As the battle reports from Jutland were studied, earlier design weaknesses became apparent, and the brutal destructive power of British 15-inch shells even more so. Two inches of horizontal plate was added over the machinery and magazine spaces during construction. The protective armored deck did away with the sloping edges and tied directly into the main belt side armor. The forward conning tower was armored to 14 inches, while the aft conning tower had 8 inches. The anti-torpedo bulkhead stretched along both beams from “A” turret to “D” turret, and was 2 inches along the boiler spaces and 2.5 inches in all other areas. Three views of SMS Mackensen exiting the Inner Basin at Cuxhaven. Normally, four “fleet tugs” could have handled a ship of this size, but the German practice of mounting twin rudders on the centreline, “in parallel” (one behind the other), caused the ships to handle poorly in any shallow water and especially in confined spaces, such as harbors or canals. The more modern Panzerkreuzer were longer, and known to suddenly veer off in odd directions at slow speeds. Here you see two tugs towing, two more “riding drag” astern, and two alongside for emergencies. The shift to a 14-inch main battery necessitated an entirely new gun house design to accommodate the big rifles. The face plates were 13 inches, with 8-inch sides, sloping roof sections of 7 inches, and flat roof sections of 4 inches. The turret barbettes were 11 inches down to the floor of the battery deck, where they thinned to 3.7 inches. Thinning barbettes as they went down into the ship was a common weight-saving practice in all navies – but it was a faulty theory. Designers assumed several layers of various armor – decks, transverse bulkheads, and hull armor belts – would either detonate the shell, or slow it down sufficiently to prevent penetration if it did manage to strike the barbette armor. The battles of Dogger Bank and Jutland would prove the theory entirely bankrupt. Both British and German capital ships suffered heavily from the loss of main battery turrets – and entire warships -- due to insufficient armor on the gun houses and barbette trunks. (See related chapters on the battle.) Since the Mackensen’s were never tested in battle, we will never know if the additional armor would have been enough. But the designers had made the effort to send Mackensen into battle – without forcing her to carry the seeds of her own potential destruction. This picture has somewhat poor resolution, but it is the only one I could find showing the new SK L/45 14-inch gun – on the right. On the left, is the SK L/50 12-inch gun mounted in the Derfflinger Class battlecruisers. These guns are mounted in “test beds” which are very similar to the gun cradles found inside the turrets. Note the surprising difference in the girth and length of the two guns – as well as the ammunition displayed – and note the size of the sailor in the shot. The Krupp 14-inch gun is a veritable monster. ARMAMENT The main gun armament of the Mackensen Class battlecruisers was to be eight SK L/45 14-inch Krupp rifles. They were to be mounted in a Drh L/C 1914 model gunhouse – and in a Drh L/C 1915 model gunhouse aboard SMS Graf Spee. In most respects the turrets and mountings were very similar to the Drh L/C 1913 turrets designed for the 15-inch-gunned Bayern Class battleships. The new turrets had greater elevation and were somewhat smaller in size. (They were, in fact, larger than previous battlecruisers – but smaller than the battleship version.) Another change from previous turret designs included a “depot platform” – just below the turret working chamber -- intended to store “ready ammunition”. However, as battle reports came in from the North Sea, it was decided only shells would be stored there. The gun cradles were identical in shape to the 1913 designs, but made heavier and stronger to accommodate the more powerful guns. Each of the four gun houses had a 25-foot rangefinder located beneath the roof in its forward extremity. The original gun elevation was increased from 16 to 20 degrees, but wartime experience led to that being further increased to +28 degrees. The gun tube weight was 81 tons – roughly 30 tons heavier than the 12-inch weapons in Derfflinger – and required a more robust hydraulic elevation system with extended driving rods. At +28 degrees of elevation, the 14-inch gun could hurl a 1,321 pound shell out to 30,700 yards at a firing rate of 2.5 shells per minute. The muzzle velocity of 840mps was slower than previous German main battery weapons, but the slower shell velocity actually produced a more stable flight pattern imparting greater accuracy while reducing the “wear rate” of the barrel. With the major increase in tube weight, emergency manual elevation was no longer possible, so an auxiliary electric drive was installed, while the gunhouses were traversed electronically. In an attempt to reduce the overall weight of the turret and working machinery, only a single munitions hoist was installed for each gun. This meant both powder charges and shells were carried in the same hoist. This was roughly the same hoist system installed in Lutzow and Derfflinger – but without the usual interruption between magazine and gun house. This was a most unusual choice for the normally safety-conscious German designers. But using an uninterrupted hoist directly from the magazine to the gunhouse did not appear to entail any undue hazards. Automatic flash doors were installed at both ends of the hoist to prevent accidents, as well as special flash-proof scuttles on the powder magazines and shell rooms. The shells came up from the magazines and exited the hoists between the two guns, where an automatic rammer pushed them onto a “munitions car” – the car was automatically transported behind the guns, where they were rammed home by another automatic rammer. The control position for the loading machinery was in the rear of the turret and had a clear view of the entire operation. Each gun tube was supplied with 85 shells – a mixture of high-explosive, or aluminum-capped armor-piercing. Two smoke extraction fans were installed in the rear of the turret, exhausting the fumes through an armored grate in the floor. The main battery turrets were arranged with excellent arcs of fire – 300 degrees for “A” and “B” turrets – with 310 degrees for “C” and “D” turrets. The Artillery Transmitting Station (fire control central) was located deep within the hull on the middle Platform Deck. The secondary battery consisted of 14 SK L/45 (QF) 5.9-inch guns mounted within hull casemates – 7 on each beam. The casemate area stretched from the rear of “A” turret to the rear of “C” turret – much farther forward than in previous battlecruisers. The German 5.9-inch was an excellent gun and quite capable of dealing with destroyers, and even light cruisers. (See Chapter 17 for details on gun performance.) The light artillery (anti-aircraft weapons) were the standard 3.1-inch Flak L/45 in the MPL C/1913 mounting. These were grouped with four around the forward bridge and four more around “C” turret. The guns were supplied with 450 rounds apiece. Again – the small number of anti-aircraft guns were more than sufficient to deal with the nearly harmless aircraft of the period. The torpedo armament had been increased at the insistence of the Weapons Department, but was reduced to five tubes when the stern torpedo compartment was eliminated to make room for the rudder steering system (itself moved to make room for the new geared turbines). One torpedo tube was mounted in the bow, one on either beam just forward of “A” turret, and one on either beam just aft of the “D” turret magazines. All tubes were equipped with the new quick-loading system and would fire the H-8 Type torpedo. This weapon had two optional speeds and ranges – 6,600 yards at 36 knots, or 15,300 yards at 30 knots. Here we see two of the four Mackensen Class battlecruisers tied-up at mooring points in the Cuxhaven roadsted. SMS Prinz Eitel Friedrich is moored inboard, and SMS Graf Spee is outboard, preparing to take aboard fresh provisions, stores, and coal. The mooring points are by “Mattb325” – modified for use in Cuxhaven. The two wonderful battlecruisers are by @Barroco Hispano. The white tug was gifted by “WolfZe”. Breakwaters by “Uki”. The sailors, lighters, boat boom, small boats, and Thor Class tug are the meticulous work of @AP. In the lower picture you can clearly see where the new 25-foot, internal rangefinder is mounted at the forward extremity of each main battery gunhouse. Close-up detail shot. MACHINERY As with previous Panzerkreuzer, SMS Mackensen was powered by marine steam turbines. Two high-pressure turbines drove the outer shafts through “direct-drive”, and were located outboard on either side of the “C” turret magazines. Low-pressure turbines drove the two inner shafts and were located in the below-decks space between the two aft turrets. The ship’s main condensers were also housed in the aft turbine rooms. For the first time in a German capital ship, “cruise turbines” were coupled to the inner shafts. A high-pressure and low-pressure cruise turbine was coupled to a reduction gear, which was, in turn, coupled to each inner shaft. SMS Mackensen, Graf Spee, and Ersatz Freya were to receive this arrangement, while Furst Bismarck was to be fitted with Professor Fottinger’s recently tested hydrodynamic transmission. (Fottinger’s transmission was slated to be used with the following Ersatz Yorck Class battlecruisers, but in the end, it never saw service in a commissioned capital ship. The system was tested in one of the pre-war German passenger liners, which was ceded to Britain as war reparations. They yanked the system out in 1926 and replaced it with a standard turbine arrangement. But there must have been some merit to Fottinger’s system -- it eventually led to the automobile automatic transmission.) In the final design, Mackensen’s boiler plant comprised eight oil-fired boilers and twenty-four coal-fired boilers. In a slightly improved pattern, there were four smaller boilers in each of the watertight boiler rooms (easier to fit into tight spaces). This was also in line with the Imperial Navy’s policy for a more uniform method of generating steam. It also allowed for boilers to be held in reserve, and made provision for “boiler rotation” during prolonged high-speed operation (for cleaning and trimming the fires -- a problem encountered at Jutland). Contemporary design detail sketches show the coal-fired boilers to be a custom-built double-boiler type. The new cruiser was designed with the standard four-shaft, twin rudders in-parallel, configuration – each rudder operated by a steam-powered spindle drive. In the event of a steering engine failure, the rudders could be cross-connected or operated manually. Mackensen’s bunker capacity was 4,000 tons of coal and 2,000 tons of oil – giving a theoretical operating range of 8,000 miles at 14 knots. The ship’s propulsion plant had a designed rating of 90,000shp capable of achieving 28 knots. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS SMS Mackensen’s electrical plant was more extensive than her predecessors – eight diesel dynamos – the diesels variously built by Blohm & Voss, M.A.N., and Germania-Werft. With eight dynamos provided by Siemens Schuckert, AEG (General Electric), and Brown-Boveri & Co. The system operated on 220 volts with a total output of 2,320kw. Among other equipment, the diesel-dynamos powered nine 48-inch searchlights – one on the upper tripod mast -- four mounted on the forward searchlight bridge – between the fore funnel and the tripod mast. The other four were on the aft searchlight bridge between the mainmast and the second funnel. This view from the stern shows the grouping of the aft anti-aircraft guns on the main deck around “C” turret and a good look at the newly configured aft searchlight bridge. You will note the tight grouping of the “no frills” superstructure and the clutter-free decks. Drainage and pumping systems for the Mackensen Class were completely redesigned from that of previous battlecruisers. Instead of the old “closed-loop”, the new system was a “group-drainage” type – where the transverse bulkheads divided the ship into sections independent of one another. Each watertight compartment and all of its subdivisions were drained through a common pipe, which in turn, could be connected by a valve to the adjoining watertight compartments. In theory, this prevented flooding in one watertight section from overwhelming the pumps in another section. In an emergency, the ship’s condensers, auxiliary cool water pumps, and engine cooling water pumps, could be linked to the system for added capacity. There were eight drainage pumps instead of the usual five. Her crew complement called for 46 officers and 1,140 enlisted men. In all other respects, the Mackensen Class would have had the same details and arrangements as the Derfflinger Class. At this point it might be worth studying the two ships to see just how similar they really were…… Derfflinger is in the foreground, with Mackensen behind her. Mackensen’s extra 41 foot length is apparent. The forecastle ahead of “A” turret is longer, as is the fantail aft of “D” turret – while her midships between the gun turrets is shorter than that on Derfflinger, and her taller funnels are grouped closer together. Mackensen has a more spacious navigation bridge and armored conning tower. While Derfflinger’s forward bridge is lower, and less cluttered – Mackensen’s is more built-up, taller, and has a tripod mast and designated searchlight bridge between the conning tower and the first funnel. The distance between the “C” and “D” turrets is greater on Mackensen than on Derfflinger. SMS Mackensen is in the foreground of this close-up, which shows the individual details much better. “C” turret has two large air scoops on either side, leading down to the high-pressure turbine rooms on either side of the turret magazines. The below-decks space between “C” and “D” turret is occupied by the low-pressure turbines, cruising turbines, and reduction gearing. Mackensen’s gun houses are much larger than those on Derfflinger, and have adopted sloping armor to reduce the vertical and horizontal surface areas of the turret roof and sides. The fronts of the turrets have an unusual “protruding wing” which was specifically included to house the new 25-foot rangefinders used for “local control” in emergencies. Yes – you could tell the two ships apart with no difficulty. But if you examine the deck layout as separate components – the two ships are remarkably similar. The turrets are placed in similar fashion. The conning tower, bridge, and first funnel form the same component structures in both ships (Derfflinger even received a tripod mast after Jutland.) The midships section is again mostly devoted to the ship’s boats. And the aft control structure and funnel on both ships are very similar. The structures are a bit smaller, or a bit larger – but they are basically the same. A sailor transferred from Derfflinger to Mackensen would have felt right at home. MACKENSEN CLASS: Mackensen – Graf Spee – Prinz Eitel Friedrich – Furst Bismarck 31,000 tons – 731 feet in length – 28 knots – 8x14-inch guns – 14x5.9-inch guns – 8x3.1-inch guns – 5x23.6-inch torpedo tubes – Belt armor 12 inches. CONSTRUCTION The keel of this magnificent warship was laid on 30 January 1915, at the Blohm & Voss shipyards in Hamburg. Imperial Germany was only 6 months into the war, and the staff at the Admiralstab were just beginning to find out how ill-prepared they were. Only a little more surprised, were the members of the Army’s Great General Staff. During the first few weeks of the war, the German Army had advanced from success to success, and the army commanders and the General Staff were elated. But as the weeks turned into months, the enemy’s resistance stiffened, and German casualty rates became alarming. Pre-war staff exercises and wargames had never anticipated the sheer slaughter of a machine-gun-dominated modern battlefield. The Army had been in heavy combat from the start -- and was not only in need of replacements for their thinning ranks, but was burning through vast quantities of ammunition, supplies, and equipment of every description. Factories all over Germany were swamped with new contracts demanding huge quantities of uniforms, boots, weapons, and especially machine guns – but most especially for the monster cannon from the Krupp Works. And even at this early stage of the war, the factories and the farms were beginning to lose their unskilled workers to replace battlefield losses. The Kaiserliche Marine also suffered shortages they had never anticipated. Before the war, the fleet had been chronically short of crewmen to man the new dreadnoughts – but that had been more a shortage of money to pay them. Now, the Army was taking every able-bodied man they could and naval recruits were scarce. Soon, the Admiralstab would have to decommission their elderly ships so they could assign the crews to actual fighting ships. Construction yards were overwhelmed with orders for additional torpedo boats to screen the fleet – for minesweepers – and for submarines to attack the English. Dockyards were filling up with damaged warships of all sizes – dreadnoughts torpedoed by submarines – light cruisers struck by mines – or torpedo boats peppered with gunfire while skirmishing in the German Bight or the Baltic Sea. Worst of all – the ranks of the dockyard workers were being thinned by conscription into the Army. Suddenly there was more work than the yards could handle – and fewer workers to handle it. SMS Mackensen fell prey to every shortage and delay imaginable. Within weeks of the keel laying ceremony, the decision was made to slow down her construction so Blohm & Voss workers could be switched to repairing battle damage from light forces skirmishing in the North Sea. Several months later, more workmen were reassigned to begin construction on new U-Boats urgently requested by the Admiralstab. Soon thereafter, Krupp Werk in Essen let it be known priority demands for Army heavy artillery would slow the delivery of Mackensen’s big 14-inch guns. (Eventually, all of her gun tubes were commandeered and mounted as railway guns for the Western Front.) The hull of (arguably) the most advanced warship ever designed for the Imperial Navy remained on the builder’s slip for all of 28 months. Easily a year past its due-date. SMS Mackensen, officially christened, slides down the builder’s slip and into the construction basin at Blohm & Voss Dockyards. She is over a year late getting into the water. You can just make out the shape of the new “bulbous bow” around the “cut” of the “forefoot”. On 21 April 1917, the new battlecruiser was christened by the wife of Feldmarschall August von Mackensen – the man for whom the ship was named. Feldmarschall Anton Ludwig Friedrich August von Mackensen – 1849-1945 – was born in Saxony and joined the 2nd Hussar Regiment of the Prussian Army at age 19 in 1868. He fought in the Franco-Prussian War of 1871 and rose to command the 1st Hussar Regiment in 1893. During The Great War he commanded the 9th and 11th Armies with distinction and was promoted to Feldmarschall in June 1915. He participated in the conquest of Serbia and Romania and was appointed military governor of Romania in 1917. August von Mackensen retired from the Army in 1920, but remained politically active until his death in 1945, at age ninety-five. The unfinished hull of SMS Mackensen was moved into the fitting-out basin, but by 1917 the war aims of the Kaiserliche Marine had changed. The Hochseeflotte had only managed a “tactical” victory at Jutland, while narrowly avoiding a disaster. It was clear to the Admiralstab that even a strengthened battle fleet would not be enough to achieve a decisive victory over the British. The Imperial Navy would now rely upon its U-Boats, mines, and light forces to confront the English across the North Sea. Continuing to build massive capital ships, with no hope of producing a victory, would merely waste valuable resources needed by the fleet – not to mention the Army. A fitting-out gang of around a thousand workmen were allocated to the new Panzerkreuzer and work proceeded slowly. When the Armistice was signed in late 1918, some fifteen month’s work remained before completion. The newly formed Wiemar Republic had no interest in finishing the vessel, and on 17 November 1919, SMS Mackensen was stricken from the naval register. On 21 October 1921, the unfinished hull was sold to Fa Kubatz of Hamburg for scrapping – which was carried out in Kiel beginning in 1922. SMS GRAF SPEE The keel of Graf Spee was laid on 30 November 1915 at the Ferdinand Schichau Werk in Danzig, and she was launched nearly 22 months later, on 15 September 1917. The christening speech was given by HRH Grossadmiral Prinz Heinrich, Commander Baltic Forces, and the ship was christened by the widow of Vizeadmiral Graf von Spee, Grafin Margarette von Spee. She brought a bottle of vintage white wine from the family estates in the Rhineland for the purpose. The ship’s namesake was Vizeadmiral Graf von Spee, born in Copenhagen in 1861, to traveling parents with roots in the Rhineland. Young Maximilian joined the Imperial Navy at age 17, and over the years held several seagoing commands, including the cruiser Hela and the pre-dreadnought battleship Wittelsbach. He did two tours on the Reichsmarineamt staff, and held appointments as second in command of Scouting Forces, and second in command III Battle Squadron, before being appointed to command the German East Asiatic Squadron in China. He and two of his sons perished when his flagship, SMS Scharnhorst, went down at the battle of the Falkland Islands, 8 December 1914. (See Chapter 09 for full details.) SMS Graf Spee was to have been finished as a flagship, with quarters and amenities befitting an admiral and his staff. But no admiral would ever serve in her. Graf Spee suffered much the same fate as Mackensen. She was struck from the ship register and sold for scrap on the same day as her sister ship. She was broken up between 1921-1922 at Deutsch Werke on the Nordmole in Kiel. SMS PRINZ EITEL FRIEDRICH The ship’s keel was laid at the Blohm & Voss yards on 1 May 1915. The work progressed slowly from the start – until it stopped entirely in the summer of 1917 – some 21 month’s work remaining. Never launched, she was not christened – but the name can be found on official correspondence in numerous places. As her predecessors, her name was struck from the register of ships on 17 November 1919, but she remained on the building slip until launched on 13 March 1920 – to clear the slip for other work. The unfinished hull was sold to Fa Kubatz in Hamburg and was broken up between 1920 and 1922. “The remains of Glory” – circa 1921. In this quiet backwater of the Blohm & Voss dockyards lies the residue of a mighty fleet. At lower left, moored along the quay, is the unfinished hull of SMS Prinz Eitel Friedrich. Alongside is the unfinished 15-inch-gun Bayern Class battleship, SMS Wurttemberg. On the right is her unfinished sister-ship, the 15-inch-gun SMS Sachsen. Also visible in front of the big liner on the left is a pair of floating “masting sheers” – often used as a cheap alternative to cantilever cranes. At the end of that line of ships can be seen a large floating dock – even these would be turned over to the “victorious powers” as war reparations. (Note the line of “mooring dolphins” in the center of the basin.) SMS FURST BISMARCK The contract was awarded to the Imperial Dockyards Wilhelmshaven on 18 April 1915, followed by the keel laying on 3 November 1915. She was intended to replace her namesake – the first armored cruiser commissioned into the Kaiserliche Marine in 1900. By the time The Great War ground to its bitter end, the new cruiser was still twenty-six months from completion. Struck from the lists along with her sisters, Furst Bismarck was broken up on the slip, the job finished by 1922. The following four pictures show “what might have been”. Had things gone according to plan, this could have been a typical scene in mid-1918. Three battlecruisers performing “picket duty” in Schillig Roads. Front to back – SMS Moltke, Derfflinger, and Mackensen. But “plans” are only dreams – and not all of them come true. (Battlecruiser models courtesy of @Barroco Hispano. Mooring buoys, tugs, lighters, and channel marker buoys are the work of @AP) The Mackensen Class ships were not the last battlecruiser designs considered by the Imperial Navy, but they were the last ships to even come close to being a reality. At 31,000 tons, they would have been the largest capital ships afloat. The British built faster battlecruisers, but nothing that could have stood up to Mackensen’s 14-inch guns and superb armor suite. And it should be remembered – Beatty’s battlecruisers at Jutland were fast, but that did not save them from taking a severe pounding. It had taken many years and much discussion, but The Imperial German Navy finally produced a capital ship design that was, in almost all respects, superior to their British opponents. It was true – they had declined to mount 15-inch rifles – but the 14-inch shell possessed much greater penetration and a significantly increased bursting charge over that of the 12-inch. The German’s superior gunnery skills would have more than offset the difference. They were handsome warships – long and low – with a towering tripod mast and more closely grouped funnels. Their clean lines bespoke the high speed of powerful engines – and the large, squat, turrets with their massive guns clearly showed her destructive power. Had the Mackensen’s been commissioned, they could well have been the perfect battlecruiser / fast-battleship. If proof is needed of the German ship’s power -- when the British obtained particulars of their design, they countered by laying down the four battlecruisers of the Admiral Class. As The Great War approached its close, three of the British battlecruisers were canceled, and the fourth one was not commissioned until 1920. But she was known the world over as...”The Mighty Hood”. HMS Hood at anchor in the Solent, circa 1924. NEXT TIME…… THE PIPE DREAMS MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful warship models. SPECIAL THANKS to my friend and partner, @AP, for his talents, meticulous models, colorful imagination, and extreme dedication. If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496

SMS Hindenburg lying at anchor in Schillig Roads – circa late 1917. IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 41: THE THIRD SISTER Just two weeks after SMS Lutzow’s keel was laid, the first meeting to discuss “Grosse Kreuzer – 1913” was held on 31 May 1912. Chief Architect Burkner presented several proposals for improvements to the Derfflinger Class Panzerkreuzer. It was, of course, standard practice for German battlecruisers to be laid down a year apart, even when they were sister-ships of the same class – and it was not uncommon for succeeding sister-ships to be “improved” versions. Burkner placed six proposals before the committee, the most important of which involved alterations to the ship’s main gun turrets. The usual two-stage hoist, carrying powder and shells to the gunhouse, would be replaced with two hoists. A two-stage hoist would continue to carry powder -- but a second, direct hoist, would carry shells to the gunhouse without interruption. This would speed delivery of the projectiles, while reducing the number of times the powder hoist would have to be opened, thereby reducing powder handling hazards. Burkner also wanted to add the built-in 25-foot rangefinders planned for the Bayern Class battleship turrets. Admiral Gerdes was in favor of this change, while suggesting the diesel dynamo rooms (positioned below the munitions chambers) be relocated as a further safety measure. It was estimated the changes would add about 120 tons to the designed displacement. The secondary battery of 5.9-inch guns was to be increased from 14 to 18, while reducing the 3.4-inch guns to eight. Since the small guns were primarily for anti-aircraft purposes, it was thought advisable to increase the ammunition allowance to 350 rounds per gun. This was estimated at another 120 tons added weight. It was Burkner’s intention to equip the cruiser with the new “Type H” 24-inch torpedo. This model could make 30 knots with a range increase from 8,000 to 12,000 yards. The larger caliber torpedo reloads would add 65 tons. At the same time, Burkner wanted to remove the single stern torpedo tube and replace it with an aft torpedo flat deploying two tubes -- one on either beam -- laterally angled at 10-20 degrees. This change was, however, heavily dependent on space and would require the stern to be lengthened by 3 meters -- adding some 300 tons to displacement. Burkner also wanted to increase the battlecruiser’s speed by a half a knot, but withdrew the suggestion. Other department heads pointed out the required machinery, and additional citadel armor to protect it, would add considerable weight and require a major redesign. Finally, Burkner’s last suggestion was to reinforce the torpedo bulkheads to a 2-inch thickness. After some discussion, the State Secretary, Grossadmiral von Tirpitz, ruled out anything requiring a time-consuming redesign – so the secondary battery was kept at 14 guns and the diesel dynamo room would remain where it was. He approved reducing the 3.4-inch guns to eight, but kept the ammunition allowance at 250 rounds per gun. The changes to the main battery gunhouses and the new torpedoes were approved – but not the complicated aft torpedo flat. At the close of the meeting, Tirpitz requested weight and cost figures for the same Grosse Kreuzer, only with four double turrets mounting 14-inch guns. (It is worth noting Tirpitz persisted in arming the battlecruisers with guns one caliber smaller than the 15-inch-gunned Bayern Class battleships.) The Construction Department replied on 9 September 1912 with two studies: one armed with 14-inch guns, and another one with 15-inch guns. Tirpitz, unwilling to take on the higher cost, flatly ruled out the 15-inch option. And -- equally unwilling to accept any increase in size or displacement, the 14-inch gun caliber could only be accommodated by weight reductions in other areas. In the end, the new design studies were unable to completely compensate for weight increases, and the cost was still 33.3 million Marks – 1.8 million more than the estimated 31.5 million Marks spent on Lutzow. “Grosse Kreuzern 1913 – Erstaz Hertha” profile plan. This working sketch of SMS Lutzow was used as a starting basis for the new cruiser and would visually differ very little when done. Tirpitz considered the increases in displacement, and especially in cost, to be too great -- so it was ultimately decided “Grosse Kreuzer - 1913” would be built as the “third sister” of the Derfflinger Class. The final design was approved by His Majesty, the Kaiser, though there would still be a few minor changes made during construction. A quick-loading device for the broadside torpedo flat was designed and installed, and an additional searchlight was added to the foremast. The middle passageway was laid out to take advantage of protective coal bunkers while reducing the close proximity of the 5.9-inch magazines amidships. Increased ventilation was incorporated for the machinery spaces and boiler rooms. She was given fifty additional crewmen, and the central superstructure on the upper deck was lengthened to provide better cabin accommodations. There was a slight increase in displacement, and an effort was made to compensate the loss in speed by fine-tuning her underwater hull lines. The worrisome diesel dynamo rooms, in the end, were taken from beneath the main gun shell rooms and placed on the Hold Deck – removing a fire hazard from the magazine areas. THE OPPOSITION HMS Repulse: Commissioned August 1916 – 27,200 tons – 31.5 knots – 6x15-inch guns – 17x4-inch guns -- 2x21-inch torpedo tubes – armor belt 6 inches. While the discussions, planning, and cost-cutting for “the third sister” went forward, the British were not idle. “Grosse Kreuzer - 1913”, once laid down, would likely join the Hochseeflotte some time in 1916. Unbeknownst to Tirpitz and the Admiralstab – the new Panzerkreuzer would not be commissioned until 1917. By that time, the Royal Navy would posses 4 battlecruisers with 12-inch guns – HMS Inflexible, Indomitable, New Zealand, Australia – and 3 cruisers with 13.5-inch guns – HMS Lion, Princess Royal, and Tiger. If needed as support, they also had the services of the 15-inch-gunned fast battleships of the Queen Elizabeth Class – HMS Queen Elizabeth, Barham, Warspite, Malaya, and Valiant. And between Jutland in May 1916, and the commissioning of the new Imperial Panzerkreuzer in 1917, the British would add 2 battlecruisers of the 15-inch-gunned Renown Class – HMS Renown and Repulse. In the same year, two 15-inch-gunned ships of the Courageous Class (Courageous and Glorious) would also join the fleet. (I mention these last two only to be statistically correct – they were so thinly armored they could never have survived Jutland. Taking them into battle against anything bigger than a light cruiser would have been an act of self-immolation.) That gave the Grand Fleet a total of 11 battlecruisers and 5 fast battleships capable of opposing the German battlecruisers. By contrast, the Hochseeflotte could only muster five battlecruisers – two of which mounted 12-inch guns. Due to the inability of German builders to turn out capital ships quickly, and the Reichstag’s reluctance to pay for them, von Hipper’s 1st Scouting group was hopelessly outnumbered by 1917. And it was only made worse by von Tirpitz’ fear of spending money on Krupp’s excellent SK-L/50 15-inch rifle. HMS Courageous: Commissioned November 1916 – 19,180 tons – 32 knots – 4x15-inch guns – 18x4-inch guns – 2x21-inch torpedo tubes – armor belt 3 inches. With their 3-inch armor belt, the Courageous Class battlecruisers were considered “death traps” by Royal Navy officers. After the war, they were laid-up “in ordinary” and eventually converted to aircraft carriers. Below are three images of Courageous moored to buoys in the Old Harbor Basin where “retired” ships are kept awaiting final disposition. In the first shot, the old harbor wharf was made with an older brick texture, fronted by “WMP” Seawalls, with a shirt factory building repurposed as a large warehouse. The wharf was “dressed-out” with various props from “PEG’s SNM” naval series, dockyard cranes from “Nob’s 1905 Naval Series”, and a “truck-load” of other props by “AP” and various authors. The offshore mooring buoys are by "AP", as are the various lighters and crane barges scattered about. The elderly warships are from “Nob”, and the fine model of Courageous is courtesy of @Barroco Hispano. The remaining two shots give you a close-up of the battlecruiser. You can see the extremely long and narrow hull designed for great speed and providing the length to pack in the extra boilers. The last shot gives you a good detailed view of the model. Note the triple mountings for 4-inch guns adjacent the bridge and the rear of the superstructure deck. The model pictures her as she would have appeared in 1918, with “flying-off” platforms on her main battery turrets for “Sopwith Pups”. (However, NO place to land.) With only four 15-inch guns, Courageous would have been at a severe disadvantage in an engagement with an Imperial battlecruiser. GROSSE KREUZER – 1913 The construction of “Ersatz Hertha’s” hull is well underway. The “wall” running down the center of the ship is the longitudinal bulkhead that will divide the boiler and turbine rooms into separate watertight compartments. Under the terms of the Reichstag Fleet Law Amendment of 1906, an elderly warship could be “retired” after 20 years and automatically replaced. The new ship would be designated in the construction contract with the “Ersatz” (replacement) name of the cruiser that had been “retired”. “Grosse Kreuzer – 1913” would hold the builder’s designation of “Ersatz Herta”, replacing the old protected cruiser of 1898 (see Chapter 2 for details of the old cruiser). On 20 April 1913 the contract was awarded to the Kaiserliche Werft Wilhelmshaven. “Ersatz Hertha’s” keel was laid on 1 October 1913 and she would be launched a shockingly slow twenty-three months later on 1 August 1915. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS “Ersatz Hertha” – profile plan as she appeared upon completion. Visually, “Hertha” was a near-identical twin of SMS Lutzow, with the exception of a few minor differences. Her funnels and funnel caps do not match – but each of the three battlecruisers could be identified by their unique funnels and caps. Lutzow had a simple pole mast forward, rather than the substantial tripod mast on “Hertha”. Derfflinger only received her tripod mast during the extensive repair period following Jutland. Beyond that, the differences between the two ships i\was limited to “internal” adjustments (see previous text). The “Grosse Kreuzer Ersatz Hertha” was constructed as the third ship of the Derfflinger Class. As such, there were very few differences in the construction methods, materials, and process. Rather than repeat them here, I refer you to Chapter 23 for details – and will discuss only the differences between “Hertha” and her predecessors. At 26,947 tons, her displacement was some 350 tons greater, and the new cruiser’s hull was a bit longer, at 696 feet. The Derfflinger Class had a wider beam than previous battlecruisers, which allowed for better use of internal subdivision, resulting in an enormous capacity to withstand battle damage. But wider hulls invariably increased the “drag co-efficient” – reducing the ship’s speed. Through further testing of the hull form in the hydraulic tanks, it was determined a slight lengthening of the stern would add a half knot to her speed. This resulted in a 2.5 meter increase in “Hertha’s” overall length. Unlike Derfflinger and Lutzow, the new Panzerkreuzer would not be fitted with torpedo nets and booms, nor did she receive “Frahm” roll-damping tanks. After Jutland, Derfflinger was fitted with a very heavily braced tripod mast of unusual height, with a multi-level foretop for gunnery direction. Well supported by the heavy-duty tripod, the foretop structure was spacious compared to previous arrangements and contained a fire direction and control position, a 25-foot rangefinder, a torpedo direction position, and a night observation position. “Hertha” would receive hers during the fitting-out process. The Bayern Class battleships would also be given tripod foremasts, indicating a new trend in Imperial capital ship design. ARMOR For all practical purposes, “Hertha” was given the same superb armor suite as her sister ships, with all the advantages of protective coal bunkers and even more extensive internal compartmentalization. There were, however, four exceptions. The armor on the sloping portions of the main battery turrets was increased from 4.2 inches to 6 inches. The armor belt on the bow was 4 inches, as in Derfflinger and Lutzow, but in “Hertha” it was discontinued 40 feet from the stem and replaced with a more narrow belt of 1.2 inch plating. The thinner plates were riveted to the hull skin, rather than the standard practice of bolting armor plate to the hull. An armored transverse bulkhead was added midway between “A” turret and the stem. In an effort to compensate for the reduced armor thickness at the stem, “Hertha” was given an additional watertight compartment forward (17 in total) to increase the reserve buoyancy of the bow. The designers did not yet have any battle experience to draw upon, so they had no idea they were making a serious problem even worse. ARMAMENT MAIN BATTERY The main battery arrangements of “Ersatz Hertha” were somewhat different from her two sisters. She duplicated the mounting of eight SK-L/50 12-inch rifles in four twin turrets, but they were installed in the Drh-L-C/1913 gunhouse designed for the Bayern Class dreadnoughts. Each turret had a 25-foot rangefinder installed up forward just beneath the armored roof. The old turret hood was replaced by a traversing-bearing telescope mounted between the guns. Two more bearing telescopes were mounted on either side wall of the gunhouse. The designers, in a rather bold move, took it upon themselves to alter the gunhouses for an elevation of -5 to +16 degrees, bringing them into line with foreign navies and providing a maximum range of 20,000 yards. (The US Army has an old saying...”It is easier to ask forgiveness than it is to get permission.”) Instead of the old manual traverse back-up system, an auxiliary electric motor was provided. The major difference between the gunhouses on Derfflinger and Lutzow, and those on “Hertha” was the new ammunition hoist system. Two shell hoists, one for each gun barrel, ran up the center of the barbette trunk from the shell rooms and handling spaces located on the lower platform deck. The top end of the “express” hoist came out between the guns near the trunnions. An auto-loader pushed the shell back onto a loading tray which swung the shell behind the breech. The hydraulic rammer then pushed the shell into the breech. Each hoist could service either gun. The shell hoists could only be accessed at the top or the bottom – and there were flash-proof automatic doors at either end. The powder hoists ran up from the powder magazines on the upper platform deck to the transfer room three levels below the guns. Here the powder charges were switched from the lower hoist to the upper hoist, and then up to the guns. The upper and lower hoists had flash-proof automatic doors fitted. The powder hoists were always designed with two stages so flash explosions could not shoot straight down into the powder magazines. This new arrangement gave shells their own dedicated, “express” hoist, eliminating the need to handle them twice on the way to the guns, and clearing the powder hoists of the extra work. Even with the new arrangement, shells and powder could be delivered to the guns at the rate of three rounds per minute. SECONDARY BATTERY The 5.9-inch batteries remained the same as Lutzow – fourteen SK-L/45 guns in shielded casemates on the battery deck amidships. The only difference in the guns were the mounts. A new mounting pedestal had been designed for the Bayern Class – an MPL-C/1913 – and it was taken for use on “Hertha” as well. There were minor modifications to the location of the elevation and traverse controls, but the mount was shorter, and sat closer to the deck. This made the casemate compartment somewhat smaller and allowed a few extra degrees of elevation (slightly increased range). TERTIARY BATTERY Originally, twelve 3.4-inch SK-L/45 (QF) high-velocity guns were intended for torpedo boat defense. But war experience proved these light guns useless against modern destroyers. (See Chapter 36 for specifics on gun performance.) In the end, four 3.4-inch “Flak” L/45 cannon mounted in MPL-C/1913 mounts were positioned around the forward funnel – two on either beam. As anti-aircraft weapons, they also proved of little use. British aircraft were generally carried by primitive “aircraft tenders” and proved awkward to operate, difficult to handle, unreliable, and generally incapable of seriously damaging a capital ship. TORPEDO ARMAMENT As was customary, “Ersatz Hertha” was fitted with four submerged torpedo tubes arranged in the standard pattern -- one fore and aft, and one on each beam. Sixteen of the new 24-inch “Type H” torpedoes were carried. They had a speed of 30 knots and a range of 12,000 yards, with a warhead containing 463 lbs of TNT. The Kaiserliche Marine favored a modified version of “TNT” as the bursting charge in all their shells, torpedoes, and mines because of its stable composition. Foreign navies, the British in particular, tended toward acid-based explosive compounds like Cordite and Lyddite – which often crystallized over time – and either became volatile or went inert and failed to explode on impact. A newly designed quick-loading device was installed in the broadside torpedo flat (the bow and stern torpedo flats were too small for the device). The propulsion plant – boilers, turbines, shafts, propellers, and rudders – were identical to Lutzow. The fine tuning of the underwater hull lines and the slightly lengthened stern allowed “Hertha” to achieve a speed of 27.5 knots in shallow water, even with the slightly heavier displacement. All other details of the design and construction – anchors, ship’s boats, electrical plant, searchlights, wireless transmitters and receivers – were the same as Lutzow. The “ring drainage system” was similar to Lutzow’s “improved” capacity, but the pumps were located in different positions in the hull. “Ersatz Hertha” would ship a crew of 45 officers and 1,118 men. “Grosse Kreuzer Esatz Hertha” was built to be just as fast, rugged, and powerful as her sister ships. And – if at all possible – her towering tripod mast made her even more handsome and warlike than her predecessors. Unfortunately, all the efforts of the planners and architects were unable to defeat the accountants – she came in at a “wartime inflation” cost of 59 million Marks – 3 million Marks over budget. The unadorned hull of “Ersatz Hertha” slides down the slipway at the Imperial Dockyard Wilhelmshaven with much rumbling and clanking of drag chains. Though it was a simple ceremony, it was a moment of great pride for the workmen and extreme interest for the naval officers. (Note the file of officers on the stairs right of center, bottom.) On 1 August 1915, after twenty-three long months on the builder’s slip, “Grosse Kreuzer Ersatz Hertha” was launched. After war broke out her construction was delayed, mainly due to workforce shortages. But the Admiralstab also assigned a higher priority to building U-Boats and repairing battle damage. Repairing torpedo and mine damage tied down a large part of Germany’s shipyard capacity. The new battlecruiser was christened SMS Hindenburg – in honor of Feldmarschall Paul von Hindenburg. Warships were not usually named after “living” military figures, but Hindenburg was, perhaps, the only nationally recognized “war hero” – and he was born to the Prussian aristocracy. Hindenburg had retired as a General der Infanterie in 1903, but was recalled in 1914 and won many victories on the Eastern Front. He became chief of the Supreme Army Command (OHL) in 1916 and remained as such until his second retirement on 30 June 1919 as a Generalfeldmarschall. As the most respected man in Germany, he was elected President of the Weimar Republic in 1925 and held the post until his death at age 86 on 2 August 1934. Though SMS Hindenburg was moved directly from the slipway to the fitting-out basin, work proceeded slowly, and she would remain there for another twenty-one months. In June 1916, an unusual delay occurred when specialized building materials and fabricated sections were “borrowed” to repair Derfflinger after Jutland. Judging by previous warship construction, they could have shaved a year off her time on the slipway, and another year off the fitting-out process. The delay was intolerable, and was responsible for Hindenburg’s absence at Jutland. This is an overhead shot – quite possibly taken from a Zeppelin. SMS Hindenburg has slid down the ways of the large construction slip visible in the left of the picture. The construction slips and dry docks of the Kaiserliche Werft construction yard are laid out along the west and north sides of what is the Inner Basin area of Wilhelmshaven. Hindenburg’s repair or maintenance will be carried out in the large dry dock basins to the right, or in one of several large floating docks built to accommodate the larger dreadnought capital ships. Tugs will push Hindenburg down to the “fitting-out” quay at lower left. Due to the somewhat limited facilities at Wilhelmshaven, it was only possible to have one capital ship building, and one fitting-out, at any given time. In this shot, Hindenburg has been moved from the fitting-out quay to one of the larger repair basins for the final stages of her completion. You can see the heavy work – gun turrets, superstructure, masts, and funnels have been completed. There are numerous small, but essential jobs – mostly interior finishing to be done – but there is no large work force, nor any sign of urgency. This is a 3-D artist’s view of SMS Hindenburg as she would have appeared at the time of commissioning. You can see the long, low, profile of the Derfflinger Class has been dramatically altered with the addition of the heavy and unusually tall tripod foremast. Note the large foretop fire control and spotting position. The overall design concentrates the above deck structures in a compact grouping between the gun turrets, while the long, low, hull gives her the look of a greyhound – lean and fast. The addition of the tripod mast only adds to her majestic proportions and elegant lines. SEA TRIALS Commissioned into the Kaiserliche Marine on 10 May 1917, Hindenburg was given to the battle-tested Kapitan zur See von Karpf, the commanding officer of SMS Moltke at Jutland. The new cruiser lay alongside the coaling and munitions piers from 10-21 May, while stores and fresh provisions were taken aboard from lighters. As the goods were stored below, preparations were made to begin sea trials. Unfortunately, Hindenburg’s official trials report did not survive WW II, but Kapitan von Karpf wrote several progress reports for the Admiralstab which are still extant. With the morning tide on 22 May, Hindenburg weighed and passed through the III lock to Wilhelmshaven Roads where compass deviation was determined, followed by engine and steering maneuver tests. Satisfied with her maneuverability, three torpedo boats from the 14th Flotilla assumed escort duties, and von Karpf set course for the mouth of the Elbe River at 18 knots. She anchored overnight in Altenbruch Roads and on the following day made the transit of the Kaiser Wilhelm I Canal, arriving in the Kieler Hafen by late evening. Hindenburg spent 24-29 May in the hands of the Imperial Dockyard Kiel while her machinery was checked and adjustments made. Newly commissioned, SMS Hindenburg is moored at the Munitions Quay”, working quickly to take aboard her “full combat load” so her sea trials can begin. The turret crews are loading shells and powder charges over the port side, while a work detail is preparing to take aboard ship’s stores and fresh provisions over the starboard rail. All of the lighters and tugboats in this picture are the work of “AP”, while his props are – quite literally – all over the munitions complex. Below is another view of the same scene. The staggeringly detailed model of the battlecruiser SMS Hindenburg is the exquisite work of @AP – and is, without doubt, the finest work he has yet produced!! SMS Hindenburg running the “measured mile” in the Kleinen Belt. She is putting out a great deal of smoke and raising a huge bow wave – as well as a turbulent wake (due to shallow water). At 07:00 on 30 May 1917, the Panzerkreuzer put to sea to begin trials in the western Baltic. Two separate forced-draft trials were run to test the operation of the supplemental oil-firing for the boilers. The ship reached 64,862shp and achieved a sustained speed of 25.49 knots. The morning of 4 June, the cruiser ran out for a “measured mile” speed trial in the Kleinen Belt, during which it was noted the condensers were running “warm” – indicating a retarded flow of steam to the turbines. From 1-5 June she was in dockyard hands to correct the problem, while the traversing works of “C” and “D” turrets were tested. On 11 June, Hindenburg returned to the Kleinen Belt for a re-test on the “measured mile”. This time, her engines developed 95,777shp and attained a speed of 26.7 knots. Since the Kleinen Belt is fairly shallow, it was estimated Hindenburg could easily make 28.5 knots in deep water -- without resorting to boiler overloading. During the high speed test, Hindenburg “dug-in”, taking considerable water across the fantail. From 17-20 June, Hindenburg was moored quayside while aircraft handling equipment was installed. The idea had been added during construction, and the plan called for two twin-engine floatplanes to be shipped on either beam, abaft the second funnel. Hindenburg has been moored at the Cuxhaven repair docks while mechanics work on the overheated steam condensers. The steam pipes could be blocked by construction debris, or the pipes may need to be rerouted to improve the flow pattern and steam dispersal. The repair ship Vestal has moored alongside to support any heavy work, while a machinist’s barge has been brought over to help with the precision fitting needs. This angle shows the new tripod foremast with its spacious fire control top. This second view clearly shows the additional length at the stern and the streamlined hull form. The Steam tug Goliath, standing by the machinists barge, is courtesy of @Barroco Hispano. The building on the barge is by “Nob”, while the barges, dockside cranes, small boats, tugboats, and lighters are all by “AP”. The wonderful repair ship Vestal is also by “AP”. And the absolutely fantastic battlecruiser is the handsomely crafted, scratch-built, work of @AP. SMS Hindenburg on the gunnery range. Kapitan von Karpf has worked up to full speed and has opened fire with the main battery on his second run. On 21 June, the wind was from the WSW, force 3, with light cloud as Hindenburg weighed and put to sea for gunnery trials. The main batteries opened fire at 09:45 and continued at a slow and deliberate pace until 14:15 that afternoon. The following day the 5.9-inch secondary batteries were tested between 08:45 and 13:00. On 27 June, His Highness the Grossherzog (Grand Duke) Friedrich-Franz von Mecklenburg-Schwerin was received on board for a tour of the ship and luncheon with the officers. Beginning 18 July, 1st Scouting Group arrived in Kiel and Hindenburg joined them for unit maneuver training. This was followed by torpedo firing practice and main and secondary gunnery practice on the ranges. SMS Hindenburg was officially detached from trials on 20 August 1917, and the squadron shifted to the Mecklenburg Bight to carry out more maneuvers and towed-target gunnery. The Panzerkreuzer remained there until 11 October, when they returned to the Kieler Hafen. SMS Seydlitz (foreground) followed by SMS Hindenburg during squadron maneuvers with the 1st Scouting Group in Mecklenburg Bight. On 15 October, 1st Scouting Group again ran out for training with torpedo boat flotillas. It gave the torpedo boats station-keeping practice cruising with the big ships, while each of the two flotillas took turns making mock-attacks on them. The squadron anchored in the Kieler Hafen that afternoon, and Vizeadmiral Hipper was received on board Hindenburg. He toured the ship and dined with the officers, discussing their opinions of the new warship. During his inspection, he gave special attention to the new ammunition hoist system – climbing around “B” turret like a young naval cadet. At 22:43 on 25 October, SMS Hindenburg entered the south lock at Holtenau and made the transit of the Kaiser Wilhelm I canal, arriving in Brunsbuttel around 11:20 the following morning. There was a bit of fog, so von Karpf secured the services of a pilot boat and continued to the mouth of the Elbe. Once clear of the river, speed was increased to 18 knots and Hindenburg arrived in the Jade at 16:35. Later that evening, Hindenburg received orders assigning her to 1st Scouting Group, and ran into the dockyard for more minor adjustments and some “finish work” that needed to be done. OPERATIONAL HISTORY SMS Hindenburg was the last battlecruiser, and the last dreadnought, commissioned into the Kaiserliche Marine. She was fully operational by 20 August 1917, but the war had only fifteen months to run before the guns went silent. There would be no more major action at sea, and Hindenburg’s career would be both mundane and short. With trials out of the way, the big cruiser settled into the tedious routine of pulling picket duty in the Jade, being on short notice for raising steam (back-up for picket ships), or being in dockyard hands for periodic maintenance. There were no peacetime cruises as in days past – though the new battleship SMS Baden, escorted by Derfflinger, did carry the Kaiser on a Royal visit to Heligoland Island in August 1917. Training exercises were frequent, but were held in the western Baltic or confined to areas of the German Bight protected by minefields. And there was, of course, the occasional enemy intrusion on this tiresome monotony. In the wee hours of the morning on 17 November, SMS Hindenburg was on picket duty in Schillig Roads when a message was received to assume a state of “increased readiness”. There was a reconnaissance by minesweepers (light cruisers in support) in progress in the Bight – scouting out some recently laid British minefields. The Germans were eager to clear the mines, but the British had been particularly active in the area, and they were unsure what they might run into. As a precaution, Kapitan von Karpf ordered all boilers to be lit-off and steam raised for sailing as soon as possible. At 08:51 a wireless came in from the light cruiser SMS Konigsberg...”Enemy light forces in grid square 058 Alpha.” This was followed four minutes later with...”Enemy heavy units in support – 3 battlecruisers – cruisers and destroyers.” Orders went out to Hindenburg and Moltke to standby, and at 09:40 they were ordered to weigh and put to sea in support of the German light forces. Five boats of the XII Torpedo Boat Flotilla tore down the Jade’s deep water channel to get out ahead and form a screen for the big ships. Within minutes, Hindenburg, followed by Moltke, swept down the channel at 15 knots – visibility was just 5 miles. SMS Hindenburg moving to support German light forces operating in the Heligoland Bight. As seen from SMS Moltke. By 10:45, the Panzerkreuzer were passing War Light Vessel “A” off the Jade, making 23 knots. Around 11:16 the wind shifted slightly and a haze began to settle-in to the north and west. With visibility down to 2 miles, Hindenburg increased to 26 knots and gradually pulled ahead of Moltke, who’s best speed was only 23 knots (dirty bottom – bad coal). At 12:10, ships came in sight ahead on both bows and lookouts identified SMS Kaiser and Kaiserin. German torpedo boats could be seen ahead with light cruisers off the starboard bow. Konteradmiral von Reuter signaled Hindenburg and Moltke to fall-in astern and von Karpf took station off the battleship’s starboard quarter. They maintained course NW until 12:40 when a wireless from the Flottenchef (Scheer) ordered the battleships back to the Jade. Vizeadmiral Souchon (returned from Turkey) ordered the battlecruisers to continue scouting to the NW, and they did, until recalled around 15:00. Hindenburg and Moltke dropped anchor in Schillig Roads at 19:45 without sighting a single enemy. It is just as well. The British had been laying minefields close around the German Bight in an attempt to hinder German surface units, and especially U-Boats, from getting into the North Sea. The raid was supposed to discourage German mine-sweeping activity. HMS Renown, Courageous, Glorious, and a light cruiser squadron were to carry out the attack -- supported at a distance by the 1st Battle Squadron of the Grand Fleet. The British charged out of the haze just after sun-up and opened fire. The German minesweepers instantly scattered and laid a very effective smoke screen as they withdrew. Repulse landed one 15-inch shell on the light cruiser Konigsberg and raced ahead at 31 knots to close on her prey – when a great cloud of black smoke was seen rising to the SE. That could only mean one thing – battleships. Repulse quickly put about, recalled her light cruisers and destroyers, and withdrew into the NW haze. On 23 November, Vizeadmiral von Hipper transferred from SMS Seydlitz to SMS Hindenburg, and in a brief ceremony, his flag was hoisted to her forepeak. Hindenburg would remain flagship of the 1st Scouting Group until 21 June 1919. Beyond that bit of naval protocol, Hindenburg’s existence continued in the mundane and tiresome duties of a fleet in harbor: picket duty – escorting minesweepers – squadron evolutions – visits to the dockyard – and, the occasional “war patrol.” SMS Hindenburg on a visit to the dockyard. She is seen here, cradled in one of the large floating docks. Typically, one or two Panzerkreuzer, accompanied by light cruisers and torpedo boats, might sail westward and scout the “Hoofden” area off the Dutch coast in hopes of surprising some British shipping or light forces. Or – they might even run out to the Dogger Bank and scatter British light forces interfering with German minesweeping operations. Even if nothing momentous was achieved, it allowed the battlecruisers some time at sea and gave them practice operating in the wartime environment. In the later part of 1917, Admiral Scheer began harassing the Norwegian convoys to and from Britain. The Royal Navy had begun providing convoy escorts at least a year earlier to keep U-Boats away from the vital cargoes bound for Britain. After Jutland, Scheer was desperate to find some way to hit back at the British while proving the Hochseeflotte was still relevant to the German war effort. On 17 October, the fast minelaying light cruisers SMS Brummer and Bremse intercepted an east-bound convoy of twelve freighters and two destroyers – HMS Mary Rose and Strongbow. The convoy scattered while the German cruisers were distracted by the escorts, but they managed to sink both destroyers and hunt down nine of the freighters before withdrawing at high speed. On 12 December, four German torpedo boats ambushed another convoy of five freighters, again with two escorting destroyers. All five freighters were lost along with one destroyer. Admiral Sir David Beatty, new C.-in-C. Grand Fleet, could not afford to keep losing destroyers, and was equally reluctant to risk light cruisers. He decided battleships would quickly put an end to the German nuisance raids and attached a Battle Squadron of eight ships to the escort force. This quickly became known to the Admiralstab, and just as quickly, it was seen as the opportunity for which they had been waiting all along. At long last, a manageable portion of the British battle fleet might be isolated and destroyed. This is a view of SMS Hindenburg moored at her berth along the breakwater in Cuxhaven’s roadsted. Built as one of three Derfflinger Class battlecruisers, she is nearly identical to SMS Lutzow. The only visible differences are the tripod foremast with fighting top, and the “cosmetic” appearance of her funnels. You will note, as flagship of Scouting Forces, she is flying a Vizeadmiral’s flag at the forepeak. And -- she is the largest, last, and finest, of all the Imperial battlecruisers. The breakwaters are by “Uki”, and the modified mooring points are by “Mattb325”. The gunboat USS Erie, patrolling off the breakwater, is courtesy of “Barroco Hispano”. The motor launch off the port beam, the boat boom and small boats, the harbor tug with provision lighter – and the superbly crafted model of the SMS Hindenburg is the meticulous work of “AP”. BELOW is a close-up of the detail work on SMS Hindenburg. The massive gun turrets are authentic in every detail, right down to the German version of the “Carley Floats” on their sides. The new tripod foremast and fire control fighting top are clearly visible, with a new black paint scheme for the upper portions. The “signature” boat booms (cranes) and “Kingston Posts” are intricately detailed constructions, and each of the ship’s boats is an individual “work of art” in itself. The soot-stained funnels, weathered decking, and weathered hull are details that are often overlooked. The level of detail is magnificent – and this model is his best work – with more to come. Vizeadmiral von Hipper was tasked with planning the operation and he fell back on the old reliable methods. With the light cruisers of 2nd Scouting Group screening ahead, the Panzerkreuzer of 1st Scouting Group would form the advance screen and convoy strike force. If there were no battleships in the escort, the battlecruisers would make short work of the convoy. If there were British battleships present, Hipper would signal the Hochseeflotte – waiting to the south – just below the horizon. Scheer would outnumber the British battle squadron by nearly 3 to 1. The only real difference in the operational planning was that Hipper imposed strict wireless restrictions on the fleet prior to and during the operation. There would be no gossip on the airwaves. On 23 April 1918, at 05:00, 2nd Scouting Group, followed by 1st Scouting Group cleared the Jade and steered north along the swept channels. But the weather was terrible, with patches of thick fog limiting visibility to as little as 200 meters, and only two and a half miles at best. Navigating minefield channels in such conditions was insanity. Both scouting groups anchored at 11:35, but resumed course and speed at 12:10. By midnight, the two scouting groups had cleared all the British-laid minefields and increased speed to 18 knots. Morning of 24 April dawned bright with a NE breeze and visibility of 34 to 46 miles. Around 09:00 Hipper swung Hindenburg about and led Derfflinger and Seydlitz back to Moltke, lying dead in the water – some fifty miles SW of Bergen, Norway. SMS Moltke had thrown her inboard, starboard propeller, and before the turbines could be shut down, the shaft ran away and caused the couplings to shatter – sending large chunks of metal slicing through the ship. Several boilers were disabled, the hull had been holed and was making water, and only one turbine could be operated. The crew plugged the leak, began sorting out the boilers, and made temporary repairs that would get the ship underway at 4 knots. Fortunately, the main body of the Hochseeflotte drew abreast around 10:25, and the battleship SMS Oldenburg was ordered to take the crippled battlecruiser under tow for the Jade. With Moltke in good hands, Hipper turned north once more in search of the British convoy. By 13:10, 1st Scouting Group was about 60 miles west of Bergen, Norway. Hipper steered a search pattern across the known course of the previous convoys three times. At the top leg of the third pass, he searched about 20 miles farther north, then swung 10 miles inshore and, steering SSE, passed within 40 miles of the fjord mouth. But to no avail – no merchant ships nor warships. It was now past the usual sailing time for the convoys – so they had either sailed early, or canceled the sailing. Hipper swung Hindenburg due south, recalled 2nd Scouting Group from their search pattern, and set course for the Jade. A brief, code-word signal was sent to Scheer, who promptly turned the battle fleet about and also made for Wilhelmshaven. About 01:00 on 25 April, SMS Oldenburg, with Moltke in tow, came into view under a bright moon in a cloudless sky. By this time, Moltke’s crew had made repairs to the engines and the towed battlecruiser was making 13 knots. Hipper reduced speed and 1st Scouting Group took station on the seaward flank of the tow to provide security for the journey home. The group made steady progress southward until about 12:10, when a minesweeper in advance of the group, M-67, struck a mine, broke in half, and sank. Later, around 19:37, Moltke (under tow) was approaching Amrum Bank Passage and the entrance to the German defensive minefields. She was struck in the port side engine room by a torpedo fired from the British submarine E-42. The battlecruiser took on nearly 1,800 tons of water and began listing to port. Kapitan zur See Gygas knew his pumps were holding the water in check, so he maneuvered Moltke into the Amrum Bank Passage and gained the safety of the defensive minefields. Eventually four salvage tugs arrived and helped pump out the flooded compartments, then two of them were lashed alongside, while a third took over the tow from Oldenburg. Around 03:20 on 26 April 1st Scouting Group dropped anchor in Wilhelmshaven Roads, and Moltke went into dry dock soon after daybreak. It was later determined the German agent in Bergen had gotten his information wrong. The convoy was actually scheduled to sail on 25 April – twenty-four hours after Hipper’s visit. But – Hipper’s ban on wireless traffic before and during the sortie proved quite effective. The canny Bavarian had pinpointed the weakness in German operational security. The Room 40 code-breakers in Whitehall never had the slightest notion the Hochseeflotte was loitering about off Norway. A great deal has been written by historians to prove Jutland put the “fear of God” into the Germans and they never again ventured to sea after the battle. The truth, however, is far less complimentary to the British, and a lot less provocative to the Germans. In fact, the entire nature of The Great War at sea changed after Jutland. Submarines and mines were considered far too dangerous in the confined waters of the North Sea. German submarines had become a positive menace to merchant shipping and warships alike. After the battle, Jellicoe arbitrarily decided the Grand Fleet could no longer be risked in the southern portions of the North Sea – it was too close to German submarine bases and too easily mined by German light forces. For his part, Scheer devoted much money and many man-hours to keeping lanes swept through the British-laid minefields, and his warships were constantly stalked by British submarines. The Norwegian sortie proved the German battle fleet could, and would, put to sea – but only when they thought an ambush was possible. The German heavy ships went to sea quite frequently, and sortied outside their own territory, but mostly kept in waters where they could not be easily surprised. So the two greatest battle fleets in the world kept to their own portion of the North Sea – or rode at anchor in “checkmate” of one another. But events in the land war continued to move forward, regardless of the stalemate at sea. And anyone in a position of command knew the war could not last much longer. The British naval blockade had strangled German trade and access to foodstuffs and raw materials – the nation would soon collapse. On 11 August 1918, Hipper was promoted to full Admiral and given command of the Hochseeflotte. Konteradmiral Ludwig von Reuter assumed command of 1st Scouting Group, hoisting his flag aboard SMS Hindenburg the following day. Scheer, having been promoted Chief of the Naval Staff, was determined to inflict as much damage as possible on the Royal Navy in order to obtain a better bargaining position in a negotiated peace. It was early October 1918, and at this point in the game, Scheer was no longer concerned about possible losses to the Hochseeflotte. Scheer’s plan involved two simultaneous raids. One, with torpedo boats and a light cruiser squadron, was to attack British warships operating off the Flanders coast. The other strike by more torpedo boats and light cruisers was to be supported by the Panzerkreuzer of 1st Scouting Group – and would be aimed at the massed shipping in the Thames estuary. No one had attacked the Thames estuary since the Dutch raided the Medway in 1667. This was a spectacularly bold move – guaranteed to bring Beatty and the Grand Fleet south. Once the raids had caused the maximum damage and confusion, the two strike forces would retire and rendezvous with the battle squadrons of the Hochseeflotte. Somewhere off the Texel or Terschelling, Hipper and the Hochseeflotte would offer battle to the Royal Navy. As the Hochseeflotte began to concentrate in the Jade, war-weary sailors became aware of the suicidal nature of the coming operation, and began to jump-ship in large numbers. As Derfflinger and Von der Tann passed through the III Lock into the roadsted, over 300 men from the two ships climbed over the side and disappeared ashore. By 29 October the capital ship crews were in full mutiny and the planned operation was abandoned. Events moved quickly as news of the mutiny spread. Demonstrations and outright riots broke out across Germany, and on 9 November, Kaiser Wilhelm II abdicated both the Imperial and Prussian thrones. On 10 November Wilhelm took a train across the Dutch border and went into exile – where he remained, rather well-off, until his death at age 82, in June 1941. On 11 November 1918, the Armistice was signed and the blood-letting stopped. In less than two weeks, 500 years of Hohenzollern rule over Prussia ceased, and the Imperial German Empire became the Wiemar Republic. Under the terms of the Armistice, the bulk of the Imperial Fleet was to be interned at Scapa Flow pending further disposition by a formal treaty. On 21 November 1918, fifteen capital ships (to include all of the battlecruisers), seven light cruisers, and 50 modern torpedo boats, departed German waters for an unknown fate. Prior to departure, Admiral Adolf von Trotha (Admiralstab) made it clear to Konteradmiral von Reuter (commanding), that the interned ships were not to be seized by anyone – under any circumstances. The German fleet remained in an uneasy captivity during the Versailles peace negotiations -- until a copy of the London “Times” informed Reuter the Armistice was to expire at noon on 21 June 1919. This was, of course, the deadline by which Germany was to have signed the peace treaty. But Reuter decided the British intended to seize the German fleet once the Armistice expired. With no ammunition, he could not defend the ships, and they had insufficient coal to reach Germany. The only means to prevent seizure was to scuttle the ships when an opportunity presented itself. Early on the morning of 21 June, the Grand Fleet steamed out of Scapa Flow to conduct training maneuvers. (Yet another blunder by Beatty.) Around 10:00, Reuter made a flag signal ordering the German ships to stand by – and at 11:20 the order to scuttle was sent by semaphore and searchlight. Actions were taken immediately. Seacocks and flood valves were opened, water pipes smashed, porthole scuttles and watertight doors opened, and even condenser covers were removed to facilitate flooding. Without going into the sad details, 15 capital ships, 5 light cruisers, and 32 torpedo boats settled to the bottom of Scapa Flow. SMS Hindenburg was the last to go down around 17:00. Among the capital ships, only the battleship Baden failed to sink – boarded by the British before it was too late. Within the space of a few hours, the second largest Navy in the world all but ceased to exist. Rightly or wrongly – the Imperial Navy officers had performed the only act of defiance within their power. Defeated in war – but not in battle – they could only preserve their honor through destroying the Hochseeflotte by their own hand. By 17:00 on 21 June 1919, this is all of SMS Hindenburg that remained above water. Her Kapitan scuttled the vessel on an even keel – making it easier for the crew to escape. She was raised 11 years later and scrapped at Rosyth. Her ship’s bell was returned to the Bundesmarine in 1959. NEXT TIME…… THE LAST DREAMS OF EMPIRE MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful warship models. SPECIAL THANKS to my friend and partner, @AP, for his talents, meticulous models, colorful imagination, and extreme dedication. If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496

SMS Konig – lead ship of a class of four – Grosser Kurfurst, Markgraf, Kronprinz – they were the most modern Imperial dreadnought battleships at the Battle of Jutland, 31 May 1916. Konig led the powerful III Battle Squadron in the van of the Hochseeflotte and suffered the most damage of all the German battleships. IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 40: IF THE TRUTH BE TOLD... With the damaged ships repaired, all traces of the traumatic battle were, for the most part, erased. But it took months of time and countless man-hours worked around the clock to make that happen. When the last rivet was hammered home and the last coat of paint applied, The Great War at sea returned to pretty much what it had been before the Battle of Jutland. But what remained was a question that has been contested by naval officers and debated by historians for over a century: Who won the Battle of Jutland? And the controversy surrounding this over-simplified question began almost as soon as the first returning ship’s anchor touched the seabed. At noon on 2 June, German authorities issued a press release claiming victory -- including sinking a British battleship, two battlecruisers, two armored cruisers, a light cruiser, a submarine, and several destroyers. (The claims are, of course, inaccurate – but probably honest. In confused battles it is possible to make such mistakes.) The statement also admitted to the loss of SMS Pommern and Wiesbaden (a pre-dreadnought battleship and a light cruiser). The scuttling of Lutzow, Elbing and Rostock was unknown to the British and withheld as a matter of military intelligence. The “Victory of the Skagerrak” was lauded in the press, school children were given a holiday, and the whole nation celebrated. The Kaiser addressed the fleet on 5 June, proudly showering “his” navy with Iron Crosses and announcing a new chapter in world history...”the magic of Trafalgar has been broken”. (The Imperial government originally claimed a victory on the basis of being the smaller battle fleet, while sinking more ships than the British. Post-war official Germany chose to hail the battle as a victory, and continued to celebrate it until the late 1960’s. The “Skaggerak Victory” was mainly used as a means to suppress the disgraceful memory of the German naval mutiny of 1918-1919, as well as a means to salvage wounded pride after defeat in World War I). His Majesty Kaiser Wilhelm II addresses the assembled officers of the Hochseeflotte from the deck of SMS Grosser Kurfurst (just aft of “B” turret). It should be noted he is wearing the uniform of a Grosseadmiral – complete with red sea boots and the “baton” of a GrosseAdmiral. He was overjoyed to think he had beaten the mighty Royal Navy. (A detail from a Claus Bergen painting.) In Britain, the first news came from boasting German wireless broadcasts..."The result of the fighting is a significant success for our forces against a much stronger adversary". Then, warships began to arrive in British ports, many damaged – some heavily and visibly -- and their crews had stories to tell. Slowly, the British public began to realize the Royal Navy had not delivered a “second Trafalgar”, and quickly became suspicious and angry as the Admiralty remained ominously silent. The government considered suppressing the news, but realized this was no longer possible. Late evening on 2 June, the Admiralty released a rather laconic statement containing nothing more than the losses on each side. The following day, based on that communique, British newspapers reported a German victory -- and the British population was thunder-struck. On 3 June, the Admiralty issued a statement expanding on German losses – with another the following day making grossly exaggerated claims. But they were far too late and no one believed the exaggerated claims anyway. At this point, it must be remembered both Britain and Germany had lavished billions in taxpayer funds on their battle fleets, and a victory (even a conditional one) was needed to justify those expenditures. But -- in an even more tragic development, the wrath of the British public would be shifted onto the Army when July brought horrific losses at the Battle of the Somme. However – there is some justification for both sides at Jutland to claim a victory, of one sort or another. For the Kaiserliche Marine there were several points in their favor: (1) The loss tables (previous chapter) clearly demonstrated the Germans sank more ships than did the British. The 99 ships of the Hochseeflotte sank 117,000 tons of British warships, while the 151 ships of the Grand Fleet sank only 63,000 tons of German warships. (2) It can be argued the Germans sank three modern battlecruisers for the loss of only one of their own. (The loss of Pommern was of no great consequence. It was certainly sad and tragic – but the pre-dreadnought battleship was obsolete, of little combat value, and had no business being at Jutland.) (3) All damaged German ships were repaired and returned to service with the fleet. (4) The British had been prevented from achieving a decisive victory comparable to Trafalgar. (5) The Germans had preserved their battle fleet and Alfred Thayer Mahan’s strategic doctrine of “a fleet in being”. (6) An intact Hochseeflotte in the Jade discouraged the British from making amphibious landings on the German coast – either the North Sea or the Pomeranian beaches of the Baltic. (7) Scheer’s withdrawal from the battle was not viewed as a mark of defeat. The Admiralstab had always known Britain’s margin of superiority was too great to challenge in a stand-up fleet engagement. When surprised by Jellicoe, Scheer merely followed strategic doctrine and withdrew in the face of superior numbers. However, the destruction of 3 British battlecruisers could be considered an “ambush victory”. (The very thing Jellicoe had warned Beatty against.) (8) By mid-1916, German leadership (including the Kaiser) had begun to think in terms of a “negotiated” peace. A largely intact Hochseeflotte would be a powerful bargaining chip at the negotiating table. Scheer’s withdrawal at Jutland preserved that option. SMS Von der Tann as she would have appeared circa 1915. Von der Tann was the first “Grosse Kreuzer” commissioned into the Kaiserliche Marine and the progenitor of the “so-called” battlecruisers of the Imperial Navy. She was, in fact, the first warship to demonstrate the successful merger between the large cruiser and the battleship – the “fast-battleship”. The detail in this superb 3-D graphic is well worth careful examination. On the British side: (1) The “risk theory” was discounted. Admiral Tirpitz had built the Hochseeflotte based on the “risk theory”. He hoped to build enough battleships to threaten the British with unacceptable losses -- possibly reducing Britain to a second or third class naval power. At Jutland, British capital ships outnumbered the Germans nearly 2 to 1. The British were not the ones “at risk” – the Germans were. So much for the “risk theory”. (2) The Germans failed in their tactical objective of destroying a substantial portion of the Grand Fleet. (Though sinking three battlecruisers is a pretty good start.) (3) The British prevented the Germans from breaking the economic blockade of Germany, which would eventually strangle their “home front” and bring the war to a close in late 1918. (4) The Royal Navy maintained control of the sea lanes, exercising Alfred Thayer Mahan’s dictum of “sea control” to Britain’s fullest benefit – while Germany was confined to the Heligoland Bight and the Baltic Sea. HMS Lion leading the “Splendid Cats” into battle. Based on the facts, and in light of subsequent actions by the British and German fleets, it is obvious there was no clear-cut victor. In this instance, both the Grand Fleet and the Hochseeflotte could claim to have partially satisfied their objectives – notably without crippling losses. The Germans clearly won a “tactical” victory. Everything they accomplished had either limited political ramifications, or was directly tied to the operation of a battle fleet at a tactical level. The Imperial battlecruisers were magnificent weapons superbly handled by Hipper, and accounted for all three capital ships lost by the British. German gunnery, as a whole, was far superior to that of the British. The battle line of the Hochseeflotte was a tight and well-controlled formation that responded quickly to command signals. And through it all, the various German squadrons worked in close cooperation with one another. The British lost the “tactical” Battle of Jutland for a number of reasons. Beatty and his battlecruisers managed to perform brilliantly in the last few minutes before the battleships opened fire on one another – but those were the only few minutes. Early in the battle, Beatty nullified the advantage of longer range guns by allowing Hipper to close to a range suited to him – and then open fire first. Then he threw away his greatest advantage in failing to coordinate his two squadrons (only ten ships) during “the run to the south” and “the run to the north”. And after Scheer’s second “battle turn away” he failed to reestablish contact with the enemy. At age 57, Jellicoe was undoubtedly a creature of the Victorian Era navy. Regardless of his innate intelligence and abundance of technical knowledge, he and his captains were finely crafted products of the rigid and class-conscious hierarchy of the Royal Navy. None above the rank of captain could be called dashing, bold, or heroic – but they had spent a lifetime perfecting the craft of handling ships and men – and none would flinch at the sound of the guns. Jellicoe handled his battle fleet with a calm and considered skill, outmaneuvered Scheer twice, and overwhelmed his enemy with “fire superiority”. But the Grand Fleet was cumbersome and not nearly as agile or responsive as the Hochseeflotte – so there were no bold plans nor elaborate maneuvers. And Jellicoe’s captains had not been sufficiently impressed with the need to keep the flagship informed. But I can say with all confidence that no man in the Royal Navy could have handled the fleet better than Jellicoe. Unlike Beatty, Jellicoe knew a simple “tactical” victory would not be enough. Due to his quick thinking and cool judgment, the British won the all-important “strategic” victory at Jutland. When the smoke cleared, Britannia still ruled the waves and controlled the North Sea – more or less. The day after the battle, Jellicoe was ready to put to sea with a powerful battle fleet – and the Germans were beginning to think it might not be wise to run such risks. Grand Fleet at sea, early 1914. There is, perhaps, a more pertinent question than who won the Battle of Jutland. Most historians have approached the subject from a simple and uncomplicated viewpoint: there was a battle – so there MUST be a winner. But there is more to be considered. Was it possible in 1916 to achieve any sort of decisive result between two modern dreadnought battle fleets? Or was it, in fact, impossible for two such technically advanced battle fleets to achieve any result remotely resembling Trafalgar? There were approximately 260 ships engaged at Jutland, spread over many miles of ocean. Were the means of communication then available to the two commanders capable of controlling long battle lines and far-flung cruiser groups? And what about the unanticipated effect of poor visibility on the “command” function? The vast quantity of funnel and gunsmoke from nearly 300 warships made it impossible for either Admiral to see more than ten or twelve ships at any given moment. The Hochseeflotte did a fairly professional job with their flag signals, searchlights, and wireless traffic – and managed a fairly tight formation. But Jellicoe’s line-ahead formation for his long and ponderous battle fleet was more necessity than choice. Any effort at a complicated envelopment of the German fleet was beyond his limited visibility and signaling capabilities. In the decade before The Great War, dreadnought technology and tactics had developed by leaps and bounds – forced along at a mind-boggling, frantic, pace. Jutland may be the proof it had exceeded human capabilities to control it. The years after Jutland produced many volumes of literature – especially between the wars. Most books were written by one major player or another, some staunchly defending their actions, while others tried to blame someone else for their failings. After WW II, the senior commanders were dead, and an entirely new generation of writers began examining Jutland with unbiased eyes. Though there is a new Jutland book every few years, none have yet produced a clear consensus as to who was victorious – or if there was a victor at all. The battle is now widely viewed as indecisive, and this view remains influential. There has, of late, been a literary trend proclaiming the battle the “last hurrah” of the Dreadnought Era, and therefore of little significance. (There is always a “new school of thought”, every five or ten years, that feel it necessary to rewrite the knowledge on Robert E. Lee, Erwin Rommel, or the Battle of Waterloo.) The “new school” believes battleships became irrelevant with the coming of mines, torpedoes, and submarines, and Jutland merely proved it. That is simply WRONG. By 1916 the floating mine had come of age, but the submarine and torpedo were still primitive and unreliable. Neither weapon, though useful, proved particularly deadly at Jutland. The battleship coexisted alongside mines, torpedoes, and submarines for the first four decades of the 20th Century and continued to be the measure of a nation’s naval power. Numbers of battleships were built between the wars -- largely due to the “old school” influence of the “battleship admirals”. And it was only in 1940 at the Battle of Taranto, 1941 at Pearl Harbor -- and the loss of HMS Prince of Wales and Repluse in the South China Sea -- that the battleship was supplanted by the aircraft carrier. But in 1916, submarines and torpedoes were both new and largely untried, proved difficult to operate, and were frequently unreliable. For the record – was the Battle of Jutland indecisive? Quite possibly – because the status quo hardly changed. But the dreadnought battleship and the Battle of Jutland – were ABSOLUTELY relevant to their time and place. The 5th Battle Squadron at sea during the Jutland sortie – HMS Barham leading Warspite, Valiant, and Malaya. LESSONS LEARNED There were a great many lessons learned from the battle of Jutland – most of them the hard way. The two worst lessons learned by the Kaiserliche Marine could be attributed directly to Admiral von Tirpitz. Promoted to Grosseadmiral by 1911, he had dominated the Kaiserliche Marine for very nearly 20 years -- strategic and tactical thought – and more importantly, warship design. Once war broke out in 1914, his design decisions and compromises came back to haunt the capital ships of the Hochseeflotte. Beginning with the first battlecruiser, SMS Von der Tann, the armor suite was a brilliant piece of work. But Tirpitz, ever mindful of the financial limitations imposed by the Reichstag, did everything in his power to keep the costs down. With each new battlecruiser, the size, tonnage, speed, and armament increased – dramatically raising the price tag. Eventually, it became standard practice on both battleships and battlecruisers to reduce the waterline armor belt as it neared the bow and stern. The standard pattern became a 12-inch main belt running from “A” turret to “D” turret. Beyond that, the armor belt extended to the bow and stern, but only with a 4-inch thickness. At the time, Tirpitz deemed that to be sufficient protection. By 1910, building costs had skyrocketed and the Derfflinger Class, still on the drawing boards, was overweight and over budget. It was suggested the armor on the bow section might be reduced below the standard 4-inch thickness. Herr Hullmann of the design bureau counseled against such a move…… “With a reduction in belt armor thickness on the bow, it should be understood large caliber shells will inevitably strike the ship there. One must then expect the ship will fill with water forward. If the damage is sufficient, leaks will occur that cannot be sealed with the means available onboard. The ship’s outer hull, to which the armor is secured, will undoubtedly leak, and the forecastle ahead of the citadel transverse bulkhead will certainly fill, and could not be kept drained with the means available onboard”. Herr Hullmann’s explanation stopped them from reducing the armor thickness, but none of them realized he had put his finger on the “Achilles Heel” of all Imperial battlecruisers. The midships sections of German armor belts extended vertically up to the main deck, but at the bow and stern they did not. In effect, the bow armor protection was not thick enough, nor did it cover a large enough area. At Jutland, three of Hipper’s five battlecruisers were heavily damaged by gunfire -- in the bow, above and below the waterline. SMS Lutzow could not be saved and was abandoned and scuttled. SMS Derfflinger, her sister-ship, was heavily damaged in exactly the same manner, but managed to reach the Jade. SMS Seydlitz took devastating damage to the bow and forecastle and arrived in the Jade more sunk than afloat. It should be noted both Moltke and Von der Tann suffered large caliber hits and flooding in the equally lightly armored stern section. It is, indeed, ironic that after all that careful planning and design, all those adjustments to the complicated armored suite, and the tremendous amount of damage they were able to absorb – Hipper’s magnificent battlecruisers had a “glass jaw”. SMS Derfflinger taking on ammunition while moored in Schillig Roads. Derfflinger is seen as she might have looked in early 1915 – after the Battle of Dogger Bank. Upon returning from battle, the Panzerkreuzer was assigned to picket duty, but the job of making the ship “battle ready” went on regardless. While minor repairs were being made by the crew, the gunnery crews were tasked with restocking the ship’s magazines. In order to speed-up the process, lighters have come alongside both the seaward (port) side, as well as the shallow, inshore side. Same scene, view from astern. The beautifully detailed model of Derfflinger is courtesy of "Barroco Hispano", and the tugs, lighters, and mooring buoys are from “AP”. The second lesson learned also applied to design decisions made by Tirpitz – the gun caliber of the Panzerkreuzer. The chosen main battery guns of the Kaiserliche Marine were the 11-inch SK-L/45, and later, the 11-inch SK-L/50, followed by the 12-inch SK-L/50. The long-barreled, high velocity weapons were, indeed, excellent – and their higher velocity reduced the time of flight of the shells, while imparting greater accuracy and armor penetration through increased kinetic energy. This was especially so with the 11-inch weapon, while the greater weight of the 12-inch shell improved penetration. At the time of Von der Tann’s design, the Admiralstab became aware 12-inch guns would be mounted on the British Invincible Class battlecruisers. Tirpitz was urged to change Von der Tann’s 11-inch armament to the excellent and available Krupp 12-inch gun. Taken at face value, the request for a larger gun, equal to your enemy, only makes sense. Tirpitz, however, believed in the “volume of fire” theory -- smaller shells, fired faster, would do the job. This theory did not take into account the weight of shell and the size of the bursting charge. The increase in gun size was declined on the grounds of additional cost and a delay in construction time. The request to jump to 12-inch guns was again made when the Motlke Class was designed – and again with SMS Seydlitz. Each time the request was refused for the same reasons – increased costs and delays in the design or construction process. When the Derfflinger Class design was undertaken, the British had already armed a number of battlecruisers and battleships with 13.5-inch weapons, which outclassed the German 11-inch gun. The disparity was so painfully obvious it could no longer be ignored – so the Derfflinger Class got 12-inch weapons. But during the discussion, the point was raised that there was talk in Britain of going to a 15-inch weapon. This, alone, should have been an “alarm bell” to Tirpitz. If there was “talk” in Britain of a 15-inch gun, that meant Vickers already had one under development – and the Royal Navy would most certainly use it. British pre-war Admiralty memorandum can actually shed some light on this subject. Jellicoe, as Second Sea Lord and Controller of the Navy, produced a 1909 study on the comparison of armor and gun calibers between the Royal Navy and the Imperial Navy. Even then, German ships were known to be better armored than comparable British warships – because of their high quality armor and internal subdivision. Because German technology produced a savings of weight in the propulsion plant, it could be directly applied to additional armor. Just one comparison (and there are others) will illustrate this point. HMS Queen Mary was given 3,900 tons of armor plate on a total displacement of 27,200 tons. Her German contemporary, SMS Seydlitz carried 5,200 tons of armor plate on a displacement of only 24,593 tons. Seydlitz held a small advantage in speed. The Germans had gained a distinct technological advantage over the British because their turbines and boilers were custom-made with weight-saving materials and designs. Their boilers were smaller and more efficient because they used small water tubes as opposed to the larger British “steam box” method. German turbines were just as sturdy and efficient – but used less steel of a higher quality. And Krupp rifles were much lighter than British weapons of an equivalent performance. Jellicoe’s memorandum went on to point out the superiority of German guns. For example: the standard German 11-inch gun weighed considerably less than its’ British counterpart and had better ballistics, with a penetrating force equivalent to the British 12-inch weapon. The newly developed German 12-inch rifle was an unknown quantity at the time of the memorandum, but Jellicoe prudently recommended new construction for the Fleet be armed with a 13.5-inch weapon developed by Vickers. It was later found that Krupp’s 12-inch gun exceeded the performance of the Vickers weapon. The Vickers 13.5-inch gun tube weighed in at 76 tons – Krupp’s 12-inch rifle weighed only 48 tons. The reason for the difference in weight and performance is simple (and I will keep this short and simple). The British armaments industry had adopted a “wire-wound” gun tube for heavy artillery and naval guns in the 1890’s. A central core is cast and then bored out to form the gun barrel. In Britain, it was discovered that the steel “bore-tube” was prone to failure due to impurities in the metal. British steel was manufactured with the Siemens-Martin “open-hearth” process. Consequently, the cast “bore-tube” was tightly wrapped with several layers of steel wire cable as reinforcement, then “cased” by an outer steel jacket (which is what you see poking out of a gun turret). These guns were not suited to “enhancement”. If better performance was needed – the British had to build bigger, longer, and heavier guns to obtain it. Krupp guns were made of steel produced in special electric furnaces (the “crucible” method) which provided an exceptionally fine metal free of impurities. The process produces a high-strength steel with less weight. German designers opted for the “built-up” naval gun. This was a solid, bored-out, central gun tube, encased with as many as five, high-tensile strength, layered outer tubes of reducing size toward the muzzle. (If you look at a German gun tube, you will see they usually have “segments” that reduce in size as they approach the muzzle.) These tubes were precision tooled and fit tightly around the central core as reinforcement. This is the forward main battery turret of SMS Helgoland (mentioned above). This is a classic view of the German 12-inch SK-L/50 gun. These guns were “built-up” as opposed to “wire-wound”. The difference between the two can be seen easily. If you look closely, there are three “segments” in each of the gun barrels. Each successive segment (or tube) increases in diameter as it approaches the breech of the gun, located inside the turret. There would be several reinforcing tubes layered over the shell chamber inside the gun tube -- where the explosive power of the firing charges would be greatest. The strength and rigidity of this method allowed for much longer barrels. German guns tended to be 50 calibers in length, whereas British guns were no more than 42 to 45 calibers in length (wire-wound gun tubes always “droop” beyond 45 calibers). The added strength of the Krupp gun allowed a larger firing charge, which increased velocity -- while the lengthened gun tube, with its longer rifled bore, imparted greater spin on the shell – providing much greater accuracy. The strength and length of the Krupp rifles is largely responsible for the phenomenally accurate, and tightly grouped salvos seen at Jutland. The Krupp steel also showed less wear on the rifled grooves in the barrel, giving the guns a long service life before requiring a new liner (about 200 rounds). British gun accuracy tended to degrade considerably after 70 rounds. It was clear to anyone interested – German science, innovation, and metallurgy had jumped far ahead. Jellicoe’s memorandum showed remarkable foresight and, oddly enough, the Admiralty adopted the 13.5-inch gun while going a step further and encouraging Vickers to develop a 15-inch weapon. The Ordnance Chief of the Admiralstab recommended designing Derfflinger to accommodate a new 15-inch Krupp weapon that would be ready for use about the time the battlecruiser was launched. Tirpitz flatly refused the more powerful weapon. He agreed to 12-inch guns because the British had opted for the 13.5-inch weapon, and they were equal to the German battleship guns. But he balked at putting a weapon on a battlecruiser that was more powerful than those of the battle fleet. It is possible Tirpitz was reluctant to up-gun the battlecruisers because of the German Naval Laws. The laws fixed building rates at three battleships and one large cruiser per year. The armor suite of a battlecruiser was already approaching that of a battleship, and if he armed them with 15-inch guns they would be more powerful than the current German battleships. The Reichstag might well accuse him of building an entirely new and unauthorized ship type while disguising it as a large cruiser. Peacetime politics were the same in Berlin and London – admirals had to watch their political backsides. There was yet another possible reason for not up-gunning. Tirpitz always indicated the 11-inch was adequate to destroy the British battlecruisers, and he only went along with the 12-inch weapon because the British had forced his hand. It is just possible his purpose in clinging to the lower caliber gun was to ensure battlecruisers would be employed as fleet scouts and “cruiser killers” – not to fight in the line of battle. He may have feared the Panzerkreuzer with 12-inch or 15-inch guns would tempt the Hochseeflotte officers to use them just as they would any battleship. Whatever the reason, Tirpitz habitually designed under-gunned battlecruisers regardless of the wishes of his line officers and department heads. The British built their first six battlecruisers between 1908 and 1913 with 12-inch guns, then increased to 13.5-inch caliber in 1910. Tirpitz did not see the need to increase to the 12-inch gun until 1912 – and at that time he declined to jump ahead of the British with a 15-inch caliber for the Derfflinger Class. British shells kept getting larger, but it’s as though Tirpitz gave no consideration to the weight of shell. It’s really quite simple – the bigger shell meant more penetrating power on impact – and more weight meant a larger bursting charge on detonation. That adds up to a much greater destructive force – outside and inside the target’s hull. No one in the Kaiserliche Marine had any actual knowledge or experience with the destructive power of British 13.5-inch Lyddite shells prior to the war, and they came as something of a surprise at Dogger Bank. But German line officers had absolutely zero comprehension of the destructive force of the 15-inch shells they encountered at Jutland. It was, literally, difficult to believe the devastation wrought by a 15-inch shell weighing 1,900 pounds. A starboard side view of Derfflinger taking ammunition aboard. Inshore, abaft the stern turrets, a Sophia Class paddle tug has positioned two lighters – one with yellow-tipped armor-piercing shells, and another with brass-cased powder charges. Up forward is a Thor Class tug with two similar lighters in position. On the port side, astern, another Thor Class tug is pushing a shell lighter (diagonal model) up against the battlecruiser’s hull, while near the bow, a Helena Class paddle tug (diagonal) has positioned her two lighters and is standing by. Same scene, bow view. Note the sleek lines of the battlecruiser’s hull. German battlecruisers had been designed to withstand 12-inch gunfire, and the armor suite was supposed to keep them afloat long enough for their 11-inch guns to sink a British battlecruiser. It turned out the armor suite was capable of absorbing far more punishment than expected, but the 11-inch guns took longer than anticipated to dispose of their enemy. As the battle wore on, damage to Hipper’s battlecruisers continued to accumulate. But the real problem showed itself when the British 15-inch guns came into action. The destructive power of the British 15-inch shell was capable of overwhelming the German armor long before their 11-inch guns could inflict fatal damage to their opponent. Tirpitz’ stubborn refusal to upgrade main gun caliber ended up sending the Imperial battlecruisers into action with one arm tied behind their back. The larger 12-inch gun would have evened the odds a little, and inflicted more damage on the British battlecruisers – perhaps even sinking one or two more. Equipping Lutzow and Derfflinger with 15-inch weapons would have evened the odds considerably – and the superior gunnery skills of the Hochseeflotte would have conveyed a distinct edge. The Battle of Jutland was not lost at sea. It was lost years before -- on the drafting boards of the Reichsmarineamt. The 1st Battlecruiser Squadron, Battlecruiser Fleet, of the Grand Fleet. Top to bottom – HMS Lion (flagship) – Princess Royal, Queen Mary, and HMS Tiger – collectively known as “The Splendid Cats”. A tug is positioning two lighters against the stern of Lion, preparing to unload – paint – to keep her bright and shiny. And a motor launch is approaching her bow – possibly with Admiralty despatches. Princess Royal is “coaling ship”, and a tug has arrived alongside Tiger with fresh provisions and ship’s stores. This is what they might have looked like just days before sailing for Jutland. The battlecruiser models are courtesy of “Barroco Hispano”. The tugs, lighters, motor launches, boat booms, and mooring buoys are by "AP". The white steam tug alongside Tiger was “gifted” by “WolfZe”. The British, too, learned many lessons from Jutland, but not as many as they should have. Some “lessons” were merely excuses for poor design, poor training, or poor tactical performance. One such problem was defective ammunition. British shells tended to break up on impact – or failed to penetrate when they struck at an oblique angle. This serious issue only came to light quite by chance. Beatty had hosted a luncheon (more of a public relations event) aboard HMS Lion in August 1916. One guest was a Swedish naval attache recently attached to his embassy in Berlin. During conversation with Ernle Chatfield (Beatty’s Flag Captain) the attache explained the Germans considered British shells more the object of comic relief than fear. Of course, the matter was investigated and new shells designed. (Jellicoe had already pointed this out when he was Second Sea Lord, before the war.) But the munitions were not delivered to the fleet in sufficient quantity until April 1918. All 12,000 of them were duly loaded into magazines and never fired in anger. But – I will not go into all of the problems discovered by the British, since our subject matter is focused on the Imperial battlecruisers. Though -- there is one more point worth mentioning. A closer look at HMS Lion, name ship of the Lion Class battlecruisers. Note the exceptionally wide spacing between the aft turrets. Both Jellicoe and Beatty blamed the loss of HMS Indefatigable, Queen Mary, and Invincible on their inherently thin armor – and that was quite accurate. But recent information obtained by wreck divers found excessive numbers of bagged powder charges stacked outside the magazines in the working chambers and barbette trunks of the ship’s main gun turrets. This negligent handling of powder was discovered earlier, at Dogger Bank, when HMS Lion was nearly lost to a magazine explosion. New handling procedures were immediately put in place to prevent such a disaster. Apparently, the ammunition handling parties on Beatty’s battlecruisers reverted to their bad habits at Jutland in an attempt to increase their rate of fire. German shells caused flash fires in the turrets and barbette trunks, blowing up each of the lost battlecruisers – not to mention damaging several ships that did not explode. Current authors have decided the British armor was more than sufficient – it was actually the powder handling procedures that caused the loss of the ships. After the battle, an urgent investigation was made and the British powder handling arrangements were, indeed, found to be deficient. Older flash-proof scuttles in the magazine bulkheads were found to be less than safe, while some had actually been removed by turret crews to speed up the rate of fire. New “revolving door” scuttles were designed and hastily installed to prevent future disasters. Poor procedures may be technically true – but it rather “puts the cart before the horse”. Let me ask a simple question. If the armor was sufficient to keep the German shells out – how did the flash of a detonating shell get inside a turret or barbette trunk to start the fire? The German shells had to penetrate turret armor or barbette armor – or – fracture the armor badly enough to admit detonation flash into the interior and set off the powder. There is no other way. The British armor was NOT sufficient to keep the shells out. A closer view of HMS Tiger – the most handsome of all the British battlecruisers at Jutland. Note the armor plate “apron” designed around the three main battery turrets installed at deck level. One rather gruesome revelation resulted from the “finger-pointing” and petulant accusations of “The Jutland Scandal”. “The Scandal” was a thoroughly ugly business, and during the numerous examinations and investigations of every moment of the battle, the signaling failures of Flag-Lieutenant Ralph Seymour came to light. Needless to say, the facts did not bode well for his career. Prone to bad luck, he tried to marry a young lady who stood to inherit a large sum of money from wealthy relatives – Beatty’s step-niece, and Beatty’s wife’s money. The Admiral forthwith ordered young Ralph to direct his amorous attentions elsewhere. Seymour, completely disgraced, eventually flung himself off the cliffs at Beachy Head in 1922. And that brings us back to the original question – “Who won the Battle of Jutland?” The short answer is – nobody. But -- if anyone could be said to have been beaten – it was Beatty. He led six battlecruisers and four fast battleships against Hipper’s five Panzerkreuzer in a foolhardy dash without coordinating the movements of his battleships. Hipper sank two battlecruisers and thoroughly mauled the other four. Only the timely arrival of the fast battleships saved Beatty from utter destruction. Scheer could not possibly have won the battle, so it seems difficult to “lose” something you never intended – or attempted -- to win. Finally – considering the poor visibility, lack of sighting reports, and shells that didn’t penetrate – Jellicoe did not actually “win” the battle. But he did manage to avoid losing it – and that was vastly more important. The day after the battle, a New York City newspaper columnist summed-up the battle rather neatly…...”The German Fleet has assaulted its jailer – but it is still in jail.” A detail view of SMS Derfflinger taking ammunition aboard. The battlecruiser model by “Barroco Hispano” is, of course, a thing of beauty – but I mainly wanted to show a close-up of the amazing detail @AP has put into his tugboats and lighters. Each shell lighter has the projectiles laid out in neat rows, with each shell individually crafted. And each powder lighter has four rows of clearly visible brass cartridge cases. And if you look behind the Helena Class paddle tug, he has even made a powder lighter with the hatch covers still battened-down. This is the kind of detail that really brings a model to life. Vice-Admiral John Rushworth Jellicoe was promoted to 1st Sea Lord in November 1916. In essence, he was “kicked upstairs” to the Admiralty -- promoted so the fleet could be turned over to a more aggressive man. Jellicoe’s prudent handling of the Grand Fleet was hardly heroic, but it was sure and certain. And it preserved British naval supremacy for another generation. The failure to deliver a “second Trafalgar” was blamed on Jellicoe – determined mostly on the basis of criticism in a letter-writing campaign aimed at Jellicoe’s supposed “timidity”. The letter writer, Vice-Admiral David Beatty was appointed in his place as C.-in-C. of the Grand Fleet. Jellicoe was rudely sacked from the Admiralty in January 1918 by Lloyd George’s administration for his failure to find a “miracle cure” for German U-boat attacks on British merchant shipping. There was, in fact, hardly any way to prevent submarine attacks in those days – though a “convoy system” seemed to intimidate U-Boat commanders. But the simple fact is -- Lloyd George simply needed a scapegoat to cover his own political backside. (Despite whatever good he may have accomplished -- in politics, Lloyd George was a creature not to be trusted.) Jellicoe was created Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa Flow in March 1918, and promoted Admiral Of The Fleet in April 1919. He was appointed Governor-General of New Zealand in 1920 and upon his return to England was created 1st Earl Jellicoe (hereditary) and Viscount Brocas of Southampton in 1925. Though lavished with honors, he never again served in a military capacity. There was a great deal of intrigue and back-stabbing over the Battle of Jutland – mostly Beatty trying to shift the blame for his poor performance onto Jellicoe’s shoulders. Each admiral had a number of their own supporters and the situation elicited a great many letters in the newspapers – and even involved deliberate alterations to the official Admiralty reports of the battle (ordered by Beatty while serving as First Sea Lord). I suggest you Google “The Jutland Scandal” for full details – it’s far too complicated to cover here. Admiral Of The Fleet, Lord John Rushworth Jellicoe, died aged 75, at his London home in 1935 and was buried with full military honors in St. Paul’s Cathedral. Vice-Admiral Sir David Richard Beatty was appointed to command of the Grand Fleet in November 1916, but never got another crack at the High Sea Fleet. Ironically, the “Hell for leather” battlecruiser admiral immediately adopted the cautious operational strategy of his predecessor (Jellicoe) and never fought a fleet engagement on his own. (The man couldn’t coordinate ten ships at Jutland – what would he have done with nearly 200?) Beatty brought out the entire Grand Fleet in November 1918 to escort the Hochseeflotte to internment in Scapa Flow. (But it should be noted he guarded what he considered “his” victory like a miser’s hoard. He could have invited both Admirals Fisher and Jellicoe aboard Queen Elizabeth to attend the ceremonies – but he did not.) He was promoted full Admiral in January 1919, and to Admiral Of The Fleet in May 1919. In October 1919 he was created 1st Earl Beatty, Viscount Borodale, and Baron Beatty of the North Sea and Brooksby. In November 1919 he was appointed First Sea Lord of the Admiralty and served in that capacity until his retirement in 1927. His main goal as a peacetime First Sea Lord seems to have been trying to prevent the United States from supplanting Britain as the foremost seapower – though that “claim to fame” seems dubious. He was considered for the post of Governor-General of Canada in 1926, but Colonial Secretary Leo Amery rejected the notion...”no manners and an impossible American wife”. (In 1901, Beatty had married Ethel Tree – the wealthy heiress to Chicago’s Marshall Field Department stores.) Admiral Of The Fleet, Sir David Richard Beatty died in March 1936 and was interred in St. Paul’s Cathedral. Vizeadmiral Reinhard Scheer was lauded as a hero upon his return to Wilhelmshaven and was decorated by the Kaiser with Germany’s highest military honor -- the Pour le Merite (sometimes called “The Blue Max”). He remained in command of the Hochseeflotte and made several sorties into the North Sea to attack convoys and shipping concentrations, but to little effect. He could not afford to risk his small fleet – so there was little chance of a “safe” operation producing impressive results. In August 1918, Scheer was promoted to full Admiral and appointed Chief of Naval Staff to replace an ailing Admiral Holtzendorff. Scheer lobbied heavily for unrestricted submarine warfare because he saw little opportunity for the Hochseeflotte to achieve any significant results. He retired from the navy after the war and wrote his memoirs in 1919, but his life after the war was not pleasant. An insane intruder broke into his home in 1920 and murdered his wife, his maid, and injured his daughter, before committing suicide in the cellar. Scheer withdrew into solitude and wrote an autobiography published in 1925. In 1928 Scheer accepted an invitation from Earl Jellicoe to visit England, but died aged 65 before he could make the journey. He is buried in the municipal cemetery in Weimar. The inscription on the stone reads “Here rests Admiral Reinhard Scheer” with the single word “Skagerrak” carved below. The last warship built by the Reichsmarine of the Weimar Republic was the pocket-battleship Admiral Scheer launched in 1933. As a matter of some interest: Books and articles about the battle began to appear as early as late 1916 – mostly written by British or American authors – all in English – and all based on the British accounts of the action. None of them paid very much (if any) attention to the German literature or their available official records. Up until the 1970’s, it was not unusual to see Admiral Scheer referred to as “von Scheer”. This is a simple, but obvious, proof of how little fact actually appeared in books written in the first 50 years after the battle. Reinhard Scheer was born to a middle-class family in lower Saxony – certainly not the nobility. Upon his return from Jutland, Kaiser Wilhelm did offer to raise him to the Imperial nobility. But, for reasons known only to him, Scheer declined the offer and never received the much-coveted “von” before his name. Vizeadmiral Franz Ritter von Hipper also returned to a hero’s welcome – and justly so. His performance at Jutland was nothing short of magnificent. On 5 June 1916, for his conduct in the battle, Hipper received the Pour le Merite from the Kaiser’s own hand and a kiss on both cheeks. He was also awarded the Royal Bavarian Military Order Of Max Joseph, Commander’s Cross, by His Majesty, King Ludwig III of Bavaria – including elevation to Bavarian nobility and the title “Ritter” (knight). He was presented with several other awards, including the Royal Saxon Order of Albrecht, and all three Hanseatic League Crosses from Lubeck, Bremen, and Hamburg. On 12 August 1918, he was promoted full Admiral and appointed to command the Hochseeflotte -- but his time in command was short and unpleasant. The war was all but lost and within weeks, the crews of the Hochseeflotte began to demonstrate mutinous tendencies. By 29 October several battleship crews had mutinied, so the fleet was dispersed to various ports. On 9 November, Hipper personally hauled down his flag and departed the battleship Baden. Just twelve days later, on 21 November 1918, Hipper watched as his cherished battlecruisers led the Hochseeflotte to sea one last time – headed for internment at Scapa Flow as part of the Armistice agreement. With no fleet to command, there would be no more battles to fight, and Hipper retired in December 1918 after 37 years of service at sea. For the next year, he hid from the radical elements of the 1918-1919 revolutionaries that overturned the monarchy, then settled in a comfortable home in Altona, near Hamburg. Unlike Scheer, Hipper never wrote his memoirs or anything concerning his service during the war – he was confident the heroism of his men and battlecruisers spoke for him. Of the four senior admirals (on both sides) present at Jutland, Hipper made no mistakes that day – and was the only one to come away with his reputation burnished. In May 1932, Admiral Franz Ritter von Hipper died and was buried in his hometown of Weilheim. The Kriegsmarine later named their Hipper Class heavy cruisers after him. Upon hearing of Hipper's death, David Beatty said..."I am very sorry. One would like to express one's regrets for the passing of a gallant officer and a great sailor.” It would, no doubt, have pleased Hipper, and certainly – after the rough handling he had given Beatty – it would have made the old Bavarian buccaneer laugh. Elements of the German III Battle Squadron steaming past Heligoland Island. Painting by Claus Bergen. NEXT TIME…… THE THIRD SISTER MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful warship models. SPECIAL THANKS to my friend and partner, @AP, for his talents, meticulous models, colorful imagination, and extreme dedication. If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496

The Grand Fleet steaming NW in line-ahead formation -- full daylight on 2 June 1916. IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 39: THE REMAINS OF THE DAY: THE AFTERMATH OF BATTLE The sun rises early in northern latitudes, and as the misty dawn crept above the eastern horizon on 1 June 1916, Vice-Admiral David Beatty’s Battlecruiser Fleet sighted their first German. Lookouts aboard HMS Lion spotted the Zeppelin L-11 as she dipped below the cloud base around 03:30. Nearly as long as a dreadnought, the big airship received a warm reception as Beatty’s ships opened fire – some with their main battery guns. The German air crew reacted quickly, released water ballast, and took their fragile craft back into the clouds. Beatty assumed the airship was scouting ahead of the Hochseeflotte and signaled “clear for action”. But the minutes ticked by with nothing more to be seen. The Battlecruiser Fleet was alone in the choppy waters of the North Sea. (L-11 would stumble into the Grand Fleet a few minutes to the NW, receive the same “hot” reception, and report both encounters to Scheer before being ordered back to Nordholz aerodrome.) Some miles to the north, at 02:47, a heavy mist settled over the sea with the first touch of dawn, and Vice-Admiral John Jellicoe, hopeful of finding the enemy, signaled his fleet to form “line-ahead” battle formation. While the dreadnoughts maneuvered into line, the C.-in-C. set about signaling his light cruiser squadrons and destroyer flotillas to close the battle fleet and assume their assigned stations. The various elements of the Grand Fleet had become disoriented during the night – while SMS Westfalen had scattered and mauled destroyer flotillas much like a fox among barnyard chickens. Jellicoe intended to close Horns Reef and intercept Scheer. About the same time Beatty fired on the Zeppelin, HMS Iron Duke took in a signal from the Admiralty. The Hochseeflotte’s position had been fixed by wireless direction-finding stations an hour earlier (02:30) – 30 miles NE of Iron Duke on a SES course, estimated speed 16 knots – just one hour’s steaming from Horns Reef. The signalman delivered the message to Flag Captain Dreyer on the bridge. Having read it, he shook his head and climbed the ladder to the Admiral’s bridge. Jellicoe read the message with no show of emotion whatsoever. He merely handed the message back...”This signal makes it painfully evident that by no possible means can I catch Scheer before he reaches port – even if I disregard the danger of following him through the minefields…” Jellicoe ordered Dreyer to recall the battlecruisers and alter course for Horns Reef – on the off chance he might snap-up a few German stragglers as he passed by. Jellicoe had trapped Scheer and beaten him – twice – but the sun went down before he could finish the job. In the end, Scheer outmaneuvered and outwitted Jellicoe and escaped the well-laid trap. By sunrise, 2 June, Beatty’s Battlecruiser Fleet was back in Rosyth, Jerram’s 2nd Battle Squadron anchored off Cromarty around 09:00, and the bulk of the Grand Fleet was safely tucked-up in Scapa Flow by noon. But there was little rest to be had. The Fleet took on coal, oil, and ammunition – and, as an afterthought -- a few fresh provisions. At 21:45 that evening, Jellicoe telegraphed London to inform the Admiralty the Grand Fleet was, in all respects, ready for sea. Capital ships of the Grand Fleet lying at anchor in Scapa Flow. The 15-inch gun battleship HMS Revenge is front and center. Around 03:00 1 June, Vizeadmiral Franz von Hipper stood quietly on the bridge of SMS Moltke, the only remaining combat-ready battlecruiser. He held his duty-station ahead of the Hochseeflotte, leading the main body past Horns Reef and toward the Amrum Bank Passage. They would soon pass inshore of the German minefields. Due to the severe damage suffered by SMS Derfflinger and Von der Tann, Scheer ordered them to assemble on Moltke and run into Wilhelmshaven. (SMS Seydlitz was still afloat, but lagging far behind.). As Derfflinger and Von der Tann steamed ahead -- SMS Ostfriesland ran onto a mine. (It was not the minefield Jellicoe had ordered HMS Abdiel to sow – it was another field she had sown a month earlier.) Though considerably damaged, Ostfriesland was able to maintain her place in line. SMS Moltke led the remaining battlecruisers past the outer Jade light ship and anchored in Wilhelmshaven Roads at 14:50. Once the tide came in Derfflinger was able to transit the locks and the Panzerkreuzer ran into the southern harbor basin around 17:15 – badly battered – but covered in Glory and Legend. Vizeadmiral Scheer watched Hipper’s battlecruisers steam off to the south. He would hold the fleet, temporarily, between Horns Reef and the Amrum Bank while he waited for the tide to come in. SMS Konig had led the battle fleet into the gun sights of the Grand Fleet twice, and paid the price. Several large caliber hits (probably 15-inch) badly holed her forward causing serious flooding. Kapitan Bruninghaus had to counter-flood to keep her on an even keel, resulting in the ship taking on 1,600 tons of water. She was down by the bow and forced to wait for the tide (09:30) before trying to navigate Amrum Bank Passage. The fleet eventually cleared Amrum Bank, and a little past midday, Konteradmiral Mauve’s II Battle Squadron was detached for the Elbe River and Cuxhaven. The five old pre-dreadnoughts dropped anchor in Altenbruch Roads around 14:25. After having to beg to be included in the battle fleet’s sortie – and having lost SMS Pommern – the old pre-dreadnoughts had twice steamed into harm’s way to save Hipper’s crippled battlecruisers. They had earned their battle honors. And now every man that crewed the “five-minute-ships” could stand proudly and say...”We were at the battle!” And no one could take that from them. In the gasthauses of old Cuxhaven there would be many stories to tell this night, much beer, and toasts to missing shipmates. As Scheer approached Schillig Roads, five battleships of I Battle Squadron were detached to stand guard. Scheer worried the British might choose this moment to launch a raid on Wilhelmshaven. The remainder of the Hochseeflotte steamed up the deep-water channel to anchor off Wilhelmshaven and wait for the tide to pass through the locks. By 06:30 the following morning (2 June), it was all over – except for the tidying-up. (As an interesting sidelight -- before the battle, Konteradmiral Behncke had made a quick tour of SMS Konig to deliver some words of encouragement to the crew, and the ship’s cat – “Max” – began to follow him. “Max” was a rather large, long-haired, part Norwegian Forest Cat (orange or ginger) with the remainder of his parentage unknown – and he had always had the run of the ship. When Konig finally came to anchor in Wilhelmshaven Roads one of the cook’s assistants thought to feed Max, but he could not be found. Word went around the dreadnought and an informal search was conducted – without success. He was later found in the only place no one had dared to look, the Admiral’s day cabin off the bridge – curled into a neat ball on the Admiral’s cot – sound asleep.) The Hochseeflotte moored quayside in Wilhelmshaven after the battle. Some ships went into dry dock, others made minor repairs and replenished provisions, ammunition, and coal. “The whole situation was difficult to grasp, as I had no real idea of what was going on and we could hardly see anything except flashes of guns, shells falling, ships blowing up, and an occasional glimpse of an enemy vessel…” That is the best one-sentence summary of the Battle of Jutland ever written – and it was in Admiral Jellicoe’s report to the Admiralty. And like the telegram reporting the fleet ready for sea, it may have mollified the Admiralty, but it hardly covered the myriad of details and what followed. Despite the enormous numerical advantage held by the British, the Grand Fleet had been knocked about a bit. Of the 28 British dreadnoughts present at Jutland, 5 were damaged to varying degrees. Of the 9 battlecruisers at Jutland, 3 were sunk and 4 damaged. The official British warship losses at Jutland: Battlecruisers: Queen Mary – Indefatigable – Invincible Battleships: 0 Armored Cruisers: Defence – Warrior – Black Prince Light Cruisers: 0 Destroyers: Tipperary - Nestor - Nomad – Turbulent – Ardent – Fortune – Shark - Sparrowhawk British battlecruisers damaged at Jutland: New Zealand – 1 hit Lion – 14 Princess Royal – 9 Tiger – 21 British battleships damaged at Jutland: Colossus – 2 hits Barham – 6 Malaya – 8 Warspite – 15 Marlborough – 1 torpedo British personnel losses: 6,094 dead – 674 wounded – 177 taken prisoner At first glance, the damage to the Grand Fleet may not seem so bad – but Jellicoe saw things differently the morning after Jutland. He entered the battle with 9 combat-ready battlecruisers. On the morning of 3 June, Beatty’s “Battlecruiser Fleet” was reduced to two undamaged Invincible Class and one lightly damaged Indefatigable Class. ALL of his remaining modern battlecruisers were significantly damaged. A heavily damaged HMS Lion was repaired and returned to duty on 19 July – minus her burnt-out “Q” turret – which could not be replaced until September. Princess Royal received temporary repairs over an eight-day period at Rosyth, then sailed to Plymouth for permanent repairs – and returned to the Grand Fleet on 21 July. Among the “Splendid Cats”, HMS Tiger was peppered pretty heavily by shells, but was repaired at Rosyth Dockyard and returned to the fleet on 1 July. (Incidentally, she fired 303 rounds from her main battery guns and obtained only one hit on SMS Moltke and two on Von der Tann – a 1% hit ratio.) The upshot of this, is Jellicoe had only 4 battlecruisers available for scouting duties during the next six weeks. (HMAS Australia had missed Jutland, but was now available.) This perceived weakness in his scouting forces bothered Jellicoe. HMS Tiger completed repairs and took on coal before rejoining the Battlecruiser Fleet. Three Passat Class and a Nordwind Class tug ease the big battlecruiser against the coaling dock. The docks are 11x3 custom-made lots using an old brick texture and “Paeng’s Grunge Concrete”, fronted by “WMP Seawalls”. The coal cranes are from the “PEG” trash lots, “resized” to fit. The two warehouses left of center are from “Nob’s 1905 Naval Series”. HMS Tiger, the steam locomotive, and coal gondolas are courtesy of Barroco Hispano. The numerous sailors, rope coils, Atlantic fenders, and beautiful tugs are the work of “AP”. The dreadnoughts of the Grand Fleet, as a whole, suffered comparatively little damage – though several individual ships took considerable punishment. HMS Colossus took two shells in the forward superstructure, causing little damage, and returned to duty by 18 June. After nearly being lost to a single torpedo strike, HMS Marlborough received temporary repairs at Hull, then moved to the Armstrong-Whitworth shipyard at Jarrow (Clydebank) for extensive permanent repairs. She returned to the fleet on 5 August. HMS Barham, flagship of the now-famous 5th Battle Squadron “fast battleships”, was a bit “chewed-up”, but returned to the fleet on 5 July. HMS Malaya, another “fast battleship”, survived a great deal of enemy attention and many near misses, but was repaired in the floating dock at Invergordon and returned to the fleet on 4 July. HMS Warspite was the most heavily damaged of the “fast battleships”, but she managed to make port under her own steam and underwent extensive repairs, only returning to the fleet in early August. (Warspite went on to a long and glorious career in WW II. At the Battle of Calabria, 9 June 1940, she opened fire on the Italian battleship Giulio Cesare and scored a hit at the longest known range of 29,000 yards. The record stands unbroken to this day. Warspite was also the first Allied warship to open fire on the Normandy beaches, on June 6, 1944. However, it became something of a standing joke in the Royal Navy that her steering gear problem was never fully cured. For the rest of her service life, Warspite’s steering would, for no apparent reason -- occasionally go “haywire” – and the big ship would “go-walk-about”.) An added stroke of luck came to Jellicoe within days of the battle, when HMS Queen Elizabeth and Emperor of India completed their maintenance and rejoined the fleet. And a few weeks later, the new 15-inch-gunned battleship HMS Royal Sovereign completed her working-up exercises and joined the battle squadrons at Scapa Flow. So – for the next six weeks -- Jellicoe’s “fast battleship” squadron was reduced to two ships – and his total dreadnought battleship strength dropped from 28 to 24 ships. Though this temporary decline in strength preyed on Jellicoe’s mind, the danger was more imagined than real, and he had one obvious and overwhelming advantage. On the morning of 3 June 1916, Jellicoe had an operational battle fleet on two hour’s notice for steam – Admiral Scheer did not. SMS Helgoland undergoes repair in one of the large floating dry docks in Wilhelmshaven that so impressed Jellicoe in the time before the war. The dock is very wide in relation to Helgoland. It was designed to accommodate ships as each class got progressively bigger. Note the funnels on the right of the dock. Boilers and steam engines powered the big pumps used to raise and lower the dock so ships could enter and exit. They also ran generators providing electric light, ventilation fans in the machine shops, and power for the heavy machine tools. Across the North Sea, much the same scene was being played out with the Hochseeflotte. True enough, Scheer had fewer ships to worry about – but more of his were damaged. The size of the British battle fleet, the poor visibility on the day of the battle, and the way in which the battle unfolded, all conspired to concentrate damage to just a portion of the German fleet. The opposing battlecruiser forces engaged early on and stayed engaged for the entire battle – both sides steadily accumulating damage. The British battle fleet was arrayed in such a manner as to be able to bring virtually all their guns to bear on the enemy, while the poor visibility limited their field of vision. This haphazardly resulted in many British ships concentrating their fire on the few visible German dreadnoughts – causing heavy damage. Considering the circumstances, it’s a miracle they survived at all. (Had British gunnery been better, they might not have survived.) Of the 5 German battlecruisers present at Jutland, one was sunk, one was virtually unharmed, two were heavily damaged, and the fifth one was near sinking. Scheer engaged the British with 16 dreadnought battleships – 9 were damaged in varying degrees. Of the 6 pre-dreadnought battleships present, one was lightly damaged and one sunk. (Some authors claim the old battleships were “hit repeatedly” – but there is no evidence in the “BundesArchiv” to support this assertion.) The official German warship losses at Jutland: Battlecruisers: Lutzow Battleships: Pommern (pre-dreadnought) Light Cruisers: Wiesbaden – Elbing – Rostock -- Frauenlob Torpedo Boats: V-48 – S-35 – V-29 – V-27 -- V-4 German battlecruisers damaged: Von der Tann – 4 hits Moltke – 4 Seydlitz – 26, 1 torpedo Derfflinger – 31 German battleships damaged: Rheinland – 1 hit Westfalen – 1 Helgoland – 1 Oldenburg – 1 Kaiser – 2 Ostfriesland – 1 mine Grosser Kurfurst – 8 Konig – 10 Markgraf – 5 Nassau – 2, rammed by destroyer Spitfire German pre-dreadnought battleships damaged: Schleswig-Holstein – 1 hit Schlesien – 1 hit German personnel losses: 2,551 dead – 507 wounded ** (It should be noted no two sources agree on the number of hits taken by the Imperial warships. Consequently, I have taken my numbers from the “BA-MA” – Bundesarchiv – Militararchiv. For purposes of simplification, I have included only hits scored by main and secondary battery guns.) Comparing the numbers, they speak for themselves. In the early decades of the 20th Century, the balance of power was measured in capital ships, and the Royal Navy lost three battlecruisers, while the Kaiserliche Marine lost one battlecruiser and one old pre-dreadnought battleship. If you simply crunch the numbers, the British lost more men and ships. But the immediate balance of power after the battle could be better measured in “repairs” and how long they took to complete. Jellicoe, always worried about maintaining his 2 to 1 margin of superiority, needlessly wrung his hands over a six week repair period. Scheer, on the other hand, did not have imaginary problems – he had real problems. Despite all the grief she inflicted on British destroyer flotillas during the night, SMS Westfalen suffered only minor damage and returned to the fleet in mid-June. She is seen taking on coal from a pair of lighters with a Thor Class tug lashed alongside. Another tug stands by with various ship’s stores. SMS Westfalen courtesy of Barroco Hispano. Tugs, lighters, mooring dolphins, and small boats by AP. Due to the volume of fire directed at them, and the sheer destructive power of the larger British shells, the Imperial capital ships suffered devastating structural damage that would have certainly sunk less well-armored vessels. What’s more – German commercial shipyards and Imperial Dockyards were few in number and scattered between the North Sea and The Baltic. Compounding the difficulty was their limited capacity (hence the numerous floating docks), and their inability to match the speed of English facilities. Scheer was in far worse shape than Jellicoe, and far more worried – and with good reason. A week after the battle of Jutland, Scheer could only muster one slightly damaged battlecruiser (Moltke) and eight undamaged dreadnought battleships. (SMS Konig Albert missed Jutland due to condenser trouble, but was ready for duty on 3 June.) SMS Rheinland was hit only once, and returned to I Battle Squadron by 17 June. A pair of Sophia Class paddle tugs have come alongside to unload their lighters. The first tug is hauling fresh provisions, while the second is transferring dry goods and ship’s stores. A Thor Class tug stands by to top-off Rheinland’s coal bunkers. SMS Westfalen, Rheinland, Helgoland, and Oldenburg were lightly damaged, and returned to service by mid-June (about two weeks), providing a much needed boost in battleship strength. The elderly Schleswig-Holstein and Schlesian (pre-dreadnoughts) were moderately damaged but were repaired dockside at Cuxhaven. Despite being rammed by HMS Spitfire, losing 20 feet or her belt armor, and having a considerable gash above the waterline, SMS Nassau went into Kaiserliche Werft Wilhelmshaven and returned to the fleet on 14 July -- about six weeks. The damage to SMS Grosser Kurfurst was largely superficial, but two hits involved structural damage, so the ship returned to her builder’s yard, A.G. Vulcan, Hamburg. She rejoined the battle fleet on 16 July (approximately six weeks). SMS Nassau was hit by two shells, causing moderate damage – but she was rammed by the destroyer HMS Spitfire. The British ship was passing on an opposite course and seriously damaged the battleship’s port bow and armor belt, with collateral damage along the rest of the port side. Nassau is moored outboard of the dry dock mole undergoing repairs. Two crane barges have been brought alongside to work on the hull plating with a machinists barge to help with the steel work. The steam tug Goliath and the paddle tug Helena are standing by to move the crane barges as needed. SMS Nassau and Goliath are courtesy of “Barroco Hispano”. The mooring dolphins, lighters, tug Helena, and the barges alongside the battleship are all by “AP”, as well as the crane on the left hand barge. There are many props and cranes on the dry dock mole – also by “AP”. The barges and cranes in the left of the picture are from the “PEG” seaports and “SNM Series”. Below is a detail shot. SMS Konig suffered the most serious damage among the Imperial dreadnoughts. She had structural damage to the main armor belt and the forward armored citadel transverse bulkhead. There were also large areas below decks where small compartments were shattered by the blast from armor-piercing shells. (No doubt, 15-inch rounds from HMS Barham, Revenge, or Royal Oak.) Because of her size, Konig required a large floating dock. Wilhelmshaven’s were already occupied, so she transferred to Kaiserliche Werft Kiel for immediate repairs, then to the Howaldtswerk shipyard in the Kieler Hafen to finish the work. She returned to the Jade on 22 July (seven weeks). SMS Ostfriesland is going into dry dock for major repairs to the mine damage on her starboard bow. Once the water is drained they will be able to repair the interior compartments as well as the hull and armor belt. Off her stern are two Passat Class tugs and one older Nordwind Class. While in dock her hull will be cleaned and repainted. The tugs and lighters in the lower left are carrying hundreds of gallons of paint for the purpose. The small dockside cranes are borrowed from the “PEG SNM Series”, while the large 250 ton steam cranes are the meticulous work of “AP”. Ostfriesland is courtesy of “Barroco Hispano”. The tugs, lighters, sailors, and numerous small props dockside are the fine work of “AP”. The mine damage to Ostfriesland, both internal and external, was considerable, but the Imperial Dockyard returned her to duty on 26 July (nearly eight weeks). SMS Markgraf was knocked-about quite a bit – taking at least three 15-inch shells -- but it was a near miss aft that sent her back to the builder’s yard. The force of the detonation alongside (probably another 15-inch round), warped a propeller shaft. Markgraf was escorted to the A.G. Weser Shipyard in Bremen to make use of their large dry dock – and only returned to the Jade on 5 August (roughly nine weeks). SMS Kaiser suffered light damage from 2 hits, but as part of the guard force anchored in Schillig Roads, her repairs were delayed and she only rejoined the battle fleet on 7 August (nine weeks). With Scheer’s battle squadrons once again whole, he received a bit of luck. The new 15-inch-gunned battleship SMS Bayern commissioned into the Kaiserliche Marine on 15 July and was assigned to III Battle Squadron. Due to wartime conditions, the dreadnought battleship SMS Bayern conducted her working-up exercises largely in the Baltic Sea. Urgently needed to strengthen the Hochseeflotte, she was dispatched to Wilhelmshaven with little coal in her bunkers. She anchored in Schillig Roads on 15 July and immediately began coaling ship. Her big 15-inch guns were a welcome addition to III Battle Squadron. Bayern and the steam tug Goliath are courtesy of Barroco Hispano. The Helena Class paddle tug, lighters, small boat, and mooring dolphins are the detailed work of @AP. The repairs to the German battleships had been handled fairly quickly, but then, they had not been under fire for very long. The German battlecruisers were another matter entirely. SMS Moltke only took four hits – but all of them were 15-inch shells. She was holed aft below the armor belt and flooded-down by the stern. On 6 June she was despatched to her builder -- up the Elbe River to the Blohm & Voss Yards. The four big Lyddite shells also caused superficial damage to her hull and decks, but considerably more internal damage to her below deck compartments. Admiral Hipper was finally able to raise his flag aboard Moltke on 14 August (ten weeks). SMS Von der Tann was also hit by four large caliber shells -- two of them 15-inch – one of which struck below the waterline aft, dislodging part of the armor belt and causing serious flooding. Other shells damaged the ship’s upper works, but the most serious problem was with the main gun recoil buffers. During rapid firing early in the battle, Von der Tann’s main battery guns began to overheat, and eventually came out of battery during recoil – effectively putting the guns out of action. A good deal of time was spent overhauling the gun slides and recoil buffers. Repair parts for Von der Tann’s jammed “A” turret were cannibalized from the battleship Rheinland to speed the work. The guns then had to be tested on the Baltic gunnery ranges, and Von der Tann did not rejoin 1st Scouting Group until 15 August (ten weeks). The repair of SMS Seydlitz was one of the most difficult operations ever performed at the Imperial Dockyards Wilhelmshaven. The ship barely made port in a near-sinking condition – and repairs were more like a salvage operation. Almost two weeks were spent sealing holes and lightening the ship enough to get her inside the harbor locks, and then into a floating dock. She absorbed an unbelievable 26 large caliber shells (twelve of them 15-inch) and a torpedo strike. The torpedo, alone, was enough to sink most capital ships of the period. Everything forward of the bridge was riddled with massive shell holes and an utter shambles. Initial repairs were carried out in various floating docks and basins at Wilhelmshaven – then she transferred to Kiel, where more advanced work was undertaken in the construction yard. Seydlitz finally rejoined 1st Scouting Group on 3 November (approximately twenty weeks). SMS Derfflinger was in better shape than Seydlitz, but not by much. She went into a floating dock on 2 June and work was begun draining compartments, plugging holes, and fitting temporary patches to the hull. From 7-9 June she was moored at berth A-5 to clean the ship, remove the torpedo nets and booms, and land part of the ammunition ashore. Derfflinger arrived in Kiel on 11 June where permanent repairs would be carried out in the construction yard. At the same time, the big cruiser received a tall tripod mast -- the signature look for which she is so well known. The new tripod would accommodate a large foretop with an improved 15-foot rangefinder. On 22 June she returned to the floating dock where final repairs were concluded on 15 October. Sea trials and gunnery tests were run to ensure the battlecruiser was combat-ready, and Derfflinger rejoined 1st Scouting Group on 9 November, when they arrived in Kiel for squadron maneuvers and gunnery practice (roughly twenty-one weeks). (Just for the record – If anyone requires proof of the superiority of German armor and its application – Seydlitz and Derfflinger represent tangible proof. Considering the enormous amounts of damage done to these two ships – they should have sunk. But the key philosophy behind German warship construction was survivability. It took, roughly, three years to build SMS Seydlitz, and twenty-nine months for Derfflinger – but it only took five months to make repairs and return them to the fleet. German naval architects understood: it was far cheaper, and much faster, to repair a ship than it was to build a new one.) SMS Derfflinger – circa 1917 – with her tripod foremast and spacious “spotting top”. The legs of the mast were unusually heavy compared to those seen in other navies. German designers made them especially sturdy to eliminate any possibility of vibration that might interfere with the optical rangefinder. The large 15-foot rangefinder would have been installed in the cylindrical shaped, rotating upper level of the spotting top, while the lower level housed the necessary fire control instruments, their operating party, and the firing circuits of the Chief Gunnery Officer. Access to the spotting top would have been via ladders outside the steel mast legs. Oddly enough – none of my extensive research has ever turned up an incident where a spotting top or tripod mast was destroyed by gunfire. There were, of course, numerous instances of rangefinders mounted anywhere on the ship’s superstructure being knocked-out by enemy fire. On 18 August, Vizeadmiral Scheer once again assembled the serviceable units of the Hochseeflotte in Schillig Roads – some 18 dreadnought battleships and 2 battlecruisers. SMS Seydlitz and Derfflinger were not out of the repair yards, so 1st Scouting Group consisted of the battlecruisers SMS Von der Tann and Moltke (flag), reinforced by the battleships Grosser Kurfurst, Markgraf, and the new 15-inch-gunned SMS Bayern. Vizeadmiral Hipper cleared the Jade by 20:00 and set course to the west. An hour later, Admiral Scheer followed with the remaining battleships of the III and I Battle Squadrons. It was Scheer’s intention to show the English, and the rest of the world, the Imperial battle fleet was just as full of fight as ever. In yet another attempt to ambush a portion of the Grand Fleet, he would carry out the previously aborted Sunderland Raid, complete with U-Boat ambushes, and this time fully covered by Zeppelin reconnaissance. As usual, the British were fully alerted by German wireless traffic and the Grand Fleet, Battlecruiser Fleet, and Tyrwhitt’s Harwich Force had put to sea some five hours ahead of the Germans. The morning of 19 August dawned bright and clear as the Hochseeflotte continued to steer west, interrupted twice by early morning submarine sightings. On both occasions, Hipper immediately turned away from the enemy and signaled submarine warnings to Scheer before swinging back to the west. Unfortunately for the Hochseeflotte battle squadrons, around 06:00, some 60 miles north of Terschelling – the British submarine E-23 slammed a torpedo into SMS Westfalen. Hit amidships, the German dreadnought took onboard 800 tons of water, and was ordered back to Wilhelmshaven under escort. As Hipper’s scouting group proceeded on a westerly course, yet another British submarine, this one on the surface, was sighted by SMS Bayern at 08:43. Wary of the numerous submarine sightings, Hipper increased speed and altered course to WSW. To the north, almost simultaneous to the torpedoing of Westfalen, the Grand Fleet was approaching Dogger Bank. HMS Nottingham (Goodenough’s 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron) was on the extreme east end of the scouting line, 6 miles ahead of the battle fleet. Without warning, a single torpedo fired from U-52 struck the light cruiser in the port engine room -- she barely had time to get out a distress signal before going down. Apparently, the signal was sent in such haste it was unclear whether Nottingham was torpedoed or had struck a mine. Alarmed, Jellicoe feared he had run into a freshly laid minefield, and immediately reversed course. For the next two hours, the Grand Fleet actually steamed to the north -- until it could be confirmed Nottingham had been torpedoed – whereupon, the fleet resumed their southerly course. During the brief detour, a Zeppelin sighted the Grand Fleet and reported its course as north. This alerted Scheer to the fact the Grand Fleet was at sea, and puzzled him because of its direction of travel, but ultimately made no difference in the balance of things. Around 14:20, the wind began to freshen from the NW and belts of rain began blowing in. Shortly thereafter, a signal was picked up from the airship L-13…...”Strong enemy force...SE...30 units including dreadnoughts…”. The report was, of course, inaccurate – it was only the light cruisers and destroyers of the Harwich Force. Nevertheless, Hipper signaled Scheer, and swung his ships to close and investigate the report. He ordered SMS Von der Tann and Moltke to increase speed and take a position four miles in advance of the dreadnoughts in his force. Scheer assumed the Zeppelin report had identified Beatty’s battlecruisers, so he aborted the Sunderland Raid and moved to support Hipper. Hipper and Scheer searched briefly for the enemy to the SE, but Tyrwhitt’s force never turned up. After two more unsuccessful attacks by British submarines, Scheer was becoming nervous about a possible British submarine concentration and ambush. Finally, at 16:15, U-58 accurately reported the main body of the Grand Fleet just 60 miles north of Scheer’s position, so he broke off the fruitless search and set course for the Jade. Around 18:30, Tyrwhitt’s Harwich Force finally came on the scene and sighted the screening light cruisers of Hipper’s 1st Scouting Group far to the east and steaming for home. The British gave chase, briefly, but realized it would be dark before they could catch the retiring German warships. When Tyrwhitt sent in the sighting report, Jellicoe swung the Grand Fleet to the east, but it was more a gesture than an act of aggression. A half hour later, Jellicoe stumbled upon another German submarine ambush (U-63) and the screening light cruiser HMS Falmouth was torpedoed. (U-66 finished the job and sent her to the bottom on 20 August while she was being towed back to port.) That was enough for Jellicoe. He had been nervous about bringing the battle fleet that far south in the first place. Now he was certain it was no longer safe to use the Grand Fleet anywhere south of Horn’s Reef. With the High Sea Fleet steaming for the Jade, the signal lamps flashed up and down the long lines of battleships, and the Grand Fleet was ordered back to its’ various bases. After giving Tyrwhitt’s Harwich Force the slip, Hipper and his ships formed a rearguard for the battle fleet and dropped anchor in Schillig Roads around 09:00, 20 August – with no further incident. For all the bravado, on both sides, two things had become clear: (1) Both battle fleets were now wary of each other – and (2) the North Sea had become infested with submarines hostile to one side or the other. Here are four model views of SMS Derfflinger as she looked with her tripod, after rejoining the fleet – circa 1917. She is preparing to take on coal. In the final picture, it is obvious the rangefinder mounted high in the tripod fighting top has a much better vantage point than the rangefinder on top of the armored conning tower. The increased height not only allowed the fire control team to range farther over the horizon, but it was much more likely to be be free of obstruction from gunnery smoke. Excellent model provided by @Barroco Hispano. NEXT TIME…… IF THE TRUTH BE TOLD MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful warship models. SPECIAL THANKS to my friend and partner, @AP, for his talents, meticulous models, colorful imagination, and extreme dedication. If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496

SMS Moltke – guns blazing with a “bone in her teeth” (a pronounced bow wave) as she charges along at 27 knots – tactical #3 in the battlecruiser line during the “Death Ride”. Moltke, under utmost speed was capable of 28 knots, but by this time of the day, the German warships were suffering the effects of inferior coal. The low grade coal did not fully burn and the fire boxes were filling up with “clinkers”. The problem was especially acute on the smaller light cruisers and torpedo boats. (Willy Stower) IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 36: DEATH RIDE OF THE BATTLECRUISERS The III Battle Squadron of the Hochseeflotte is under heavy fire and steering toward the British battle line during the “second encounter” of the Battle of Jutland. Left to right are the dreadnought battleships SMS Kronprinz, Markgraf, Grosser Kurfurst, and Konig leading the van. (Claus Bergen) Far to the east, twilight was descending into darkness as the sun sank toward the western horizon. But Vizeadmiral Reinhard Scheer could not see the eastern horizon. Nor could he see the northern horizon, for that matter. All he could see from the bridge of SMS Friedrich der Grosse was a veritable forest of shell splashes from the enemy guns and rolling smoke from his own guns – and everything frequently lit a dull orange as a British shell found a target among his battleships. When he did manage to get a glimpse beyond the smoke and water columns, all he could see – from horizon to horizon -- was a churning bank of smoke, lit with the flickering muzzle flashes of more than two hundred big guns. Instead of slipping east across the wake of the Grand Fleet, Scheer had managed to stumble into the center of their battle fleet – for the second time. He knew the only solution was to disengage from the enemy – but it would have to be a quick and clean break. He needed to disrupt the British battle line long enough to escape back into the haze and smoke. At 19:13, Scheer signaled Hartog’s battlecruisers with a flag hoist – “9R”. In any naval signal book of the day, flags denoted certain things with a variety of colors and symbols, which are explained in the signal book. In this case, #9 is the “series” and “R” is the instruction. The signals officer would scan down the pages until he hit series 9, and then look for the “R”. Beside “9R” in the Imperial Naval Signals book, it said...”ran an den Feind – voll einsetzen!”. Historically, the Imperial flag signal codes had originated in the old Prussian Navy of the 1860’s. In those days, many ranking naval officers had started military life in the Prussian Army, with the result that some instructions in the flag book were a bit archaic and sounded more like orders to a heavy cavalry regiment. Very “loosely translated”, “9R” said...”PANZERKREUZER AT THE ENEMY! GIVE IT EVERYTHING!” Scheer would hurl the battlecruisers at the enemy to draw their attention away from the battle line. What transpired thereafter, was both the most splendid and the most foolhardy moment in, perhaps, the entire recorded history of the Dreadnought Era. The four remaining battlecruisers – Derfflinger, Seydlitz, Moltke, and Von der Tann – had sunk three British battlecruisers that day -- fought Beatty, Evan-Thomas, Hood, and then Jellicoe – and had been brutally battered by heavy shells. Von der Tann had only her 5.9-inch guns left in the fight, and all the ships and crews had been in a continuous high-speed gunnery action for nearly four hours. When the signal was read out on Derfflinger’s bridge, Kapitan Hartog did not hesitate, he merely ordered...”Steady on course – ring for utmost speed”. Within seconds thick black smoke gushed from the funnels as the engineers sprayed oil on the boiler fires, and the big battlecruiser began to gather speed. With Vizeadmiral Hipper still aboard the torpedo boat G-39, it fell to Hartog and Derfflinger to lead the already badly damaged Imperial battlecruisers directly into "the greatest concentration of naval gunfire any fleet commander had ever faced" – at an insanely short range. In Seydlitz, Kapitan von Egidy read Scheer’s signal and told the handset operators to pass the word to the crew. As the various stations acknowledged the message, there was a pause, then the sound of cheering came through the voice pipes, ventilation shafts, and the passageways. Soon the stirring strains of “Wacht am Rhein” could be heard. Down in the boiler rooms, the sweaty, grimy, exhausted stokers rang their shovels on the deck plates and shouted...”Drauf Seydlitz – Drauf Seydlitz!” (Attack Seydlitz! -- the battle cry of Frederick the Great’s cuirassier cavalry.) As the Panzerkreuzer gathered speed and steered for the British line, their crews hadn’t a thought their actions over the next few minutes would forever be enshrined in legend and glory. It was, in fact, the single “greatest concentration of naval gunfire” ever seen in all of history. The low and sleek cruisers, pale gray against the blue-gray sea erupting and boiling around them, steered east at speed – their Imperial battle ensigns whipping straight and stiff at the masthead. Kapitan Hartog did not have time to savor the grand and gallant action of his ships – nor, perhaps, would his warrior’s mind have grasped the symbolism. He was fully absorbed in hurling at the British, the best science, technology, and metallurgy the German analytical mind could devise. And opposing him was the steel-sided, fire-breathing embodiment of victory – a British battle fleet with a naval tradition stretching back to Sir Francis Drake and the Spanish Armada. Actually, the symbolism might not have been lost on Hartog – he was known to be well-read in European military history. But he knew the “grand gesture” he and his ships were making was far more important that any symbolism that might be attributed to it in later years. And so began what came to be known as...“The Death Ride Of The Battlecruisers”. This rather “romanticized” phrase only came into use after The Great War, when Korvettenkapitan von Hase, Derfflinger’s gunnery officer, wrote his book. But it does capture the courage and determination of the officers and men who manned the Imperial battlecruisers. All the Panzerkreuzer, with the exception of SMS Moltke, were seriously damaged. Nevertheless, they increased speed and surged toward the enemy battle line, their gunners firing at any target they could see. Even Von der Tann, with only her 5.9-inch guns left, steamed toward the flaming maw of the Grand Fleet’s guns. As the gun action heated up, III Torpedo Boat Flotilla, retiring from their battle around Wiesbaden, cut through Scheer’s battle line and regrouped on the light cruiser SMS Rostock (on the starboard flank). With their torpedoes expended, they would take up screening duty. At 19:15, Scheer sent a wireless message to his remaining flotillas to charge the British line and launch torpedoes. The light cruiser SMS Regensburg rallied the II, VI, VII, and IX Flotillas and steered to the NE. The little torpedo craft began laying a thick smokescreen as they advanced, fanning out so the smoke would cover Scheer’s maneuver. The attack was utterly reckless, but absolutely essential. Scheer’s battle fleet was within 10,000 yards of the enemy and still closing. If he was going to make good his escape, he would have to thoroughly disrupt the enemy battle line. SMS Derfflinger, battered and down by the bow, leads the Imperial battlecruisers on “The Death Ride” against the British Grand Fleet. Thick black smoke gushes from her funnels as the engines strain at full speed. Though heavily damaged, she will do her duty and help save Scheer’s battle fleet. THE Imperial battlecruisers approached the British line at high speed and Derfflinger, as lead ship, came under a particularly galling fire. There is no way to tell with any certainty how many enemy ships concentrated their fire on the “Iron Dog”, but it was certainly no fewer than 12 battleships -- the British 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Battleship Divisions were the nearest to her with a clear line of sight. And the 15-inch-gunned HMS Royal Oak and Revenge were well placed to bring their massive guns into action. Derfflinger and Seydlitz (just astern) frequently disappeared from view as a dozen shell splashes leapt high into the air and rained down tons of water onto their decks. Near misses plunged into the water alongside and exploded, shaking the battlecruisers as if they had been struck by a giant hammer. And then, there were the shells that struck home. When Richard Wagner composed “Der Ring des Nibelungen”, he could not have foreseen the death and destruction of Jutland – but surely this last act of the Imperial battlecruisers was their own “Gotterdammerung” (Twilight Of The Gods). As “point ship” of the German battle line, SMS Derfflinger was the “target of choice”, and her luck ran out around 19:15, when a 15-inch shell fired by HMS Revenge penetrated the roof of “D” turret. The huge shell detonated on the right hand powder hoist, set fire to the charges in the hoist, and completely burned-out the turret. There was no danger of an explosion, but 75 men were killed and “D” magazine was flooded as a precaution. Between 19:16 and 19:17 (yes – just two minutes) four more hits were scored by Revenge. One 15-inch shell penetrated the barbette of “C” turret just below the gun house and exploded -- just below and between the gun breeches. Again, the powder charges in the hoists ignited, killed 68 men, and burned-out the turret. Derfflinger had lost both stern turrets in the space of two minutes. Two of the big shells plunged into the quarter deck and exploded below, blasting a pair of 15-foot holes in the deck, while causing extensive damage to the compartments below, and starting a raging fire. The final shell from Revenge went through Derfflinger’s forward funnel about three feet above the bridge. A short time later, two 15-inch shells from HMS Royal Oak passed through the aft funnel, while a 12-inch round from HMS Bellerophon plowed into the forward armored conning tower. Korvettenkapitan von Hase was directing his guns from inside the upper level… “Suddenly, it was as if we had heard the crack of Doom. A terrific roar, a tremendous explosion, and then darkness. The whole conning tower seemed to rise into the air, only to fall back into position. We tumbled about like stones in a bucket, then poisonous yellow-green gases filled the tower and we managed to get the heavy door open with great difficulty to breath fresh air. To our great relief, the heavy shell had failed to penetrate the thick steel.” Hammered by large caliber shells, with her aft turrets enveloped in a raging inferno, Derfflinger shouldered her way through the towering water columns and held course for the British battle fleet. SMS Seydlitz, battered and with smoldering fires, follows Derfflinger on “the Death Ride” against the British Grand Fleet. (Claus Bergen) Next astern of Derfflinger was SMS Seydlitz and, she too, came in for her share of attention. At 19:17 a 15-inch shell disabled the right hand gun barrel of “E” turret. And around 19:20, a 12-inch shell fired by HMS St. Vincent impacted the gun house of the burnt-out “C” turret, igniting a furious powder fire from charges still in the loading trays. Both Seydlitz and Derfflinger would burn for hours. Moltke, with her luck holding, managed to avoid any damage during the “Death Ride”. Little Von der Tann, expertly handled by Kapitan Zenker, continued to dodge salvos and took only one hit during the “second encounter” with the Grand Fleet. A 15-inch shell from HMS Revenge struck the rear of the aft conning tower, and though it failed to penetrate, it exploded on contact and splinters entered through the vision slits, killing four men. Unfortunately, the massive spray of splinters also penetrated the fantail deck and knocked-out a dynamo, plunging the below-decks compartments into darkness. SMS Seydlitz on fire in several places and burning fiercely from the second hit on the burnt-out “C” turret. Seydlitz would be the most heavily damaged capital ship in the Hochseeflotte to survive the Battle Of Jutland. This picture was taken the day after the battle, and in the end, it was a miracle she managed to make Wilhelmshaven. Hartog’s Panzerkreuzer continued their reckless charge, closing the range to under 7,700 yards – so close, no armor in existence could prevent shell penetration. Though battered, the Imperial battlecruisers held their course, maintained their speed, and kept up a steady fire against the enemy line. But no amount of courage and determination was going to overcome the odds they faced. Around 19:16, there was unexpected relief from the madness. Derfflinger’s lookouts spotted a flag signal on Friedrich der Grosse’s halyards ordering a course change...”Operate against the enemy’s van”. Kapitan Hartog went out on the bridge wing, verified the signal, and only then did he order a four point turn to starboard. Hartog swung his battlecruisers onto a southerly course, parallel to the British battle line and continued to engage – but he now had leeway to maneuver. As he fought a running gun duel to the south, Hartog gradually opened the range to something less suicidal. To his credit Scheer, during his later audience with the Kaiser, regaled His Majesty with the heroism of the Panzerkreuzer…,,, “When the signal was given to attack the British line with the utmost ferocity, the battlecruisers threw themselves at the enemy without regard to their own safety. The sight of our battlecruisers steaming at full speed against the enemy, while their shells fell all about, was an inspiration to the entire fleet. Although a number of their guns were unable to fire, and some of the ships were severely damaged, they did not hesitate to advance recklessly towards the enemy. Their conduct is especially deserving of the highest possible praise...” The Kaiser was nearly overcome with the very thought of the scene. Seydlitz in the heat of battle as “the Death Ride” nears its climax. Notice how the ship is closed-in on all sides by rolling gun smoke and towering water columns from near misses. As many as a dozen British battleships have taken her under fire and at slightly more than 7,000 yards, her upper works have been shredded by 6-inch shells and splinter damage. Her blackened “C” turret was hit and burnt-out early in the battle and the gun tubes are still elevated over the starboard side. Numerous shell casings ejected from the rear of “D” turret lie among the battle debris strewn about the decks. (Claus Bergen) About the same time Hartog made his turn to the south (around 19:20), the massed flotillas of the Hochseeflotte threw themselves at the British battle line. Five flotillas struggled through the fusillade of shells hurled at them -- thick smoke churning from their funnels trailed astern -- laying the smoke screen Scheer so desperately needed to conceal his dreadnoughts. The little torpedo boats spread out into attack mode and formed up in “waves”. They were having difficulty working into an attack position and were, for the most part, operating at reduced speeds. The small boats only had a few boilers in their slim hulls, and the inferior German coal was “playing-up” in the fireboxes. The low grade coal burned slowly and not even fully. This resulted in a build-up of “clinkers” in the fireboxes – seriously hampering efforts to maintain steam pressure. The little craft had been in constant motion for several hours, and mostly at high speed – they simply did not have the time nor opportunity to “trim their fires” and keep them hot. At the same time, the ever-present British destroyers emerged from between the columns of dreadnoughts and sought to blunt the German attack. Torpedo boats from several flotillas had no remaining torpedoes, and they peeled off to engage the enemy. The torpedo boats moving to the attack simply fended off the English destroyers with gunfire as they rushed past, leaving them to be dealt with by their flotilla mates. A British destroyer flotilla coming out from behind the British battle line to repel the mass attack of the German torpedo boats. German torpedo boats closing with the British battle line to deliver a diversionary torpedo attack while Scheer extricates his fleet from a critical situation. The little torpedo boats closed, in some cases, to less than 6,500 yards to launch their torpedoes – an insanely close range for a daylight torpedo attack. The VI and IX Flotillas worked their way in to about 8,000 yards, then started their attack run. The British dreadnoughts shifted fire onto the attacking torpedo boats and opened with both main and secondary batteries. The battleships kept up a rapid fire, the big guns aimed in the enemy’s general direction. Even if they did not obtain a direct hit, a near miss with a heavy caliber shell might be enough to disable the flimsy torpedo boats. The German “first wave” pressed in to 6,500 yards, twisting and turning to avoid the heavy fire. Shell splashes towered high into the air before crashing down on the torpedo boat’s exposed decks. Shell splinters from near misses whirred through the air like angry hornets, punching holes in funnels, the thin hull plates, and the torpedo crews working their weapons mounts. When human endurance could bear no more, the small boats swerved to port, loosed their torpedoes, and zig-zagged back into their own smoke. The “second wave” was supposed to be made up of the II and VII Flotillas, but the II Flotilla lost their way in the thick smoke, and by the time their eleven boats located the enemy, they were no longer in a position to delivered their 63 torpedoes against the British battle line. (The other German flotillas had already retired from the fight, and the British battle line was well out of range and steaming out of danger. A major “lost” opportunity for the Germans.) Meanwhile, the VII Flotilla had gamely followed their predecessors to a little less than 7,000 yards before unleashing their torpedoes. The third wave of boats went in right behind them, joined by three stragglers from III Flotilla that still had torpedoes. They had to struggle to get into an attack position, because the Grand Fleet had already begun to turn away from the danger. The boats in the third wave finally fired their torpedoes in the general direction of the retreating dreadnoughts on the theory that with so many targets they had to hit something. (This was a then-current tactical theory held by both the British and US navies – referred to as a “browning shot”. With an enemy arrayed in a line-ahead formation, you massed the torpedo craft, fired the torpedoes, and about 30% of them would likely strike a target. As with most theories, it worked better on paper than in practice.) German torpedo boats have launched their torpedoes at the British battle line and are taking evasive action as they begin a zig-zag withdrawal under murderous fire. Lookouts aboard HMS Iron Duke spotted the mass of enemy torpedo boats rushing toward the fleet and alerted Jellicoe. He immediately ordered the signal officer to hoist the pennant for an “emergency turn-away”. The Grand Fleet first turned away two points to port, then two minutes later, Jellicoe ordered them back to starboard, mistakenly believing he had avoided the torpedoes. Swinging back into the path of oncoming torpedoes, Jellicoe was forced to order a three point turn to port, putting them on a SE course. The Germans launched a number of torpedoes despite the British destroyer attacks and the chaos of heavy gunfire from the battle line. The quoted number varies from 21 to 41 torpedoes – so it is impossible to say how many were actually fired. And though the turn-away was executed promptly, it was not nearly enough helm to get out of danger -- and the torpedoes only had a short distance to cover. HMS Marlborough, Colossus, Hercules, and Agincourt (5th and 6th Battleship Divisions), all had to put their helms hard over to avoid numerous torpedoes. HMS Marlborough seemed to attract the German torpedoes, with one each passing ahead and astern, and a third traveling beneath the battleship without exploding. Another torpedo passed between Iron Duke and Thunderer – one each passed ahead and astern of both HMS Collingwood and HMS Temeraire. And HMS Revenge had to put her helm over twice in succession as two pairs of torpedoes sped past. But the nearness of these “known” torpedoes does not imply a failure on the part of the Germans or their torpedoes. The goal of the torpedo boats was to disrupt the British battle line – and they had certainly done that. But if Jellicoe had chosen not to turn away from the torpedoes, there is every possibility he could have had eight dreadnoughts torpedoed and withdrawn from the battle line – including his own flagship. Out of those eight, five could easily have gone to the bottom. HMS Marlborough, having already taken one torpedo, would most certainly have succumbed to a second hit. In the end, there were no torpedo hits on the dreadnoughts of the Grand Fleet – and it was entirely due to Jellicoe’s prompt signal to turn away from the danger. The Germans had two torpedo boats badly damaged, while HMS Iron Duke sent a third boat to the bottom with two 13.5-inch shells. Within hours of returning to Scapa Flow, Vice-Admiral Jellicoe was being criticized for turning away from the enemy torpedoes instead of turning toward them. Why? Because, unknowingly, it was at this moment of chaos that he lost contact with the Hochseeflotte. He was steaming away from the enemy while his enemy was steaming away from him. With the Imperial battlecruisers and the massed torpedo boat flotillas fully engaged, and the smoke screen across the bows of his battle line -- Vizeadmiral Scheer seized the moment of maximum confusion. At 19:18 he signaled his third “battle turn-away” of the day. This time the maneuver was not executed with the same precision as the others. During the second encounter with the English battle fleet, the German ships had strayed from their careful formation – some to open the firing arcs of their guns – others to dodge salvos. Some of the German dreadnoughts had been damaged and were having difficulty maintaining their station in the battle line. Some were “bunched-up”, and still others had slowed down to avoid collision. But the “cluster” gradually sorted itself out, and by 19:30 the Hochseeflotte was making best speed to the west – completely unobserved by the British. When Kapitan Hartog received Scheer’s signal to turn away, he immediately swung the battlecruisers SW and began making smoke. Once the smoke covered his wake, the enemy firing stopped, and the badly battered 1st Scouting Group altered course to WSW, and later to west. By 19:26 Derfflinger’s lookouts sighted the lead elements of the Hochseeflotte. As they drew nearer, Scheer signaled a course change to SW, and ordered the battlecruisers to take station off I Battle Squadron’s port beam. During the approximately ten minutes of the “second encounter”, the German battleships suffered some 108 dead, while SMS Konig had been hit 10 times, Grosser Kurfurst-8, Markgraf-5, and Kaiser-2. SMS Helgoland had been hit once, Oldenburg-1, Rheinland-1, Nassau-2, and Westfalen-1 (all medium caliber shells). Kronprinz, Prinzregent Luitpold, Kaiserin, Friedrich der Grosse, Ostfriesland, Thuringen, and Posen received no damage during the second encounter. Understandably, the first three ships leading the battle line had suffered the most damage, but for all the “steel” that had been thrown at them, there were surprisingly few hits – and none of them critical. Of course, during the entire day of battle, the dreadnought battleships of the Hochseeflotte had only been directly engaged for just under an hour. The Imperial battlecruisers, on the other hand, had been closely engaged for all of five hours – and they were in bad shape. SMS Lutzow was struck by 25 large caliber shells and suffered 128 dead. Too badly damaged to continue, she had already been detached to make for Wilhelmshaven (but would eventually founder). SMS Derfflinger lost 158 dead, was struck by 18 large caliber shells (10 of which, were 15-inch), and still had one operational main battery turret. She had taken on some water, but was capable of maintaining her place in the line. SMS Seydlitz was hit by 21 large caliber shells (source BundesArchive) and one torpedo, lost 98 dead, and though heavily damaged and down by the bow, she could make 18 knots. SMS Moltke, miraculously, had received only 4 hits during the course of the day (by 15-inch shells) and took on about 1,000 tons of water, but with no significant damage and only 16 dead. While striking HMS Tiger 13 times, Moltke emerged from the maelstrom virtually intact. SMS Von der Tann was hit by 4 large caliber shells during the day (two of them 15-inch) and only lost 11 dead. Both “A” and “C” turrets were jammed by shell fire, while the guns of both “B” and “D” turrets overheated and jammed in their slides. One 15-inch shell struck her aft below the waterline and caused serious flooding. Through the Herculean efforts of the damage control and repair parties, Von der Tann maintained her place in the line. Turret crews and mechanics worked tirelessly to repair and replenish the recoil systems on the midships gun turrets, while artificers had even used explosive charges to clear the twisted metal jamming the stern turret. Soon after nightfall, three of Von der Tann’s turrets were restored to operation. It is late in the day, and 2nd Battleship Division of the Grand Fleet is steaming SW in parallel pursuit of the Hochseeflotte. Note the very hazy visibility at the end of the column. As the Hochseeflotte steered SW at 17 knots, Jellicoe turned the Grand Fleet SSW and maintained speed at 18 knots. He was determined to hold onto his tactical advantage by keeping between Scheer and his escape routes to the east. But though they were no longer at each other’s throats, the shipboard routine was anything but “business as usual”. As dusk deepened into night, a pause in the action from roughly 20:20 to 21:00 allowed the German crews to tend to immediate needs. With darkness approaching, men were hurriedly detailed to prepare the big searchlights for nighttime action – making good splinter damage where possible, and restoring severed power leads. Turret crews and mechanics worked in the dim light, tending to the big guns they served -- cutting away wreckage, replacing broken instruments, and restoring power leads and voice tubes. There were, of course, casualties that had to be dealt with – and the gun crews had been confined to their turrets under a great deal of stress – they needed fresh air and rest. The shot-away signal halyards and wireless aerials needed to be replaced and there were still fires to put out. And there were hundreds of splinter holes to be plugged, shell holes to be patched, and weakened bulkheads to be shored-up. Most important of all, the drain inlets to the pumps had to be regularly cleared of blast debris so the seawater in the flooded compartments could be held in check. The engine room crews had been hard at it since early afternoon – the engines running at full revolutions – gauges to be watched, valves to be adjusted -- and the sudden flurry of activity when orders came from the bridge. On the other side of the watertight bulkhead, the back-breaking effort to maintain a full head of steam had taken its toll. Stokers on a coal-fired ship -- steaming at high speed -- had the never-ending job of feeding the boilers. With the forced-draft fans whirring at full speed, the fireboxes devoured coal just about as fast as a man could shovel it. At the height of the battle, the teams of stokers had to be changed out regularly, and replacements were kept handy if someone fell out in the stoke hold. Stripped to the waist and sweating like pigs, they were covered head to toe with the coal dust that hung in the air. Nearing the limits of human endurance, they too, would have to be relieved, fed, provided with a “pint”, and allowed topside for fresh air. In the descending darkness, while all this feverish work was going on, Scheer altered course to the south around 19:50 and began “getting his house in order”. The Hochseeflotte had taken something of a pounding, and was a bit strung-out as a result. The Flottenchef did his best to gather his squadrons and tighten-up the formation before darkness made it impossible. Kommodore von Reuter’s light cruisers of the 4th Scouting Group (Stettin, Munchen, Frauenlob, Stuttgart, Hamburg) were scouting about two miles in advance of the battle fleet. The pre-dreadnoughts of Konteradmiral Mauve’s II Battle Squadron (Hannover, Pommern, Schlesien, Schleswig-Holstein, Hessen, Deutschland) were at the head of the main body. About a half mile off their port quarter, Kapitan Hartog’s four remaining battlecruisers were guarding the eastern flank of the two leading battle squadrons (II and I). Vizeadmiral Schmidt followed on a parallel course about two miles to the north with the I Battle Squadron (Westfalen, Nassau, Rheinland, Posen, Oldenburg, Helgoland, Thuringen, Ostfriesland). Scheer’s flagship, Friedrich der Grosse was attached to the tail of I Battle Squadron. About a half mile astern was, Konteradmiral Behncke and the III Battle Squadron (Prinzregent Luitpold, Kaiserin, Kronprinz, Markgraf, Grosser Kurfurst, Konig). With her battle damage, SMS Markgraf was having trouble keeping up, but Behncke was making best possible speed to try and close the gap before darkness set in. It was vitally important that he maintain contact with the battle line at this point. When the sun dipped below the western horizon, the night would be pitch-black. Everyone’s nerves were on edge, and it would be only too easy to open fire on friendly ships. During the last hour and a half of daylight, while Scheer’s ships were repairing battle damage and making preparations for a possible night engagement – they did so unmolested. Though he had twice beaten Scheer in battle, Jellicoe showed no sense of urgency about tracking him down to finish the job. His battle fleet was positioned to cut Scheer off from his base, and he was reluctant to jeopardize his blocking position by going off on a potentially fruitless search. It was, in fact, the job of Beatty’s battlecruisers to hunt down the Hochseeflotte – but he had tamely assumed the traditional scouting task about six miles ahead of the battle fleet. Beatty occasionally -- through the smoke, mist, and gathering twilight – saw German capital ships steaming SW until 19:45, but his later biographer wrote… ”He wished to close the enemy van, but in poor visibility, felt it would be unwise to press the enemy too closely without battleship support.” With diplomatic language of that sort, his biographer could have filled a posting to the Foreign Office. The whole “raison d’etre” of the battlecruiser was to hunt down the enemy, report on him, and if necessary, engage him until the fleet could come up in support. The sound tactical reasons why Jellicoe did not go swanning about searching for the enemy in no way applied to Beatty – and Kapitan Hartog had just given a magnificent demonstration of how to take battlecruisers into close action with a battle fleet. Beatty’s sudden prudence contrasts sharply with the rash eagerness he had shown when first closing with Hipper – without the support of Evan-Thomas’ battleships. But then – Beatty had since put in four hard hours and lost three battlecruisers trying to sink just one of Hipper’s ships. Around 19:47, his newly acquired caution resulted in the now famous (or infamous) signal...”Submit van of battleships follow battlecruisers. We can then cut off whole of enemy’s battle fleet.” Notably, Beatty declined to act on his own initiative and waited the 23 minutes it took to send the signal to HMS Iron Duke and receive the answer – by which time the Imperial battle fleet had disappeared into the approaching gloom and all opportunity was lost. For some reason, neither Beatty nor Jellicoe ordered their light cruisers to search for Scheer until around 20:00. With his dispositions made, Scheer steamed south – completely unaware Jellicoe had already altered his course to the SW. Jellicoe’s intention was to force Scheer farther away from the swept minefield channels south of Horns Reef. With barely half an hour of dim light remaining, the two mighty fleets were on a converging course, yet again. And the first indication of this potentially explosive situation came just minutes before “last light”. About a half mile ahead of Jellicoe’s battleships, the British 4th Light Cruiser Squadron (Calliope, Constance, Caroline, Royalist, Comus) and 11th Destroyer Flotilla stumbled upon the German V Torpedo Boat Flotilla and unwittingly chased them west, across the wake of Hartog’s battlecruisers. In a few more minutes, the British scouting group ran up against Scheer’s battle line. About the time Commodore Le Mesurier realized what he had run into, his light cruisers were taken under fire by SMS Prinzregent Luitpold, Markgraf, and Kaiser. The German dreadnoughts obviously thought it was an enemy torpedo attack and they opened a rapid and accurate fire with both their main and secondary batteries. Startled by the tightly grouped enemy salvos, the British quickly turned away, but not before HMS Calliope launched a torpedo at the battleships. The torpedo missed, but Calliope was hit by five 5.9-inch shells and suffered 33 casualties before she could get clear. Some four miles ahead, just after 20:00, the advance screen of both fleets stumbled into each other and fought a rather spirited engagement. Kommodore von Reuter’s 4th Scouting Group (Stettin, Munchen, Frauenlob, Stuttgart, Hamburg) was steering south ahead of the German battle fleet, when Rear-Admiral Napier’s 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron (Falmouth, Yarmouth, Birkenhead, Gloucester) steamed out of the murky dusk. Von Reuter turned to attack, and both sides opened simultaneously, exchanging rapid fire for three or four minutes. Barely able to see their enemy, von Reuter’s squadron sustained several hits – two on Munchen – one of which destroyed the casings on the aft four boilers, making it difficult to maintain steam pressure. Von Reuter turned away sharply to the west – coming back to a southerly course after a mile or two. Napier, not wishing to press his luck in the near-darkness, turned his cruisers due south. Oddly enough, Konteradmiral Boedicker’s 2nd Scouting Group (light cruisers Frankfurt, Pillau, Elbing) was trailing von Reuter about a quarter mile astern when the skirmish erupted. Instead of moving to support von Reuter, Boedicker turned away sharply to the west – later claiming he did not wish to mask the fire of II Battle Squadron approaching a mile astern. (A somewhat flimsy excuse for not supporting von Reuter, but Boedicker was not relieved of his command.) The muzzle flashes and sounds of gunfire attracted the attention of everyone on HMS Lion’s bridge. Beatty swung his battlecruisers west to investigate and within a few minutes (20:18), Hartog’s battlecruisers were sighted on the starboard beam at roughly 8,500 yards. (Visual range was falling as the evening grew darker.) Vizeadmiral Hipper, in the torpedo boat G-39, was just pulling alongside SMS Moltke, preparing to transfer to the battlecruiser, when Beatty opened fire. Oberleutnant von Loefen shouted for full speed, and as G-39 shot forward, he sheered away from the battlecruiser and disappeared into the gathering darkness. Beatty’s first few shells landed among Boedicker’s scouting group, but fire was quickly concentrated on the German battlecruisers. The Panzerkreuzer instantly replied with what cannon they still had available. SMS Derfflinger had been taken under fire by HMS Lion and Princess Royal. HMS Tiger was shooting at SMS Pillau as Boedicker withdrew to the west, and SMS Seydlitz was under fire from HMS New Zealand and Indomitable. The falling darkness seriously interfered with the German gunnery, making it difficult to range on a target, but they opened fire just seconds behind the British and fought back all the same. Both Lion and Princess Royal were struck once apiece, but the German ships suffered far worse. Derfflinger was hit twice by 13.5-inch shells at short range, one of which jammed “A” turret, leaving the big cruiser with no serviceable main battery guns. But the already heavily damaged Seydlitz was struck five more times in the space of just a few minutes. At 21:27, with most of his battlecruisers unable to return fire, Hartog swung sharply to starboard and the column steered west and away from Beatty. As British salvos continued to fall about the battlecruisers, Hartog cut through the gap between II Battle Squadron (to the south) and I Battle Squadron (to the north). Vizeadmiral Schmidt (I Battle Squadron) held his course and speed as Hartog crossed his bow headed west. SMS Westfalen and Nassau, leading Schmidt’s column, were showered with splinters from near misses, and Westfalen was even forced to reduce speed and haul out to starboard to avoid colliding with Von der Tann as she passed ahead. The first of Schmidt’s ships to open fire was SMS Posen, followed by Westfalen, Nassau, and Rheinland. But after a few salvos, they lost their targets in the billowing smoke and darkness, and ceased firing. Konteradmiral Mauve’s old pre-dreadnoughts of II Battle Squadron open fire on Beatty’s battlecruisers while covering the withdrawal of the heavily damaged Imperial battlecruisers. SMS Hannover leads the squadron and is shown here straddled by 13.5-inch shell splashes. Too small and obsolete to stand in the line of battle, they earned their battle honors in the early hours of darkness when their sudden appearance dissuaded Beatty from chasing Hartog’s crippled Panzerkreuzer. (Superb painting by Claus Bergen.) At almost the same moment, Konteradmiral Mauve (II Battle Squadron) became aware of the commotion astern of his squadron and swung the old pre-dreadnoughts SW to open their firing arcs. In the gathering gloom and mist, Schleswig-Holstein and Pommern could see nothing, though the later eventually opened fire on a target. But Deutschland, Hannover, Schlesien, and Hessen spotted HMS Lion and Princess Royal. Visibility was poor and deteriorating quickly, but they opened fire on the “fuzzy” targets, nonetheless. Once again, Lion, Princess Royal, and now Indomitable, were struck by 11-inch shells. Beatty’s battlecruisers switched fire to the new targets and opened on the elderly “five minute ships”. Gamely returning fire, Mauve’s pre-dreadnoughts “diced with the Devil” as British shells began to fall around them. SMS Hannover, leading II Battle Squadron, was straddled aft on the third salvo. The next salvo straddled the bow. The concussion of the 13.5-inch shells shook Hannover as splinters tore into her hull above and below the waterline, causing minor flooding. The range could not have been more than 8,000 yards and the British were getting the better of the bargain. Pommern was repeatedly straddled and began dodging salvos while remaining in the line. On the sixth salvo, the old battleship was struck with a 12-inch shell fired by HMS Indomitable. The shell hit the citadel armor a glancing blow, and slammed into the belt armor below, detonating on impact. The armor plate was fractured and forced back some seven inches, causing heavy structural damage and minor flooding. The pre-dreadnought battleship SMS Pommern, II Battle Squadron, Hochseeflotte: Commissioned 1907 – 13,200 tons – 18 knots – 4x11-inch guns – 14x6.7-inch guns – 20x3.5-inch guns – 6x17.7-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 9 inches. Technically obsolete the day she was launched, Pommern “earned her keep” at Jutland when she helped cover the withdrawal of the Imperial battlecruisers. Here you see her opening fire on HMS Lion around 20:20. Over the course of just a few minutes, it was all darkness, smoke, and muzzle flashes as shells fell all about. HMS New Zealand hit Schleswig-Holstein with a 12-inch shell on the casemate armor. The shell did not actually penetrate the plate, but detonated and blew a large piece inboard, wrecking a 5.9-inch gun and injuring several men. SMS Schlesien was hit as well, though the damage was mostly splinters from a near miss. Having engaged the British in battle, and covered the withdrawal of Hartog’s wounded battlecruisers, Admiral Mauve decided not to tempt the “Gods of Battle” – and ordered an eight-point turn to starboard – disappearing into the dark of night around 20:35. Beatty, for his part, thought he had finally “bagged” the German battle cruisers, and was somewhat rudely surprised when -- out of the darkness -- battleships had fired on him from both his starboard beam and his starboard quarter. He was also keenly aware he was alone and unsupported. Beatty chose not to press his luck and steamed on to the SW – oblivious of the fact he had just steamed across the path of the approaching Hochseeflotte. By 21:00, Beatty had altered course to SSE – still unaware that only ten miles astern, the Hochseeflotte followed in his wake. And Konteradmiral Mauve could not have known his old pre-dreadnoughts had just fought the last capital ship action of The Great War. Off to the west, hidden by the shroud of darkness, Vizeadmiral Hipper finally managed to board SMS Moltke and once again hoist his flag. Kapitan von Karpf greeted Hipper when he came over the side, expressing his pleasure at having the Admiral aboard. Hipper merely raised an eyebrow and chuckled…”I assure you Kapitan, you are not half as pleased to have me aboard as I am to finally be aboard. I have spent a wild night in a torpedo boat that I shall not soon forget!” The “old buccaneer” had endured an unnerving night, but managed to keep his sense of humor. Once again, for a bit of clarity, I have included a map track of the battle that might help tie some of the events together. FLEET ACTION (1) 18:00 Scouting forces rejoin their respective fleets. (2) 18:15 British fleet deploys into battle line (3) 18:30 German fleet under fire turns away (4) 19:00 German fleet turns back (5) 19:15 German fleet turns away for second time (6) 20:00 (7) 21:00 Nightfall: Jellicoe assumes night cruising formation NEXT TIME…… THINGS THAT GO “BOOM” IN THE NIGHT My apologies for not including any in-game images with this chapter. We have not yet figured out how to show a model firing it’s guns – and virtually none of the warships have night-lighting on them – so it was impossible to work them into the text of the story line. Consequently, I felt compelled to include a selection of random pictures from the Cuxhaven map tile. I have numbered the pictures – so if you have any questions – just drop me a note and I will be happy to explain. I hope you enjoy them…… RANDOM 01 RANDOM 02 RANDOM 03 RANDOM 04 RANDOM 05 RANDOM 06 RANDOM 07 RANDOM 08 RANDOM 09 MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful warship models. SPECIAL THANKS to my friend and partner, @AP, for his talents, meticulous models, colorful imagination, and extreme dedication. If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496

Hipper’s battlecruisers pursuing Beatty during “The Run To The North”. From left to right: Von der Tann, Moltke, Seydlitz, Derfflinger – Lutzow is lost among the shell splashes and smoke at the head of the column. Note the hazy horizon where only enemy gun flashes may be observed. It is not at all surprising the battle became confusing when viewed from a single ship. The combination of haze, smoke, and shell splashes made it impossible to see much beyond seven miles (14,000 yards) in any direction – and more often than not, a great deal less than that – perhaps only 5,000 yards. Indeed, it was nearly impossible to see the ships in one’s own battle line. (Claus Bergen) IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 32: THE TRAP IS SPRUNG Beatty’s battlecruisers reappeared out of the smoke around 17:40, on a NNE course, converging with Hipper’s squadron. Within seconds, Lutzow and Derfflinger opened on the approaching British and the battlecruiser duel resumed with a vengeance. Beatty recognized he had narrowly avoided Scheer’s ambush and had barely escaped the German battle fleet. He knew if he wanted to lure the High Sea Fleet into Jellicoe’s trap, he would have to prevent Hipper from discovering the presence of the Grand Fleet. Beatty reasoned the battle fleet would likely approach from the northwest – so the only way to close the trap was to divert the German battlecruisers from their northerly course. Beatty currently held the advantage. His battlecruisers were still capable of maximum speed, and though battered, their firepower was still dangerous. Evan-Thomas had finally engaged with the full force of the powerful 5th Battle Squadron, and Beatty knew he would hang onto Hipper like a bulldog. Using his 4-knot speed advantage, Beatty closed the range on a converging course that would bring him across the bows of Hipper’s battle line – the classic crossing the “T” maneuver. Beatty would either cross his bows and destroy the leading German battlecruiser – or Hipper would give way to the east to avoid the danger. By way of making his point, Beatty turned his battlecruisers two points to starboard and closed to 12,000 yards. At this range the British shooting improved considerably. Within the next few minutes, Seydlitz was struck by six large caliber shells, some of them 15-inch, and most of them falling on the forward part of the ship. One large shell slammed through the forecastle deck and detonated on the upper deck below. The blast ripped a large hole above, in the forecastle deck, and devastated eight compartments below – touching off a raging fire. Splinter damage sliced through the fire-fighting mains and caused more flooding before they were switched off. Another shell punched through the forecastle deck and penetrated all the way to the battery deck before exploding. The blast damage destroyed five compartments while large splinters sliced through numerous thin compartment and passageway bulkheads. A third shell fell short off the port bow and struck the outer hull below the armor belt. When the shell detonated, it ripped a hole approximately 6 x 9 feet below the waterline and destroyed the watertight integrity of the surrounding compartments and the wing passage. This caused heavy flooding, which reduced the buoyancy of the bow section enough to allow more water to flow into other damaged areas. For the moment, the flooding could be controlled by the pumps, and Seydlitz was able to continue firing while maintaining her speed. But the splinter damage and the dozens of sprung compartment seams would allow the flooding to spread. The failure of the designers to properly armor the forward part of the battlecruiser had now become problematic. Unaware of the destruction aboard Seydlitz, Hipper, seeing no value in allowing his bows to be crossed, gradually gave way and came onto an easterly course. (Hipper probably hoped this turn would put the 5th Battle Squadron out of position – thereby relieving the pressure of those destructive 15-inch guns on his hard-pressed squadron.) The German battlecruisers were now diverted from their scouting mission. And with visibility being so poor, Scheer was virtually “blind” to an approaching enemy. As brilliant as Beatty’s maneuver had been, the brilliance lay in that Hipper had no viable options. Holding his course would likely have cost Hipper his flagship. Altering course to the west would have thrown his squadron onto the guns of the 5th Battle Squadron – at point blank range. Hipper’s battlecruisers following Beatty’s line around to the east while firing rapid and accurate salvos at their enemy. On the left is SMS Seydlitz, with Derfflinger ahead, and Lutzow lost in the smoke ahead of her. (Claus Bergen) The battlecruisers continued their deadly duel as they settled onto the easterly course, and within two minutes, a rumble of heavy guns came from the NE, where the dim horizon was lit by the flashes of a sharp engagement. Vizeadmiral Hipper instantly turned his glasses on the gun flashes. The sound of rolling, irregular gunfire drifted down to him, rhythmically punctuated by louder, sharper thunderclaps. His instinct told him there were big guns out there – not just light cruisers. And he was keenly aware it could be none of Beatty’s ships. He suspected it might be the remaining British battlecruiser squadron, which had so far been missing from the battle. If, in fact, they were the missing battlecruisers – then there was a good chance they were the advance reconnaissance screen of the Grand Fleet. Hipper suspiciously scanned the misty eastern horizon with his glasses and spoke over his shoulder to Kapitan Harder...”Mark my words, Harder...there’s something nasty brewing out there. It would be better not to get in too deep.” Some minutes later, just before 18:00, salvos of 12-inch shells began to raise tall water columns among Hipper’s ships, and they were coming in from the northeast. Grim, brutal, and destructive as the day had so far been – the main event was about to unfold. HMS Iron Duke leading the 4th Battle Squadron of the Grand Fleet – followed astern by HMS Royal Oak, Superb, Canada, Benbow, Bellerophon, Temeraire, and Vanguard. Vice-Admiral John Jellicoe paced the Admiral’s Bridge aboard the Grand Fleet flagship, HMS Iron Duke. The big battleship pitched gently as she rose and fell with the long rollers pushing down from the Atlantic. But Jellicoe paid her no mind. He paced slowly, his right hand clutching a pair of binocular glasses slung around his neck, his left hand tucked into the pocket of his old Burrberry (early trench coat), and his head bowed – deep in thought. Some flag-officers paced because they had nervous energy, others out of worry. Jellicoe commanded the mightiest fleet of dreadnoughts in all of history – and he did it with precision and confidence. Right now, all the irritation and worries were one level below, on the navigation bridge, with Flag-Captain Frederic Charles Dreyer. But Jellicoe knew Dreyer was perfectly capable of moving this fleet without him. He wasn’t pacing out of worry – it was simply an activity that cleared his mind when he had much on it. Jellicoe’s problem was he didn’t have much in the way of facts to work with. The Admiral had been on the navigation bridge, around 14:35, when the light cruiser HMS Galatea’s first sighting report had been intercepted and decoded. Commodore Alexander-Sinclair’s signal had been clear and concise...”Sighted large smoke – possibly a fleet – ENE”...then gave his longitude and latitude. Jellicoe immediately ordered a course change to the SE, to close Galatea’s position. It was hardly likely Commodore Alexander-Sinclair had sighted “a fleet” -- and the report had been sent to HMS Lion, so Beatty would already be steaming to investigate. Jellicoe was fifty miles to the northwest, and whatever they might find, if Beatty could not handle it, he would fall back on the battle fleet. So the Grand Fleet left the rendezvous point and steamed southeast – purely as a precautionary move. A little over an hour later, 15:50, a second sighting report was received, this one from HMS Lion...”Enemy sighted...battlecruisers...bearing ENE...engaging…” and he gave his latitude and longitude. It was obvious the signal had been written out hastily, and it left out crucial bits of information – the enemy’s course, speed, and strength. Unfortunately, Beatty’s “Flag-Navigator” had been out of sight of land for the best part of fifteen hours and had been unable to take bearings on any landmarks. Normally, that would not present a particular problem, but the “Flag-Navigator” must not have been making precise use of his chronometers. Simply put – the Admiral’s navigator did shoddy work. His given position in the sighting report was approximately eight miles east of his actual location. In the miserable visibility, anyone looking for Beatty at the given location, wouldn’t find him. Lion’s sighting report, though incomplete and inaccurate, was the first confirmed sighting of enemy capital ships at sea. And Beatty identified them as Hipper’s battlecruisers. Jellicoe knew it was not uncommon for the Germans to send their battlecruisers out, alone, on offensive operations – they were fast, hard-hitting, and Hipper handled them well. There was, of course, no sign of the Hochseeflotte, which the Admiralty’s wireless intercepts placed at anchor in the Jade as late as 11:00. Nevertheless, a few minutes after the sighting report came in, Jellicoe decided to support Beatty. At 16:05 he signaled Rear-Admiral Horace Hood to pull his 3rd Battlecruiser Squadron (accompanied by the light cruisers HMS Chester and Canterbury) out of the advance scouting line and proceed at his best possible speed to reinforce Beatty. Hood acknowledged the signal, ordered 24 knots, and instructed the other two battlecruisers to fall in astern of the flagship – course SSE. The stoker’s shovels scrapped on the deck plates, smoke gushed from the funnels, and the bridge officers could feel the trembling under foot as the big ships worked up to speed. One by one, HMS Invincible, Inflexible, and Indomitable disappeared into the mist to the southeast – only two of them would survive the battle. HMS Inflexible and Indomitable, astern of Invincible, as they work up to speed on their way to rejoin Beatty’s Battlecruiser Fleet. At 16:38, Commodore Goodenough’s sighting report from HMS Southampton was intercepted by the wireless room on HMS Iron Duke and three other dreadnoughts of the Grand Fleet, which dutifully repeated the signal to their C.-in-C. ”Urgent – Priority – Have sighted enemy battle fleet bearing SE – enemy course N – dreadnoughts in van -- my position Lat. 56-34 N – Lng. 6-20 E.” This information struck the various units of the Grand Fleet like a bolt of lightning. No one in the fleet had the slightest suspicion the Hochseeflotte was even at sea – now it was nipping at Beatty’s heels. Goodenough was an experienced commander, and he had seen it with his own eyes. Obviously, the Admiralty’s intelligence estimate of the German battle fleet had been seriously in error. Jellicoe watched as his navigator hastily plotted the estimated locations of various detachments on a chart. Since Beatty had not bothered to send his own sighting report, Jellicoe could only guess at his position and hope he was leading the Germans to him. The distance between the two fleets was closing, but he could not deploy into battle formation until he was close enough. Based on what the chart told him, Jellicoe sent a coded wireless to the Admiralty with his position and...”Fleet action is imminent.” He then made a flag signal to the battle fleet...”See to your men and ships – action imminent.” Minutes later, one man from every battle station was ordered to the galley to fetch hot cocoa, soup, and sandwiches for his mates. Hot cocoa was passed around from time to time on cold days or late night watches – but soup and sandwiches? Now every man knew he would see battle this day. The Grand Fleet steaming southeast in search of the enemy. Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot’s old armored cruisers of the 1st Cruiser Squadron (HMS Defence, Warrior, Black Prince, and Duke Of Edinburgh) formed the advance screen of the Grand Fleet. At 17:33, HMS Black Prince, on the far southwest flank, came within sight of HMS Falmouth of the 3rd Light cruiser Squadron – screening about 5 miles ahead of Beatty’s battlecruisers. Arbuthnot immediately sent a sighting report to the C.-in-C., which established the first visual link between the British battlecruisers and the Grand Fleet. But there was no further information on the whereabouts of the Hochseeflotte. At 17:38, the light cruiser HMS Chester, screening Hood's oncoming 3rd Battlecruiser Squadron, was intercepted by the light cruiser screen of Konteradmiral Boedicker’s 2nd Scouting Group -- ranging ahead of Hipper’s squadron. The opposing cruisers immediately opened fire. HMS Chester suddenly found herself under fire from SMS Frankfurt, Wiesbaden, Elbing, and Pillau – a regular hornet’s nest. Eighteen shells slammed into the British cruiser, wreaking havoc among the main deck gun crews and the bridge staff. One 5.9-inch shell bored into Chester’s machinery spaces and passed out the other side without exploding. The engine room mascot – “Smokey” -- a black kitten, sat calmly in his bed and watched the whole affair with great interest. Fortunately for Chester, her engines were unharmed and Captain Lawson put his helm hard over, sheering off to the east – where he might find salvation under the guns of Hood’s battlecruisers. The earlier error by Beatty’s navigator inadvertently led Admiral Hood to swing his battlecruisers farther to the east and south looking for Beatty. HMS Invincible’s lookouts spotted the gun flashes of a sharp engagement between light cruisers off to the west and Hood increased speed and came about to intervene. In a matter of minutes, HMS Chester was seen tearing out of the mist off Invincible’s port bow, surrounded by shell splashes. Hood signaled the light cruiser to take station on his starboard beam as he charged past, while ordering his gunnery officer to engage as soon as he had a target. Boedicker’s cruisers had surprised HMS Chester and mauled her severely, and now he was closing for what he thought was a certain “kill”. But it was Boedicker’s turn to be surprised. Suddenly, the massive shapes of HMS Invincible, followed by Inflexible and Indomitable, loomed up out of the mist, charging along with rollers crashing over the bows and guns blazing. Boedicker instantly ordered the helm hard over to evade – but it was too late. Around 17:54, at nearly point-blank range, the guns of Invincible and Inflexible thundered and SMS Wiesbaden, nearest to the British, was hit squarely by one of the salvos… “A tremendous blow was felt...shaking the whole ship...and the lights went out. Seconds later, the accumulators restored the lights and it was discovered a large caliber shell on a flat trajectory had penetrated the engine room, struck the starboard turbine, and carried on to strike the port turbine, where it detonated.” Chief Stoker Hans Zenne – Wiesbaden’s sole survivor. In the blink of an eye, Wiesbaden had been rendered “dead in the water”. Pillau, too, was hit and four of her boilers disabled, but she managed enough steam to escape back into the mist with Frankfurt and Elbing. Following close behind were four destroyers – HMS Shark, Acasta, Ophelia, and Christopher -- led by Commander Loftus Jones. It was Jones’ intention to engage the German light cruisers with his torpedoes. As he drove his ships into the mist, 5.9-inch shells rained down around the four destroyers as Boedicker’s light cruisers turned to crush their pursuers. Jones’ ships were hit several times, blowing holes in their decks as splinters mowed down the gun crews. HMS Acasta was hit by two shells (one under he bridge) and sheered off wildly, temporarily out of control. Just moments later -- when all seemed lost – HMS Canterbury (Hood’s other light cruiser) appeared out of nowhere and lured the German light cruisers off to the SW. Jones and his three badly battered destroyers had been saved – but his salvation was brief. To the west he could make out the misty shadows of numerous torpedo boats bearing down upon his small force. Meanwhile, motionless under the guns of three battlecruisers, Wiesbaden’s troubles were just beginning. As the British battlecruisers swept past, they poured shell after shell into her. The Germans steadfastly manned their guns and returned fire on the big cruisers. Each shell impact shook the light cruiser, blasting holes in her deck, demolishing her bridge, and starting fires, but she remained afloat. As the exposed gun crews took casualties, they were replaced by the stokers no longer needed below decks. Wiesbaden kept up a steady return fire over the next few hours, while becoming a sitting target for most of the British fleet. But Wiesbaden stubbornly refused to sink, and her remaining crew had the audacity to fire torpedoes at passing British battleships. German torpedo boats go into action in an effort to turn back Admiral Hood’s 3rd Battlecruiser Squadron – 17:56 – 31 May 1916. (Black & white detail of Claus Bergen painting.) SMS Lutzow’s lookouts spotted Hood’s approaching battlecruisers in the distant mist, and Hipper acted quickly. He had just ordered his torpedo boats into an attack on Beatty’s ships, but this new threat was much more dangerous – their shells were falling far too close for comfort – and Hipper feared they might be the lead elements of the Grand Fleet. Hipper diverted the torpedo boats and sent them against Hood’s battlecruisers instead. He hoped they might be able to turn the enemy away, and perhaps, give him a small advantage. Torpedo boats of the 6th and 9th Flotillas are once again sent into action. They are charging full bore to reach an attack position against Hood’s 3rd Battlecruiser Squadron. HMS Invincible (flag), is seen on the right, leading the line. (Claus Bergen) Hipper’s combined flotillas smashed headlong into Jones’ tiny force and a vicious and chaotic close-quarter action ensued. Boats dodged and darted in and out of the mist and smoke – their machinery straining as they tried to get around Jones and close with the three mammoth battlecruisers. HMS Christopher and Ophilia each tackled an opponent and blazed away as they twisted and turned, trying to gain some sort of advantage. Jones put his helm over at full speed and drove HMS Shark across the bows of three German torpedo boats, forcing them to sheer off violently as his guns peppered each one in turn. He came about to make another run but his luck had run out. At least six torpedo boats were firing on Shark, and in an instant, the forecastle gun and its crew were blown clean away, and her fuel feed pipes and steering gear were wrecked – and she went dead in the water. HMS Acasta, once more under control, offered a tow line, but Commander Jones waved them off – it would have unduly endangered Acasta. Soon after, Shark’s aft 4-inch gun was destroyed, her bridge wrecked, and Jones and three seamen continued to operate the midships gun until one of his legs was shot away. Shortly before 18:00, Jones ordered the ship abandoned – it is believed Shark at least took one German torpedo boat down with her. The mortally wounded Jones was placed into a life raft with six survivors – who were eventually rescued by a Danish steamer. Jones, however, was not among them. His body washed ashore some weeks later on the coast of Sweden and he is buried in the village churchyard of Fiskenbacksie. In March 1917, Commander Loftus Jones was gazetted with a posthumous Victoria Cross. An even dozen of the 31 German torpedo boats managed to close the British battlecruisers – some as close as 7,000 yards -- and each loosed a torpedo at their target. But the torpedo boats could not blunt, nor deflect, Hood’s approach – and he expertly avoided the torpedoes before returning to his course. Loftus Jones and the little Shark had born the brunt of the battle and blunted the German torpedo attack. His ship and crew created absolute chaos, disrupting the German attack, and tying down nearly two thirds of the attacking torpedo boats. There is little doubt he prevented the probable destruction of Hood’s battlecruisers. Hood’s 3rd Battlecruiser Squadron approaching from the NE. Left to right: HMS Invincible (flag), Inflexible, and Indomitable. HMS Inflexible and Indomitable had seen action at the Falkland Islands battle. Hood improvised this formation (in echelon) in order to open up the firing arcs on “A” and “P” turrets (port wing turret) while approaching and closing the range on Hipper’s ships. Below is a detail shot of Invincible – note the unmistakable heavy tripod masts of these “first generation” battlecruisers. Invincible Class: 17,250 tons – 25 knots – 8x12-inch guns – 16x4-inch guns – 5x18-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 6 inches. The arrival of the 3rd Battlecruiser Squadron was even more fortuitous than was, at first, apparent. Had Hipper’s torpedo boats not been diverted to attack Hood’s squadron, they would have carried out the original attack on Beatty’s battlecruisers. The British ships would have been forced to turn away from the threatened torpedo attack. With Beatty’s ships out of the way, Hipper would have had a clear line of sight to the approaching Grand Fleet. He would have instantly reported the range, bearing, and course of the enemy to Vizeadmiral Scheer, thereby giving him the intelligence he needed to devise a tactical response. Based on the positions of the two battle fleets at that moment, Scheer might well have been able to catch Jellicoe at a severe disadvantage. Scheer would most certainly have thrown the Grand Fleet into disarray – he might even have inflicted grievous losses on the British. But we will never know, because “Fate” had intervened in the shape of Rear-Admiral Horace Hood. In the confusing dogfight developing around this small stretch of ocean, Lutzow’s lookouts spotted the battered Wiesbaden in distress. Hipper turned his battlecruisers through 8 points and steered to the NW at high speed. The battleships of Scheer’s III Battle Squadron also altered course to come up in support. At the same time, Boedicker’s 2nd Scouting Group (slightly east of the disabled Wiesbaden) was taken under fire by Arbuthnot’s armored cruisers (attached to the battle fleet) as they arrived on the scene around 17:53. Arbuthnot led Defence (flag) and Warrior across HMS Lion’s bow as they approached from the ESE (forcing the battlecruiser to take evasive action to avoid a collision). Defence and Warrior took Wiesbaden under fire, and though crippled, the German cruiser returned fire -- knocking out Warrior’s forward turret. This headlong dash across the battlecruisers’ bows was typical of Arbuthnot – impetuous and certainly over-eager. His four armored cruisers were, next to Scheer’s pre-dreadnoughts, just as obsolete, but far less battle-worthy. Only one would survive Jutland. The 3rd and 4th Light Cruiser Squadrons going in to support destroyers as they launch a torpedo attack on the approaching German battlecruiser squadron and battle fleet. Around this time, the British 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron (Falmouth, Yarmouth, Birkenhead, Gloucester) and 4th Light Cruiser Squadron (Constance, Caroline, Royalist, Comus) saw the approaching German battlecruisers and initiated a torpedo attack with their attending destroyers. The destroyer HMS Acasta charged down on Lutzow but was met by a barrage of 5.9-inch shells, hit twice, and forced to retire. One destroyer, HMS Onslow, whirling and firing amid the melee, spotted the disabled Wiesbaden in a favorable position to launch torpedoes at the approaching 3rd Battlecruiser Squadron. Onslow’s Captain opened fire with his 4.1-inch guns and moved in, ready to torpedo the battered German cruiser. Suddenly, SMS Lutzow appeared out of the smoke and mist coming to Wiesbaden’s aid. Onslow held on and got off one torpedo in Wiesbaden’s direction – but Lutzow opened with her 5.9-inch batteries at 6,500 yards -- almost at the same time. Onslow’s lookouts thought their torpedo hit beneath Wiesbaden’s conning tower, and the destroyer swung to starboard and fired two more torpedoes at the approaching battlecruiser line (both missed). In a matter of moments, Onslow was struck by five 5.9-inch shells, one of which entered and badly damaged the #2 boiler room – destroying the water feed tanks and leaving her dead in the water. Fortunately for Onslow, the rolling clouds of smoke closed around Lutzow again, and she had to cease fire. (Onslow was later taken in tow by HMS Defender and eventually returned safely to port. Her captain, Lieutenant-Commander John C. Tovey, would live to make Admiral and command the Home Fleet in the May 1941 action against KM Bismarck.) In all this confusion, with the odds seemingly against him, Konteradmiral Boedicker took his remaining ships and fell back on Hipper and Scheer. The sudden swarm of battlecruisers, destroyers, and armored cruisers led him to believe the British had a large force of capital ships – in all probability the Grand Fleet – approaching from the east and northeast. Without visual proof, Boedicker signaled that information (faulty information) to Vizeadmiral Scheer. Twice during all this confusion, and under a heavy fire from Beatty and Evan-Hughs’ squadrons, Hipper turned away to the south, quickly regrouped, and steamed back north to attempt to break through the line of British gunfire. Hipper had the gnawing suspicion the Grand Fleet might well be nearby. But he was unable to get through the British line to scout north of the battle zone. Boedicker, comparatively in the open to the north east, could have pushed ahead and shortly ascertained the exact location of the Grand Fleet – its course – speed – and strength. But Konteradmiral Boedicker had “flinched” – at the very moment he needed to press ahead. The Konteradmiral would play no further part in the battle – more or less. Meanwhile, Jellicoe was steadily advancing southeast, his dreadnoughts steaming in six columns – each column a division of four battleships. Over an hour had passed since he signaled the Admiralty, and the only communication he had received was Arbuthnot’s first contact with Beatty’s screening cruisers. Jellicoe knew he must start his deployment into battle formation soon. To be taken under fire while steaming in columns would be a gross tactical blunder – and simply would not do. But not a word had been heard from Beatty – or even Hood. And, as if the lack of information was not troubling enough, Jellicoe was well aware his battle fleet was a flawed instrument. The mass of data Jellicoe had accumulated (years earlier as Third Sea Lord) included the latest intelligence information on German warships, guns, and armor – and his pre-war “courtesy” visits to Wilhelmshaven and Kiel left him… ”under no delusions as to their skills...and convinced me that in materiel, the Germans were ahead of us…” It was well known the German torpedo boats, light cruisers, and even capital ships carried heavier torpedo armaments – with better torpedoes. Very familiar with Fisher’s “speed equals armor” dictum – Jellicoe knew many of his dreadnoughts had inferior armor arrangements – but even he did not know the half of it. And numbers of Royal Navy officers had been treated to exhibitions of German gunnery and torpedo skills in the years leading up to war, though many tried to make light of what they knew to be efficient and accurate firepower. Equally disturbing, Jellicoe knew British gunnery to be of dubious quality. It suffered from ship to ship, even though he constantly stressed gunnery training – and was particularly bad in the Battlecruiser Fleet because there were no suitable gunnery ranges at Cromarty or the Firth of Forth. The chief reason, however, was because most of the dreadnoughts had only “portions” of an updated fire control system installed. And Jellicoe was less than happy about the quality of British shells. As Third Sea Lord he had presided over extensive tests with 12-inch and 13.5-inch armor-piercing projectiles. British shells were outstanding when fired at a low trajectory (close range) with a 90-degree impact on the target. When fired from longer ranges, with a “plunging angle”, the shells were considerably less reliable – exploding on contact – sometimes not at all – or simply breaking up. Even worse – the Lyddite explosive used in the shells was highly unstable – especially in hot conditions. (Two battleships – the pre-dreadnought HMS Bulwark, November 1914, and the dreadnought HMS Vanguard, July 1917 – sank due to ammunition explosions.) The British battleships, on the whole, appeared mighty and majestic, but they suffered from their share of design and engineering errors. Many secondary batteries were only of 4-inch caliber, while those of the more suitable 6-inch size were often poorly sited with bad firing arcs, and were all but useless in a medium seaway. The majestic behemoths also displayed an amazing number of design defects in their propulsion plants. Up to five dreadnoughts at a time were frequently side-lined with condenser troubles, and the battlecruiser Indomitable was prone to electrical failures, with the occasional fire as a result of defective circuits. And four, five, or as many as six dreadnoughts could be found in dockyard hands for boiler repair. (The British insisted on using “large tube” boilers, whereas the Germans used the more reliable “small-tube” boilers.) Such as it was, Jellicoe dutifully steered the Grand Fleet southeast at its’ best practicable speed, hoping he would arrive at the right place in time to support Beatty. And yet – he could not forget at the Battle of the Falkland Islands, Sturdee’s two 12-inch-gunned battlecruisers had taken just over three hours -- and almost all their ammunition – to sink two German armored cruisers with 8.2-inch guns. Captain Allen, commanding the cruiser HMS Kent during the action, had written in his battle report… ”The Germans, though out-ranged, shot magnificently. Any time the range closed, they scored hits with tightly grouped salvos. Never have I seen heavy guns fired with such rapidity and yet with such control.” Jellicoe could only hope he would arrive in time to throw his overwhelming number of ships into the equation. SMS Derfflinger (center) with SMS Lutzow (right) leading the line around 17:58 – they are closely engaged with Beatty’s battlecruisers to port. A torpedo boat is in position along the disengaged side of the battle line. Two minutes later, Hipper would fall back to cover the van of the Hochseeflotte. As the confused and brutal combat flowed back and forth, Hipper handled his big Panzerkreuzer with a deft touch, making use of their excellent gunnery skills and ability to absorb punishment to keep taking the fight to the British. The more lightly armored British battlecruisers were suffering terrible punishment and Beatty had, several times, opened the range and dodged into thick smoke to try and relieve the pressure on his hard-pressed squadron. The sudden and aggressive arrival of Hood’s 3rd Battlecruiser squadron was a Godsend to Beatty. Some historians have gone so far as to suggest Hood saved Beatty’s ships from complete destruction. Hipper was unable to break through the British line, two of his ships were heavily damaged, and his flagship’s wireless aerials had been shot away – he thought it best to turn away. Beatty had already forced him out of position to the east -- the sudden appearance of three fresh battlecruisers was most unwelcome – and the big 15-inch shells of the 5th battle Squadron continued to rain down among his ships. The shrewd Bavarian could see little advantage to being boxed-in on three sides -- and he was out of position to cover Scheer’s van. At 18:00 he hoisted a flag signal, repeated it with a searchlight, and led the Panzerkreuzer onto a southerly course, swiftly disappearing into the smoke and haze. In a few more minutes, he would come around to the north and assume his position in advance of the Hochseeflotte. Though still under fire, he had evaded being boxed-in, and now had room to maneuver. Just seconds after Hipper disappeared into the smoke, the visibility to the north opened up, briefly, and lookouts aboard HMS Iron Duke sighted HMS Lion. Jellicoe’s fleet was still in sailing formation and he was desperate to get information on the location and course of the German battle fleet. He impatiently signaled Lion demanding...”Where is enemy battle fleet?” -- he sent it twice. Beatty, had deliberately lured Hipper out of position to prevent him discovering the approaching Grand Fleet – but that meant he was no longer able to see the German battleships, and failed to respond to the question until 18:14. (Even then his response was of little help.) Meanwhile, Jellicoe signaled HMS Marlborough, flagship of the 6th Battleship Division, leading the starboard column...”What can you see?” Vice-Admiral Burney replied three minutes later...”Our battlecruisers – bearing SE – steering east – Lion leading.” Marlborough signaled again at 18:05...”5th Battle Squadron bearing SSE.” Now Jellicoe knew where everyone was – except for the Germans – and he had come to the point of no return. In reality, Hipper’s battlecruisers were only eight and a half miles to the southeast. But Jellicoe could only see gun flashes through the rolling smoke -- lighting the sky above in a pale orange glow. They rippled in an irregular line as the thunder of the big guns rolled across the water. But Jellicoe still knew nothing of the enemy, and none of his own warships bothered to send a report. As Vice-Admiral John Jellicoe hovered on the brink of decision, he had no way of knowing his decision – whatever it might be – would lead to more than a century of criticism and controversy. None of which, in the final analysis, would be deserved – little of which could be said to be accurate – and most of which was untruthful and self-serving of others. But that was all in the future. His problem, right now, was information – or rather, the lack of it. Without adequate knowledge of the enemy battle fleet’s position, he had to decide how to deploy six columns of battleships into a single line of battle – in the shortest time possible – and to his best tactical advantage. Jellicoe had drilled them well. The Grand Fleet was a well-oiled tactical tool, capable of deploying into one of several formations, but most usually into “line-ahead” from either the port or starboard columns – and all within fifteen minutes. But fifteen minutes, amid the raging chaos of gunfire and smoke, would be far too long – if a mistake was made. Without knowing your enemy’s location, course, or speed – the deployment could be too soon or too late. Deploying too soon (and out of sight of your enemy) could place your battle fleet at a tactical disadvantage – your broadside guns might not fully bear on target – your own funnel smoke might blind your gunners – you might find your enemy “crossing the T” on your bow – or the enemy might simply refuse to give battle and turn away into the mists. Deploy too late and the enemy might well catch part of your fleet still in sailing formation – with your own ships masking each other’s fire while trying to get into line-ahead. That would be the perfect target for the crack gunnery ships of the Hochseeflotte – and a choice target for torpedo boats. Deployment was also a matter of choosing the right tactical formation and “where” you wanted it to be. The answer to that question came at 18:10 when HMS Barham sent in a sighting report referencing HMS Lion’s position and that of the German battle fleet. Jellicoe stood on Iron Duke’s compass platform with his flag-navigator, signal officer, and Dreyer, his flag-captain. Jellicoe was bent over the compass, with the collar of his worn blue raincoat turned up and a white muffler around his neck to keep out the damp. The tarnished brass on the old rumpled hat looked right at home on the man wearing it. But that man held the fate of an entire fleet in his hands. Jellicoe knew the bearing of HMS Lion, and had just barely been able to get a bearing on HMS Barham. By reverse-engineering their reported bearings on the enemy – Jellicoe figured The Hochseeflotte was about ten miles due south. He stared at the compass another twenty seconds, his mind going through the necessary maneuvers, ticking-off the variables, then he turned to the Fleet Signal Officer...”Hoist equal-speed pendant SE”. That was the coded flag signal to maintain speed and prepare to deploy on the port column. The flags raced up the halyards, and battleships to port and starboard quickly acknowledged. Jellicoe stepped away from the compass and spoke to his flag-captain...”Dreyer, commence the deployment.” Dreyer quickly dropped down the ladder to the navigation bridge and blew two short blasts on the ship’s siren – the order to execute the maneuver. The siren blasts were taken up by the other battleships as the column leaders began their precision turns to port and fell into the line-ahead battle formation. The sirens sounded odd, and very much out of place as they mingled with the thunder of gunfire and screech of falling shells. The exact time of the order was logged as 16:15 hours. For more than a century, Vice-Admiral Jellicoe has been roundly criticized by numbers of newspaper men, politicians, and “armchair admirals” over his choice to deploy on the port column – “away from the enemy”. These critics are, for the most part, unqualified to offer an opinion on subjects of which they are, at the most basic levels, truly ignorant. What did a newspaper columnist or a Member of Parliament know about handling a fleet of 24 dreadnought battleships? And not one of them could have imagined the haze, mist, and rolling banks of smoke that obscured nearly everything south of the British battle fleet. Even Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, had never served at sea – his post was purely “civil” – a civilian politician dealing with politics and budgets. He did, indeed, give orders – but (supposedly) only in consultation with the First SEA Lord – a naval officer of long experience. History would show his criticism, in particular, to be both hasty, and ill-advised. Jellicoe chose to deploy on the port column for four primary reasons; (1) He intended to work around the German battle fleet to the east and cut them off from their bases. The port column deployment was best suited to that task – (2) The battleships composing the two starboard columns were the least modern in the fleet with weaker armor and only 12-inch guns, while the port column deployment would place the modern, 13.5-inch-gunned King George V Class ships in the van of the battle line – (3) Each of the two port columns contained one 15-inch-gunned Revenge Class battleship -- (4) A starboard deployment was only 4,000 yards closer to the Germans, but it might have given their battle fleet time to block his deployment and throw the fleet into chaos. Finally – in view of his Flag Officer’s inability to keep him informed – it was clear to Jellicoe he could only control his fleet if he formed a “line ahead” battle formation. All of these are perfectly sound reasons for deploying to port. And the decision was made by the man “on the spot” – the professional – not by men in drawing rooms with a cigar in their mouth and a glass of brandy in their hand. The expectation of every Englishman was that Jellicoe and the vaunted Grand Fleet would secure a victory every bit as magnificent as Trafalgar. But this was a singularly uninformed expectation. It should be noted, by way of comparison, neither battle had much in common with the other. At Trafalgar there were 71 ships engaged. At Jutland there were 260. The weather at Trafalgar was clear with a light wind allowing them to close for battle at an agonizingly slow 3 knots. At Jutland, by the time the Grand Fleet deployed for action, the weather had deteriorated into a misting haze made miserably worse by the smoke from hundreds of guns and funnels – and the opposing fleets were closing at a combined speed of nearly 40 knots. And finally, Nelson had been in full view of his enemy since early morning – Jellicoe would not see his enemy until after he had deployed for battle. Comparison would be, as they say, “like apples to oranges”. SMS Moltke, fourth in line, as Hipper screens the battle fleet steaming north around 18:15. Other ships are still falling into line, but SMS Von der Tann is already astern of Moltke as the torpedo boats close up to screen the flanks. Note the bow wave (about 22 knots) and the funnel smoke drifting to leeward. (Willy Stower) While Jellicoe’s deployment was in progress, the rest of the confused mass of warships, out of sight of the forming battle line, played out their individual scenes in the drama. Hipper had rejoined Scheer to the south, and was now leading the line as the battle squadrons of the Hochseeflotte steamed north – completely unaware of the presence of the Grand Fleet. Scheer’s ships were a bit strung out because they had been chasing the British at their “best speed”. The Konig and Kaiser Class ships of the III Battle Squadron were well closed-up. And the Helgoland Class ships of the I Battle Squadron were keeping station astern of them – but the Nassau Class ships of I Battle Squadron were a bit older and slower, and a gap in the line had opened (about two miles). Some three miles astern, Konteradmiral Mauve was cutting-corners on course changes in an effort to keep his plodding pre-dreadnoughts in the line. Hipper was in sight of Beatty and following him around to the NE, while Scheer was adjusting his course accordingly. Jellicoe signaled Evan-Hughes to make his best speed north and take up position at the end of the battle line. (Jellicoe would have preferred to have the super-dreadnoughts in the van, but they would have had a long trek across the front of the battle line – masking the fire of the Grand Fleet and obscuring their targets with funnel smoke.) Beatty had heard the repeated siren blasts of the Grand Fleet battleships and could see they were forming a line of battle. Still engaged with Hipper, he dutifully steered to take up his position at the head of the battle line. Unfortunately, Beatty’s ravaged battlecruisers had to steam across the front of the battle fleet to get there. Their funnel smoke and the smoke from serious fires aboard HMS Lion completely obscured Jellicoe’s view to the south – but there was no other way for Beatty to reach his assigned battle position. (While Beatty’s smoke effectively concealed the Grand Fleet’s deployment from the Germans, it also concealed the German battle fleet from Jellicoe’s deploying battleships. They would be unable to open fire until Beatty was out of the way.) Rear-Admiral Hood took it on his own initiative to reattach his command to the Battlecruiser Fleet and came about to take station ahead of Beatty’s line. Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Keith Arbuthnot, 4th Baronet Edinburgh – 1864–1916. Commander 1st Cruiser Squadron, Grand Fleet. A strict disciplinarian, he performed gymnastics daily on the quarter deck, attended daily church services aboard ship, and competed in the 1904 Bexhill Speed Trials in his “Sunbeam Tonneau” motor car. It was at this point in time (around 17:53) that Rear Admiral Arbuthnot had earlier charged across Beatty’s bows and rushed at the disabled light cruiser SMS Wiesbaden. At the time, Beatty was steering NE under heavy fire from Hipper’s battlecruisers. About 8,000 yards off Beatty’s starboard quarter the torpedo boat / destroyer melee was still in wild progress with German light cruisers weighing in and swinging the battle in their favor. This area was crowded with dozens of destroyers and light cruisers crossing and recrossing each other’s wakes while attempting to reach their assigned stations with the Grand Fleet. Another 8,000 yards or so to the south and closing the range were Hipper’s battlecruisers. This area between the two battle lines was so congested with swirling ships and falling shells of all calibers – most ships were trying desperately to avoid it. This particular stretch of water – the most fought-over patch of ocean that day -- has gone down in history as “Windy Corner”. But Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, 4th Baronet Edinburgh, simply ignored the shells falling out of the sky like scattered bird-shot. He spied the drifting light cruiser SMS Wiesbaden, recently crippled and left for dead by HMS Invincible, and like a true “rider to the hounds” – he smelled a “kill”. The armored cruisers HMS Defence (leading) and HMS Warrior charging through the barrage of shells in “Windy Corner”. Defence has just come under fire from SMS Lutzow. Of the four British armored cruisers present at Jutland, three would be lost. They were simply too old and obsolete to be included in a modern battle fleet action. This is the exact reason the Imperial German Naval High Command transferred all their armored cruisers to the Baltic Sea or East Asia. Arbuthnot was not the most analytical mind in the fleet, but he was known to be impetuous and a bit of a fire-breather. He immediately swung 1st Cruiser Squadron out of line along the Grand Fleet’s starboard flank and set off at full speed to the SW. The old armored cruisers gushed mountains of funnel smoke as they strained their boilers to gather speed. Arbuthnot paid little attention to Beatty’s oncoming battlecruisers. Instead, he took the most direct route and charged full-bore across Beatty’s bows. HMS Defence (flag) and Warrior passed ahead of HMS Lion, which had to put her helm up to port to avoid collision – but HMS Black Prince and Duke Of Edinburgh were unable to follow. Arbuthnot pressed on to the SW, trailing a huge cloud of funnel smoke -- effectively obscuring Beatty’s line of fire and forcing him to cease firing on Hipper’s battlecruisers. The armored cruiser HMS Defence is taken under fire by SMS Lutzow (far right) as she appears out of the smoke and haze. Note the size of the water columns thrown up by the 12-inch shells. Though a painting, the artist got the size of the shell splashes correct – they could have easily risen to mast height or more. Defence and Warrior charged on, then slowed and swung their broadsides to bear on the hapless Wiesbaden. The two armored cruisers poured several salvos into the drifting German cruiser – the exact number remains unknown. But within two minutes of Arbuthnot opening fire, dark silhouettes with towering masts, great turrets, and broad-beamed hulls loomed up out of the mist. The Imperial battlecruisers, followed by the Hochseeflotte battle squadrons, were a mere 9,000 yards distant when their massive 11-inch and 12-inch guns opened fire. SMS Lutzow, probably the “best shot” in the fleet, could not miss at this range. The big shells tore great, gaping holes through the vitals of the thin-skinned cruisers. HMS Warrior was reduced to a flaming wreck in seconds, and Defence -- simply vaporized… “...Suddenly disappearing completely in an immense column of smoke and flame, hundreds of feet high. It appeared to be an absolutely instantaneous destruction, the ship seeming to be dismembered all at once.” Arbuthnot had once remarked to the Fleet Flag-Captain, Frederic Dreyer, that he would not give a “dull performance” when the day of “the big show” arrived. Defence was lost with all hands (856 officers and men), and as he had wished, it had not been a “dull performance”. A lieutenant, watching horrified from the nearby HMS Malaya later wrote...”When I first saw them, I knew they were doomed.” One wonders if Arbuthnot even had time to realize the ghastly mistake he had made. In the thick of the “Windy Corner” action, HMS Warspite is seen with her helm jammed in a starboard turn and under heavy fire from the Imperial battlecruisers and elements of the Hochseeflotte. To the right, the badly battered HMS Warrior is limping away to the west. HMS Warrior would have gone the same way if “Fate” – in the shape of HMS Warspite – had not taken a hand. The 5th Battle Squadron was passing fairly close to the west of Warrior – on their way north to take station at the end of Jellicoe’s battle line. Shellfire from both the German battlecruisers and battle fleet had been falling hot and heavy for the past several minutes and Warspite was taking violent evasive maneuvers. Having gotten too close to HMS Valiant’s stern, Warspite hauled out of line to starboard to avoid a collision when a 12-inch shell fired by SMS Kaiser hit the battleship’s port wing engine room. The armor-piercing shell detonated on the aft engine room bulkhead, sending splinters in all directions and seriously warping the bulkhead. Unfortunately, Warspite’s steering gear was mounted on the other side of the bulkhead, and the severe distortion caused the thrust bearing and tiller shaft to overheat and jam the ship’s rudder in a starboard turn at 25 knots. HMS Malaya, following, was forced to sheer out of line to avoid a collision. Warspite continued to swing to starboard and directly toward SMS Konig, leading the German line. Captain Phillpotts decided against stopping Warspite in such a dangerous position, and the big battleship made two complete circles to starboard in the next ten minutes. A circling battleship draws gunfire like a dying whale draws sharks – it also diverted attention away from the mangled Warrior. The German battle fleet had drawn closer with each turn – the last one bringing the battleship within 10,000 yards of the enemy battle line – and Warspite was the first close and clearly visible target the German battleships had yet seen. Between 18:20 and 18:24, SMS Friedrich der Grosse, Konig, Helgoland, Ostfriesland, Thuringen, Nassau, and Oldenburg concentrated their main and secondary batteries on the unlucky Warspite. As the German battle line steamed north, they moved into a patch of smoke and heavy mist, most of the battleships losing their target, but Ostfriesland maintained a steady and accurate fire until 18:45 when she, too, was forced to cease fire. HMS Warspite was surrounded by the towering shell splashes from nearly sixty large caliber guns, and hit with thirteen large shells and an unknown number of 5.9-inch rounds in quick succession. One shell struck the port side armor belt, penetrated and detonated twelve feet inboard, wrecking the fresh water tanks and opening a 3 x 3-foot hole to the sea – eventually flooding the port wing engine room. The next shell exploded in the aft funnel casing, completely collapsing the forward boiler room air intakes. Another shell blasted a hole in the starboard aft 6-inch casemate, taking out the gun and starting a large powder blaze. Two shells struck the starboard main armor belt almost simultaneously, but failed to penetrate – pushing in the armor plate and starting leaks. One 5.9-inch shell struck the left hand barrel of “Y” turret, putting the 15-inch gun tube out of action. The remaining large and medium caliber shells managed to start a fire in the starboard 6-inch casemate battery, damaged the main rangefinder and gun director tower, cut the gunnery control leads, penetrated three decks to knock out the main gunnery transmitting station, mangled the forward superstructure and the aft superstructure, destroyed both wing bridges, the auxiliary compass platform, and landed yet another hit in the machinery spaces. In effect, Warspite was on fire in several places, her speed reduced to 16 knots, and her remaining firepower amounted to two guns in “A” turret. With her guns virtually useless, and her speed an absolute hindrance to the Grand Fleet, Evan-Thomas ordered the ship to withdraw westward and make for the Rosyth dockyards. Warspite had not been sunk – but she had been “neutralized”. And there is an oft overlooked lesson, here. YES – the 15-inch guns of the Queen Elizabeth Class fast-battleships were Hipper’s worst nightmare – but their armor scheme proved Warspite to be just as vulnerable as any other British battleship. The ships of the 5th Battle Squadron had no supernatural protection against gunfire – contrary to what some historians would lead you to believe. HMS Warrior – commissioned 1906: 13,550 tons – 23 knots – 6x9.2-inch guns – 4x7.5-inch guns – 3x18-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 6 inches. Seen here, circa 1908, off the Round Tower, Portsmouth, when she was assigned to the Channel Fleet. Meanwhile, HMS Warrior struggled on. Though her engine rooms were filling with water, the engines continued to turn the propellers and she limped, unnoticed, to the west and into the night. At some point, HMS Engadine chanced upon her and took the battered hulk under tow. But Arbuthnot’s foolhardy bravado had done for Warrior as well. Her crew, those still alive, were taken off and she sank the following day with the surprising loss of only 70 men after such a harrowing experience. SIDEBAR Much has been said about floating mines and minefields in various chapters, so I thought a brief discussion might be in order. The “floating mine” came into common use between 1900 and 1914. Though mines could be laid in varying depths of water, they were particularly suited to the relatively shallow waters of the North Sea. “Floating mines”, as they were commonly called, were actually anchored by a heavy base mechanism resting on the seabed. The explosive “mine”, usually spherical with “spiked” detonator nodes, was allowed to float toward the surface on a cable attached to the base, stopping at a predetermined depth. The idea was to set them deep enough so they remained largely invisible while the submerged part of a ship’s hull would make contact and detonate the device. Mines were usually laid in “fields” (groups) according to the desired purpose. The number of mines in a field varied. Rule of thumb: The more mines in a field – and the larger the field area -- the better the chance of sinking a ship, or ships. Minefields could be laid for several reasons: (1) Randomly placed fields could be laid across a known “sea lane” (commonly used routes), or where more than one sea lane came together (intersection), usually to attack merchant shipping. (2) Mines could be laid off an enemy naval base to “ambush” warships. Or -- (3) Minefields could be “area denial” weapons. You could protect your important harbors with minefields, denying approach to the enemy, while you knew the cleared path through the field. The British became particularly aggressive and prolific in their use of mines. Early in the war fields were used at random to ambush unsuspecting German warships, and gradually came to be seen as a cheap alternative to exposing their capital ships to submarine attack. By late 1916, the Royal Navy hit on a plan to isolate the Hochseeflotte inside the German Bight by surrounding it with minefields. Eventually, they developed a similar plan to created “mine barrages” to close the English Channel against German warships and submarines, with a similar “barrage” from Scotland to Norway to deny German submarines access to the Atlantic shipping lanes. These “barrages” were of epic proportions – thickly sewn with, literally, millions upon millions of mines – and their own trawler and minesweeper fleets to maintain them. Some German U-Boat skippers were unbelievably brave, adept at navigating their way through the barrages – out-bound and the return journey. But many boats set out on patrol and simply never returned. Both the Germans and the British built several “minelayers” – usually fast light cruisers specially designed to act as cruiser/minelayers. But the increasing use of mines led to vast fleets of “minesweepers” to clear old mine fields, or remove the fields planted by your enemy. Both sides had purpose-built sweepers, but were forced to convert a variety of fishing trawlers and other small craft to handle the immense work load. In the Kaiserliche Marine, the mining and sweeping operations were coordinated by the Admiral Commanding Baltic Forces, and the Admiral Commanding the Hochseeflotte. In the North Sea, the majority of minesweepers were home-ported out of Wilhelmshaven and tended to the defensive minefields in the Jade Estuary with overall responsibility for keeping “cleared” lanes swept through the British minefields surrounding the German Bight. Smaller detachments of minesweepers were stationed at the ports along the Elbe and Weser rivers to keep the routes and deep-water channels cleared to the open sea. This is Cuxhaven’s minesweeper station. Six old Goliath Class tugs have been converted to minesweeping duties. On the right, along the seawall, you have two Odin Class harbor tugs (nested, diagonal) and one Passat Class (diagonal) tug by “AP”. The docks and warehouses were re-lotted from “Somy’s Japanese Tugs”. The Quonset Huts are from the “SNM Naval Series”, and the barracks building is re-purposed from Mattb325’s “UC Sydney” lot. Above and below are two close-up views of the steam tug Goliath, courtesy of “Barroco Hispano”. This superbly detailed model is a joy to behold. She has a small raised forecastle deck designed to reduce the amount of water taken over the bow in rough seas. Larger than the average tug of her day, Goliath was used for ocean-going work as well as for heavy hauling. Minesweepers had heavy wire cables (called “paravanes”) permanently attached to the fore-foot for sweeping operations. The cables would be paid-out on either beam and a “Paravane Kite” was attached at the end, then lowered into the water. The “kite” is that greenish object on the aft deck, shaped like a torpedo with wings. As the sweeper gathered speed, the kite would glide below the surface at a designated depth and pull the cables out until they formed a large inverted “V” to either side of the minesweeper. The paravane cables would cut the anchor cables on the mines, which then floated to the surface and were destroyed by gunfire. Primitive, but effective. This is a view of a holding basin beside the minesweeper station. To the left of the basin are the munitions docks. On the left side you can see two Esmeralda Class paddle tugs moored to “Barrel buoys”. ABOVE: In the lower left, an Odin Class harbor tug (diagonal) has come alongside two lighters moored to “dolphins”. They put a work crew aboard the lighters and are preparing to take them under tow. Another pair of similar lighters is also being prepared and a small boat is running the towing hawser. BELOW: Another view of the same scene. The lighters, harbor tug, paddle tugs, mooring dolphins, small boats, and barge crane are all the imaginative work of @AP. NEXT TIME…… THE DEATH OF TWO BATTLECRUISERS MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful warship models. SPECIAL THANKS to my friend and partner, @AP, for his talents, meticulous models, colorful imagination, and extreme dedication. If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496

The British Battlecruiser Fleet engaged with Hipper’s 1st Scouting Group – HMS Lion, Princess Royal, Tiger, and New Zealand. The 5th Battle Squadron can be seen far to the rear. IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: dreadnought & AP Chapter 31: RUN TO THE NORTH Vice-Admiral Beatty’s Battlecruiser Fleet was steaming SE at 22 knots, hotly engaged with the Imperial German battlecruisers of the Hochseeflotte’s 1st Scouting Group. The British Admiral had already lost two battlecruisers to enemy fire, but had the overwhelming support of four Queen Elizabeth Class fast-battleships of the 5th Battle Squadron. Heavily armored, with mighty 15-inch guns, they were the most powerful dreadnought battleships in the world. Beatty fully intended to cut off the German squadron’s line of retreat and annihilate it. But the designs of mortal man stand little chance against the whims of “The Gods”. Beatty “the fox-hunter” was about to become “the hunted”. Two wireless sighting reports were received on HMS Lion’s bridge around 16:38 -- almost simultaneously – one from HMS Southampton (Commodore Goodenough) and another from HMS Champion… ”Urgent – Priority – Have sighted enemy battle fleet bearing SE – enemy course N – dreadnoughts in van - my position Lat. 56-34 N – Lng. 6-20 E.” This news came as a great shock to Beatty, and though still engaged with Hipper’s battlecruisers, he immediately altered course toward Southampton’s position. Just five hours ago, he had been informed the German battle fleet was at anchor in the Jade – he needed to see this with his own eyes. Within a very few minutes, the masses of smoke with the long line of battleships beneath came into view. Beatty instantly realized he’d been led into a trap by Hipper. He had to extricate his battered squadrons from certain destruction, and once that was done -- lure both Hipper and Scheer onto the waiting guns of the Grand Fleet. At 16:40, Beatty hoisted the flag signal for a 16 point (180 degree) turn to starboard, “in succession” – then signaled “recall” to his skirmishing destroyers and light cruisers. The big battlecruisers heeled hard over as they swung to starboard at 22 knots, then took up a course NNE. The “Run To The South” was over – but the “Run To The North” was only just beginning. And it was beginning badly. When HMS Southampton sighted the German battle fleet, Evan-Thomas’ 5th Battle Squadron was still eight miles astern of Beatty’s battlecruisers. HMS Barham continued to close the distance, and switched her fire to SMS Moltke, engaging her to great effect. Three certain hits on Moltke were observed, but the Gunnery Officer ordered a switch to the more powerful armor-piercing Lyddite shells, and these were virtually smokeless, so no further hits could be seen. The return fire from Moltke was doing great internal damage to Barham and caused heavy casualties among the crew -- but, curiously, there was little external “scarring”. Beatty relied on flag signals since his dynamos were acting up -- no doubt due to the pounding Lion had received -- and his wireless transmitters were only sending at half-power. Unfortunately, Barham’s Captain Craig could not see the flags. Not only was he trailing far behind the battlecruisers, but the weather had suddenly closed-in and he could hardly see the ships, let alone their flag signals. When Beatty suddenly put-about and headed north, Craig thought they turned to port rather than starboard. He only caught a fleeting glimpse suggesting the German battlecruisers were giving chase and heading north as well. For a few minutes, Evan-Thomas and his staff were puzzled. Was Beatty retreating north with the Germans in hot pursuit? Or were the Germans trying to flee through the Skagerrak to safety in the Baltic? The bewilderment on Barham’s bridge was quite understandable. The battleship’s wireless room had been wrecked, and Beatty had not bothered to repeat Southampton’s sighting report – Evan-Thomas did not even know Scheer’s battle fleet had been sighted. By now, funnel smoke and gun smoke had darkened the sky, and mixed with a steadily thickening mist until it was nearly impossible to tell where the battle was, or where it was going. And so it came to pass that, around 16:48, Evan-Thomas and his four super-dreadnoughts were steaming south at 24 knots, and about to pass Beatty’s battlecruisers steaming north at 22 knots. Just before HMS Barham thundered past, Beatty hoisted the same flag signal ordering a 16 point turn in succession to starboard. Evan-Thomas still hadn’t a clue as to why – but Barham promptly acknowledged the signal. Now “Fate” once again intervened in the guise of Beatty’s hapless flag-lieutenant, Ralph Seymour. Barham waited for the order to “execute” the maneuver. That was standard signaling procedure. When the Admiral commanding wanted the maneuver to begin, he hauled down his signal flags – which was the order to “execute”. Only then, would the receiving ship, or column, begin to turn. As Lion charged past the 5th Battle Squadron, every ship was able to read the flags – because Seymour never hauled them down! In this picture, you see a column of battleships steaming in “line-ahead” formation. They are executing a “16 point turn to starboard in succession”. In the Royal Navy, a “16 point turn” is simply a 180 degree turn, or, reversing course. “In succession” is a bit more complicated. Counting from the rear of the formation (on right) – the 4th ship is about to start it’s turn. The 5th, 6th, and 7th ships are making the turn. And the 8th ship has completed the turn and steadied-up on a NE course. Each ship must, in turn, steam to position #4 to start it’s turn – thereby turning each successive ship in the same spot. (Kind of like racing yachts rounding the same course buoy -- only much more organized). This is an excellent formation for ship handling in large or small formations. It is a simple maneuver, easily executed, and keeps the #8 ship at the head of the formation (possibly the flagship). The maneuver will also work in a sailing formation with multiple columns of battleships. It also helps a commander keep tight control of his ships because it is very “organized” and discourages reckless behavior. However, in Beatty’s particular situation, it was not the wisest choice he could have made (see text below). Notice the width of distance between ship #4 and ship #8. This is the width of the “turning circle” and clearly demonstrates why all ships should be designed with similar turning circles – and as small as possible. Both USS Oklahoma models (ortho & diagonal) provided by @Barroco Hispano. Five minutes may not seem a very long time, but it was long enough to put Evan-Thomas two miles farther along his course, and to put five miles between him and Beatty. To compound the matter, Beatty had ordered a “turn in succession” to starboard – not the best choice he could have made. As seen in the picture above, a “turn in succession” forces all the ships to turn in the very same patch of ocean. Not only does this maneuver take longer to finish, but in battle, it allows an enemy to concentrate their fire on a single spot and pound each ship as it makes the turn. By now, Evan-Thomas was almost out of sight of Beatty’s battlecruisers, and the reason for Beatty’s sudden course change came steaming over the southeastern Horizon – the whole of the High Sea Fleet. III Battle Squadron of the Hochseeflotte – the eight ships of the Konig and Kaiser Classes in the vanguard (van) of the battle fleet. They are seen in line-ahead steaming north to support Hipper’s Panzerkreuzer. (Claus Bergen) Vizeadmiral Reinhard Scheer, Flottenchef of the Hochseeflotte, stood on the bridge of his flagship, SMS Friedrich der Grosse, as she steamed north at 15 knots. Occasionally, he scanned the northern horizon with his glasses. The wireless room had been receiving regular sighting reports from Vizeadmiral Hipper in SMS Lutzow, so he knew he was approaching the scene of action. What’s more, he would have known he was gradually closing the trap on Beatty’s battlecruisers and the accompanying battleships of the 5th Battle Squadron. And – so far – there had been no evidence placing the Grand Fleet at sea in support of Beatty. This was exactly the kind of ambush the Kaiserliche Marine had been trying to pull off for years. The 4th Scouting Group (light cruisers SMS Stettin, Munchen, Frauenlob, and Stuttgart) and their attendant torpedo boats were deployed about six miles ahead of the battle fleet, while torpedo boat flotillas screened both flanks of the battle line. Around 15:50, Friedrich der Grosse hoisted the signal to “Clear ship for battle” and the klaxons sounded the call. Men dashed about the various decks, running and dodging other men as they made for their assigned stations. The reports began to flow into the Central Command Position deep inside the armored hull...”Artillerie clear” – “Torpedo arm clear” – “Boiler room manned and clear” – “Combat dressing station clear” – “Maschinen spaces clear”. Twelve minutes after the call sounded, “CCP” reported to Kapitan zur See Fuchs...”Ship is clear for battle”. SMS Friedrich der Grosse – Kaiser Class dreadnought battleship – commissioned 1912: 24,724 tons – 22.4 knots – 10x12-inch guns – 14x5.9-inch guns – 12x3.5-inch guns – 5x19.7-inch torpedo tubes. Friedrich der Grosse served as the flagship of the Hochseeflotte from her commissioning until March 1917, when she was replaced with the newly commissioned 15-inch-gunned SMS Baden. The Kaiser Class ships were the second-most modern dreadnoughts of the Kaiserliche Marine and served with the Konig Class in the III Battle Squadron. (Model courtesy of Barroco Hispano.) In the picture below, you will notice that her 565-foot length did not provide sufficient distance between the midships turrets to allow for cross-deck firing. Though possible, the firing arcs would have been woefully inadequate. An additional 60 feet would have made all the difference. The detail of the model is superb, but an error occurred in the arrangement of the midships wing turrets. They are positioned properly on the deck, but the turrets are improperly oriented. German capital ships with this “lozenge pattern” amidships, have the starboard wing turret facing forward, with the port wing turret facing aft. Other than this blindingly obvious “boo-boo” – the model’s detailing is accurate and absolutely exquisite. It is so richly detailed – I simply could not bring myself to leave it out of the CJ. (My apologies.) Around 16:11, with the Hochseeflotte just below the horizon from Hipper, Scheer ordered the battle line to close-up and maintain 500 meters between ships. The gun crews in the big, squat turrets stood frozen, waiting for commands, as the officers behind their rangefinders eagerly scanned the horizon. At 16:30, SMS Konig – leading the battle line – signaled...”Enemy in sight – ahead – 28,000”. As Konteradmiral Behncke watched, the haze and battle smoke rose to reveal a scene of organized chaos. To starboard were Hipper’s Panzerkreuzer on a southerly course, closely engaged with two groups of British capital ships to port – quickly closing the range to the Hochseeflotte. Destroyers, torpedo boats, and light cruisers were swirling and clawing at each other between the big ships, while other British light cruisers could be seen approaching to the west. Scheer signaled for 17 knots to close more quickly. Had the German Flottenchef been more critical in the planning stages of this sortie, he could have ordered 20 or 21 knots – the speed of his dreadnought battleships. But the German battle fleet was hampered by the slow speed of the six pre-dreadnoughts of II Battle Squadron. The old battleships (5 Deutschland Class and 1 Braunschweig Class) were rated at 18 knots, but most likely had to struggle just to sustain 17 knots. The slow speed and comparative vulnerability of the pre-dreadnoughts would limit Scheer’s tactical options and automatically give the Grand Fleet a 4 knot speed advantage. At 16:38, SMS Konig’s foretop lookout reported the British turning onto a northerly course, and two minutes later, Scheer signaled the battleship divisions for a 2 point turn to port, to close the range more quickly. He was within just a few thousand yards of closing the ambush and having Beatty under his guns. He then signaled...”fire distribution order...right to left...ship against ship.” And just two minutes later...”Open fire !” SMS Konig opens fire on Beatty’s battlecruisers at 16:48. Note the massive clouds of Cordite smoke. Now you understand why, after two or three minutes, with ten or twenty ships firing, it would be all but impossible to get a clear view of anything. SMS Konig, leading the battle line, opened at 16:48 – her target HMS Lion – but the range was too great and she ceased fire after two salvos. At this point, it should be remembered Admiral Tirpitz had arbitrarily ruled out the possibility of a fleet engagement beyond 11,000 yards. Consequently, many of the German capital ships were capable of no more than 13.5 degrees of elevation – effectively limiting them to a maximum engagement range of 17,700 yards. When taken under fire, HMS Lion was at approximately 20,500 yards – hopelessly out of range. The failure of Tirpitz to grasp the advances in modern gunnery technology (see chapter 23) had led to poorly designed turrets with too little elevation and range. (After Dogger Bank, German battleships began receiving turret modifications to increase elevation and range – but not all had been completed prior to Jutland.) Tirpitz had given the British a “gift” – and Beatty’s battlecruisers escaped from Scheer’s carefully crafted trap. With Beatty steaming north at high speed, still closely engaged with Hipper’s battlecruisers, 5th Battle Squadron held on -- waiting for Seymour to haul down Lion’s signal flags. Evan-Thomas’ battleships were charging down on the entire High Sea Fleet like the Light Brigade at Balaclava – and that simply would not do. The Admiral finally decided to act on “his own initiative”, and signaled his squadron to...“Conform to flagship’s maneuvers”. HMS Barham’s helm went hard-a-starboard and began to turn away from the enemy. Evan-Thomas might have had four of the most powerful battleships afloat – but he was nobody’s fool – he didn’t fancy being outnumbered four-to-one. As 5th Battle Squadron began their turn, the leading German dreadnoughts took Barham under fire, but the range was still too great. However, Admiral Behncke, having missed Beatty’s battlecruisers -- was determined Evan-Thomas’ ships would not get away. On his own initiative, he signaled III Battle Squadron to “...go to utmost speed...everything the engines can do!” The stand-by stokers poured into the stokeholds to lend their muscle, while the engineers opened up the valves on the oil sprayers. Steam pressure in the boilers began to climb and the thick, oily smoke belched from the funnels as the dreadnoughts gathered speed. Suddenly, the tables had turned and Hipper was chasing Beatty, while Behncke was chasing Evan-Thomas. About the same time, German lookouts sighted Goodenough’s 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron approaching from the northwest. Scheer ordered the battle fleet to engage them with the 5.9-inch secondary batteries – to keep them out of torpedo range. Scheer’s dreadnoughts, holding course to the north, continued to close both Evan-Thomas and Beatty. The 5th Battle Squadron had just began to turn away, and the rear of Beatty’s battlecruisers were, actually, still completing their turn. Unfortunately, Beatty’s flag signal had called for a 16 point turn to starboard “in succession” for both groups. That meant the ships had to continue to steam toward the enemy until they reached the appointed position to begin the turn (see picture above). And each ship would have to turn in the exact same spot – while the German battle fleet closed the range. A distinct tactical blunder on Beatty’s part. For the next few minutes, the leading German dreadnoughts (Konig, Grosser Kurfurst, Markgraf, and Kronprinz) fired ranging salvos that fell short. But as HMS Barham completed her turn and steadied-up on a northerly course (about 16:46), she was hit by a heavy caliber shell from Lutzow, penetrating the forecastle deck abaft “A” turret and exploding on the battery deck below, destroying several compartments and starting a considerable fire. As Behncke’s dreadnoughts came into range, a veritable fusillade followed. Around 16:58, another 12-inch shell ripped a 5-foot hole in Barham’s upper deck near the 6-inch casemate battery, before exploding below and ripping a 10-foot hole in the main deck. The blast wrecked the Medical Store and the Auxiliary Wireless Office, with an unusually large chunk of shrapnel penetrating the armor of the lower conning tower. The Platform Deck was also pierced by red-hot shrapnel, starting a fire and filling the 6-inch magazine and shell room with smoke, while disabling two ammunition hoists. Two minutes later, a shell landed on the aft superstructure near the mainmast, taking out several officer’s cabins, starting a large fire, and knocking-out the main wireless station. Around 17:06 a large caliber shell struck the ship’s side in the fantail area, detonating on contact with the main deck and blowing a 7 x 3-foot hole in it, while blowing another hole in the middle deck below. Shell fragments caused extensive damage to the main, middle, and lower decks – starting a large fire that nearly gutted three decks and all the officer’s accommodations. The last shell struck at 17:10, piercing the forecastle deck just forward of the starboard #1 6-inch gun casemate – peeling back the 1.5-inch deck plates, showering the forecastle with splinters, and starting yet another fire. Though still an effective fighting unit, Barham had suffered serious internal damage and taken substantial losses among the crew. HMS Valiant, also turning on the same point in succession, seemed immune to the enemy fire. Though straddled regularly, the decks deluged with thousands of gallons of water thrown up by near-misses, the battleship emerged from the danger zone unscathed. HMS Warspite followed Valiant through the maze of shell splashes – tall water columns erupting on all sides – water cascading down upon her decks – and the thunder of her own guns shaking the ship with each salvo. During the turn to the north, Valiant was hit with three large caliber shells, but the timing was not noted in her log. One shell struck near the stern, punching through the lower strake of the armor belt below the waterline, and detonated after penetrating the aft capstan flat. The blast blew out a bulkhead and flooded both flats on the middle deck. Another shell struck near the stern below the Admiral’s Day Cabin – right on the waterline. This one opened a hole 4 x 3-feet to the sea, and split the hull plates open for some twenty feet – causing even more flooding in the stern. The last shell struck the upper 6-inch armor strake ahead of the starboard #1 6-inch gun and penetrated twenty-five feet before exploding on the battery deck. The blast shattered two compartments and sent large splinters tearing through compartments as far as forty feet away. By comparison, Warspite’s damage was comparatively light. Malaya’s captain, observing the forest of shell splashes ahead, started his turn earlier, but still received the full fury of the German gunners. SMS Von der Tann took Malaya under fire at 17:00, joined by Kronprinz at 17:06, Kaiser at 17:08, and Moltke at 17:27. (SMS Konig, Grosser Kurfurst, and Markgraf were engaging, respectively, HMS Barham, Valiant, and Warspite.) Konteradmiral Behncke’s dreadnoughts had worked-up to 22 knots, but Evan-Thomas’ faster battleships began to pull away to the north. For fully five minutes during the turn, and the following thirty-five minutes after shaping course north, Malaya was the target of the crack gunnery ships of the German III Battle Squadron. Between six and nine salvos per minute rained down around the super-dreadnought. One of Malaya’s turret captains recalled…… “As I trained my turret around to engage over the starboard side, my telescope revealed the battlecruisers some 8,000 yards ahead of us, and it dawned on me that the four of us of the 5th Battle Squadron would now become the sole source of entertainment for the High Sea Fleet...I expected at any moment any one of those shells should hit us in the right place...our speed would be sadly reduced...and we should fall behind and be sunk...” In the first seventeen minutes, Malaya was struck seven times, with the first shell landing around 17:20 and striking the lower 8-inch belt armor abaft “A” turret. The armor was driven in about two inches with the hull plating behind it driven in also – starting several leaks. The second shell struck the roof of “X” turret at 18:27 – detonating on impact. The blast lifted the armored roof clear of the gun house by about three inches, sheered-off many securing bolts, and put the turret’s “local” rangefinder out of action. At 18:30 a large caliber shell struck the superstructure just behind “B” turret and beneath the bridge, blasting a large hole and starting a raging fire. At the same time a second shell, probably from the same salvo, struck the forecastle deck immediately above the #3 6-inch casemate gun. The impact ripped up the deck planking and left a 5 x 3-foot hole before exploding below – taking out forecastle deck beams, shredding several compartments, distorting the deck plating on the forecastle and battery decks, and carrying away voice pipes, electrical leads and ventilation trunking, as well as blowing the 6-inch gun overboard and starting yet another fire. Eventually, all the starboard 6-inch casemate guns were put out of action by the fire and 102 men became casualties. The flash from the resulting cordite fires also shot down into the 6-inch shell room, forcing prompt action to flood the magazine. This act most likely prevented the adjacent 15-inch “B” turret magazine from exploding and destroying the ship. As destructive as that single shell had been, two more followed simultaneously at 18:35. Probably from the same tightly grouped salvo, the two 12-inch rounds struck Malaya in almost the same area, but below the waterline and below the belt armor. The first shell detonated after impact, ripping a 7 x 4-foot hole in the inner bottom, and leaving hull plates and inner frames torn and buckled. The second shell punched a large hole in the outer skin, but failed to explode and passed out through the double bottom creating another large hole. The end result was serious flooding of two outer oil bunkers and several wing compartments, causing Malaya to take on a 4-degree starboard list within ten minutes. A final large shell struck the 6-inch side armor between “A” and “B” turrets, but detonated on impact, driving in the armor plate some three inches and showering a vast area with splinters. The 4-degree list actually effected her main gun elevation and shortened her firing range. HMS Malaya returning fire on the Hochseeflotte approximately 17:35. The fore-top of HMS Valiant can just be seen above the gun smoke. Malaya’s thick armor belt was undoubtedly effective, but in all truth, it was the handling skill of Captain Algernon Boyle that saved her. For very nearly an hour, with double helmsmen at the wheel, he made sudden and random course changes, throwing off the aim of the German gunners. In spite of Captain Boyle throwing the massive battleship around like a destroyer, Malaya’s gunnery -- and that of the entire 5th Battle Squadron -- was superb. The four fast-battleships rained down as many as sixteen salvos a minute on their German opponents. Four of Hipper’s battlecruisers (still in range) and two of Konteradmiral Behncke’s dreadnoughts were hit by the 1,900-pound 15-inch shells. Five hits were made on SMS Seydlitz alone, several of which fell on her lightly armored forecastle deck. The shells penetrated the thin decks and the lighter belt armor forward of “A” turret, exploding below decks and opening the ship to the sea. One shell (possibly from Barham) tore a 10x13-foot hole near the waterline which let in vast quantities of water. When Beatty had suddenly turned north, Hipper quickly swung the Panzerkreuzer to follow, but Beatty had gained several thousand yards. As the German battlecruisers focused on trying to catch him, many of their officers and crew were unaware the shells falling around them were not from Beatty’s battlecruisers – but from the battleships of the 5th Battle Squadron. A few gunnery officers were shocked when the big shells began to fall among them, but the smoke and sudden course changes had confused them. The reality set in with the first thunderous hits of the 15-inch shells and the massive damage they caused. But Hipper knew all he could do was outrun the battleships – he had no intention of letting Beatty get away. As the 1st Scouting Group came within gun range of Beatty, Hipper altered course to close and resumed fire around 16:57. Beatty was now under fire from four German battlecruisers and four battleships (Von der Tann was still firing on HMS Malaya). HMS Lion on fire after several hits by SMS Lutzow. The gunnery duel continued with increasing ferocity. Soon, Seydlitz was struck on the face-plate of “B” turret, and the turret went out of action. After some minutes, they restored one of the barrels to service, but then the hydraulic elevating gear failed and the turret went silent. She was now down to two operational turrets, but took HMS Tiger under fire when she appeared clearly out of the smoke and mist. At least two hits were observed and Tiger’s “A” turret stopped firing. SMS Lutzow resumed fire on HMS Lion, obtaining hits at 16:59, 17:01, and 17:02. SMS Derfflinger took Princess Royal under fire for some minutes, but Kapitan Hartog quickly realized he was under fire from the 5th Battle Squadron and shifted fire onto HMS Valiant. SMS Moltke fired on HMS New Zealand, but deteriorating visibility and smoke interfered with ranging, so the fire was only intermittent. It was around this time that SMS Prinzregent Luitpold opened fire on New Zealand and repeatedly straddled her. There were no hits, but splinters from near misses peppered the battlecruiser like buckshot. SMS Von der Tann was nearest to 5th Battle Squadron and attracting more than her share of attention. Gamely, she fought back – taking HMS Malaya under fire with her one remaining main battery turret. At least two significant hits were observed on Malaya, one at 17:03 raising a great sheet of flame and starting a large fire. Unfortunately, at 18:18, the two guns of Von der Tann’s “D” turret overheated and came out of battery (just as those of “B” turret, earlier). Now Von der Tann had no heavy guns in operation. Kapitan Zenker did not sheer out of line in his unarmed condition, but chose to remain in the battle line and draw some of the enemy fire away from the other battlecruisers. Relieved from the necessity of providing a steady course for gunnery, Kapitan Zenker began “chasing salvos”, thereby avoiding further damage from the enemy. While hundreds of big shells roared overhead, the smoke billowed across the water and blotted out the sky. British destroyers continued to mill about between the lines of battlecruisers. The threat of a stray torpedo attack was very real, and the gunnery officers of the German 5.9-inch batteries continually peered into the smokey, misting turmoil. A destroyer would appear out of the smoke, orders were shouted into hand sets, and the medium guns opened a fast and furious fire. Moments later, the target disappeared back into the smoke – and the game would begin again. Farther astern, Scheer’s battleships were being similarly harassed by Commodore Goodenough’s 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron. The 5.9-inch guns fired well, but the lunging and weaving light cruisers seemed to lead charmed lives. However -- if the British approached too close, they received the unwelcome attention of the battleships’ 12-inch guns – instantly sending them scurrying out of range. HMS Birmingham -- 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron –31 May 1916 -- 17:53 – under 12-inch fire from battleships of the Hochseeflotte. After completing his turn and steering north, Beatty was anxious to get out of range of the German battle fleet and increased speed to 24 knots. He needed to lure the Hochseeflotte into Jellicoe’s trap, but he did not want to lose any more battlecruisers in the process. Beatty quickly left Scheer’s slow battleships behind in the poor visibility. And since Hipper’s battlecruisers were only making 21 knots (to maintain contact with Scheer), it was simply a matter of a few minutes before he lost sight of them as well. And both Beatty and his hard-pressed squadron needed the breathing room. The prolonged gunnery duel with the German battlecruisers had been far more destructive than anticipated. Hipper’s well-aimed and tightly grouped salvos had destroyed two of his ships and severely mauled the rest. Beatty needed time for his crews to put out their fires, make what repairs they could, and tend to the all too numerous wounded. But – even as the British sought a respite from the enemy guns, the conditions of battle were changing in their favor. Hipper’s gunnery, through no fault of the Germans, was beginning to fall off with the approach of late afternoon. As the sun lowered itself toward the western horizon, it no longer shown down on the British warships – but right into the lenses of the German rangefinders. The only thing to be seen through the smoke, mist, and glare of the sun, were the British gun flashes. Even when the smoke and mist cleared, briefly, there was very little of the enemy to be seen. The shift in the position of the sun disadvantaged Hipper, but only relative to Beatty’s position, and only momentarily. But Hipper’s situation was about to get worse -- at 24 knots, the 5th Battle Squadron was closing on the rear of the Panzerkreuzer even as Beatty was leaving them behind. With the British racing ahead, bearing NW from the German battlecruisers, the German angle of fire changed with each minute that passed. Hipper’s ships were still shrouded in mist and Beatty was still lit by the setting sun – but the sun was no longer glaring into German gun-sights at that angle. Outnumbered five ships to four, and with visibility favoring the Germans, Beatty saw nothing to be gained by continuing the uneven contest. To do so would have risked further losses among his depleted battlecruiser squadrons while his own gunnery would be largely ineffective. Oddly enough, Beatty’s reasoning was sound. During the “Run To The North”, the Imperial Panzerkreuzer (Lutzow) hit HMS Lion with four rounds in quick succession, while Seydlitz landed one on HMS Tiger. By contrast, the British battlecruisers failed to score a single hit. Vice-Admiral Beatty swung onto a NNW course, around 17:35, to open the range -- and disappeared into the smoke and mist. As it turns out, disengaging from Hipper was one of the few smart moves Beatty made that day. Scheer, anxious to “bag” Beatty’s battlecruisers, at 17:20 hoisted the signal “General Chase” to allow the Panzerkreuzer to use their superior speed in an effort to turn Beatty back into the battle fleet’s line of fire. And though willing – Hipper was not sure he could comply. His big cruisers had been steaming at high speed for nearly two hours, rotating stokers in and out of the stokeholds, and shoveling tons and tons of coal into the fireboxes. Not only were the stokers beginning to show signs of exhaustion, but the poor quality of coal was now effecting the speed of the ships. As more and more coal was shoveled into the fireboxes, the quantity of un-burnt “clinkers” rose dramatically. A “clinker” is, simply put, a non-burnable mineral object mixed into the coal – such as too much stone in the mix. Or – a clinker can result from mineral-laden coal ash that melts together and forms large solid blocks inside the firebox. High-grade “Anthracite” coal burns completely – evenly and hot -- a fine gray ash falling through the fire grates into the ash-pan, where it can be raked out with ease. German coal – predominantly “Bituminous” – is rather low-grade and prone to a high proportion of non-burnable clinkers. The clinkers invariably form large chunks that do not fall through the fire grates and have to be raked off the top of the burning mass – sometimes called “trimming a fire”. Basically, the German stokers were shoveling their hearts out, but were fast approaching the point where they would be unable to produce the hot fires needed for the excessively high speeds, of which, their ships were capable. As Hipper chewed his cigar and watched Beatty disappearing from view, he ordered a target shift onto the 5th Battle Squadron. Hipper could not know the full extent of the damage caused by the big guns of the British – but it worried him. He would continue to pursue Beatty to the north, but would, for the moment, turn his guns on those annoying battleships. For almost an hour, beginning with their turn north, 5th Battle Squadron would be Beatty’s rearguard – drawing fire from all the ships within range and fully occupying Hipper’s attention. Evan-Thomas’ super-dreadnoughts were now under fire from both the German battlecruisers to the northeast, and the leading battleships of the Hochseeflotte to the southeast. HMS Barham and Valiant engaged Hipper, while HMS Warspite and Malaya engaged Scheer. During the period after the turn to the north, only HMS Valiant escaped further damage. SMS Derfflinger struck Barham four times, and HMS Malaya was struck by another four shells from the Hochseeflotte battle line. Meanwhile, HMS Warspite was engaged by several battleships of the III Battle Squadron and, in particular, SMS Seydlitz. Around 17:16, a large caliber shell, probably 12-inch, landed on the port side upper deck between “X” and “Y” turrets, smashed a 7 x 3-foot hole in the deck before exploding on the Battery Deck just behind the stern-most 6-inch casemate gun. The “X” turret 15-inch magazine refrigeration unit was destroyed, a fire was started, and the aft fire mains were shot through, flooding three compartments before they could be switched off. Moments later, another shell penetrated the port side upper armor belt between the upper and main decks, but failed to detonate – breaking into large pieces causing splinter damage and ripping out a large section of armor plate on the “X” turret barbette. At 17:19, a shell believed to be from Seydlitz penetrated the hull side plating just below the upper deck, directly in line with the rear portion of “Y” turret barbette. The projectile detonated some 40 feet inside the ship, blowing a 5 x 6-foot hole in the main deck and inflicting severe damage to a dozen different compartments. Captain Philpott’s quarters had a 7 x 4-foot hole blown in the bulkhead, while the escape trunk to the steering compartment was badly damaged and allowed the compartment to flood to a depth of four feet. Two of the aft transverse bulkheads were distorted by the blast with many rivets and bolts sheered-off. The next hit penetrated the armor and wrecked the Captain’s Pantry, while the final hit during this phase (again, from Seydlitz) struck right aft on the waterline – further damaging the stern area and allowing more flooding. Evan-Thomas’ big battleships were far more capable of withstanding this sort of hammering than Beatty’s battlecruisers. None were lost at Jutland, but the super-dreadnoughts were on the receiving end of some of the finest shooting displayed that day. In constant action for just over two hours, Hipper’s gun crews had continued to fire three salvos per minute – well-aimed, with unbelievably tight shot patterns. HMS Barham suffered significant and extensive internal damage, several fires, and heavy casualties, while HMS Malaya was positively battered – very heavy internal damage, an ammunition fire, a 4 degree list caused by flooding, and unusually heavy casualties among the crew. At the same time, the well-trained gun crews of 5th Battle Squadron fired rapid and accurate salvos. Every thirty seconds, the massive 15-inch shells tore through the air, rumbling like a thousand steam locomotives, before throwing up vast columns of water, or crashing violently into the German battlecruisers. The 5th Battle Squadron quickly proved to be a lethal opponent. SMS Lutzow was hit with four shells, three fell on Derfflinger, a whopping six slammed into Seydlitz, and five fell on Scheer’s battleships. (Only SMS Markgraf among the battle fleet suffered any notable damage.) To the perceptive observer, the determined slugging match between Hipper’s Panzerkreuzer and Evan-Thomas’ battleships more clearly demonstrates the inherent defects of British warship design – even more so than the mauling received by Beatty’s battlecruisers. In as much as two British battlecruisers had been sunk by Hipper’s 11-inch and 12-inch guns, his battlecruisers had, so far, survived a brutal pounding by massive 15-inch shells – and with the exception of Von der Tann – they were all in reasonably good fighting order. But Hipper could see some of the huge shells crashing into his battlecruisers and knew they were now at serious risk. HMS Warspite, followed by Valiant and Malaya, settling onto a northerly course, preparing to open fire on the rear of Hipper’s battle line. Photo taken from HMS Barham. At this stage, as “The Run To The North” comes to a close, it is worth taking a moment to examine the performance of the two antagonists. Both the British and German battlecruisers had been firing briskly for nearly two hours, and the only thing slowing them down was the miserable visibility. The German battlecruisers had taken their share of damage during “The Run To The South” -- Von der Tann continued to engage with her 5.9-inch batteries, but her main battery turrets were out of action. Seydlitz lost two main battery turrets, was fairly battered and on fire, and had taken a torpedo, but remained in the battle line. Beyond some battle induced flooding among the remaining ships, it was nothing serious. The Krupp steel was proving more than adequate to resist the British 12-inch and 13.5-inch shells. The Panzerkreuzer were shooting superbly, especially Lutzow, and Hipper’s squadron had pretty much had it their own way. Beatty, on the other hand, was not doing well. During “The Run To The South”, Beatty had under his command six battlecruisers and four fast battleships. During “The Run To The North”, Beatty still had four battlecruisers and four fast battleships. (Beatty had, after all, lost HMS Indefatigable and Queen Mary.) The British gunnery was not at all good. Serious damage was mounting aboard the thinly armored warships -- both internal and external – wrecked compartments, heavy casualties, blasted superstructure, fires, flooding, and burned-out or jammed turrets. And – Hipper accomplished all of this destruction with just five battlecruisers. Both the British and Germans had particularly bad luck with battle damaged main battery turrets. The British tended to lose the “Q” turret on the more modern Lion Class ships – and the ”X” turret on the older Indefatigable design. The Germans seemed to lose their “C” turrets (Von der Tann, Seydlitz, and Derfflinger). It was quite obvious neither the British nor German designers had adequately armored the roof of the turrets. In all probability, the armor requirements were determined by mathematical formula, rather than actual tests on a gun range. Several turrets were also lost or put out of action due to penetration of the barbette armored trunk. It was common design practice in both navies to reduce the thickness of barbette armor as it extended deeper into the bowels of the ship. It was believed an incoming shell would strike light belt armor, armored bulkheads, and armored decks – either detonating the shell before it reached a barbette, or slowing the shell sufficiently to prevent penetration of the armored trunk. In reality, this was a mistaken belief. On “The Run To The North”, everything changed for Hipper. The setting sun to the west threw off the German rangefinders temporarily, only improving as Beatty pulled ahead, changing the firing angle to the northwest and removing the glare from the optical lenses. Nevertheless, the Panzerkreuzer had continued to inflict damage on the British battlecruisers and received very little in return. This situation was dramatically altered only when Evan-Thomas’ 5th Battle Squadron used their speed advantage to bring all 32 of their big guns into action. From that point forward, Hipper was caught between two fires – Beatty to the northwest and the super-dreadnoughts to the southwest. This is the point at which the tide turned against Hipper. And it should be noted for the record, the majority of the vital damage done to the Imperial battlecruisers at the Battle of Jutland was inflicted by 15-inch guns. It is, in all practicality, impossible to assemble accurate figures on how many of Evan-Thomas’ 15-inch shells landed on the German battlecruisers. What was obvious to the naked eye was the extent of destruction each one of those shells caused. When a 15-inch shell impacted a battlecruiser, the blast of the 1,900 pound shell was horrendous. They bored through decks and exploded, shaking the big ships like an earthquake. Interior compartments were blown into contorted shapes and bulkheads pierced by fist-sized pieces of shrapnel. Foot-thick armor plates were punched five inches into the ship’s side, twisting steel support frames, bowing torpedo bulkheads, sending splinters in all directions, and more often than not – resulting in heavy flooding. Flooding damage is insidious – and cumulative. Heavy shells, without penetrating, can violently displace armor plate, sheering rivets, opening seams, and causing leaks. A flooded compartment, though sealed off, can allow water to leak into adjacent compartments through air ducts, voice tubes, and around electrical conduits – and through shrapnel splinter holes. The biggest threat from a 15-inch shell was its’ capability to blast very large holes in thinner belt armor -- opening the ship directly to the sea. Once a compartment is flooded, it can be difficult or impossible to remove the water – especially if the hole is too large to be ”plugged”. In a worst-case scenario, pumps can fail due to battle damage, electrical failure, water damage, or drains clogged with blast debris. A warship can be blazing away with all guns one moment -- and a moment later -- be in danger of foundering, because there is simply too much water sloshing about inside the hull. From the moment 5th Battle Squadron came into effective range, Hipper’s battlecruisers were in extreme danger. German naval architects had designed a magnificent armor suite that made the Imperial battlecruisers superior to any British battlecruiser afloat. SMS Von der Tann, with her eight 11-inch guns, had sent HMS Indefatigable to the bottom within minutes. Derfflinger’s eight 12-inch guns had destroyed HMS Queen Mary with a final, well-placed salvo. But the fast battleships of the Queen Elizabeth Class were an entirely different animal. Tirpitz had never wanted the battlecruisers to serve in the battle line, and he had influenced their design to that end. Even with their superb armor scheme, they were not meant to go toe-to-toe with battleships – especially not the most powerful dreadnoughts in the world. The heavy armor scheme of Hipper’s battlecruisers was designed to withstand 12-inch gunfire, keep them in the battle line, and ensure they survived to return home. The armor would keep them afloat and intact long enough for their 11-inch and 12-inch guns to destroy the lightly armored British battlecruisers. But the architects, guided by Tirpitz’ tactical philosophy and financial restraint, were not allowed to armor the ships against 15-inch gunfire – even when they knew their enemy had such weapons. The 15-inch guns aboard HMS Barham and her sisters were the key to the whole issue. One of Barham’s 1,900 pound shells was, in destructive force, the equivalent of three 11-inch shells, or two 12-inch shells. Their destructive power was simply monstrous by comparison. And Barham and her sisters had the thickest armor of all the battleships present at Jutland. The Imperial battlecruisers could bang away at Barham, steadily inflicting damage, but the big 15-inch guns would, literally, dismantle the German cruisers before they could do lethal harm. Not to digress too much, but 15-inch weapons were briefly discussed for SMS Derfflinger, and Tirpitz deemed them too expensive, and the ship was already on the builder’s slipway. The Imperial Navy High Command then forcefully argued Lutzow should be armed with the big guns. Unfortunately, Tirpitz still did not envision his battlecruisers fighting battleships – so he simply did not understand the need for the bigger guns with their heavier shells. In all truth, neither Tirpitz, nor anyone else in the Kaiserliche Marine, had any battle experience of 15-inch shells. They simply did not know how much damage one of those shells could do. SMS Lutzow’s superb marksmanship astonished the British – and Derfflinger’s 12-inch guns and ability to survive were highly regarded by their opponents. The British nicknamed her “The Iron Dog” out of respect. For just a moment, imagine how different the opening phase of Jutland might have been if the two battlecruisers had been armed with the big 15-inch rifles. Dreadnought battleship SMS Bayern – sister ship SMS Baden: 28,530 tons – 22 knots – 8x15-inch guns – 16x5.9-inch guns – 5x24-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 13.8 inches. Only recently commissioned for trials, Bayern was left behind when Scheer sailed for Jutland – the crew had only been in training for three weeks. Her speed was slower than the Queen Elizabeth Class fast battleships, but only by two knots. Had she been leading Scheer’s battle line on 31 May 1916, her 15-inch rifles might have made a difference. When inspected by British dockyard authorities after the war, they found her to be equal or superior to anything in the Royal Navy. Below, two views of her moored in the old fleet anchorage at Bremerhaven. Her “off-duty” crew is being rowed ashore to spend the night in their barracks. If you look closely at the landing, you can see contingents of sailors loading into trucks to be taken to their barracks. Bayern is by Barroco Hispano. The small boats, sailors, and much of the “dock clutter” is by "AP". Seawalls by “NBVC”. The rickety pier is from the “PEG” Cannery lot – and the small office is a re-purposed SFBT railroad signal box. SIDEBAR QUEEN ELIZABETH CLASS Fast-Battleships Queen Elizabeth (1914) – Warspite (1915) – Barham (1915) – Valiant (1916) – Malaya (1916) Displacement: 32,590 tons – Length 643 feet – Speed 24 knots – 8x15-inch guns – 12 to 16x6-inch guns (varies between individual ships) – 4x21-inch torpedo tubes – Armor: main belt 13 inches – barbettes 10 inches – turrets 13 inches – conning tower 13 inches. Complement 930 officers and men. At the time of the Battle of Jutland these five ships were considered to be the mightiest dreadnought battleships in the world. It was not because they were the biggest warships, or the fastest, or because they were more heavily armored, or even had the most guns. Their displacement was, in fact, about 5,000 tons heavier than any of the Imperial battleships and battlecruisers, but their armor plate was nearly an inch thinner than the German Konig Class battleships. The speed of the British warships was about 2 knots faster than the German battleships, but between 2 to 3 knots slower than the Panzerkreuzer. The British dreadnoughts carried eight main battery guns while the most modern German dreadnoughts carried ten. In this case, it was not the number of guns that counted – it was the size and weight of shell that made the Queen Elizabeth’s mighty. These dreadnoughts were the only warships in the world to mount 15-inch guns – the Mk-1 BL (breech-loading) 15-inch L/42 rifle – to be precise. It could be pointed out the Royal Navy already had a 13.5-inch weapon firing a 1,400-lb shell – and the US Navy mounted a standard 14-inch weapon firing a similar size shell. But the unquestioned superiority of the British 15-inch gun was derived from the horrendous destructive power of its 1,900-lb shell. The kinetic penetrating power of such a large shell traveling at 2,450 feet per second (roughly ½ mile per second) was enormous. And once it bludgeoned its way inside an enemy hull, the explosive force and resulting damage was almost beyond human comprehension. BELOW you can see the massive size of the turrets designed to house the 101-ton gun tubes. This is a view of the 5th Battle Squadron of the Grand Fleet as it might have looked moored at their buoys off the Rosyth dockyards – just a few days before their rendezvous off the Jutland coast. Left to right: HMS Barham (flag), Valiant, Malaya, and Warspite. HMS Queen Elizabeth is temporarily in the dockyard for periodic maintenance and did not participate in the battle. All five ships of the class were very nearly identical (or as close to “identical” as possible). The only really noticeable difference was in the number and arrangement of the secondary 6-inch gun battery. Some ships had as few as 12 guns, while others had as many as 16. This is a close-up of HMS Barham. You will note Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, flag officer commanding, has his steam launch tied-up at the aft gangway. On the port side, you see the fuel-oil lighter Harold Smith replenishing Barham’s fuel bunkers. The Queen Elizabeth’s were the first battleships in the Royal Navy to be completely oil-fired. Note the prominence of the large gun houses – they had to be large. The 15-inch guns were gigantic compared to 13.5-inch weapons and actually had a 4-foot recoil when fired. You will also notice the small boat traffic between ships and ship-to-shore. HMS Malaya is standing by to unload two lighters full of ship’s stores. “Ship’s Stores” could include such items as canvas tarps, machine oil, rope and hawsers, balk timber, nails and spikes, tools, caulking iron, mops and brooms, galley supplies, leather goods, machine parts, and the inevitable toilet tissue. Malaya clearly demonstrates one of the chief characteristics of all British capital ships – the tall, bulky, built-up design of the fore and aft superstructures, with twin funnels grouped close behind the bridge. Of course, there is also the “trademark” of all English battleships – the soaring tripod foremast with a spotting top. Right next to the voluminous clouds of smoke, the spotting tops appearing over the horizon alerted an enemy to the presence of battleships. HMS Valiant has received a motor launch alongside, no doubt delivering mail bags from ashore. The hull form is shorter, and a bit on the “stubby” side -- but from her foremast to her mainmast – Valiant’s insides are crowded with twenty-four boilers to guarantee her status as a 24-knot fast-battleship. HMS Warspite has two lighters alongside and an Odin Class harbor tug is pushing a third lighter into position. Once the lighters are secured, the ship’s boat boom will hoist cargo nets full of crated fresh provisions aboard. The fuel-oil lighter Harold Smith, the Admiral’s steam launch, and the exquisite battleship model were graciously and expeditiously provided by @Barroco Hispano. The lighters, tugboats, small boats, boat boom, motor launch, and battleship mooring buoys made the creation of these scenes possible – and are generously provided by @AP. Just for those of you that might be curious about the fuel-oil lighter Harold Smith – here is a close-up shot to show the detailing. NEXT TIME…… THE TRAP IS SPRUNG BUT – before you go – we will finish the tour of the ammunition handling facilities…… This is an overview showing the route from the distribution docks (bottom center) back to the ammunition storage bunker complex (top left of center). The road and rail line runs back through a valley between the hills. The bunker complex was built on the far side of the hills to mitigate the effects of any accidental explosions. This is an overview of the bunker complex. You can see a rail line loading dock outside the bunker compound where shells and powder can be brought into the complex by rail or road – and can be sent out to the distribution docks in the harbor. Another loading dock and rail line can be seen inside the compound in the upper left. This one is strictly for the receiving and distribution of torpedoes. This is the receiving and distribution dock for shells and powder. Ammunition can be brought in by rail or sent out to the replenishment docks in the harbor. The loading dock was deliberately built outside the bunker complex and offset from the entrance to the compound to reduce the possibilities of damage in the event of an “accident”. Two shuttle engines with loaded rail cars are preparing to leave for the ammunition piers. To the rear of the loading dock, trucks can be seen unloading shells they have brought out from the bunker complex. To the right of the dock area are the administrative offices of the complex. In this close-up of the dock, you can see full shell racks lined up and waiting to be loaded onto the next available train. You have an excellent view of one of the shuttle engines and the ammunition rail cars. At the rear of the dock a 20-ton crane is unloading shells from the trucks. A railroad crane and shuttle engine are standing by on a siding – in case one of the dockside cranes breaks down. The loading dock is re-purposed from the “PEG SNM Battleship Docks”. The dockside cranes are from the “PEG” trash lots. The railroad crane is from “Simmer2” while its shuttle engine is from “PEG”. The small shuttle engines and ammunition cars are by “AP” – as are the 20-ton cranes, shells, and some of the sailors. The water tower was borrowed from the Maxis Movie Studio lot. This is the main bunker complex. Powder charges are stored in the four large bunkers on the left, while the shells are stored in the smaller bunkers on the right. As you can see, there are practically no structures in the compound other than the bunkers – no need to build anything that might, literally, go up in a large puff of smoke. The bunkers are thick, concrete structures buried under an earthen mound and can be found in the “PEG SNM Series”. This is a close-up of one of the fire-fighting water towers. Beside it, the fire brigade is undergoing training and maintenance of their equipment. The landscape has just a few trees, with some berry bushes scattered about, on gravel-covered terrain. The concrete road sections are “Paeng’s Grunge Concrete” sections with tire tracks -- some of them have been modified for lighting. The fire brigade and their equipment is by “AP”. The trees and berry bushes are by @Girafe and the gravely-looking areas are actually “Heblem” grey sand. This is a view of the outer wall of the bunker complex. This consists of a 16-meter earthen berm built-up around the whole complex, then layered with reinforced concrete on the inner side and a thinner layer on top of the berm. The outer side of the mound has been left natural and a controlled amount of vegetation has been allowed to grow to prevent erosion of the soil. The bunker complex has been built as close as possible to the hills. The building on the left is used for storage of small goods, supplies, and tools, with office space for clerical work and record keeping. The right hand building is used for periodic inspection, maintenance, and testing of the various lots of stored powder and shells. This is the torpedo loading dock on the far side of the compound. A separate dock was provided to reduce the congestion on the main compound. The dockside cranes are 100 ton capacity, while the cranes on the lower level are of 20 ton capacity. When needed, torpedoes are removed from the bunkers on the left, transported by truck to the loading dock, then hoisted across and placed in special railways cars to be carried to the replenishment docks. In this close-up, you get an excellent view of the small shuttle engines and the torpedo laden rail cars. If you look closely, you can see the torpedoes in the back of a truck waiting to be unloaded, while working parties behind the truck are inspecting and preparing other torpedoes that will be hoisted up onto the loading dock in their turn. The cranes, torpedoes, Imperial officers and sailors (black & white uniforms), fire brigade personnel, small shuttle engines and torpedo railway cars -- are all the intricate work of "AP". Without these specialized props, the degree of detail portrayed in this scene simply would not be possible. MANY, MANY, THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful warship models and continued support. SPECIAL THANKS to my friend and partner, @AP, for his talents, patience, meticulous models, colorful imagination, and extreme dedication. If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496

Ships of the Hochseeflotte moored quayside in Wilhelmshaven harbor – circa 1916. The dreadnought in the foreground is a Konig Class battleship, III Battle Squadron. IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 27: THOSE WHO LEAD As with all military plans, they look very good on paper, but they rarely survive the point at which they are put into execution. And so it would be with Jellicoe’s elaborate operation -- but it was hardly his fault. He had the benefit of commanding the largest battle fleet the world had ever seen. And Room 40 was decoding German wireless traffic almost as soon as they got it -- and -- he outnumbered his opponent by a considerable margin. As his battle fleet steamed southeast by east, Jellicoe was not at all certain he was going to encounter the enemy. The boys in Room 40 had as much as told him so. Around half-past noon (12:30) on 31 May, Rear-Admiral Jackson, the Admiralty D.O.D., had checked in with Room 40 to see where the German flagship was located. Room 40 had long ago established Sheer’s flagship (SMS Friedrich der Grosse) was assigned the wireless call-sign “DK”. By intercepting enemy messages, and taking the directional bearings at the same time, they knew exactly where the German flagship was located. When Jackson asked, Room 40 gave him the short answer – Wilhelmshaven. And if the flagship was still in port, that meant the Hochseeflotte was still at anchor. Without confirming the particulars with the Room 40 staff, or even consulting other Admiralty staff, he transmitted a message to Jellicoe…“DK still placed in Jade at 11:10 – Apparently they have been unable to carry out air reconnaissance which has delayed them.” The message was received by both the Grand Fleet and Beatty’s Battlecruiser Fleet. Suddenly, a trap certain to ensnare their enemy, had been transformed into just another training mission. With the wind blowing strong from the northwest, Jellicoe reasoned there was little likelihood the German airships could be used, and even less chance the Germans would put to sea without them. Now his thoughts turned to deciding if he could remain at sea and try again, tomorrow. Unfortunately for Jellicoe, the Hochseeflotte staff officers had grown suspicious when the Grand Fleet seemed to miraculously turn up everywhere they planned an operation. It was simply too often for it to be coincidence. Though suspicious, the German naval command never changed the codes. But two bright lads on Scheer’s staff came up with a plan and managed to convince Scheer to try it. Just before taking the battle squadrons to sea, Scheer’s flagship exchanged call signs with the radio station at the entrance of the III lock into Wilhelmshaven. The flagship now had a new call-sign Room 40 did not know, while the lock wireless station continued to transmit normal traffic as “DK” – giving the impression Friedrich der Grosse was still at anchor in the Jade. The end result was two great fleets steaming into the North Sea – and neither would know the other was out. The ironic twist – and there is always an ironic twist – is that the Germans transmitted a signal to all ships and stations announcing the exchange of call-signs, just to make sure everyone was on the same sheet of music. However, the Germans transmitted in an entirely different and little used cypher code. Room 40 was unable to decode the message right away, so with an operation in progress, they simply put it to one side and carried on – leaving Jellicoe unaware the German battle fleet had followed Hipper to sea. With a battle as controversial as Jutland, there always seems to be a second version of events, and this is no exception. In the alternative version, it is normal operating procedure for the German flagship to change call signs when it goes to sea – there was no attempt at deception. The problem occurred within the Admiralty. Rear-Admiral Jackson mistakenly asked the whereabouts of “DK” – the call sign – NOT the actual flagship. Had Jackson asked for the location of the German flagship, presumably, he would have been told it was at sea, and given the position based on the radio direction bearings. There is, of course, a problem with the second story. Once at sea, the Germans were unlikely to generate enough wireless traffic to provide Room 40 with a position fix. AND – my guess is that if Room 40 had any idea the German flagship was at sea – they would have notified the Admiralty staff and The Fleet immediately. But – I will leave you to decide which version of events sounds more logical. With four groups of capital ships steaming on converging courses, and the sun about to rise in the North Sea – let us take a moment to learn about the men who command them. THE PRINCIPLE COMMANDERS John Jellicoe in the uniform of “Admiral Of The Fleet” – circa 1917. Admiral Of The Fleet Sir John Rushworth Jellicoe, 1st Earl Jellicoe, Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa Flow: 1859 – 1935. Born the son of a merchant sea captain, John Jellicoe joined the Royal Navy in 1872 at the age of thirteen. He gradually rose through the ranks in the slow but steady career progression common to the Royal Navy in the Victorian Era. Attaining the rank of commander, he was serving in the Mediterranean aboard the battleship HMS Victoria in 1893 when it collided with HMS Camperdown and sank off Tripoli. The accident was the result of incompetent ship handling by Vice-Admiral Sir George Tryon. (Tryon at least had the good sense to go down with his ship.) In 1900, during the Boxer Rebellion, Captain Jellicoe commanded the battleship HMS Centurion, and was chief of staff to Admiral Sir Edward Seymour at the time of his relief expedition to Peking. Having been badly wounded ashore, at the Battle of Peitsang, Jellicoe refused to die and was appointed a Companion Of The Order Of The Bath, and also awarded the Imperial German Order Of The Red Eagle, 2nd class, with Crossed Swords. In 1905, Jellicoe was taken on as a protege of Admiral Jackie Fisher, and his career began to alternate between sea commands and assignments in the Admiralty. He was made Aide-de-Camp to the King-Emperor, Edward VII, in 1906, and promoted rear-admiral in 1907. He pushed hard for funds to modernize the navy, supported dreadnought construction, and campaigned tirelessly for improvements in gunnery fire control. In the first decade of the 20th Century, the Royal Navy had become obsessed with “spit and polish” and paid little attention to gunnery. British fleets spent much of their time steaming from port to port, reminding the world that Britannia ruled the waves, and touching-up their gleaming white paintwork. Gunnery practice was only mandated four times per year, and even then, there were no instructions, guidelines, or required performance standards. In fact, the only requirement was that a ship should expend 25% of its ammunition load at each practice. With such a slack attitude toward gunnery, it is not surprising that on more than one occasion, ship’s officers were known to have ordered the ammunition jettisoned over the side – rather than risk powder stains on the paint scheme. Jellicoe was appointed second-in-command of the Atlantic Fleet in 1907, Third Sea Lord in 1908, then moved to Commander-In-Chief Atlantic Fleet in 1910. Promoted vice-admiral in 1911, he became second-in-command of the Home Fleet, then commander of the 2nd Battle Squadron in 1912. In December 1912, he was appointed Second Sea Lord. With the outbreak of war in 1914, Winston Churchill removed Admiral George Callaghan as Commander-In-Chief Home Fleet, and promoted Jellicoe to full admiral to take command of the renamed “Grand Fleet”. There was some grumbling among the “senior” ranks in The Fleet over the precipitate manner in which Churchill promoted Jellicoe over the heads of officers with more seniority. But, despite the grumbling, the question remained – who better to command the Grand Fleet than Jellicoe? In 1902, as a young officer, he had shown an aptitude for gunnery and was sent to the new gunnery school aboard HMS Bulwark. By 1904 his quick grasp of technical issues found him selected to serve as a member of Fisher’s exploratory design committee for HMS Dreadnought. He then served as Third Sea Lord of the Admiralty under Fisher, making him responsible for developments in ship design, armor research and application – and -- development and advancement of warship guns and munitions. This post also gave him access to the latest information on the development of submarines, torpedoes, and mines, both at home and abroad. There was no other line officer in the Royal Navy possessed of such a comprehensive technical knowledge of the modern dreadnought. Simply put – he knew the strengths and weaknesses of each of his battleships and had the tactical knowledge to use them. Jellicoe, the man, had a spotless service record, was known as immensely capable, and was considerably more than “well-connected”, with friends in the very highest places. Despite all this, he was a modest man and sincerely placed the unity of his flag-officers and the well-being of the Fleet above his own ambitions. His very appearance bespoke modesty. He was just 5 feet 6 inches, with a spare frame, a tight-lipped mouth, and a somewhat prominent nose. He had kind eyes – a welcome feature to junior officers – but they were deceptive. He was quick and clever, saw everything, missed nothing, and instantly understood everything he had seen. His physical courage, though not often on display, was beyond doubt. As an “enlightened” admiral, he cared for each and every man under his command. Jellicoe was universally recognized as a superb seaman and an expert ship handler. Large fleets were notoriously difficult to handle in the early decades of the 20th Century, and his quick brain, cognitive powers, and instant commands were faultless – even in the midst of roaring battle. (It should be noted the Battle Fleet was far larger, and its battle line far longer, than any other at Jutland. And yet, there were no mistaken flag signals among the battleships.) Though he acted swiftly, he made careful and calculated decisions. Some have criticized him as over-cautious – he was not. But he was careful. Jellicoe understood the responsibility resting on his shoulders. Winston Churchill later said he was “...the only man on either side who could lose the war in an afternoon”. Though typical of Winston’s fondness for hyperbole, it is substantially true. If Jellicoe had rashly and recklessly sacrificed the Grand Fleet, the Hochseeflotte might have gained the upper hand, and the outcome of the war could have been different. Without giving undue weight to outrageous “what if” scenarios, there is little doubt a significant loss of capital ships would have considerably effected Britain’s political stance. Tactically, the British might even have lost the ability to effectively blockade the German ports. HMS Iron Duke, flagship of the Grand Fleet at the Battle of Jutland. Iron Duke Class: HMS Iron Duke, HMS Marlborough, HMS Benbow, HMS Emperor Of India – all commissioned 1914. Displacement: 25,820 tons – 21 knots – 10x13.5-inch guns – 12x6-inch guns – 4x21-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 12 inches. Model courtesy of @Barroco Hispano. Vizeadmiral Carl Friedrich Heinrich Reinhard Scheer – 1863 – 1928. Reinhard Scheer was born to a middle-class family in Obernkirchen, Lower Saxony. He entered the Imperial navy in 1879, at age fifteen, as a naval cadet. His early grades in training exams were not spectacular, but he managed to achieve the second highest rating in his class for the 1880 “Sea Cadets” exam. He was sent for special training in gunnery, torpedo warfare, and naval infantry tactics. (In those days, many young officers would serve in the African colonies or on the China Station.) Scheer served in various posts aboard foreign station cruisers – some wooden-hulled and steam-driven. He participated in, and even led, some of the landing parties sent to keep order in the far-flung parts of the empire. By 1905, Scheer had attained the rank of Kapitan zur See and took command of the pre-dreadnought battleship SMS Elsass in 1907. In 1909 he became chief of staff to Flottenchef Admiral von Holtzendorff and, at age 47, reached flag rank less than 6 months later. By 1911, he had been transferred to the Reichsmarineamt, where he held the post of Chief of the General Naval Department. Scheer returned to sea duty in January 1913, with command of the II Battle Squadron, and was promoted to Vizeadmiral in December of that year. War broke out in 1914, and in January of the following year, he was given command of the modern and powerful dreadnoughts of the III Battle Squadron. In January 1916, Admiral von Pohl became too ill to carry on as Flottenchef, and Scheer was given the command. One of his first acts was to write “Guiding Principles For Sea Warfare In The North Sea” – not exactly a “catchy” title. But he outlined the idea that the Grand Fleet should be pressured by increased submarine warfare, Zeppelin raids, and more frequent sorties by the Hochseeflotte. This would force the Grand Fleet to abandon its distant blockade and actually pursue the German fleet. The Kaiser signed-off on the memorandum on 23 February 1916 – and with that approval – Scheer would be able to use the fleet more aggressively. Aged 52 when he took command, Scheer was known as an excellent seaman and could handle dreadnought formations as well as any man alive. He was widely regarded by his fellow officers as one of the ablest and quickest-thinking flag-officers in the Kaiserliche Marine. His vigorous and aggressive spirit was much admired and well known – even in the British Admiralty. In many ways Scheer was a very different man than Jellicoe. All they really seemed to have in common was a rapid and analytical thought process. He was energetic, active, and impatient. He wanted action – and he wanted it now. Scheer was a man that expected his staff to have detailed plans and orders for an operation – but they were often pushed aside as soon as he appeared on the bridge. He tended to command by instinct and made quick decisions. He preferred to have all options presented to him, and might then chose another option no one had considered. Scheer’s chief of staff, Admiral Adolf von Trotha, summed it up neatly...”In action he was cool and clear-headed. The pressure of Jutland showed his ability to think calmly in the midst of chaos – a great gift. And a man like that must be allowed to drive his subordinates mad.” Apparently, Admiral von Trotha had a sense of humor. SMS Friedrich der Grosse, flagship of the Hochseeflotte at Jutland. Kaiser Class: SMS Friedrich der Grosse - 1912, SMS Kaiserin - 1913, SMS Konig Albert - 1913, SMS Prinzregent Luitpold - 1912, SMS Kaiser – 1912 Displacement: 24,380 tons – 21 knots – 10x12-inch guns – 14x5.9-inch guns – 12x3.4-inch guns – 5x19.7-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 13.75 inches. Model by “Barroco Hispano”. Admiral Of The Fleet Sir David Richard Beatty, 1st Earl Beatty, Viscount Borodale, and Baron Beatty of the North Sea and Brooksby – 1871 – 1936. Seen here in his uniform as a Vice-Admiral – circa 1915. The picture tells you very nearly everything you need to know about the man. The tailored uniform coat, the hands in the pockets, the affected stern, tight-lipped, steely glare, the casual air of a “rake” or a “maverick”, and the cap tilted at a jaunty angle over the left eye. Say what you will – the picture is the man. This “biographical sketch” will be a bit longer than the first two “players” – for two good reasons; (1) Beatty and his battlecruisers fought a goodly portion of the Battle of Jutland, and (2) There is simply so much more to say about an uncommonly “colorful” man. Born in Cheshire, Beatty’s father had served with the 4th Hussars, and three brothers served in the army – but Beatty chose to join the Royal Navy at age thirteen. He left Dartmouth Naval College in 1886 – but not with distinction. He was, however, possessed of a wealth of physical courage, a love of adventure, and a natural talent for “the dramatic”. All traits that were on display when indulging in his passion for fox hunting. (A bit of a “prima donna” before the phrase had become popular.) By 1896 he had been appointed second-in-command of the Nile Flotilla accompanying General Herbert Kitchener’s expedition into the Sudan. He proved very cool in a crisis – on more than one occasion -- and even personally jettisoned an unexploded shell from his gunboat while under fire. He demonstrated his ability to improvise under pressure and went out of his way to bedevil the hostile tribesmen. He earned both the D.S.O. and Kitchener’s admiration. (Something Winston Churchill – attached to Kitchener’s staff – was unable to do.) Four years later, and promoted to commander, Beatty again distinguished himself in action during the Boxer Rebellion. Leading a naval contingent from the fleet, Beatty saw combat at Tianjin and was wounded in the left arm and wrist. His heroism won him promotion to captain at age 29 and made him a celebrated hero back home. Returning to England, Beatty began a long, and sometimes difficult, marriage to divorcee Ethel Tree, heiress to the Marshall-Fields (Chicago) department store fortune. The marriage liberated Beatty financially, and put him on the “A-list” of guests at Edwardian house parties, allowing him to travel in the best social circles. Her money also bought him a steam yacht, an estate in the Leicestershire fox-hunting country, and a Scottish grouse moor. But it was akin to a Greek Tragedy. She was also a notorious “flirt”, and Beatty suffered “the tortures of the damned”. Serving afloat in a variety of warships, including command of a battleship, he also rotated through a wide range of shore duties – including an appointment as Aide-de-Camp to King George V in 1908. Despite having served on several ships, his experience in command of big ships was limited, with NO experience at squadron level under his belt. Nevertheless -- Beatty was promoted rear-admiral in 1910 – the youngest officer to attain that rank in a century. Winston Churchill was appointed First Lord of the Admiralty in 1911, and regardless of warnings about Beatty’s youth and impertinence, he made the young man his naval secretary. Churchill thought he recognized a bright and rising star in a sky that was momentarily dull due to lack of war-like employment. In 1913, command of the Battlecruiser Squadron came open – and to no one’s surprise – Churchill appointed Beatty. There were surprising similarities between the careers of Lord Nelson and David Beatty – if you chose to see them. And Churchill’s sense of the melodramatic may have unduly influenced him. Otherwise, why appoint a man with little ship handling experience and only a shaky grasp of modern naval technology and tactics? (No matter that Beatty was promoted over the heads of several senior officers.) HMS Dreadnought had changed the face of naval warfare in 1905. By 1916, Beatty would fly his flag in HMS Lion – a 26,000 ton monster with 13.5-inch guns and capable of a remarkable 26.5 knots. Naval engagements – which Beatty had never witnessed – would now unfold much more quickly, travel at greater speed, engage at longer ranges, and fire considerably bigger shells with enormous destructive power. The battle line, itself, was no longer a compact fighting unit – with 100 yards between ships. The new dreadnoughts were 200 yards long and required an interval between ships of 400 yards to avoid collisions and provide dispersal under fire. Ship handling in the modern Royal Navy was no job for unpracticed amateurs – especially in the confusion and chaos of battle. At the same time, signaling between ships had become a critical tool of command and control. If a ship’s wireless antennas were shot away, the only alternative was a signal lamp or flag hoists. And the very act of signaling was often carried out under near impossible conditions. When Beatty assumed command of the squadron he chose Lieutenant Ralph Seymour as his “flag lieutenant” (Admiral’s signals officer). Seymour did have aristocratic connections – and – his sister was a great friend of Churchill’s wife. “Influence” appointments were common in those days, but Beatty chose to overlook the fact that Seymour had NO experience whatever as a signals officer. This later caused a great deal of trouble. When people spoke of Beatty – “brash”, “rash”, “reckless”, “hotheaded”, and “impetuous” – were the adjectives most often used. And more often than not, they were used by the older and cooler heads in the Admiralty. In 1914 and 1915, this sort of behavior was on full display. Beatty led the Battlecruiser Squadron in the major clashes of Heligoland Bight and Dogger Bank (among others) – and neither he, nor his captains, seemed to learn any lessons from them. Beatty had simply charged into battle with guns blazing and gave little thought to tactics and the proper employment of his technologically advanced warships. The British demonstrated clear difficulties in reporting information up the chain of command, as well as serious foul-ups in signaling, in general. British ammunition handling procedures were seriously deficient, and Beatty placed no emphasis on gunnery practice – so they rarely hit the target. And while Beatty basked in the warmth of public adoration – the mistakes and failures were ignored, and the lessons went unlearned. After Dogger Bank, Beatty was lauded as the hero of the hour for having routed the German battlecruisers. But the reality is -- he had simply been lucky. Beatty had not prepared his squadron for modern battle. In the “old traditions” of the Royal Navy, he had not briefed his captains or prepared them with “basic fighting instructions” (as Jellicoe had done) – he merely chose to “have at the enemy” in something like an old-fashioned cavalry charge. (Follow me, Lads !) He had not been able to control his ships very well – signals were often confusing, misdirected to a given ship, or simply poorly worded by an inexperienced “flag-lieutenant”. In many cases, he failed to even make signals -- leaving his captains to guess at his intentions. The lack of gunnery practice resulted in an estimated 1% hit ratio (one out of every hundred shells fired managed to find a target). And – he very nearly lost his flagship to superior German gunnery. Beatty could lead men into battle, but he could not prepare them for it, nor could he direct them once battle was joined. In March 1915, after Dogger Bank, Jellicoe wrote Beatty a lengthy, but discreet letter. He chose not to give the younger man a verbal thrashing – after all, Beatty had managed to sink SMS Blucher. Instead, Jellicoe opted for a diplomatically phrased word of advice and caution. Like many at the Admiralty, Jellicoe worried Beatty’s impetuous nature and total lack of caution might lead the Battlecruiser Squadron headlong into a German ambush – and a resulting disaster. He expressed the fear that Hipper’s battlecruisers might lead Beatty on a merry chase, ending when the Hochseeflotte opened fire. If there was ever an answer to Jellicoe’s letter – it has not survived the century that has passed since Jutland. And if Beatty read the letter, he certainly learned nothing from it – Hipper would prove that. There was little doubt Britain longed for a Nelsonian hero at this hour, but there was no Nelson. The legendary Admiral had understood the capabilities of his ships, knew his gunnery to be superior to that of his enemy, and had planned his battles. More importantly -- he had prepared his captains to play their part. Beatty did not comprehend the strengths and weaknesses of his dreadnoughts, and his lack of forethought ensured they would come off a poor second to the Hochseeflotte’s gunnery. David Beatty looked and acted the dashing hero every man wanted to be, but he had no grasp of the responsibility of command, nor the necessity for control. He could lead, but he could not direct. HMS Lion, flagship of the Battlecruiser Fleet – attached to the Grand Fleet at Jutland. Lion Class: HMS Lion (1912) – HMS Princess Royal (1912) – HMS Queen Mary (1915) Displacement: 26,270 tons – 27 knots – 8x13.5-inch guns – 16x4-inch guns – 15x4-inch guns – 2x21-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 9 inches. Model by “Barroco Hispano”. Vizeadmiral Franz Ritter von Hipper – 1863 – 1932: seen here in his Vizeadmiral’s uniform – circa 1916. Franz von Hipper was born in Weilheim, Oberbayern (Upper Bavaria), some 40 miles south of Munich, and his shop-keeper father died when he was just three years old. Coming from humble origins, he concentrated on an education so he could make his mark in life. At age 16, he decided to join the fledgling Imperial Navy and two years later graduated officer training. (Ludwig II – “The Mad King” – was on the throne of Bavaria.) One of his fellow classmates (class of 1881) was Wilhelm Souchon, who would go on to successful command of SMS Goeben in 1914. As a “sea cadet”, Hipper served on the old sailing frigate SMS Niobe for six months, then attended Naval Cadet School in Kiel, followed by Gunnery School on SMS Mars. Hipper returned to sea duty aboard the training ship SMS Friedrich Carl before transferring to the steam corvette SMS Leipzig for a two-year world cruise. Returning in October 1884, the young man was assigned as a divisional drill officer training recruits for the First Naval Battalion. Even in its early years, the Kaiserliche Marine was known to rotate officers in and out of various commands so they would have an excellent, all-around knowledge of the service and how it operated. By 1898, Hipper was serving as navigator aboard the pre-dreadnought battleship SMS Kurfurst Friedrich Wilhelm, then transferred to the Imperial Yacht Hohenzollern in September 1899. While serving aboard, he was present for the trip to England for Queen Victoria’s funeral in 1901, and the cruise to America the following year. During his assignment, he was awarded the Prussian Order Of The Red Eagle, the Bavarian Military Service Order, and the Order Of St. Stanislaus (awarded by Tsar Nicholas II). Hipper was promoted to Korvettenkapitan in June 1901. In October 1902, he was assigned to command the Second Torpedo Unit until 1905, and was promoted to Fregattenkapitan. He then attended advanced gunnery courses for cruisers and battleships. Hipper was appointed to command several cruisers in succession, and in 1907, was promoted Kapitan zur See. The same year he was in attendance during a three-day meeting between the Kaiser and the Tsar, and was awarded the Order Of St. Andrew by the Tsar. In 1908, Hipper took command of the First Torpedo Boat Division for a period of three years, during which he trained more than half of the torpedo boats in the Kaiserliche Marine. October 1911 saw Hipper take command of the armored cruiser SMS Yorck and also assume the position of chief of staff to Konteradmiral Gustav Bachmann, Deputy Flag Officer, Reconnaissance Forces. In January 1912, Hipper became Deputy Commander, Reconnaissance Forces and was promoted to Konteradmiral. In October 1913, Hipper was appointed to command the 1st Scouting Group of the Hochseeflotte – a position he would fulfill with distinction. At age 50, Konteradmiral Franz Hipper rose to the command of a unit that would become legendary in the annals of naval history – and would make him famous as well. He worked the 1st Scouting Group hard – even in peacetime – training them in ship handling, squadron maneuvers, and especially gunnery. Hipper was practical and produced results. He knew guns were useless if you couldn’t hit the target, and his crews worked hard to earn the Kaiser’s prized shooting trophy. His men came to have complete confidence in him and his abilities. Not all naval officers responded to fast ships and tended to handle them like the lumbering battleships of the battle line. But Hipper was different, and quite unusual for a senior German officer. There was something of the “buccaneer” in him, and he reveled in the big cruisers speed and big guns. He understood them – understood how they were meant to work -- and knew how to use them. He was completely confident he had the skill to take them anywhere they were needed, and do whatever was required of them. Hipper never took a Staff College course and disliked theoretical speculation. Instead, he took in large amounts of information in a short time and retained it all – making decisions without hesitation. His operations were planned carefully, taking into account a wide range of factors – especially intelligence gathered by U-boats and Zeppelins. Hipper thought fast on his feet and proved to be a cool customer under fire. He was a gifted tactician with quick perception and a keen “seaman’s eye”. He got the most out of his ships, and kept tight control of his squadron when in combat. Hipper’s flagship always led the column and he took risks – but they were calculated risks. He handled the big battlecruisers like squadrons of heavy cavalry, and the man hand nerves of steel. Hipper was known to be energetic and hard working – but loathed paperwork and was quite content to leave that to his staff. He was well-liked by his subordinates and treated his staff with courtesy and great kindness. He was all business when at sea, but often sent his aides to sleep or eat when he had done neither. His personal modesty and cordial friendliness made him much loved by his men. He trained his crews hard and often, and respected officers that ran taught ships, but aboard SMS Seydlitz, when the crew saluted him – they were happy to do so. SMS Lutzow, flagship of the 1st Scouting Group – attached to the Hochseeflotte at Jutland. Derfflinger Class: SMS Derfflinger (1914) – SMS Lutzow (1915) – SMS Hindenburg (1917) Displacement: 26,180 tons – 27 knots – 8x12-inch guns – 14x5.9-inch guns – 4x19.7-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 12 inches. Model courtesy of "Barroco Hispano". NEXT TIME…… AN INNOCUOUS LITTLE STEAMER Again, my apologies…… I have been unable to create very many in-game pictures to cover the text of this chapter, so we will continue our tour of Cuxhaven…… This is another view of the West Loch of the Cuxhaven Dockyards. A first glance shows six ships moored to buoys in the center of the roadsted. As mentioned in Chapter 28, this small squadron of two armored cruisers and two light cruisers will be accompanied by two colliers on the long voyage to Imperial Germany’s China Station, in Tsingtau. They will significantly increase Germany’s power and influence in the region. Starting at the “tail” of the line you see the modern armored cruiser SMS Gneisenau, preparing to take aboard stores and provisions. Moored ahead of her is SMS Scharnhorst (flagship). (For details on these pictures, see Chapter 7.) The big armored cruisers are by “AP”. https://i.imgur.com/spzTJtJ.jpg[/img Moored ahead of the armored cruisers are two light cruisers of the Jurien de la Graviere Class. These are French cruisers, but I selected them because...(1) they were active prior to, and during WW I...(2) I wanted to provide a bit of variety to the cruiser mix – the number of German cruiser models available was somewhat limited...and (3) they are quite interesting in their appearance. To their port side, you see two moored colliers that will accompany the squadron. https://i.imgur.com/DYGnYGs.jpg[/i This is a very handsome, and highly detailed model, provided by @Barroco Hispano, and is indicative of French naval architecture of the period. The French navy was distinctive for the numerous funnels aboard their ships – and unique in the way they tended to separate them into groups. Displacement was 6,175 tons – 22.8 knots – 8x6.5-inch guns -- 10x1.9-inch Hotchkiss guns -- 6x1.5-inch guns -- 2x18-inch torpedo tubes. The only armor amounted to a 1.77-inch deck, a 3.9-inch conning tower, and 2.8-inch gun shields. Technically, she was a “protected cruiser”. The main armament is arranged in two single, shielded gun mounts fore and aft, with six more guns mounted amidships in sponsoned hull casemates (shown here with the armored shutters open). An Odin Class tug is seen nudging a lighter of provisions alongside – courtesy of “AP”. In this view of Jurien de la Graviere you can see the extremely fine lines of her hull. She had a length to width ration of nearly 9 to 1 – giving her a clean and extremely hydrodynamic hull form. Unfortunately, her hull was constructed of light frames and scantlings, which caused violent vibrations at her cruising speed of 10 knots. These vibrations frequently broke voice tubes and boiler piping. This very handsome collier is the SS Erlangen, and @AP has done wonders with the old girl. From the weathered hull, to the rusty brown forecastle deck plating, and the soot-smudged funnels – she is every bit a worn and over-worked collier from the early years of the 20th Century. Note the details on the ship’s boats, the weathered texture of the fantail awning, and the detailed rendering of the cargo booms. Colliers were an essential element to the operation of warships of this era, and we could not possibly have left them out. Erlangen represents a Norddeutscher Line collier that would have been leased by the Imperial Navy to provide coal for the warships on their way to China. Germany relied heavily on leased colliers, mostly from neutral nations, since they only had small naval commitments abroad. In peacetime, the Hochseeflotte rarely ventured into the Atlantic – and never beyond Norwegian or Spanish waters. In wartime – the battle fleet confined its operations to the North Sea. This is another view showing the unusually fine lines designed into this collier. SS Erlangen was based on the US Navy’s Prometheus Class colliers, and they were chosen for their modern features, as well as their unusually clean and handsome lines not found in other colliers. She displaced approximately 9,000 tons, was 466 feet in length, was capable of 16 knots, and could carry an estimated 7,000 tons of coal. Once the squadron arrives at Tsingtau, Erlangen will obtain another cargo – possibly in Yokohama or Nagasaki – and work her way back to Germany. The unusual ship in the center is the USS Proteus, name ship of a class of four colliers built for the US Navy in the early 1900’s. Commissioned in 1913, she displaced 19,000 tons, had a speed of 15 knots, and could carry 8,000 tons of coal. She was purpose-built as a collier by the Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Company. I chose this ship to represent colliers built specifically to operate as naval auxiliaries. The US Navy chose not to rely exclusively on leased colliers, largely due to the vast stretches of the Pacific Ocean, and their reluctance to be at the political mercy of neutral nations. Naval engineers drew her plans specifically to be able to handle two warships at the same time – and as quickly as possible. I also chose Proteus because her design is unique among all the colliers. This is another view of Proteus, this one showing her extremely long and narrow hull. It can easily be seen the midship’s portion of the hull is entirely occupied by coal storage holds, and cargo derricks designed to disburse the cargo in a speedy and efficient manner. The aft portion of the ship contains the engines, boilers, ship’s galley, Mess and Ward rooms, and the officer’s quarters. This view of Proteus’ bow shows the “conning bridge” of the ship. It is a very spartan arrangement, just big enough to hold the watch officer, a helmsman, perhaps the captain, and a couple of ratings. The bridge has been raised above the deck to allow heavy seas to pass beneath. The skylights in the forecastle deck are designed to allow light into the crew quarters below. These may look like small quarters, but it must be remembered, Proteus is not a warship and was crewed by only 158 officers and men. This view also allows close examination of the working booms and derricks installed between the cargo hatches. “AP” scratch-built this unique model and went to great lengths to make sure the complicated derrick system, and all its lines and rigging, have been duplicated properly. Here you have a detail shot of the aft superstructure -- such as it is. Please note the overhead crane gantry rigged over the two aft coal hatches (white), and four “reddish” hatch covers on the aft superstructure. This system is designed to bring coal from the two holds forward and deposit it in the four aft hatch openings to feed the boiler room coal bunkers. The two funnels placed side-by-side is an arrangement not commonly found on modern ships. You will also note a raised aft steering bridge extends the width of the ship at the fantail. All in all – great effort had gone into the design of the Proteus Class ships – and resulted in the simplified elegance of a rather large floating coal pile. The small machinery and crew spaces have been subordinated to the purpose of getting the coal where it needs to go. And “AP’s” wonderfully detailed model has captured every aspect of that simple elegance. (The Proteus Class collier prop-packs are available in the STEX -- "Historic Navies: 1900 -- Pack #28.) I cannot leave you without mentioning the “Twilight Zone” aspect of the Proteus colliers. During WW I, USS Cyclops, a sister-ship of Proteus, was known to have been in Barbados in March 1918 -- bound for Bermuda. She never reached Bermuda and was never seen again, nor has her wreckage ever been located. She is best remembered as one of the “ghost ships” of “The Bermuda Triangle”. During WW II (10 December 1941) USS Nereus, another of the Proteus Class, sailed from St. Thomas in the Virgin Islands bound for Bermuda (sailing the same sea lane Cyclops had taken). She never arrived in Bermuda and was presumed to have been torpedoed by a German U-Boat. But surviving U-Boat war diaries do not claim any such sinking. It is possible a submarine sank the collier, and was lost soon after -- but there is no record of a lost U-Boat near the area at that time. The wreck of USS Nereus has never been located. Did “The Bermuda Triangle” claim two sister-ships in two different World Wars? Only Rod Serling could answer that question…... MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful warship models. SPECIAL THANKS to my friend and partner, @AP, for his talents and extreme dedication. If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496

Hochseeflotte at anchor in the Kieler Hafen – circa 1912. IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP We have, so far, discussed the design, construction, and operational histories of the Imperial German battlecruisers. We are now about to see how they were handled by the Admirals and Captains, and how they preformed when put to the ultimate test – the Battle Of Jutland. I give you fair warning that this may be somewhat confusing. I have never yet examined a clear and concise – detailed – description of this battle. The immense size of the two fleets, and the fact that they were split into four distinct tactical groups – and spread over a large expanse of ocean -- can cause difficulties for anyone trying to write a lucid account of the action. I have tried, as much as possible, to stick to a “historical” chronological time sequence for the different events of interest. This has not been easy to accomplish. In order to maintain some sort of continuity to the story line, we may have to do a “flash-back” or even a “fast-forward” – this allows me to maintain a complete “story line” without splitting it into confusing parts. The keys to keeping everything in order are the quoted “times” in the text. The Choice was made to split the two fleets into separate components because they preformed different actions and maneuvers at similar times, for very different reasons. So the story is sorted into segments on the British Grand Fleet battle line – the British Battlecruiser Fleet – the Imperial Hochseeflotte battle line – and the Imperial 1st Scouting Group battlecruisers. I will try to show what each of these groups was doing at certain specific times of the battle so you will know what “everyone” was up to. Now -- let’s turn to “literary license”. “History” is not just names, dates, and numbers. It could be a high school project paper, a college term paper, a PHD thesis, a reference work, or a “narrative history” – with the writing shaped to the needs of the given work. I will tell you, frankly – each author brings their own view on the subject matter. Six different authors will produce six different views on any given subject. Case in point: many authors will tell you Erwin Rommel was a tactical and strategic genius – others will tell you he was erratic, impulsive, and ineffective. What some writers consider to be accepted historical fact – others will dispute – and produce their own view of those accepted historical facts. My treatment of the Battle of Jutland is no different. While I accept certain aspects of the battle as “hard fact” – other parts are my own particular viewpoint. In many cases, we cannot know what was in the mind of Admiral Tirpitz when he insisted on certain design and tactical aspects of the battlecruisers. And we cannot know, for certain, what was in Admiral Scheer’s mind on that fateful afternoon. But where recorded fact is absent, we may – through the use of logic and available data – extrapolate a more plausible reasoning behind their actions. I have attempted to do that in instances where there is no “accepted fact” or where the facts stated by the participants do not match with their actions. Where the narrative differs from the written word -- it is MY viewpoint – based on logic, human nature, and the physical and political conditions under which they fought. I have also taken the liberty to “call out” the various parties who indulged in “propaganda” -- or “self promotion” to make themselves look better at the expense of others. Having said all of that, I hope you will enjoy reading…... Chapter 26: THE BEST LAID PLANS In January 1916, Vizeadmiral Hugo von Pohl was forced to relinquish command of the Hochseeflotte due to advanced liver cancer (he died within a month of stepping down). Vizeadmiral Reinhard Scheer was chosen as the new Flottenchef. He was of the opinion the fleet had never been handled properly. Scheer knew he had better ships than the British – his men were just as eager for battle as his enemy – and he was inclined toward a more aggressive strategy. But Scheer was also a practical man. With only 27 capital ships he could not possibly engage 37 British capital ships in a straight-up slugging match. Consequently he fell back on the already standard policy of “tip and run raids”. The idea was to cause a public outcry in Britain by bombarding seaside targets -- thereby forcing the Royal Navy to send capital ships in response. Because of their high speed, it was only logical for Scheer to use the Panzerkreuzer as the bombardment group – and the bait for the trap. The Royal Navy, with centuries of aggressive tradition, would also send fast battlecruisers to intercept the raid. Von Hipper’s 1st Scouting Group would then lure the British over the horizon to be ambushed and destroyed by the massed guns of the Hochseeflotte. By this process, the Oberkommando der Marine hoped to whittle down the Grand Fleet to the point where an engagement might become practical. But these raids had not proven particularly successful in the past. Sometimes there was little response to the raids -- and on one occasion, Hipper’s battlecruisers were, themselves, ambushed and nearly destroyed. But more often than not, the German ambushes failed because the Flottenchef “got the wind up”. The battle squadrons of the Hochseeflotte had been hastily withdrawn before the trap could be properly sprung -- on the mere suspicion the Grand Fleet might suddenly appear. The German fleet commanders were not afraid to engage the enemy, but they were keenly aware an encounter with the bulk of the Grand Fleet could have serious consequences. The loss of even a single German capital ship would only make the disparity in numbers worse. And being outnumbered by the British, nearly two to one, could be catastrophic. A single British dreadnought could fire 100 rounds in a brief, five-minute skirmish. Imagine what could happen if only twenty British ships opened fire. This specter haunted German fleet commanders. Always heavily outnumbered, any one of the Flottenchef could have recklessly destroyed the effectiveness of the Hochseeflotte in a single battle gone badly wrong. The German fleet could have been reduced to a mere harbor guard force – and relieved the Royal Navy of the threat of “the fleet in being”. On a very personal level – no admiral wanted the condemnation of his fellow officers that such a mistake would entail. And the Kaiser had made it quite clear he did not want his battle fleet damaged – so there was always that to be considered. Nevertheless, Admiral Scheer was determined to take the war to the British. He intended to launch frequent raids against British coastal towns and support them with the battle fleet lying in ambush. He increased picket forces in Schillig Roads with the intention of launching attacks on British light forces scouting the German Bight. Scheer wanted increased minelaying operations in the Bight and around the British naval bases, and planned to station submarines off the English harbors in ambush. All of this with the goal of attaining some sort of parity with the Grand Fleet so a fleet engagement might be forced on more favorable terms. When the Admiralstab (German Admiralty) was forced to halt unrestricted submarine warfare in April 1916, Scheer was presented with a golden opportunity. The Flottenchef suddenly found himself with a large number of submarines to deploy offshore of British naval bases. But the British were wary of submarines after nearly two years of war, and mostly kept their capital ships at their moorings rather than swanning about in the submarine infested waters of the North Sea. Scheer would still have to come up with a plan to entice the British warships into his submarine ambush zones. GERMAN PLANNING The Hochseeflotte at their moorings in Wilhelmshaven – circa 1916. The large warship on the left is one of the modern Konig Class dreadnought battleships of the III Battle Squadron. Commissioned August 1914 – 25,796 tons – 21 knots – 10x12-inch guns – 14x5.9-inch guns – 5x20-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 13.8 inches. The battlecruiser Seydlitz had suffered mine damage during the Lowestoft Raid, and while waiting for repairs to complete, Scheer worked out a rather complicated plan. The operation was to include minelaying, submarines, air reconnaissance by Zeppelins, and an ambush operation with the Hochseeflotte. A bombardment raid against the British coastal town of Sunderland was the centerpiece of the mission. This was the most elaborate “ambush” yet planned, and the whole affair was scheduled for 17 May. Unfortunately, in early May, condenser problems surfaced in the battleships of the III Battle Squadron and the operation had to be pushed back to 23 May. THE SUBMARINES Here you see a number of Kaiserliche Marine U-Boats “nested” against a long pier within the naval base at Kiel – but this scene could just as well have been Wilhelmshaven. More submarines were employed in the North Sea than in the Baltic, but the scene would have been virtually the same. On the left side of the pier you see an older, dark-hulled warship from the 1880’s -- “retired” and converted to a repair and maintenance tender. The lighter-toned ship with the gangplank extended is another submarine tender – this one to provide crew berths while the submarines are in port. No sense living in a cramped submarine when you can have a bunk in a “floating hotel”. Ten submarines were dispatched during the first week in May. They were to take up assigned patrol stations in the central North Sea between 17 and 22 May, after which, they would move to allotted ambush positions. Two of the boats, U-43 and U-44, were assigned to the Pentland Firth, a particularly treacherous stretch of water between Scotland and the Orkney Islands – the entrance to the Grand Fleet base at Scapa Flow. The currents could run as fast as 30 knots and were difficult for submarines – but if the Grand Fleet sortied, they would have to pass the submarines. The remainder of the U-boats were positioned around the Firth of Forth to catch the British Battlecruiser Fleet when it departed its base at Rosyth. Each boat had its own patrol area, allowing free movement to prevent detection, but they were under strict orders to avoid being sighted for fear of giving away the operation prematurely. It was arranged for the submarines to receive a coded transmission signaling the start of the operation, when enemy units might be expected to exit their bases. An additional 11 submarines were allocated associated tasks. UB-27 was ordered out with instructions to work past May Island and into the Firth of Forth, while U-47 was sent to patrol offshore of Sunderland prior to the bombardment. On 13 May, U-72 was detailed to lay mines in the Firth of Forth, and on 23 May, U-74 departed to lay mines in the Moray Firth. Moray Firth connected the North Sea to Cromarty Firth, which was the base of the Grand Fleet’s 2nd Battle Squadron. On 24 May, U-75 sailed to lay minefields west of the Orkney Islands, while UB-21 and UB-22 were sent to patrol the Humber River mouth, in the mistaken belief warships were based there. And finally, U-22, U-46, and U-67 were positioned north of Terschelling to act as an ambush screen should the “Harwich Force” attempt to intervene. At first glance, it would appear the submarine deployment had covered all the enemy bases – but events would show otherwise. As all military plans do, this one began to unravel -- as soon as the submarines put to sea. SMS Seydlitz was returned to duty on 21 May, and within hours it was determined she still had serious leaks that had not been fixed. Scheer, to his credit, was unwilling to risk the battlecruiser squadron in an under-strength condition. Seydlitz was returned to the dockyard and the “Sunderland Operation” was pushed back to 29 May. Meanwhile, the submarines had moved to their ambush stations and were experiencing their own difficulties. The English coast was often shrouded in fog – seriously limiting their visibility. The sea conditions were either so calm the slightest ripple from a periscope gave away their position, or, the sea was so rough the submarines were unable to maintain periscope depth without exposing the conning tower. For a variety of reasons, British patrols became aware of an unusual level of submarine activity, and increased their anti-submarine patrols. UB-27 cleared Bell Rock on its way into the Firth of Forth, then suffered engine trouble. After making repairs, the U-boat followed several merchant vessels into Largo Bay, where one of her propellers got tangled in a submarine net, forcing UB-27 to abort the mission and return to base. U-74 was detected by four armed trawlers on 27 May and went down 25 miles southeast of Peterhead. U-72 had to abort her minelaying mission when it was found she was leaving a trail of leaking fuel oil. U-75 succeeded in laying her minefields west of the Orkney Islands, and though they played no part in the Battle Of Jutland, they did claim a significant victim. On 5 June 1916, the British Secretary Of State for War, Field Marshal Lord Kitchener, 1st Earl Kitchener of Khartoum, boarded the armored cruiser HMS Hampshire and sailed for the Russian port of Arkhangelsk -- on a diplomatic mission to the Romanov Court. Around 19:30, in the teeth of a Force 9 gale, Hampshire struck one of U-75’s mines and went down in 18 minutes. The official losses are stated as 737 men, with 12 survivors. Lord Kitchener was last seen on the quarter deck – his body was never recovered. This could very well be one of the U-Boats on patrol in the Pentland Firth. The waters of the North Atlantic and the North Sea met in the firth and set up shifting cross-currents and miserable conditions for the small submarines of that era. Gales were common and rough seas were considered “normal” weather. Fog and haze regularly limited visibility, and the huge rolling breakers often obscured what could be seen from the conning tower of a low-lying submarine. THE ZEPPELINS This is the dreadnought battleship SMS Thuringen at anchor in the Jade Estuary with one of the Imperial airships passing overhead – circa 1913. By 1916, the Imperial Naval Air Service operated a fleet of large airships built by Luftschiffbau Zeppelin -- often referred to by the general term “Zeppelins”. Several airships were operated in the Baltic Sea, but some 15 large airships were based out of Tondern and Cuxhaven for operations in the North Sea. They were commonly used for bombing raids – mostly against English naval bases – and even targeted the occasional ship they came across. But they are usually linked to the more infamous business of bombing English cities in the later stages of the war. (Imperial Army airships carried out the majority of those raids, while the naval airships performed only 50 bombing raids -- but over 1,000 reconnaissance missions.) Their chief duty, as far as the Kaiserliche Marine was concerned – and their first priority -- was air reconnaissance over the North Sea, and especially the German Bight. The airships were much better suited to long flights over areas where it was not safe to risk weak scouting forces, and unwise to send small groups of capital ships. The airships were capable of spotting units of the Royal Navy at great distances and giving the Hochseeflotte sufficient advance warning and details of enemy strength. The Flottenchef could then decide to engage or retire, based on his strategic goals and tactical situation. It was decidedly better than groups of opposing cruisers blundering about in the mist-shrouded North Sea – when it worked. The “down side” to Zeppelins was that they were entirely at the mercy of the wind and weather. Airships could easily be destroyed by high winds, and a heavy rain could actually add weight to the outer skin – slowing their speed, reducing their altitude, and increasing fuel consumption. At higher altitudes, “icing” could cause serious problems and, much like sailing ships, going against the wind was difficult. If the wind was strong, or came from the wrong direction, the Zeppelins remained grounded. Scheer’s planned Sunderland Operation intended to deploy two Zeppelins to bomb the town immediately before the bombardment. With their bombs gone, the airships were to spread out offshore and search north along the English coast. Other Zeppelins would search farther north for Beatty’s Battlecruiser Fleet and the Grand Fleet, while one more would keep an eye on the Harwich Force. Unfortunately, once the submarines were in position, the wind refused to cooperate. By 28 May, a strong north-easterly wind continued to blow, and the airships could not be deployed, so the raid was postponed, yet again. Now the submarines became a problem, because they could only remain on station until 1 June. After that, with onboard supplies exhausted, they would have to return to port. On the afternoon of the 28th, orders went out from Scheer to cancel the Sunderland Operation and an alternate plan was substituted. The new plan had the same basic objective; to lure a part of the Grand Fleet into an ambush, thereby making use of the submarines before their time ran out. The plan involved taking the Hochseeflotte north and sending the battlecruiser squadron into the Skagerrak to interdict merchant shipping between Scandinavia and Britain. Raw materials vital to the British war effort were shipped via the Skagerrak in regularly scheduled convoys. A raid by Hipper’s 1st Scouting Group could easily destroy escorting British cruisers and seriously disrupt trade for a number of weeks, if not months. Once Hipper’s presence in the Skagerrak was known, the Royal Navy would respond, and Beatty’s fast battlecruisers would arrive first. It would be Hipper’s task to lure Beatty onto the guns of the waiting battle squadrons of the Hochseeflotte. Scheer felt this operation would be safer -- closer to German ports -- and airship reconnaissance could be dispensed with in favor of scouting forces. The Hochseeflotte assembled in Schillig Roads on the 28th, and was ordered to raise steam and be ready for action by midnight. At 14:00 on 30 May, the wind was still too strong for Zeppelins, so the final decision was made to use the alternative plan. It was the biggest operation yet undertaken by the Hochseeflotte, and though farther away from British naval bases, it was not without considerable risk. Nevertheless, the coded signal "31 May G.G.2490" was transmitted to the fleet, ordering the Skagerrak operation for 31 May. The pre-arranged signal to the submarines was transmitted throughout the day from the E-Dienst radio station at Bruges, and the U-boat tender Arcona anchored at Emden. Only two submarines, U-66 and U-32, ever received the signal. BRITISH RESPONSE The 1st Battlecruiser Squadron lying at anchor off Rosyth in the Firth of Forth. The famous “Forth Bridge” is in the background. The dockyards of Rosyth are on the other side of the bridge. When the big ships had to pass under the bridge to get to them, the topmasts had to be lowered to avoid crashing into the structure. Right to left – HMS Lion, HMS Princess Royal, and HMS Indefatigable – circa 1915. As mentioned in previous chapters, the British had broken the German naval codes early in the war. The code-breaking unit in “Room 40” of the Admiralty building carried out direction finding, interception, and decryption of German naval signals. Though they could not decipher all signals, and some took longer than others to decode, the staff was keenly aware that any sudden increase in signal traffic from the German flagship (SMS Freidrich der Grosse) indicated an operation was in the offing. Around 22 May 1916, Room 40 began picking up heightened levels of wireless traffic, followed by an intercepted signal on 28 May providing "ample evidence the German fleet was stirring in the North Sea". As further signals were intercepted, some decoded and some not, it became abundantly clear a major operation was likely. At 11:00 on 30 May, Admiral John Jellicoe (commander Grand Fleet) was warned the German fleet was preparing to sail the following morning. By 17:00, Room 40 had intercepted and deciphered the special signal from Scheer to the U-boats -- "31 May G.G.2490" – and that sealed the deal. Action was imminent. With no knowledge of actual German plans, Jellicoe and his staff decided on a response every bit as large as Scheer’s intended ambush. The combined elements of the Grand Fleet would be positioned in a central location – roughly 100 miles west by south of Lindesnes, Norway. This would place the Grand Fleet in a position to cut the Germans off from the North Atlantic shipping lanes, as well as denying them access to the Skagerrak, thereby protecting the Scandinavian shipping routes and denying the German fleet an avenue of retreat. Once the fleet had rendezvoused, the British would either spring the trap, or sweep down the coast of Denmark in search of their prey. THE DIE IS CAST The 1st Division of Jerram’s 2nd Battle Squadron putting to sea from Cromarty Firth. HMS King George V leads the line, followed by Ajax, Centurion, and Erin – 30 May 1916. With steam up, and the crews closed-up at sailing stations, junior officers throughout the fleet stood stiffly on the bridge wings as bands of rain blew in from the northwest. It was not a cold rain, but the darkness all around made it no less miserable. At 23:30 on May 30, the signal lamps flashed and the moored ships cast off from their buoys. Jellicoe was putting to sea early enough to ensure he arrived at the likely point of interception before the Germans. Mist and funnel smoke hung low over the sea as the 16 dreadnought battleships of the 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons, and the 3 battlecruisers of the 3rd Battlecruiser Squadron, steam out of Scapa Flow. Once clear of Hoxa Sound, the warships increased to 14 knots and set course to the ESE. They would shortly link-up with the 8 battleships of Vice-Admiral Martyn Jerram’s 2nd Battle Squadron coming out of Cromarty Firth. Admiral Beatty’s 6 battlecruisers of the 1st and 2nd Battlecruiser Squadrons, and the 4 fast battleships of Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas’ 5th Battle Squadron, weighed anchor and sortied from the Firth of Forth at about the same time. It was Jellicoe’s intention to rendezvous with Beatty’s ships off the mouth of the Skagerrak, near the Jutland coast of Denmark. The first three ships are battlecruisers of the 1st Scouting Group, leading the Hochseeflotte out of the Jade Estuary. The date and occasion are unknown. Lutzow and Derfflinger are leading the line, and the picture was likely taken from Derfflinger’s fantail. Following are Seydlitz, Moltke, and Von der Tann. It can be seen they are altering course to steam out ahead of the battle line. Notice the mist and haze has obscured the low coastline, and the waters of the estuary are smooth as glass. Around 02:00 on 31 May 1916, Admiral Hipper’s raiding force cleared Schillig Roads. The light cruisers and torpedo boats of the 2nd Scouting Group swept down the Jade’s deep-water channel at 14 knots, closely followed by the big battlecruisers. Once clear of the estuary, a half-flotilla of torpedo boats would drop back to screen the seaward flank of the big ships. The light cruisers, their funnels spouting clouds of smoke, strained their engines to reach ahead, where they would take up their advance scouting positions. As the Panzerkreuzer nosed into the rolling swell of the Bight, speed was increased to 18 knots and the squadron steered northwest, then north, skirting the west shore of Heligoland Island via a cleared channel through the minefields. The Hochseeflotte is seen on maneuvers, possibly early in the war. The eight battleships of the III Battle Squadron are leading the line, followed by the I Battle Squadron. The photo was taken from the fantail of a Helgoland Class dreadnought. Note the choppy seas and the funnel smoke drifting to leeward. Admirals had to be careful not to let their own funnel smoke mask the view of the fire control rangefinders. An hour and a half later, Admiral Scheer ordered the Hochseeflotte’s main body to weight anchor and proceed to sea. The advance screen of light cruisers and torpedo boats went first, followed by the sixteen lumbering dreadnought battleships of the I and III Battle Squadrons. They, too, steered northwest from the Jade and would rendezvous around 04:00 with the six pre-dreadnought battleships of II Battle Squadron, coming out of Cuxhaven, on the Elbe River. Historians have given Scheer more than his share of criticism for bringing the II Battle Squadron to Jutland. The first of the old battleships, SMS Deutschland, was commissioned in 1906 – and the last, SMS Schlesien, in 1908. The class displaced only 13,000 tons – half the tonnage of HMS Iron Duke. They were armed with four 11 inch guns – half the broadside of SMS Von der Tann. And their triple expansion engines were rated at only 18 knots. This alone, would impose a serious limitation on the Hochseeflotte’s ability to maneuver. Their liabilities were no secret. Their own crews dubbed them “the five-minute ships” – for they were unlikely to last longer against the powerful British dreadnoughts. During the early planning stages, it had been intended to leave II Battle Squadron behind, as a guard force for the German Bight. And in later years, in his memoirs, Scheer claimed he only agreed to take them at the last moment because Konterdmiral Franz Mauve (flag-officer, commanding II Battle Squadron) had argued passionately to sail with the fleet. Mauve insisted his ships were battle-ready -- and it would be an insult to his ships, his men, and himself, to be left behind when their comrades were sailing against the English. Several historians have actually suggested Scheer may have intended to sacrifice the old ships if things went badly – allowing the modern dreadnoughts to escape, while II Battle Squadron was being shot to pieces. But there is no evidence – then or now -- to support such a notion. The decision to take Mauve’s ships to sea did more credit to Scheer as a man than as an admiral. Scheer had no wish to break the spirit of such brave men – especially in a squadron he, himself, had once commanded. The pre-dreadnought battleships of the II Battle Squadron very early in the war. Not long after hostilities commenced, two of the older Braunschweig Class ships were retired. Note the high volume of funnel smoke produced by the older ships. This would be visible to an enemy many miles away. Forty miles north of Scheer, Hipper’s flag flew at the forepeak of SMS Lutzow, and the Admiral stood on the weather side of the bridge, drinking coffee, and watching the rain and mist mixing with the funnel smoke. With any luck, the weather would clear around 05:00 – daybreak – and he’d have good visibility for convoy-hunting. They might even catch a few British cruisers…… The stage has now been set, and “the play” is about to begin. But first – we should know a bit more about the “players”…… NEXT TIME…… THOSE WHO LEAD BUT – we are not quite finished. Since I could find no way to include game-related pictures on this particular subject matter, we will take another small tour of the Cuxhaven map tile. Below is a shot of the western portion of the Cuxhaven naval establishment (fictional geography, of course). And on the left side, you have an overview of the West Loch anchorage. You have already seen some portions of the lower loch area, but we will focus on the upper portion. I included this “overview” to provide some sort of geographic context. The West Loch was originally intended as an anchorage for the Scouting forces of the Hochseeflotte. As the years passed and the ships became more numerous, the loch became a bit crowded. With the introduction of dreadnought warships in the early 1900’s, it quickly became apparent their larger size could not be accommodated in West Loch. A larger, and more modern facility was constructed on the north shoreline (visible at the top and right of the picture. The new “main anchorage” was much expanded in size, with longer docks and piers to accommodate larger ships, expanded coaling and fuel oil replenishment, and ( for the first time) a dry dock was constructed for the larger cruisers. For our purposes, West Loch was designed to berth the “evolutionary” cruisers of the Kaiserliche Marine -- from the post-ironclad era (late 1880’s), through the armored cruiser period, and including the introduction of dreadnought battlecruisers. This is a view of the northeast corner of West Loch. At the right, you can see the large quay where ship’s stores and various pieces of equipment can be taken aboard. Minor repairs and maintenance can also be accomplished at this quay. (Coaling, ammunition replenishment, or extensive repair jobs, must be handled in the “Main Anchorage” or at the dockyard facilities in Wilhelmshaven.) Directly behind the quays are the warehouses serving them, and across the tracks are more warehouses, work shops, and machine shops. Even small repairs to engines and other machinery often require parts to be cast, machined, and made to order. To the left of the industrial zone is a rail siding where locomotives and rail cars can wait until unloaded, or hauled away if empty. Below that is a tugboat station with a small mooring area for lighters. The quays are modified “battleship docks” from the “PEG SNM Series” of naval lots. “WMP” Seawalls have been added to the piers to make them appear more “turn-of-the-Century”. The “100 ton cranes” on the quay are by “AP”. The long warehouses were borrowed from the “PEG” Seaport lots. The trackside cranes are from the “PEG SNM Dry Dock” lot, and the steam locomotives are “PEG”. Some of the features are “custom re-lotted” in various sizes, while much of the area was put together with 1x1 “custom-made filler lots” of various types. Many of the hundreds of props used to “dress-out” these lots were selected at random from “Lot EDITOR” and are likely available to members on the “STEX” (If they have any interest in industrial zones in their cities). This “detail shot” shows two Emden Class light cruisers “nested” along the quay. They are taking aboard ship’s stores on the odd chance they may be ordered to the Far East on short notice. If ordered to the China Station, they will be moved to the Replenishment Piers to take on fresh provisions. These gorgeous models were provided courtesy of Barroco Hispano. This is one of the two tugboat stations in West Loch. The tug dispatch tower is borrowed from the small Maxis airport. The tug piers are re-purposed from the “Somy Japanese Tug” lot. The Quonset Hut is from the “PEG SNM Series”. The water tower (for fire-fighting) was re-purposed from the Maxis Movie Studio “reward” lot. The roads are Paeng’s Grunge Concrete, and concrete textured lots were “custom-made” as 1x1 filler lots with various activity in progress. Another view of the tug station. This is a “detail shot” of the tugboat models. The white steam tugs were provided by “WolfZe”, and are similar to small harbor tugs of the 1920’s to 1940’s in such places as New York and Philadelphia. The rest of the tugs are the excellent modeling work of “AP”. Left to right is a Midgard Class, a Thor Class, the larger Passat Class, and two Odin Class tugs nested against the seawall. Rather than make them all look alike, we researched dozens and dozens of photos to select individual tugs with the proper “look” and “feel” for their duties and the period. This angle gives you a detailed look at the profiles of the tugs. “AP” put a lot of work into these little beauties. A great deal of detail and custom texturing has been worked into them. These little boats have a very “authentic” look to them – neat and “ship-shape” – but “worn” and “lived-in” as well. Historical accuracy is a good thing – but realism is just as important. At the bottom of the picture you can see a formation of sailors, with other sailors working with Atlantic fenders. The sailors, officers, Atlantic Fenders, and rope coils are all by “AP”. This is a small mooring basin adjacent to the tug station. If room is available, you can park the odd tug, or squeeze in just one more lighter while someone figures out what to do with it. A Sophia Class steam paddle tug stands by while the small boat crews hook up a tow line to the lighter with the red barrels. The Sophia is a diagonal model – part of our goal to increase the number of diagonal models in the game. The large lighter on the left carries powder charges, while the one next to it is carrying ammunition for 5.9-inch cruiser guns. Several of the cruisers in the West Loch may be ordered abroad and will fill their magazines before departure. This view shows the excellent detail on the Sophia Class paddle tug. Coal-fired, steam paddle tugs were common all over the world from the Victorian Era well into the 1950’s. The lighters are moored to wooden structures known as “mooring dolphins”. These are quite common, to this day, in harbors all over Europe (Hamburg, etc) – and in many places along navigable rivers (the Rhine and Main). If you want to see highly detailed, authentic models – just look at “AP’s” lighters and cargo. He has taken a simple barge and turned each one into a world of its own. I have counted 11 separate details on just one of the barges – any of which could have been made quicker and easier by not including them. Just look at the stacked bags in the small lighters – or the odd planks and boxes carelessly left in the large lighter – or the different textures in the bottom planks of the empty one. Marvelous detail, and very imaginative. And this is a close-up of the rail siding. The buildings are re-lotted from SFBT models. The siding with the steam locomotives was re-lotted from “NBVC” oil filling lots and the locomotives, again are “PEG”, modified to have “steam”. One of the boxcar sidings is re-lotted from an NBVC track with assorted cars – the other is a slightly modified triple-siding from “Simmer2”. Note the landscaping around the siding. Heavily wooded slopes on the right, the retaining wall in the center, and the sandy slopes and small hills on the left. All of it has been “painted” with MMP work, while the heavily wooded areas are a combination of custom-made 1x1 tree-filler lots, and MMP work to blend it all together. Very tedious work – but quite realistic. MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful warship models. SPECIAL THANKS to my friend and partner, @AP, for his talents, colorful imagination, and extreme dedication. If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN https://community.simtropolis.com/journals/journal/5910-imperial-dockyards-wilhelmshaven/ SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496

SMS Lutzow -- circa 1916 – at sea in heavy weather. IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 25: SHORT-LIVED AND UNLUCKY SMS Lutzow – late 1915 – at cruising speed. With the laying of Derfflinger’s keel on 30 March 1912, the last of the new “Grosse Kreuzer” authorized under the Fleet Law Amendment of 1906 was under construction. Any future building would have to be done under the terms of the “replacement” clause of the Naval Laws. Under this provision, older cruisers (20 years) could be “retired” or sold for scrap, and replaced with new construction. They would be ordered under the “Ersatz” (replacement) designation. The new “Grosse Kreuzer - 1912” would be ordered as the “Ersatz Kaiserin Augusta” – a replacement for the old protected cruiser commissioned in 1892. (See Chapter 2 for details of the old cruiser.) This ship would be built as a sister-ship to Derfflinger and would be the second ship of the class. While SMS Goeben had been built as a sister-ship to Moltke, that choice was made largely as a matter of expedience. The Design Bureau had been over-burdened with work, and the Kaiserliche Marine could not afford to lose a year in the building race against the British. For “Grosse Kreuzer – 1912”, the reason was purely financial. An 18 March 1911 memorandum from Admiral Rollmann stipulated the Naval budget for 1911 and 1912 only allowed 32.3 million Marks for each battlecruiser. The rising annual costs of new ships had not been taken into account by the original Naval Laws, so any cost overruns would have to be covered by public subscription. The only logical way to obtain a new battlecruiser at least equal to Derfflinger’s power – was to build a duplicate. The Imperial economy was already groaning under the weight of the Naval Estimates, and anything larger, or more powerful, was out of the question. For the first time since SMS Blucher was launched at the Imperial Dockyards Kiel Werft, the contract for the new battlecruiser would NOT be given to Blohm & Voss Shipyards in Hamburg. This was an unusual step and has never been fully explained. Blohm & Voss had acquired considerable experience and skill over the years in building battlecruisers. And it is especially odd since the company had also granted large discounts on the building costs. The contract was awarded to the F. Schichau Werk in Danzig, which had previously built the dreadnought battleships SMS Oldenburg and Konig Albert (as well as several pre-dreadnoughts). There has been speculation that the eastern provinces needed a boost in their employment rate, or that more shipyards needed experience in building capital ships, or even the need to break the Blohm & Voss monopoly on turbine technology by encouraging other yards to build them. Regardless of why Schichau got the contract, “Grosse Kreuzer Ersatz Kaiserin Augusta” was ordered as the SMS Lutzow, and her keel was laid on 15 May 1912 – just six weeks after SMS Derfflinger’s keel laying ceremony. Officials estimated she would join the Hochseeflotte in late 1915. And it’s just as well they chose to build her as a sister to Derfflinger, for the British were pushing ahead with their plans to neutralize the Imperial battlecruisers – any loss in time could have serious consequences. The “fast battleship” HMS Warspite lying at anchor off the naval dockyard of Rosyth, Scotland, while attached to the Battlecruiser Fleet. The Forth Bridge is in the background. She was the second ship of the Queen Elizabeth Class to join the Grand Fleet in March 1915. Displacement 32,590 tons – 24 knots – 8x15-inch guns – 12x6-inch guns – 4x21-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 13 inches. The British already saw the German “Grosse Kreuzer” as a tactical threat to their battle line, but they were focused on the speed and gun power of the cruisers. First Sea Lord Winston Churchill, and his cronies at the Admiralty, knew they would be used for scouting purposes, but they feared the Germans would employ them against the battle fleet (much as cavalry might be employed against an army of infantry). If the German battlecruisers used their speed to get into position across the bows of the battle line, they could concentrate their gun fire on the lead ships and either sink them or force them to turn away. Such a maneuver could throw the Grand Fleet into disarray, resulting in unacceptable losses, and possibly even losing the battle. This was, in fact, what the British feared most, and it was their intention to build a squadron of larger and more powerfully-gunned high-speed battleships to neutralize this threat. (Churchill envisioned two squadrons – the Queen Elizabeth and Revenge classes -- but the naval budget couldn’t support that. The resulting Revenge Class was built with 15-inch guns, but a much reduced propulsion plant – only 22 knots – a significant cost reduction.) HMS Queen Elizabeth, the first of the British fast battleships, joined the Grand Fleet in 1914, and HMS Warspite would go to sea in March 1915, followed by HMS Barham in October 1915 – the same year SMS Lutzow was commissioned into the Kaiserliche Marine. (The following year, prior to the Battle of Jutland, both HMS Valiant and HMS Malaya would join the Grand Fleet – giving the British a squadron of five fast battleships. They would play a critical part in the battle.) The British Admiralty, apparently more interested in speed and big guns than armored protection, placed their reliance on safety in numbers. They continued to build capital ships at a far higher rate than Germany ever could, secure in the belief that when the smoke cleared, the more numerous Royal Navy would be the victor. By the close of 1915, and the first year and a half of the war, Great Britain could count 10 battlecruisers and 3 fast battleships in service. In contrast, Imperial Germany could only muster 5 battlecruisers (SMS Goeben was in Turkish service by that time). Though Germany’s battlecruiser / fast battleships were superior – ship for ship – they were outnumbered nearly three to one. HMS Revenge: 29,590 tons – 21.9 knots – 8x15-inch guns – 14x6-inch guns – 4x21-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 13 inches. She was the lead ship of her class and joined the battle squadrons of the Grand Fleet in February 1916. She made a fine edition to the battle line but was far too slow to keep up with battlecruisers. With such an overriding fear of the tactical employment of the German battlecruisers, the British never seemed to have considered the ships, themselves. Of course they were aware of their high speed, and their big guns were on display for all to see, but beyond that, the British had no hard information. Churchill and the Admiralty Sea Lords naturally assumed with such great speed and a ten-gun main battery, the German battlecruisers could hardly have more armor than their own battlecruisers. They had no idea they would one day be trading salvos with heavily armored “fast-battleships” rather than thin-skinned battlecruisers. It would take the outbreak of war in 1914 to alert the British to the rugged strength and superior design of the German Panzerkreuzer. But it would only be after the war was over that the British learned the full extent of the superior German armor protection. In retrospect, the only real advantage the Queen Elizabeth’s would have were their massive 15-inch guns. Any warship that dared to come within range of them was in serious jeopardy. And the Imperial battlecruisers would have the short end of the stick in this fight – Tirpitz had seen to that. He continued to insist his battlecruisers would only fight other battlecruisers – not dreadnought battleships. Anyone with a logical thought process knows it is impossible to draw such a line. A warship must engage whatever enemy targets it encounters – and in a massive fleet engagement – it is almost certain one of them would be a battleship. The Imperial battlecruisers were faster than British battleships, and their armor was strong enough to withstand damage from the 12 inch and 13.5 inch guns of the Grand Fleet. But the offensive power of the Panzerkreuzer was lacking. SMS Von der Tann was, for various reasons, armed with 11-inch guns even when the British Invincible Class was known to posses 12-inch weapons. To avoid initial construction delays, Von der Tann could have been taken into the dockyards in 1911 or 1912 and re-armed with 12-inch guns. (It would have meant extensive modifications, but there was time for that, and the money could have been found – somewhere.) The Moltke Class should have been designed with 12-inch guns to start with. And when the British switched to the 13.5-inch gun, Seydlitz should have been armed with a 13.8-inch gun being developed by Krupp. German gunnery was excellent – they hit what they aimed at. And bigger shells would have caused much more damage to the British ships. That, alone, could have made all the difference in several major engagements early in the war. But the German battlecruisers were always “a day late and a dollar short” when it came to the guns. They were fast enough – and superbly armored – they simply lacked the broadside “punch”. Here you see SMS Lutzow coaling ship while moored to buoys in the shallows of Schillig Roads. She is on picket duty, but Kapitan Harder didn’t want to risk going into action with nearly empty bunkers. In order to speed things up, coal lighters have been brought alongside either beam of the big battlecruiser. The majority of the crew would be turned-to and the ship’s boat booms pressed into service hoisting aboard cargo nets full of canvas coal sacks. At this point we see the obvious penalty of Tirpitz’ stubborn insistence in clinging to an 11-inch gun long past its usefulness. The 15-inch guns of the British Queen Elizabeth Class could hurl a 1,938 pound shell out to 24,500 yards, twice per minute. The new 12-inch guns chosen for the Derfflinger Class could fire a 915 pound shell out to 17,700 yards, three times per minute – considerably less weight and range than the British. Tirpitz’ out-dated belief that battle ranges would be shorter led to turrets designed with insufficient gun elevation. During testing at the Krupp firing range in Meppin, the SK-L/50 12-inch could fire out to 41,000 yards at maximum possible elevation – a potentially massive advantage over the British – thrown away. Tirpitz and his lack of experience with modern gunnery science, saddled the Kaiserliche Marine with a shell weight half that of the British -- and forced the German ships to close the range by 6,800 yards under fire -- before opening fire themselves! Planning for the British Queen Elizabeth Class started in mid-1911 – approximately the same time as Derfflinger. The German Naval High Command was aware the Vickers Elswick Gun Works had already developed a 14-inch rifle for the Japanese, and though Churchill tried to keep it a secret, word leaked out that a 15-inch gun was under development as well. The Reichsmarineamt should have immediately begun exploring the idea with Krupp – if too late for Derfflinger – then certainly for her follow-on sister-ship Lutzow. But that was not to be. The battleship SMS Bayern would be laid down in 1913 and armed with the new Krupp 15-inch gun. The same year, the Mackensen Class battlecruisers would be laid down and were to be armed with 13.8-inch weapons. In 1915, the Ersatz Yorck Class battlecruisers would finally be designed with a 15-inch main battery – quite literally, years behind the British. But the World War would break out in 1914, slowing or halting construction. Only two of the battleships would ever see service (SMS Bayern and Baden). And the battlecruisers of the Hochseeflotte would go into the greatest naval battle in history – outnumbered and under-gunned. SMS LUTZOW – Derfflinger Class This is an excellent 3-D “cut-away” of the lower decks of SMS Lutzow. Up forward, the top two decks are occupied with Petty Officer’s cabins and large compartments for the crew accommodation. The next deck down shows the Bosun’s Store and Capstan Machinery Room. Below that is the Lower Platform Deck with the Bow Torpedo Flat. Behind that, on the Hold Deck, is the Broadside Torpedo Flat. In the “cut-away” amidships, you can see the two air spaces of the torpedo defense, the passageway, a layer of coal bunkers, the anti-torpedo bulkhead, and then the massive boilers with their uptakes reaching up to the funnels. Behind that, you can see the high and low pressure turbines. Note the very tall “steering guide” mounted at the stem. The keel of the ship that would become SMS Lutzow was laid down in the F. Schichau Werk, Danzig, on 15 May 1912. She would be launched some 18 months later on 29 November 1913 – somewhat longer than it would have taken Blohm & Voss. She was christened in honor of Leutnant-General Ludwig Adolf Wilhelm, Freiherr (Baron) von Lutzow (1782 - 1834). He joined the Prussian Army at age thirteen, fought in the Napoleonic Wars, commanded an Army corps, was wounded twice, and decorated with the Pour le Merite with Oak Leaves. The usual period in the Fitting-Out Basin followed, but it was anything but usual. The Schichau workforce had no experience with the big battlecruisers and things progressed slowly. In August 1914, the war broke out and slowed things down even more. Some of the dockyard work force was called up to serve the colors (unskilled workers), while others were diverted to work on the construction of torpedo boats and submarines – suddenly in great demand. And, if all that was not enough, there was a brutal and hard-fought cruiser war raging in the Baltic Sea. Many man-hours of labor went into repairing mine and torpedo damage, not to mention the gunfire received in close-range skirmishes fought in the foggy narrow sea. SMS Lutzow – profile and deck plan. SMS Lutzow was built as an identical twin to Derfflinger, so there were few differences – some were visible, others were not. Derfflinger’s hull had been composed of sixteen watertight compartments – SMS Lutzow had seventeen. Both of Lutzow’s pole masts were fitted with spotting tops, and the yards – rather than set at right angles – were arranged in and “X” pattern. Both funnels were constructed at equal heights, and both were “half-jacketed”. When completing the detail work at Kiel, the forward funnel was fully jacketed. One significant distinguishing feature on Lutzow was her fourteen 5.9-inch guns mounted in casemates amidships on the battery deck – seven on either beam. In Derfflinger, one gun on either beam was removed to make room for the Frahm Roll-Damping tanks. It was decided the anti-roll tanks were of little value, and the guns were restored in Lutzow. The torpedo armament on Lutzow was different – they were placed in the usual locations, but the tube caliber had been increased to 24-inch with an H-8 type torpedo. Another view of SMS Lutzow coaling ship in Schillig Roads. The only inaccuracy in the battlecruiser model is the way the yards on the fore and aft pole masts are set. On Derfflinger they were set as you see them. On Lutzow they were not set at right angles, but in an “X” pattern – to provide two additional halyards for signaling purposes. One significant difference between Derfflinger and Lutzow was an increase in building costs. Instead of the assumed 56 million Marks paid for Derfflinger – Lutzow cost the Imperial treasury 58 million Marks. This “cost-overrun” could be attributed to several possible reasons: (1) simple inflation – each ship always costs more than the last one; (2) Inexperience in building battlecruisers would naturally lead to higher labor costs – it took much longer to build Lutzow; (3) Blohm & Voss was giving the government big discounts Schichau couldn’t match. Most likely, it was a case of “all of the above”. Twenty months later, on 8 August 1915, SMS Lutzow lay alongside the quay in weak Autumn sunshine with a heavy morning mist hanging close to the surface of the Vistula River. The new crew was arranged on the quarterdeck as Kapitan zur See Victor Harder read the commissioning orders and his orders to take command. He will be Lutzow’s first and only commander. When he finished, three resounding cheers were given as the Imperial Naval Ensign was raised on the mainmast and the commissioning pennant broke at the fore-peak. Lutzow had been commissioned into the wartime Kaiserliche Marine, and the following day she was towed to berth “V” along the Westerplatte. SEA TRIALS Here you see SMS Lutzow moored along the Westerplatte quayside in the Vistula River, Danzig – August 1915. The battlecruiser is coaling from lighters alongside before setting sail for Kiel, where her fitting-out will be completed. Note the crew’s laundry drying on the foremast stays. On 23 August, the new Panzerkreuzer weighed anchor and put to sea on her first cruise – to the Imperial Dockyard, Kiel. With an anti-submarine escort of three torpedo boats – G-192, G-194, G-196 – the small detachment increased speed to 20 knots and steered into the setting sun. At 09:00 the following day, Lutzow made fast to buoy A-11 in the Kieler Hafen. On 26 August the battlecruiser was maneuvered into Kiel’s floating dock to have the 24 inch torpedo tubes installed, and moved yet again on 4 September to the Ordnance Quay where the final pieces of her gunnery fire control equipment were installed and tested. On 13 September Lutzow went to sea for torpedo-firing trials, turning circle tests, and other maneuvering tests – then returned to the dockyard from 26 September to 5 October. On 6 October the new cruiser performed heavy artillery trials and general gunnery drills to ensure the batteries preformed smoothly. These were followed by anchoring and engine trials designed to put the equipment through all possible situations. More maneuvering and engine trials were performed before the cruiser put into the floating dock from 10 to 21 October for adjustments to her machinery. At 08:00 on 25 October 1915, Lutzow cast off and proceeded down the Kieler Hafen for her final engine and maneuvering trials. Around 11:50, the port low-pressure turbine suffered sudden and severe damage and eventual failure. Assisted by two salvage tugs, the new cruiser returned to the Kiel dockyards and began a long period of repair lasting until 2 February 1916. Once the battlecruiser was made fast in the repair basin, the workmen and mechanics lifted the housing cover on the port low-pressure turbine and found extensive damage – a very bad case of “turbine salad”. The mechanics discovered 43 blades and guide vanes had been mangled, in addition to the forward drum labyrinth seal broken, and the aft stuffing box cracked – all of which had to be replaced or mended. The cause of all this damage was also located – the head of a workman’s steel hammer – inscribed with the letters “KWK” (Kaiser Werft Kiel). Accidentally left inside the housing inlet during various machinery adjustments, the hammer had been sucked into the whirling turbine. SMS Lutzow tied-up at the repair wharf. The two Langeoog Class salvage tugs that helped her back to port stand-by. The paddle tug Helena has just made fast the machinists barge alongside the big battlecruiser. The tedious job of inspecting and repairing the damaged turbines will soon begin. Lutzow by “Barroco Hispano”. The buildings on the machinists barge are by “Nob”. The dockside warehouses are from “Mattb325”. The salvage tugs, barge, small boat, and paddle tug are all from “AP”. Subsequently, the remaining three turbines were opened and inspected for damage. The port high-pressure turbine had some blades of the “ahead turbine” damaged by an unknown foreign body, but the damage was minor and could be smoothed out. The starboard high-pressure turbine had insignificant damage to a few blades, but the rear drum labyrinth seal was found to be broken and had to be replaced. The starboard low-pressure turbine had some rotor blades damaged by an unknown foreign body – and several blades and guide vanes were replaced. On 2 February 1916, Lutzow was maneuvered out of the repair basin and shifted to the floating dock where repairs continued until 9 February. Four days later, the battlecruiser was moved to buoy A-15 where lighters were brought alongside and “coaling ship” was carried on for two days, followed by fresh provisions. On 17 February, SMS Lutzow put to sea for her final set of trials and these would mainly focus on testing the turbine repairs, while testing her torpedo shooting, and bringing her big 12-inch rifles to a state of near gunnery perfection. In this view of SMS Lutzow, you can see the sleek lines and low profile of the battlecruiser. The design is uncluttered, utilitarian, and advanced for its time. Lines like these would not be found on warships of other nations for another two decades. OPERATIONAL HISTORY On 19 March, SMS Lutzow was ordered back to her buoy in the Kieler Hafen and made fast just an hour before the 1st Scouting Group arrived from Wilhelmshaven. That evening, Kapitan Harder dinned aboard the flagship with Admiral Hipper and the other ship’s captains. The following day, orders assigned Lutzow to 1st Scouting Group, and on 21 March she put to see with the squadron for torpedo shooting and joint exercises on the gunnery ranges – with battle line training the following day. On 24 March, Lutzow and the rest of the Scouting Group made the transit of the Kaiser Wilhelm I canal, arriving in Wilhelmshaven Roads around 09:52 on the 25th. Soon afterward, a message arrived that enemy units had attacked the German picket forces in the Bight – and Seydlitz, Moltke, and Lutzow weighed and steamed down the Jade channel at 20 knots. Once clear of the estuary, the battlecruisers set course northwest into the open sea. Linking up with Derfflinger, the squadron anchored near Vortrapp Deep lighthouse and set their torpedo nets. Around 01:15 the following morning, the Panzerkreuzer weighed and steamed north, but sighting nothing, they put about. On the way back to the Jade, Lutzow was attacked by the British submarine E-24, but the torpedo passed about 75 yards astern. (Unfortunately for E-24, she would not return from her war patrol.) The squadron returned to Wilhelmshaven Roads and anchored at 20:40. On 31 March, Lutzow, Von der Tann, and a torpedo boat escort put to sea to rendezvous with three torpedo boat flotillas returning from a “sweep” beyond the Bight, and on 2 April Lutzow, Von der Tann, the 2nd Scouting Group, and the 3rd Battle Squadron, sailed in support of another torpedo boat “sweep” of “The Broad Fourteens”, west of the Dutch coast. Lying in Wilhelmshaven harbor, the new cruiser was visited by the Flottenchef, Vizeadmiral Scheer, who spent part of his afternoon inspecting the new cruiser. Lutzow spent the remainder of April on picket duty in Schillig Roads, a turn in the dockyard to have her fire control equipment adjusted, various operations in support of light forces, and even a search for a downed floatplane. Contrary to what many historians contend, the Hochseeflotte did not spend the war hiding safe in harbor while their anchor chains rusted. They were quite active from the very first weeks of the war and continued their operations in the North Sea and the German Bight – even after the Battle Of Jutland -- up until the last few months before the 1918 Armistice. The streamlined and graceful hull form is evident in this picture. Gone are the widely flared and protruding ram bows – no more overhanging deck sponsons – no wing turrets -- and no antiquated “tumble-home” along the sides. The smooth and tested hull form produced a large capital ship capable of 29 knots when pushed. And below, you can see the wonderful detail built into these handsome models. The highly detailed battlecruiser is courtesy of @Barroco Hispano and truly a work of art. The size and massive presence of the gun turrets becomes quite clear in this view – they over-shadow all other features on the deck. The channel marker buoys and mooring buoys are by @AP, as are the tugs and lighters in the picture. They are abundantly detailed and superbly textured works of beauty. Notice the large towing winches on the aft deck of the tugs, the level of detail on the lighters, and even the richly textured coal. In late April 1916, German intelligence and wireless intercepts led the Naval High Command to believe a British force would intrude into the waters of the Bight. Unsure of the enemy strength, Admiral Scheer ordered the 1st and 2nd Scouting Groups to conduct a reconnaissance sweep in the likely areas. At 20:50 on 21 April, SMS Lutzow, Von der Tann, and Seydlitz put to sea with the light cruisers and torpedo boats of the 2nd Scouting Group. Once clear of the Jade Estuary, the light cruisers and one torpedo boat flotilla fanned out in a search pattern ahead of the battlecruisers, while the remaining torpedo boats formed an anti-submarine screen around the big ships. Vizeadmiral Hipper (recently promoted) set course northwest at 20 knots, then altered course due north once clear of Heligoland Island. Around 00:25 in the morning darkness of 22 April, the light cruiser SMS Graudenz struck a mine some 15 miles southwest of Amrum Bank. The light cruiser was damaged, but remained under her own power, and was ordered to return to Wilhelmshaven escorted by four torpedo boats. Hipper’s battlecruisers lingered in the area until 05:20, when Seydlitz reported a submarine. About 20 minutes later, Hipper put about, and the squadron retraced its course without sighting any British warships. Lutzow and Von der Tann dropped anchor around 13:00 in Schillig Roads as “picket ships” while the rest of the force carried on to Wilhelmshaven Roads. On 24 April, SMS Lutzow sortied with 1st Scouting Group on the Lowestoft Raid. (See Chapter 16 for operational details.) During the mission Lutzow engaged a single enemy aircraft off Lowestoft with her 8.8cm Flak guns and brought the plane down with her second shot. Later, another plane approached and the entire squadron opened fire, driving it away. (So much for the effectiveness of early aircraft against warships.) Commodore Tyrwhitt’s Harwich Force arrived on the scene and was taken under fire by the battlecruisers, inflicting severe damage on the flagship, the light cruiser HMS Conquest. The British immediately turned away and retired behind a smoke screen. Lutzow’s secondary batteries also dueled with the escorting destroyers and damaged HMS Laertes. During the bombardment of Lowestoft and Great Yarmouth, and the skirmish with the Harwich Force, Lutzow fired twenty 12-inch explosive shells with half-charges, and forty-one 12-inch explosive shells with full charges – in addition to 168 shells from the 5.9-inch secondary batteries. SMS Lutzow returned to the Jade without further incident. On 26 April 1916, Lutzow went into the dockyard and was “out of action” for some thirty-six hours while repairs were made to the main maneuver valve on the starboard high-pressure turbine. She then returned to a mixed routine of picket duty, escort support for returning naval airships and light forces, “sweeps” into the Bight and off Heligoland Island, and more picket duty. On 15 May, Lutzow was detached for exercises in the Baltic and arrived in the Kieler Hafen the next day. After a two hour lay-over – mostly to drop a mail bag and take on fresh fruit and vegetables – the Panzerkreuzer immediately weighed and headed for the gunnery ranges. Both the main and secondary batteries were drilled and practice fired until darkness closed in. The following day, the big cruiser returned to the ranges for gun calibration and more gunnery practice. On 17 May gunnery drill and practice shooting was resumed at 07:00 with full charges. The Kaiserliche Marine had developed a practice of firing four-gun salvos in rotation – both forward turrets, followed by both stern turrets. This actually saved ammunition while “walking” the salvos onto the target. Once the target was “acquired”, the bow and stern turrets could be fired quickly with only a four-second delay between them. This morning, on the third salvo, the gyroscopic firing gear of “A” turret failed. (This was part of the mechanical computer system used when firing in “director mode”, and received data from Fire Control Central to keep the turret trained on target at all times using “electro-magnetic repeaters”.) “A” turret was immediately switched to “local control” and commands were passed by telephone from “Fire Control Central” to the Turret Captain and gun-layers. Firing continued until mid-day, when Lutzow hove-to so “A” turret could be inspected. The failure of the gyroscopic firing instruments was caused by broken gear axles – apparently shattered by the vibration of the gunfire. This was a unique problem. Derfflinger had the same model turret, but she suffered no such problem, and this one would not go away. Lutzow returned to the gunnery range near Stollergrund on 18 May, and at 09:30 made her first run on the target ship – the old Panzerkorvette Oldenburg. I quote Fahnrich zur See (Ensign) Mardersteig aboard Lutzow…… “We approached the target ship at 20 knots with all guns fully charged and loaded. Commandant Harder gave ‘permission to fire’ and with a single thunderclap, the forward two- turret salvo roared off into the distance. The fall of shot was short. ‘Four forwards’ ordered Gunnery Officer Paschen, ‘Fire!’ The aft part of the ship rumbled as the guns crashed out. The fall of shot was over. Now the target was properly bracketed. The forward turrets adjusted, fired again, and an armor-piercing shell struck the target. The target ship fired a red flare and ‘Cease fire immediately – run concluded’ came through all telephones.” Lutzow had struck the target in textbook fashion – with the third salvo – gyroscope problems notwithstanding. The battlecruiser returned to her buoy in the Kieler Hafen and, as a reward for the crew, Kapitan Harder ordered a special dinner with a fresh-baked strudel for desert – topped-off with Schnapps. SMS Lutzow working up to maximum speed during the Measured Mile run off Alsen Island, May 1916. At 07:00 the next morning, Lutzow weighed and ran out of the Kieler Hafen for torpedo firing practice, and then moved to the “Measured Mile Course” off the island of Alsen. All the aft portholes, armored screens (on the 5.9-inch batteries), and skylights were battened down to prevent flooding over the fantail during the speed trials. Double stoker teams were laid on in the boiler rooms and a full head of steam was raised. The “Speed Trial” flag broke at the masthead and ‘All ahead full” was ordered. The bridge engine repeaters clanged and Lutzow sprang forward like a greyhound unleashed. The four screws dug in as the battlecruiser surged forward and high rollers washed across the fantail nearly flooding the turbine air intakes. It should be noted Lutzow’s speed trial was conducted with the ship in a full “Combat Load” condition. On the run up and back, the average speed was recorded at 27.9 knots – and the Alsen Island course was in shallow water. Had the trials been conducted in deeper water, the hydraulic tank engineers estimated an additional two knots could be achieved – possibly more. There was little doubt on Lutzow’s bridge that she was the fastest warship in the Hochseeflotte and a match for anything in the Royal Navy. SMS Lutzow returned to the Kieler Hafen and spent 20 May coaling, and the crew was given a day of rest on the 21st. The following morning the Panzerkreuzer cast off and entered the Kaiser Wilhelm I canal via the Holtenau Lock, anchoring in Wilhelmshaven Roads around 23:45. On 24 May, Lutzow steamed out to Schillig Roads for a four-day stretch of picket duty, followed on the 28th by a brief ceremony raising Vizeadmiral Franz von Hipper’s flag aboard. Lutzow would serve as flagship, 1st Scouting Group, for the remainder of her brief but eventful career. Later that day, orders came down from Vizeadmiral Scheer for all units to assemble on their buoys in Schillig Roads, to raise and maintain steam, and to be ready for action from midnight. Around 15:30, the big cruiser cast off and steered out to Schillig Roads, making fast to tactical buoy A-5. Most of the following day, 29 May, was involved in making the ship ready for whatever orders were to come. The crew was fed three hot meals during the day, and their regular beer ration was issued, but only part of their day could be considered “a day of rest”. Lutzow’s officers and petty officers went round the ship, checking their stations, seeing to “ready” supplies, medical stores, and sealing watertight compartments that would not be used in the coming days. On 30 May, full watches of stokers and trimmers were detailed to the boiler rooms and the engineering watches were laid-on. Officers and petty officers went about the ship double-checking battle stations while the ship’s galleys laid on three hearty meals with an extra beer ration in the evening. Later that night, officers took the opportunity to shave and change their shirts, for none knew when they might get another chance. Once the squadron had put to sea, their cabins aft would have the portholes sealed, blacked-out, and dogged – and their watertight doors would be closed and sealed against flooding in case of damage. During a wartime operation there would be little sleep for officers – and that was only allowed in the Infirmary. By 02:00 on Wednesday 31 May, 1916, the weather – hardly good to start with – had worsened. Clouds hung low over the sea and belts of rain blew in from the north-northwest adding to the discomfort of the officers and crew closed up at their sailing stations. Hipper stood motionless on the bridge wing, staring into the darkness, a scarf tucked into the turned-up collar of his leather great coat to keep the rain out. The light cruisers and torpedo boats of the 2nd Scouting Group had just steamed down the Jade channel, their wakes still roiling and bright. They would form the advance scouting line for the battlecruisers of the 1st Scouting Group. Hipper turned and nodded to his Signal Officer and Kapitan Harder. The signal lamps flashed back along the line of moored ships and they came to life. Lutzow slipped her buoy and the port turbines roared into operation as she sheered to starboard into the Jade channel. Speed was increased to 18 knots, stirring up the muddy bottom, and Lutzow led the way to the open sea – followed by Derfflinger (Kapitan Hartog), Seydlitz (Kapitan von Egidy), Moltke (Kapitan von Karpf), and Von der Tann (Kapitan Zenker). The next 36 hours would be etched into the minds of thousands of men for the rest of their lives. AND – there I must leave SMS Lutzow, but there will be more of her later. For the moment, we have introduced all the characters. It only remains to present the “play”…… NEXT TIME…… THE BEST LAID PLANS… MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful warship models. SPECIAL THANKS to my friend and partner, @AP, for his talents, meticulous models, colorful imagination, and extreme dedication. If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496

SMS Derfflinger as she appeared when she came out of the repair docks – after the Battle of Jutland in 1916. The veteran battlecruiser underwent a refit and modernization at the same time the battle damage was repaired. The first thing to go was the anti-torpedo net system – they proved useless against modern torpedoes and were a liability in battle. The forward pole mast has been replaced with the distinctive heavy tripod mast and large fire control foretop -- setting her apart from her sister ships. Oddly enough, fewer pictures survive of Derfflinger with her pole mast – most photos show her with the tripod mast – which gave her a legendary profile. IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 24: CHILD OF STRIFE THE DERFFLINGER CLASS SMS Derfflinger in the Fitting-Out Basin at Blohm & Voss Shipyard, Hamburg. The basic elements of the superstructure have already been built, and “A” and “D” turrets have been installed. Notice that her heavy armor belt plate has not been installed and her stem is actually riding high out of the water. The Blohm & Voss floating dock is to the left of the picture. After a somewhat inauspicious start at her launching ceremony, on 12 July 1913, the Blohm & Voss tugs finally worked Derfflinger into the Fitting-Out Basin, and the complicated process was begun. The last connections, ducts, and pipes for the boilers and turbines were installed and the machinery spaces plated over. From the “flush” weather deck up, the superstructure had to be assembled and riveted together – much like building a house – only with half-inch thick steel plates. Each level had to be built up – one deck at a time – installing bulkheads, ventilator shafts, various auxiliary engines and pumps, plumbing and lighting – before it could be plated over to begin the next level. Holes had to be left to fit the armored funnel uptakes from the boilers, and the funnels, themselves. Eventually, the steel structure amidships would rise to a sufficient height and the new battlecruiser’s heavy gun houses would be assembled atop their barbettes so the big rifles could be hoisted into their gun cradles. And, at some point, she would have to be moved into the floating dock so her armor belt could be bolted into place. The work moved along well enough, and was nearing completion when, on 28 June 1914, an assassin’s bullet passed through the neck of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary. Within a matter of hours, the well organized world of the Blohm & Voss Shipyard went into over-drive. The news of the assassination left little doubt that war in Europe had become a very real possibility. SMS Derfflinger would need to join the Hochseeflotte as soon as possible. A reinforced work crew swarmed over the new battlecruiser and temporary lighting was strung along the docks and the warship’s decks so work could continue around the clock. Structures that would have taken a week to build were finished in three days. Teams went throughout the ship inspecting the progress and “finishing” the compartments -- cleaning and painting, and furnishing them with the necessities. Even the anti-torpedo net system, usually installed at Wilhelmshaven after trials, was shipped to Hamburg and installed by the dockyard workers. In a matter of three weeks, the tugs eased Derfflinger out of the basin and moved her to the coaling docks. The battlecruiser took on only 800 tons of coal. The trials – due to wartime conditions – were to be carried out in the Baltic, and the battlecruiser would have to transit the Kaiser Wilhelm I canal. The widening of the canal had just finished, and some of the dredging was still to be done, so capital ships were required to make the trip with a reduced draft to avoid grounding. The Oberkommando der Marine officially issued a directive on 1 August, accelerating the completion of Derfflinger, making her readiness for sea a high priority. (This was a notable exception to their usual tardiness in responding to emergency situations.) A crew was assembled from sailors recently rotated back to Germany from Tsingtao. (Part of an established system to rotate personnel in and out of the East Asiatic Squadron.) The battlecruiser would receive a trained crew made up of experienced, veteran, seamen that had served aboard SMS Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. They were steady and dependable, physically fit, comfortable with shipboard life and discipline, and knew their way around the guns and machinery of a warship. Within hours of stepping off the trains from Wilhelmshaven, newly assigned officers had classified the men according to skills, assigned them to a “watch bill”, and given them a hammock berth. The commissioning commander, Kapitan zur See Ludwig von Reuter, was granted permission to commission the ship ahead of schedule so the pre-trials and acceptance tests could begin immediately. The morning of 19 August, the new cruiser was shifted to the replenishment docks and provisions and ship’s stores were taken aboard (both from the dock, and lighters alongside to speed the process). The following day, Derfflinger was shifted to the munitions pier in Hamburg and a combat load of shells and powder was brought aboard and stowed in the magazines and shell rooms. On 1 September 1914, at high noon, Kapitan von Reuter had the commissioning pennant hoisted at the fore-peak and SMS Derfflinger officially joined the Kaiserliche Marine. The big battlecruiser would never know the peacetime frivolities of “port calls”, state visits, or yachting regattas. Commissioned just a month after hostilities commenced, she was “a child of strife” – born into a war and destined to die in the uneasy truce that followed. SMS Derfflinger with her crew and dockyard workers aboard as she prepares to get underway for trials. You can see the building gantry of the Imperial Dockyards, Kiel, in the background as she waits in the channel for tugs to assist. This is one of the rare photos showing the forward pole mast. SEA TRIALS Just after midnight on 2 September, Derfflinger put to sea from Hamburg, made the transit of the Kaiser Wilhelm I canal, and made fast to buoy A-8 in the Kieler Hafen around 16:00. Pre-trials and acceptance of the ship’s hull, engines, auxiliary machinery, and weapons were begun the next day. Instead of the long ritual of peacetime trials, the pre-trials would be made jointly by the yard officials, builders, and mechanics – as well as the ship’s crew. This move would significantly reduce the trials period – at least, that was the plan. However, on 4 September the battlecruiser was maneuvering east of the Kieler Hafen when a shudder was felt in the ship and the port low-pressure turbine began to make noise. But the trials continued – combat training, compass calibration, transferring torpedoes, boat handling, and munitions handling for the 12-inch guns. On 11 September Derfflinger, running on the starboard engines and assisted by two salvage tugs, entered the Imperial Dockyard for repairs. The housing on the port low-pressure turbine was lifted off, the blades of the third, fourth, and fifth stages were replaced, and the housing closed again – the work taking five weeks. Here we see SMS Derfflinger in the repair basin at Kiel dockyard. In this case a dry dock has been used, but it was not drained in the interest of speeding up the work. The procedure involved lifting off the upper casing of the port low-pressure turbine so the interior works could be examined and repairs performed. All this could be accomplished within the confines of the engine room (that compartment is several decks in height) and did not require removal of any overhead deck plating. Within the picture, you see a wide variety of props and models, many of which have been discussed before. The vast majority of props are already in the game and have either been re-lotted, or re-purposed for use in the Imperial Dockyard Series. This is another shot of the repair basin providing a better view of the quayside activity and a nice broadside view of the battlecruiser. It should be noted Derfflinger is shown in her 1914 configuration with the pole mast forward. On 9 October gunnery practice was carried out, and the following day Grossadmiral Prince Heinrich (the Kaiser’s brother) visited the ship. But during maneuvers on 15 October, damage occurred to the starboard low-pressure turbine – and this time there was a significant vibration when going from “ahead” to “astern”. It was determined that switching from forward to reverse set up a vibration creating a resonance in the blades of the third, fourth, and fifth stages – causing them to strike the guide vanes in between – thereby resulting in “turbine salad” (mangled blades). Repairs to the starboard low-pressure turbine were undertaken, while the port low-pressure turbine was also opened up and corrections made to prevent future damage. The repairs were finished by 9 November and the trials were carried on – wrapping-up on 13 November. The Trials Report was, for the most part, satisfactory – the turbine issues notwithstanding. The Blohm & Voss team had been on hand, quickly diagnosed the problem, and preformed the necessary work to ensure there would be no further difficulties. The ship met all the contract specifications, and the hull, engines, and boilers were all in good condition when the ship was officially handed over. Derfflinger maneuvered exceptionally well at high speed, though (as expected) her low-speed handling was barely adequate. And, as with most big ships, her performance in shallow water effected both her speed and handling. The provision and stores rooms were of sufficient size – though the positioning of the meat locker above a fuel oil cell was criticized and had to be relocated. Overall ventilation was considered more than adequate, though the lack of any wooden furniture (a wartime fire risk) was considered a bit harsh. Strangely enough, the view forward from the conning tower was obstructed by “B” turret, making it impossible for the helmsman to see the bow. The quick-fix was to erect a fourteen foot “steering guide” (jackstaff) at the tip of the stem (much like a tall flagstaff). The bridge also suffered from being too low, and without a clear, all-around, view of the horizon. (One would think the designers could have been more careful.) The machinery preformed well above specifications. Designed for 63,000shp and a speed of 25.5 knots, Derfflinger achieved 76,634shp and 26.5 knots on trials. During operational service, the Panzerkreuzer would attain 28.5 knots when pushed. Her coal consumption was well below estimates and she was calculated to have an operating radius of 5,400 miles at 14 knots. The boiler plant preformed exceptionally well, and it was found only half the turbo fans were required to provide forced-draught to the boilers. The electrical system, over all, preformed well – though the newly designed diesel-powered dynamos required a few adjustments. Gunnery exercises went smoothly, as was to be expected from an experienced and well-trained crew. Handling procedures for the powder and shells were followed to the letter, and the newly designed “1913 Model” gun houses functioned flawlessly. The big 12-inch rifles performed without incident and the new mechanical rammers made shell handling much easier. OPERATIONAL HISTORY At 01:00 on 14 November, SMS Derfflinger weighed anchor and steamed out of the Kieler Hafen bound for Wilhelmshaven via the Kaiser Wilhelm I canal. After a day’s lay-over at the docks in Brunsbuttelkoog to take on provisions, the new battlecruiser dropped anchor in Schillig Roads on 16 November. Two days later, Konteradmiral Hipper (Commander Scouting Forces, Hochseeflotte) came aboard to inspect the ship and was invited to stay for luncheon with the ship’s officers. On 19 November 1914, Derfflinger received orders to join the 1st Scouting Group and was assigned tactical number three (third slot in the battle line). Tactical exercises with the group followed on the 20th, 24th, and 25th, with the intent of integrating the new cruiser into the squadron. With the formalities out of the way, Derfflinger settled into the tedious routine of pulling picket duty in the Jade – and being on short notice for raising steam. At 04:00 on 15 December, SMS Derfflinger weighed and sortied with the battlecruiser squadron on the Scarborough, Hartlepool, and Whitby Raid. (See Chapter 12 for details.) During the course of the bombardment, the battlecruiser fired 203 shells from her 5.9-inch secondary batteries, and the ship was called on to maneuver at a sustained speed of 23 knots for an extended period of time. The following day, while returning to the Jade, the weather took a turn for the worse and the wind howled in from the northwest at Force 8, with a swell at strength 6. Kapitan von Reuter ordered the ship “battened-down” for heavy weather as the big cruiser plowed on through the rising seas at 23 knots on an easterly course. This was Derfflinger’s first test in deep water and heavy seas, and she proved herself an exceptionally seaworthy vessel. Von Reuter had ordered the upper roll-damping tanks filled and the ship’s movements appeared to be slower and less exaggerated than the other battlecruisers. But under combat conditions it was impossible to run “rolling tests”, so the validity of the tank’s performance was never certified. However, the sloshing of the water inside the tanks, and the noise of air rushing back and forth through the air channel, adversely effected the conditions in the nearby wireless transmission room. With the swell coming in on the port quarter of the battlecruiser, a good deal of water was taken over the fantail and even managed to force its way into the secured casemates of the port side secondary batteries – but though spray was thrown to unusual heights up forward, no breakers were taken over the newly designed bow. SMS Derfflinger’s next combat operation came on 23 January 1915, when she weighed and put to sea in the wee hours of the morning as the squadron’s “tactical #3” once again. The weather was reasonably fair and the night clear as they steamed northwest towards what would become the Battle Of Dogger Bank. (See Chapter 13 for details of the action.) Early on, British destroyers closed the tail of the German column around 09:42, and engaged SMS Blucher with gun fire. Admiral von Hipper ordered Blucher to return fire, and von Reuter, eager to get into the fight, sheered Derfflinger out of line to assist – but Hipper signaled her to fall back into column. Around 09:55 Derfflinger came under fire from unidentified ships off the port quarter and immediately responded with eight-gun salvos – switching to four-gun salvos once the target was straddled. The Panzerkreuzer remained engaged until hits were observed on the first two enemy ships, whereupon, they turned away. For twelve minutes around noon, two British destroyers were engaged and turned away under heavy fire from the 5.9-inch secondary batteries. Over the course of the smoke-shrouded “dogfight”, Derfflinger fired 234 12-inch armor-piercing shells, 76 12-inch high explosive shells, and 48 5.9-inch rounds. During the encounter, Derfflinger was struck only once by a 13.5 inch shell (probably from HMS Lion). The shell hit the waterline belt armor directly below the forward funnel, but failed to penetrate the 12-inch plate. Six other large caliber shells fell close alongside, mostly to starboard and port of the fantail. The base-fused shells exploded shortly after impacting the water, sending large shrapnel splinters in all directions. Some of the splinters tore through the lightly armored sections of the stern and caused some minor flooding. Around 19:40 on 24 January, Derfflinger dropped anchor in Schillig Roads and the following day ran into the Imperial Dockyard for repairs – including a stretch in the floating dock to see to the flooding aft. Repair reports indicate the large caliber hit on the belt armor failed to penetrate, but the plate was pushed in about 4 inches, with an indentation about one inch deep, and concentric rings about 6 feet across. The torpedo nets, spars, and brackets were badly damaged, and the outer hull skin below the hit was bowed-in for quite a large area. The starboard wing passage and several coal bunkers were flooded, and some water made it into the boiler room, but the pumps easily removed it. The near misses aft caused a leak in the starboard outer shaft tunnel and sheered or sprung various rivets, resulting in the initial flooding in that area. On 16 February, Derfflinger was pronounced “combat-ready”, and moved to the coaling docks, then took on fresh provisions, before running out to Schillig Roads to begin a long stretch of picket duty. The monotony was rudely interrupted on 11 March by a late-night explosion in the anchorage. The battlecruiser’s searchlights were switched on and it became apparent there had been a boiler explosion aboard the torpedo boat S-35. Derfflinger returned to the dockyard from 21-25 March to have supplemental oil-firing installed in her coal-fired boilers, and she participated in a “fleet advance” on 29-30 March, along with Von der Tann and Moltke. Four days in early April were occupied with training in the Baltic – torpedo shooting, searchlight practice, gunnery practice, night gunnery, battle line training, and acting as a target for torpedo boat training. On 17 April, Derfflinger sortied to cover a minelaying operation carried out by the light cruisers SMS Stralsund and Strassburg – and again in May when mines were laid near the Dogger Bank. In late May, the entire 1st Scouting Group put to sea to escort the auxiliary cruiser Meteor out to sea on a commerce raiding mission. In June 1915, SMS Derfflinger and Von der Tann went to Kiel for training, but Derfflinger was involved in a near-collision with the old pre-dreadnought SMS Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse. (As previously mentioned, collisions between capital ships were a lot more common than you might think.) Due to her poor handling characteristics at low speed, the battlecruiser’s bow suddenly swung to port and came dangerously close to the anchored pre-dreadnought. A collision was narrowly averted, but von Reuter was forced to go “all astern – maximum power”. There was a heavy vibration throughout the ship, and then the starboard low-pressure turbine ceased to respond. Later, when the turbine housing was lifted, it was found the turbine blades and guide vanes had been shredded in the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh stages. It was decided the sudden application of extreme reverse power had set up a fatal oscillation, resulting in turbine failure. The battlecruiser went into the Kiel dockyard for repairs lasting until 26 August. In the following sequence of pictures, we see SMS Derfflinger being maneuvered into the Inner Basin for another round of turbine repairs. Ahead are two salvage tugs towing the big battlecruiser with a third salvage tug on a stern hawser acting as a “brake”. Four harbor tugs (two Passat Class and two Nordwind Class) are stationed close to the bow and stern. Due to the battlecruiser’s known tendency to sheer to port or starboard at low speed -- especially in shallow water -- the four harbor tugs are an absolute necessity. The admiral commanding has private quarters ashore – the white house in the lower left. This is a close-up of the beautifully detailed model of Derfflinger provided courtesy of @Barroco Hispano – and the equally detailed models of the Passat Class tugs (off the bow) and the Nordwind Class tugs (off the stern) – scratch-built by @AP. This is a close-up view of the Langeoog Class salvage tug scratch-built by “AP” for the Imperial Dockyard Series. The model is based on the tug “Foundation Franklin” which was launched in 1918 from John Lewis & Sons Shipbuilding, in Aberdeen, Scotland, as HMS Frisky. She had an active and truly remarkable 30-year career – mostly performing deep sea salvage and legendary rescue missions out of Halifax, Nova Scotia. She was justly immortalized in Farley Mowat’s book “The Grey Seas Under” – which is well worth a good read. And there was many a pint downed in her name when “old-timers” gathered at a tavern. “FF” was about 600 tons and 150 feet in length, with triple-expansion engines generating 1,200shp for a respectable speed of 15 knots. In 1948, she went out in the teeth of an Atlantic hurricane to rescue a large freighter disabled by the storm. She saved the ship and the men aboard her, but was so badly damaged by the storm she was sold for scrap. “AP” has “done the old girl proud” with his detailed and handsome model. She was a truly “great” ship, and I consider this to be some of his finest work. (The model can be downloaded from the STEX – Historic Navies 1900: Volume 17.) Here are three views of SMS Derfflinger being maneuvered into the repair basin / dry dock. Before returning to Wilhelmshaven, Derfflinger carried out trials with a floatplane. The floatplane was maneuvered alongside, hoisted aboard the battlecruiser, and a test cruise taken off the Kieler Hafen. Though the idea of carrying aircraft aboard a warship might have been considered “progressive” in 1915, having to “launch” a plane much like a small boat proved problematic with big-gun ships. Even decades later, carrying float-planes on battleships was not popular with captains. The ship had to come to a complete stop to launch or recover the aircraft, and planes were prone to bursting into flame when hit by shell fragments – causing significant damage and possibly illuminating the ship during night engagements. (Navies would later develop steam operated catapults to launch floatplanes from battleships and heavy cruisers, but the ships still had to come to a complete stop to hoist them back aboard. And – the US Navy was plagued by burning floatplanes during night actions with the Imerpial Japanese Navy in WW II.) The big cruiser arrived back in Wilhelmshaven on 31 August, just in time for Kapitan von Reuter to turn over command to Kapitan zur See Paul Heinrich. The remainder of the year was spent in the usual tasks – picket duty, minelaying operations, maneuvers with Battleship Division 6, fleet maneuvers in October, and the occasional “fleet advance”. In late October Derfflinger and the torpedo boat V-30 carried out a successful ship-to-ship underway fuel oil transfer test. In early November there was a brief training period in the Baltic followed by picket duty in Schillig Roads. Again, in late November, the cruiser returned to Kiel for training, but was delayed when she grounded, hard and fast, near the “Kilometer 29” marker in the Kaiser Wilhelm I canal – largely as a result of her poor handling characteristics at slow speed in shallow waters. Once in Kiel, Derfflinger carried out training in torpedo firing, exercises with torpedo boat flotillas, and several days spent on the gunnery ranges. Having returned to the Jade in early December, the battlecruiser went into the dockyard on the 16th for the final work on her new director fire control system. The installation and “dry testing” of the system lasted until 15 January 1916, when the ship was moved out of the dock. Gunnery trials with the new equipment lasted from 19-26 January and were considered a great success. The year 1916 brought a new commander for the Hochseeflotte, Vizeadmiral Reinhard Scheer, and an increased level of activity. The new commander’s more aggressive attitude was aimed at bringing the enemy to battle – forcing a favorable situation -- rather than waiting for an opportunity. Early 1916 started out with Derfflinger and Von der Tann searching for the missing airship L-19 – a sortie in support of torpedo boat flotillas in action with British light forces in the western Bight – battle line practice – and escorting the auxiliary cruiser Mowe into Wilhelmshaven after a commerce raiding cruise. On 5 March, Derfflinger was with the 1st Scouring Group when the Hochseeflotte made an aggressive combat sweep into the “Hoofden” – an area along ”The Broad Fourteens” off western Holland. No enemy shipping or naval units were encountered by the latitude of Haarlem, so the fleet put about and returned to the Jade. The seaplane tender HMS Vindex – circa 1915: 2,950 tons – 23 knots – 4x3-inch guns – 7 floatplanes. Notice her appearance. She is nothing more than a floating hanger for floatplanes. The floatplanes are hoisted outboard and take off from the water. Upon their return, they taxi up to the ship, are hoisted aboard, and pushed into the hanger. Nothing like the aircraft carriers still 25 years in the future. On 25 March the British launched a raid from the seaplane-tender HMS Vindex against the German airship base in Tondern, but the raid was a complete fiasco. They did not know the correct location of the airship base and bombed Hoyer in error. German seaplanes from land bases attacked the British ships with bombs, and the Harwich Force destroyers HMS Laverock and Medusa collided in the confusion. Medusa was badly damaged and later abandoned. German torpedo boats on duty in the area sparred with the British forces and the light cruiser HMS Cleopatra rammed and sank G-194 – but was, in turn, rammed by HMS Undaunted. With the weather deteriorating, the British forces withdrew (with Cleopatra), but it took Undaunted four days to limp back to port. The Hochseeflotte put to sea in support on the 26th, but arrived in the area far too late to be of use. On 16 April 1916, Derfflinger and her newly commissioned sister-ship, SMS Lutzow, sortied on a search mission looking for a downed aircraft, but found nothing and returned to Schillig Roads without incident. A little over a week later (24 April), the 1st Scouting Group weighed anchor around 10:45 and slipped out of Schillig Roads, steamed down the Jade channel, and made for the open sea. In a matter of hours, Derfflinger would be in action on the Lowestoft Raid. (See Chapter 16 for details.) For most of May 1916, Derfflinger and portions of the 1st Scouting Group made several sorties into the North sea for various tasks – sightings of enemy forces in the Bight – a suspected second attack on the Tondern airfields – and generally making life hazardous for British light forces in the area. From 22-26 May the battlecruiser was in dockyard hands for scheduled maintenance and a bottom cleaning. The pre-dawn darkness of 31 May was hard and forbidding. The wind was coming in from the north-northwest at Force 3 and bands of rain scudded across the big warships anchored in long lines in Schillig Roads. It was 03:00, and the sailors on the big dreadnought battleships of the 1st and 3rd Battle Squadrons were closed-up at sailing stations. The officers on their various bridges had watched through the pelting rain and poor visibility as the 2nd Scouting Group steamed down the Jade channel and disappeared into the night haze on their way to open water. Minutes later all eyes watched – not a few with envy -- as SMS Lutzow, Derfflinger, Seydlitz, Moltke, and Von der Tann swept down the channel at 18 knots, close on the heels of their advance screen of light cruisers. Even in the darkness and haze, the long, low battlecruisers were mighty and menacing. Thick clouds of smoke belched from their funnels and hung close to the water as the bow waves and wakes sparkled bright and luminescent. The big gun turrets, so prominently displayed on their decks, clearly bespoke their purpose. Soon, they would clear the mouth of the Jade and steer north to bring those guns into action off a quiet little corner of Denmark – along the Jutland coast. SMS Derfflinger as she would appear in late 1916. Notice the massive, squat, size of the main battery gun turrets in relation to the rest of the ship. And here you see her with the distinctive, heavy, tripod foremast and the large fire control top that gave her an iconic silhouette. Not only was the Derfflinger Class the largest and most powerful of the Imperial battlecruisers – they were, quite possibly, the most elegant and handsome capital ships ever built. Again – I must leave the rest of SMS Derfflinger’s story for later…… SIDEBAR: Standard Tactical Deployment Of The Hochseeflotte Scouting Forces As Admiral Hipper’s scouting forces steered to the north that day, they were deployed in a standard tactical formation that had been developed over many years – both before and during the war. Lacking reliable air reconnaissance – and with radar still far in the future – the only reliable information about an enemy fleet had to be obtained by cruisers scouting ahead of the battle fleet. Admiral Hipper was in overall command of ALL scouting forces in the Hochseeflotte, while the various “scouting groups” were directly handled by subordinate admirals. Above you see the 1st and 2nd Scouting groups deployed in their “scouting” and “screening” formation. In the lead are the light cruisers and torpedo boats of the 2nd Scouting Group, spread out as a screening force across the bows of the Panzerkreuzer of 1st Scouting Group. The light cruiser screen, steaming in advance of the battlecruisers, acts as a scouting force to locate an enemy force for the battlecruisers to attack – or – they can screen the battlecruisers to prevent enemy cruisers from gaining knowledge of their approach. (NOTE: In all pictures the distance between the various groups, and individual ships, has been considerably reduced in order to get everything into the picture.) This is a closer shot of the advance screen composed of the 2nd Scouting Group commanded by Konteradmiral Boedicker. His force is deployed seven miles ahead of Hipper’s heavy units. There are five light cruisers, from left to right – SMS Elbing, Wiesbaden, Frankfurt (flag), Pillau, and Regensburg. Visibility before the battle began could be anywhere from 12 to 15 miles, and the five light cruiser groups would be “spread out” -- while maintaining visual contact with the next adjacent group. This arrangement would allow Boedicker’s cruisers to visually search an area about 57 miles wide. This is SMS Frankfurt, Boedicker’s flagship, deployed in the center of the search line – making it easier to control the cruiser groups on the extreme ends of the line. Each of the cruisers is screened by a gaggle of torpedo boats from the II and VI Flotillas. The standard flotilla consisted of a “Flotilla Leader” and ten torpedo boats. But wartime losses and repair work inevitably left them under strength. Another view of the Frankfurt group, below. This is a view of the cruiser group on the extreme right of the line. SMS Regensburg is the flagship of Kommodore Heinrich, Commander Torpedo Boat Flotillas. Admiral Hipper was in overall command of both scouting groups, but during battle it was understood he would be busy with other matters. Accordingly, Boedicker would be responsible for the direct command of the light cruisers in 2nd Scouting Group, while Kommodore Heinrich would maintain control of the torpedo boats. It might, at first, seem like a lot of senior officers looking for a job to do – but once battle was joined – it proved a successful division of authority. Below is another view of the Regensburg group. This is the Elbing group operating at the extreme western end of the light cruiser screen. As the light cruiser continues to search, the torpedo boats form an anti-submarine screen around her. (Again – the distance between the cruiser and her torpedo boats would be much greater than in this representation.) Submarines were still relatively unsophisticated weapons and screening destroyers or torpedo boats were usually sufficient to keep them at a distance – where their torpedoes were likely to miss the target. If smoke from an unknown vessel is sighted on the horizon, Elbing’s Fregattenkapitan Madlung would order two of his torpedo boats to peel out of formation and close to investigate the approaching stranger. If it was a steamer, it would most likely be a neutral, and she might be stopped to check her registry papers – then sent on her way. If she carried enemy cargo (contraband), she could either be boarded and sent into a German port – or possibly sunk after removing the crew. If the approaching vessel was a warship, she would almost certainly be British. A brief skirmish might ensue, or it could very well lead to a collision between opposing fleets. Light cruisers and torpedo boats were “little ships” – but they preformed vital scouting and screening functions that could have consequences all out of proportion to their size. Following seven miles astern of 2nd Scouting Group are the battlecruisers of 1st Scouting Group in “line ahead” formation under the direct command of Vizeadmiral Hipper. Leading the line (on the left) is SMS Lutzow (flag), followed by Derfflinger, Seydlitz, Moltke, and Von der Tann. Hipper did not feel the need for complicated or “fancy” sailing formations. He maintained tight control of his heavy ships and knew they were fast enough to preform any maneuver he might wish. In the event the light cruisers of the 2nd Scouting Group encountered a British force, Hipper would immediately alter course and bring the battlecruisers up in support. Screening his Panzerkreuzer ahead and on both flanks were the eleven torpedo boats of the IX Flotilla. This is a closer view of Lutzow and Derfflinger and the screening torpedo boats. You will note there are five torpedo boats clustered around Lutzow – three around the bow, and two more along her port and starboard quarter. This “concentration of force” is deliberate. Attacking submarines invariably launched torpedoes from a position ahead and to one side of their target. This meant the torpedo and the ship were running toward each other – shortening the range and closing more quickly – thereby increasing the odds of a hit. Firing from astern actually gave the target an opportunity to outrun the torpedo. This is a close-up of SMS V-25 alongside SMS Lutzow. The IX Flotilla screening the battlecruisers was composed of “V Class” boats. Early on in the development of torpedo craft in the Imperial Navy, it was decided their primary mission was to operate in support of the battle fleet. This almost guaranteed the German boats would be bigger than those of most other navies, and the design emphasis focused on torpedoes, speed, and seaworthiness. The Royal Navy preferred the gun as their weapon of choice, so their destroyers were equally large, but carried more guns than torpedoes, and were intended to protect the battle line against enemy torpedo boats. This theory was rejected by the Imperial Navy. Employing their torpedo boats to defend against attack was of secondary importance. The German torpedo boats were solely designed to deliver massed torpedo attacks against the enemy battle line. In the Kaiserliche Marine torpedo attacks were considered a primary aggressive tactical tool. Consequently, German torpedo boats carried fewer guns, but usually mounted two or three times as many torpedo tubes as their British counterparts. As demonstrated on V-25, there are only three 4.1-inch guns – but there are six 19.7-inch torpedo tubes carried in two single mounts forward of the bridge, with two double torpedo tube mountings nearer the stern. By virtue of their size, German torpedo boats were more difficult to sink by gunfire, and their more numerous torpedoes made them potentially deadly. Torpedo boat and light cruiser models courtesy of "Barroco Hispano". NEXT TIME…… SHORT-LIVED AND UNLUCKY BUT – as an afterthought – you might like to see how Vizeadmiral Franz von Hipper lives when he’s ashore. Admiral Hipper was born in Bavaria and joined the Imperial Navy at age 18. Known as an active and energetic officer, he was much respected within the Kaiserliche Marine – and his years commanding armored cruisers demonstrated his gift for tactics and love of fast warships. Most of his career was spent at sea, in one capacity or another, and he was most often to be found in his quarters aboard ship. Appointed to command of the 1st Scouting Group in 1913, he was aged 51 when war broke out the following year. Von Hipper inherited comfortable quarters ashore from the previous Scouting Group Commander (Admiral Bachmann) and found the need to rest or work from them from time to time. Life at sea, even for an admiral, can be hard and stressful. The quarters were also useful for entertaining visiting dignitaries, his squadron captains and their wives, and even the junior officers on occasion. Here you see the Admiral’s comfortable, two-story dwelling – large enough to billet his immediate aides and enlisted attendants. There is a comfortable dinning room with an adjacent ballroom for formal occasions on the ground floor -- with just enough room for a kitchen tucked away in a corner. The third floor is partitioned-off for the Staff Officers and enlisted attendants. The second floor holds the Admiral’s sleeping quarters, with an outer officer for the staff officers, and an inner office overlooking the harbor for the Admiral. The building is located on the east side of the ship channel into the Inner Basin, and the Admiral often takes breakfast on the terrace (when ashore). A short distance to the right of the building is the Admiral’s landing where his “barge” (steam launch) is moored. In this shot we see the Admiral stepping off the special train returning him from an Imperial Staff conference in Berlin. The Kaiser was kind enough to provide the Admiral with his private train to ensure his speedy return to his wartime command. After all, when an officer wears the Prussian Order Of The Red Eagle, he must not be kept from his duties. The model of the “20th Century Limited” locomotive is courtesy of Barroco Hispano. (I had to work that into a naval base somewhere. Right next to battleships, I’m very fond of old steam trains.) MANY THANKS – as always -- to @Barroco Hispano for his many beautiful models. SPECIAL THANKS to my collaborating partner, @AP, for his wonderful, models – and all the hard work that has gone into them. If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496

SMS Derfflinger -- circa 1916 – post-Jutland. The distinctive heavy tripod mast was added after the battle. In this unusual photograph, we see the battlecruiser at anchor in Schillig Roads under a heavily overcast sky – possibly a storm moving in from the North Sea. The composition of the picture provides an almost perfect silhouette of the warship – showing her long, low, and graceful lines to advantage. IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 23: THE “IRON DOG” COMETH SMS Derfflinger – late 1914. Her sea trials were a bit unusual in that they were conducted under wartime conditions with fuel and ammunition loads much heavier than normal. Here you see her riding low in the water and at speed. Naval analysts and historians have tried for a century to classify the seven battlecruisers of the Kaiserliche Marine into some sort of cohesive grouping. Most have chosen to assign Von der Tann, Moltke, Goeben, and Seydlitz to a single “class” which, at first glance, is a reasonable theory. All four ships are quite similar in appearance – with the exception of Von der Tann – the FIRST German battlecruiser. With only four main battery turrets, Von der Tann is the “odd-man-out”. Moltke and Goeben were built as “twins”, and the numerical data and visual appearance of the two ships is very nearly identical. But these two were built flush-decked, which set them apart from either Von der Tann or Seydlitz. Finally, Seydlitz, though somewhat similar in design concept to the other three, was different in numerous details – and far more advanced. I have chosen to address this question by listing them as three separate classes -- Von der Tann Class, Moltke Class, and Seydlitz Class. It should be acknowledged that Von der Tann, as the first Imperial battlecruiser, originated the main battery arrangement, the deck layout, the improved propulsion system, and the brilliant armor suite. The remaining three ships, each in its’ turn, was an improvement on that design – Moltke was better than Von der Tann – and Seydlitz was better than Moltke. Had war not broken out in 1914, this pattern of improving each ship over the last would have continued into the foreseeable future (though the budget deficit was becoming a critical issue). In Britain, it was not uncommon to see three, four, or even five ships built in a class. Their dreadnoughts of the battle line were built to a, more or less, standard configuration. (Sort of like the old sailing “ships-of-the-line” – when you got a good design you just built a “flock” of them). And Britain had a ridiculously small army, so the wealth of their empire could be lavished upon the Royal Navy. Imperial Germany could not do that. Their shipyards took between three and four years to build a dreadnought – far too long to compete with England. And Germany simply did not have the economic base to support both a large and well-equipped army, and a technically advanced and extremely costly navy. Tirpitz had gotten the Reichstag to agree to three dreadnoughts and a battlecruiser each year – which sounds fairly competitive. But it was “breaking the bank” in Berlin. Germany’s strong suite in 1914 was its superb army. In 1914, each “tactical army” was composed of anywhere between three and seven army corps. Each army corps consisted of two infantry divisions with associated artillery, light troops, pioneer detachments, etc, etc. The cost of a single battlecruiser would have paid for three army corps. You see the dilemma, here. Consequently, Imperial Germany did not build large numbers of ships in any “class” – but they built each ship better than the last. The idea of “qualitative superiority” was carried to its ultimate expression with the development of the battlecruiser as a “fast battleship”. And Imperial Germany engineered this marvel first. The British claim to have built the first “fast battleship” -- HMS Queen Elizabeth – but that is debatable. (A discussion better saved for another day.) There were other “fast” dreadnoughts – notably, the Italian dreadnoughts and the Japanese Kongo Class – but NONE of the “speedy” dreadnoughts in other navies could compare with the armor protection incorporated into the Imperial battlecruisers. In their balance of guns, armor, and speed, they were far and away superior to their opponents in their ability to fight and survive. But – they had their flaws – as will be seen. GROSSE KREUZER K - 1911 The keel has been laid – circa March 1913 – and the “double bottom” has been plated over in the center, while the hull form continues to expand into the “bilge” areas. Less than two weeks after the contract for SMS Seydlitz was awarded to Blohm & Voss Shipyard (mid-April 1910) the Design Section of the Kaiserliche Marine requested the General Navy Department to set out specifications for the battleship and cruiser designs for 1911. This would allow time to prepare building documents, run formulas, and begin planning sketches. The General Navy Department considered it too early to speculate: firing trials for Krupp’s new 12-inch rifle (destined for the Helgoland Class) had not been completed – a new triple-turret project had just been started by Krupp – and Machinenfabrik Augsburg-Nurnberg (MAN) was developing large marine diesel engines at the Germania Shipyard – all of which could have an effect on the 1911 ships. Nevertheless, Vizeadmiral Paschen (GND) set forth his own suggestions for the “Grossen Kreuzer 1911”… “The new English battlecruisers have been confirmed as mounting 13.5 inch guns, so a battery of ten guns with a caliber increase to 12 inch guns is unavoidable. (My Italics.) The difference of shell weight – 302kg against 600kg – becomes too large. And we must increase our armor protection to allow time for our guns to take effect. The ten 12 inch guns must be placed on centreline, or in the usual diagonal arrangement. Further, we must consider a three-shaft propeller arrangement with the center shaft coupled to a large cruising diesel to provide practical experience with these new engines. And it is my considered opinion that we must re- examine our underwater protection systems in view of the new intelligence concerning English mines and torpedoes.” In this brief statement is the genesis of the battlecruiser that would come to be nicknamed “The Iron Dog” by her opponents. And it is just as well Paschen was thinking along these lines. “Grosse Kreuzer 1911”, once laid down, would likely join the Hochseeflotte some time in 1914. At that point, the Royal Navy would already posses three 13.5-inch-gunned battlecruisers – HMS Lion, Princess Royal, and Queen Mary. And a fourth one, HMS Tiger, would join the Grand Fleet in October 1914. That would give Britain a total of ten battlecruisers. By contrast, the Hochseeflotte would have a total of five battlecruisers – only one of which would mount 12-inch guns (if the option was taken to increase the gun caliber in 1911). HMS Tiger – circa 1914: 28,500 tons – 28 knots – 8x13.5-inch guns – 12x6-inch guns – 4x21-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 9 inches. Often referred to as the “most beautiful warship, ever” -- she is certainly a formidable opponent, but still suffers from thin belt armor – and an “overall” lack of armor protection. HMS Tiger’s “working-up” period was accelerated, ensuring her training was sufficient to allow her to join the Grand Fleet Battle Cruiser Squadron by October 1914. That gave the British five 12-inch-gunned battlecruisers and four more with 13.5-inch guns. (HMAS Australia would be stationed in Australia at the outbreak of hostilities and would remain there until the German East Asiatic Squadron had been dealt with.) This beautiful model of HMS Tiger is courtesy of @Barroco Hispano. While it may be debated as to whether or not Tiger was the “most beautiful warship ever built”, she was certainly the most handsome British battlecruiser. With her superstructure concentrated in a single mass, slightly forward of midships, the uncluttered fore-deck and after deck spaces made her 704-foot length appear much longer and more graceful. Just as a point of reference, her turrets were lettered, bow to stern – “A”, “B”, “Q”, and “X”. Five of her casemated 6-inch secondary guns were concentrated in a compact arrangement on the Battery Deck alongside the superstructure on either beam. A sixth 6-inch gun was mounted on either beam abaft “Q” turret – an arrangement made necessary by the location of the “Q” turret magazines. A close-up showing the compact nature of Tiger’s superstructure. The tripod mast has the forward bridge and command positions built into it, while the armored conning tower and rangefinder is located in front of it, just to the rear of “B” turret. Unlike previous battlecruisers, Tiger’s boiler rooms were arranged together below decks, allowing the three funnels to be grouped close together in the rear portion of the superstructure. This created a visually pleasing arrangement with the impression of power and speed. The turret arrangements for the Lion Class and HMS Tiger were somewhat odd. British designers had not yet devised a suitable method to allow superfiring turrets to fire one over the other. (The blast over-pressure could cripple the gun crews in the lower turret.) Consequently, “A” turret could fire directly ahead, but “B” turret could only fire at a divergent angle to port or starboard off the bow. “Q” and “X” turret, for maximum efficiency, should have been superfiring -- but the main concern here, seemed to be from Royal Navy officers. They were afraid both stern turrets, grouped so closely, could easily be knocked-out with a single salvo. Needless to say, it is odd the design included superfiring turrets at the bow where the same problem might occur. By late 1911, the British had begun to perceive the threat posed by the Imperial battlecruisers. First Sea Lord, Winston Churchill, still unaware of the power and rugged strength of the Panzekreuzer, was seeking a means to neutralize them in tactical combat. Jackie Fisher had retired from the Admiralty in January, but was in constant correspondence with Churchill – and advocated for a big-gun, armored battleship, fast enough to maneuver against the head (van) of the enemy battle line and concentrate their fire against it. That was the official “Admiralty line” when asking Parliament for the ships. But Churchill’s real purpose in seeking a British “fast battleship” was to neutralize the German battlecruisers and prevent them from maneuvering against the van of the Grand Fleet. Churchill’s solution to the tactical dilemma was the five ships of the Queen Elizabeth Class – HMS Queen Elizabeth, Warspite, Barham, Valiant, and Malaya. Queen Elizabeth would join the fleet in December, 1914. HMS Queen Elizabeth: 32,590 tons – 24 knots – 8x15-inch guns – 16x6-inch guns – 4x21-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 13 inches. Purpose-built as a “fast battleship”, she was heavily armored, with massive 15-inch guns. Though capable of 24 knots, she was only 3 knots faster than the battleships of the Grand Fleet, and when “push came to shove” – she was 3 knots slower than the Imperial battlecruisers. The “QE” would be dangerous -- but could be managed. Soon after Admiral Paschen made his thoughts known, State Secretary von Tirpitz initiated meetings with department heads centered around the armament and propulsion of the new cruiser. Opening the first meeting, Konteradmiral Gerdes, chief of the Weapons Department, presented the results of the latest firing trials and performance diagrams of 11-inch, 12-inch, and 13-inch rifles. The collected data and written notes gave a comparative evaluation of projectile effects at long ranges – with an estimated engagement range of 9,000 – 11,000 yards, and an assumed target armor thickness of 10 inches. Gerdes then went on to say he believed the 11-inch gun was no longer adequate -- especially since the new cruiser would be closely involved with enemy dreadnoughts possessing belt armor of 12 inches or more. He also pointed out the proposed move to eight 12-inch weapons would only entail a weight increase of approximately 40 tons – including increased gun house armor. Von Tirpitz, thoroughly fixated on the 11-inch weapon, disagreed. He could not imagine an engagement range of 11,000 yards – and certainly nothing above that. And believed, even at 11,000 yards, the range would be closed quickly to a much more “close quarters” battle. He further stated the much shorter battle range would favor the five 11-inch turrets over the four 12-inch turret arrangement. From everything I have found in this and numerous similar discussions, the stubborn and short-sighted reluctance to increase the gun caliber can be put down to cost and his out-dated notions of a short-range gun-battle. Unquestionably, his reasoning left a great deal to be desired. The eight 12-inch guns in twin turrets could be procured with only a minimal cost increase over the ten 11-inch guns in twin turrets. Konteradmiral Gerdes had shown the numbers on that and shattered the cost objection. Von Tirpitz’ real objection was that he wanted ten guns in five turrets because he believed more guns in more turrets would be harder to disable in a battle fought at less than 10,000 yards. No doubt this stubborn conviction was born in his days as a young Kapitan -- when Dewey defeated the Spanish at Manila Bay and Togo dismantled the Russian Fleet at Tsushima. To borrow a current tactical philosophy – Tirpitz envisioned re-fighting Tsushima with ships that were twenty times more powerful and vastly more advanced. The old Admiral’s mind simply had not moved with the times. He did not seem to have fully grasped the technological advances in guns and gunnery fire control that had made close quarter combat obsolete. Why close to 10,000 yards when your 12-inch guns could score hits at 16,500 yards? And in all the design discussions I found, only Vizeadmiral Paschen drove the point home about the advantages of bigger guns and bigger shells. The bigger gun (12 inch – 13.5 inch) usually had a greater range – but it invariably had a bigger and more powerful shell. A larger, heavier, shell fell with greater velocity and penetrating power – especially armor-piercing shell. Simply put – it had more kinetic energy and could punch through thicker armor. It also had a larger bursting charge and caused more damage. Early in the war British high explosive shells, in particular, used Lyddite as a more powerful bursting filler -- and it caused tremendous internal damage to lightly armored areas (in addition to turning everything a ghastly shade of yellow). Again, Tirpitz never seemed to understand the value of the larger caliber shell – because he thought the 11 inch could do the same amount of damage at the close battle range he envisioned. “Grosse Kreuzer K” – (SMS Derfflinger) as she would have appeared in late 1914. As the lead ship of the last class of battlecruisers commissioned into the Kaiserliche Marine, she was bigger and more powerful than her predecessors. Note how the superstructure is concentrated in the center of the ship, with the remaining deck space largely free of clutter. The Passat and Nordwind Class tugs are nudging her into a berth in the Old Basin. The docks were re-purposed from “PEG” SNM Series battleship docks and bordered with “WMP” Seawalls to give the appearance of timbered mooring points. The docks were created with red brick texture to give the appearance of older docks (rather than newer concrete). The “Union Warehouse” on the left is from “SM2”, while the row-warehouses on the right were borrowed from “Matb325” and were chosen because of their similarity to structures found in old pictures of the port of Hamburg. The handsome battlecruiser is courtesy of @Barroco Hispano. The tugs, sailors, Atlantic fenders, rope coils, spare anchors, and a bunch of other props were provided by @AP. Stubborn to the last, Tirpitz “tabled” the armament discussion and moved on to what he considered the most important topic – the MAN diesel engines. He saw the emergence of diesel engines as a “...real leap ahead of other navies”. Some department heads did not see it that way – and had issues of their own that needed attention. The Design Bureau was more interested in devising a suitable scheme for underwater protection and reminded Tirpitz a change to diesels would require a new three-shaft design for the propulsion system, and a new hull form for the ship’s stern. Tirpitz was aware of the risk of trying an untested technology, and of the possible delays, but if the situation became critical he could always build the new cruiser as a sister ship to Seydlitz. Reverting to the previous design to save time (and money) had already been done with SMS Goeben -- and the technological changes that should have gone into her had to wait an additional year to be built into Seydlitz. And though the caliber increase to 12-inch guns had been requested on both ships, it was denied on grounds of cost and delay. This “dithering” over gun caliber was, in effect, costing Germany the technological edge their superb armor suit had provided. The British were pushing ahead with higher speeds, bigger guns, and marginal armor increases, while Tirpitz foolishly delayed the inevitable. In essence, Goeben, laid down without technological advances – was a “wasted” ship – a year behind the technology curve. And though improved and updated, and a great ship in her own right, Seydlitz without 12-inch guns, was “wasted” as well. Fortunately, the Construction department did not believe a ship with five 11-inch turrets and diesels to be the most advantageous option. The Design Bureau took the rejected studies from 1910 out of the file cabinets and went to work. By the end of May, a design with four 12-inch turrets on centreline had come together, with another one a month later. At this point, Tirpitz gave way on the gun caliber increase, but clung to his diesel engine until circumstances intervened. In early September 1911, MAN Fabrik determined the experimental diesel, though promising, could not yet develop enough horsepower for capital ships. In a later meeting, several changes were debated and agreed upon, but this resulted in a weight increase and the need to compensate by reducing weight somewhere. A reduction in bow armor was suggested, but Chief Designer Hullmann explained……“With a reduction in belt armor thickness on the bow, it should be understood large caliber shells will inevitably strike the ship there. One must then expect the ship will fill with water forward. If the damage is sufficient, leaks will occur that cannot be sealed with the means available onboard. The ship’s outer hull, to which the armor is secured, will undoubtedly leak, and the forecastle ahead of the citadel transverse bulkhead will certainly fill, and could not be kept drained with the means available onboard”. At that point, the notion of reducing the bow armor thickness was dropped. But tragically, Herr Hullmann had demonstrated remarkable foresight. On 15 June 1911, the Construction Department presented design 5-B. In the ensuing discussions, the ship’s silhouette was lowered by moving the casemates for the 5.9-inch guns to the Battery Deck and eliminating the upper deck where they had been. It was decided to install a splinter shield between the guns in the main battery turrets, and the forward conning tower was reinforced. And in an effort to save additional weight, eight of the original boilers were to be changed from coal-firing to oil-firing – thereby making use of their smaller size and weight. On 22 June, His Majesty The Kaiser, signed off on the design. The construction contract for “Grosse Kreuzer K - 1911” was awarded to Blohm & Voss, Hamburg, on 5 September 1911. Along with the new contract came a letter from the Kaiser requesting every effort be made to reduce the construction time from three years to just two. The executives in the Hamburg yard replied they would have no trouble accelerating the hull construction – but Krupp Essen Werk could not possibly produce the required guns, turrets, and face-hardened armor plate in such a short time. In those days, big guns were complicated and took time to cast and assemble, while the face-hardening of armor plate was a time consuming forging process. The final design of “Grosse Kreuzer K” produced a strikingly handsome ship representing the pinnacle of Imperial shipbuilding. Two sister-ships would follow, and there would be future designs – some even began construction -- but none would ever see service. The three Derfflinger’s were the last of their kind -- the final class of Imperial battlecruisers -- and are widely regarded as the best all-around capital ships of The Great War Era. The Panzerkreuzer had long, graceful, lines with a deliberately low freeboard and a much reduced superstructure. Her “Spartan” simplicity makes her, aesthetically, among the most handsome. GROSSE KREUZER K - 1911 “Grosse Kreuzer K – 1911” – profile and deck plan as she would appear upon completion. Note the raised forecastle deck of previous designs has been eliminated in favor of a gently ascending deck, starting at the “A” turret barbette and rising to the stem. This feature allows a flush-deck appearance while using the forecastle peak at the stem to reduce waves taken over the bow. She was completed with simple pole masts, but after Jutland, the foremast would be replaced by an unusually tall and heavy tripod mast with a large fire control top. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS The keel of “Grosse Kreuzer K” was laid on 30 March 1912. She would be launched nearly sixteen months later, on 12 July 1913. At 26,600 tons, her displacement was, roughly, 1,700 tons heavier than Seydlitz. The new cruiser’s hull was longer, at 690 feet, with a new hull form having finer lines, and a redesigned stern configuration. The usual “raised”, forecastle deck forward was dispensed with in favor of the Battery Deck rising gently from “A” turret to the sharp and vertical stem. This shape “cut” through the waves and threw water away from the bow, while giving the battlecruiser a graceful flush-deck appearance. The hull was plated with Siemens-Martin “mild steel” for flexibility and resilience, with a newly designed system of “longitudinal framing”. This system had been in use on commercial ships for more than sixty years, and in 1858 was used by Isambard Kingdom Brunel in his leviathan steamer Great Eastern, but had never been applied to warships. Without going into too much detail, the new system provided a savings in weight while strengthening the outer hull structure. There were sixteen watertight compartments on six deck levels, with a double bottom running 65% of her length. The double bottom and extensive use of internal compartmentalization between watertight transverse bulkheads contributed significantly to her underwater protection. “Docking keels” and bilge keels (slightly lower on the hull) were installed amidships, and anti-torpedo nets were a design feature. The new battlecruiser was outfitted with three, improved, “Frahm” roll-damping tanks to improve stability. The tanks were located amidships on the Hold Deck, Armored Deck, and Upper Deck. Though carefully thought-out, and arranged to achieve the best results, tests during the ship’s trials were inconclusive – just as they had been with Von der Tann. If you examine the profile and deck plan diagrams, you will readily see the efficient grouping and placement of the above-decks elements. The utilitarian superstructure is concentrated around the twin funnels amidships, and between the two superfiring gun turrets at either end. The whole of the superstructure has been deliberately reduced in height, even more so than previous battlecruisers – and the upper deck freeboard was reduced by one deck level – all in an effort to make her a smaller target – with a smaller price tag. You cannot help but admire the symmetry and grace of the big cruiser’s hull lines and form, and the simplicity of the open and uncluttered decks. You will note “C” and “D” turrets are separated by a deck housing. This housing provides a bit of storage for “deck kit” and covers the air intakes for the low pressure turbine rooms below, on the Hold Deck. Tirpitz had always been wary of having the two stern superfiring turrets so close together (battle damage), so this solution provided a degree of safety. All interior decks were steel plated and covered with linoleum, while exterior (“weather”) decks were steel plated with 2.5 inches of Teak planking. The ship’s electrical suite consisted of two Siemens-Schuckert turbo-dynamos and two Blohm & Voss two-stroke diesel dynamos totaling 1,660kw output at 220 volts. As a precaution against battle damage, the turbo-dynamos were mounted above the high-pressure turbines, on the Upper Platform Deck, while the two-stroke diesels were installed to port and starboard on the Hold Deck. As built, the new battlecruiser was equipped with eight 43-inch searchlights -- four each, grouped around the fore funnel and aft funnel. After the Skagerrak Battle, a heavy tripod mast forward replaced the pole mast and two searchlights were moved to the forward legs, while an additional searchlight was mounted in the platform structure of the mast. The new ship continued the extensive “ring” drainage and pump system, with a considerable increase in pumping capacity – a fifth high-capacity centrifugal pump was added on the Hold Deck, aft. In a pinch, portable electric “leak” pumps were also carried, and the powerful condenser pumps could also be used for drainage. The cruiser was equipped with the “standard” two wireless transmitters, three receivers, and as many antennas, with an additional transmitter/receiver installed in the forward conning tower. “Grosse Kreuzer K” would ship a crew of 44 officers and 1,068 men. MACHINERY ”Grosse Kreuzer K” received fourteen coal-fired, Schulz-Thornycroft water-tube boilers. These were the “naval-double-type”, custom-built in the Blohm & Voss Boiler Works to a modified design with four water drums and two steam drums. These more powerful, weight-saving, boilers were first used in Von der Tann. The coal-fired boilers had a total of fifty-six fireboxes and were arranged in the four aft boiler rooms, with each room divided by a longitudinal bulkhead. The new cruiser was also fitted with four double-ended oil-fired boilers as an experimental trial. These would allow the cruiser to raise steam for maneuvering more quickly, could produce a larger volume of steam, avoided problems with inferior coal, and greatly reduced the number of trimmers and stokers in the crew. After 1916, supplemental “oil-firing” was installed on the remaining boilers. Since the ship was designed to carry up to 3,500 tons of coal and 1,000 tons of oil fuel, the protective function of the coal bunkers was not diminished. The boilers fed four sets of Parsons Steam Turbines manufactured (under license) at the Blohm & Voss Engine Works. High-pressure turbines in the forward engine room worked the two outer shafts, while low pressure turbines in the aft engine room worked the two inner shafts. There were reversing arrangements on all four shafts. The forward and aft engine rooms were divided along the centreline by a longitudinal bulkhead. “Grosse Kreuzer K” was designed to generate 63,000shp. The two rudder, tandem centreline arrangement was retained -- each rudder controlled by an auxiliary steering engine connected with a steam-driven spindle drive. In the event of damage, both rudders could be coupled to a single engine, or manually operated. It should be remembered -- the tandem rudders resulted in extremely poor handling at slow speeds – making it virtually impossible to move these ships in harbors or canals without attending tugs. SHIP’S ARMAMENT This is the Krupp Gun Works at Essen – circa 1901. These appear to be 10-inch rifles from that era. The massive armaments works were run by Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach (a close friend of Wilhelm II) and became the chief supplier of guns and armor to both the German Army and the Kaiserliche Marine. The facilities employed some 70,000 workers and supplied weapons to many nations. Prior to 1887, Russia purchased 3,096 pieces of Krupp ordnance, while the Ottomans bought 2,773. By 1912, Turkey had purchased another 3,943 weapons. (The guns guarding the Dardanelles in 1915 were Krupp.) During the same time frame, Romania acquired 1,450 guns – Bulgaria 517 – Greece 356 – Austria-Hungary 298 – Montenegro 25 – and little Serbia, just 6 guns. MAIN BATTERY “Grosse Kreuzer K” finally adopted the 12-inch SK-L/50 (QF) high-velocity gun for the main battery armament. The rifles were mounted in the Drh L-C/1912 gun house which weighed approximately 550 tons. As with all German naval turrets of the period, they had a designed elevation of +13.5 degrees, providing a range of 17,700 yards. After the Battle Of Dogger Bank the turrets were altered and the range increased to 22,300 yards. The gun was capable of firing a 915 lb shell -- either armor-piercing or high-explosive – at the rate of three rounds per minute. Tests showed “capped” armor-piercing shells (base-fused) capable of penetrating 12 inches of armor plate at 14,000 yards. At 16,000 yards, the same shell could only penetrate an 11-inch plate. The high-explosive shell could penetrate before detonating – even on some armored areas. But on unarmored parts, the shell would detonate 2-6 meters behind the point of impact. The gun houses were electrically trained and hydraulically elevated, but could also be operated manually. All turrets were now fitted with 12-foot Zeiss rangefinders, and two gas-expelling fans were mounted on the rear wall of the turret. Due to the increased weight of the new shell and powder charges, manual handling and ramming was no longer possible. A mechanical rammer was installed in the rear of the gun house. The muzzle velocity of 875mps was a bit slower than the 11-inch rifle – but provided a barrel life of 200 rounds. The magazines held 65 armor-piercing and 25 high-explosive shells per gun tube. This is an excellent view of the 12-inch SK-L/50 (QF) high-velocity rifles mounted in a “test” pair of newly designed Drh L-C/1912 gun houses. The new gun was recently accepted for use in the Helgoland Class battleships, and this new variant of the gun house (turret) was created for use in the new battlecruiser. The unusual shape of the sloping roof is clearly visible, while the actual gun house presents a very low profile. (The sloping portions on the side roof would eventually be removed and a new front glacis plate designed before the pattern was approved.) Note the turret height compared to the workman. These are being hand-assembled and tested in the Krupp Turret Assembly Shop before the design is finalized and put into production. Fire Control “ranging and spotting” was handled from the fore or aft conning towers, whose upper floors housed the Fire Control Party operating Zeiss 15-foot stereoscopic rangefinders mounted on the roof. Other, smaller, rangefinders were installed in various locations -- even a crow’s nest Fire Control position and rangefinder was built into the foremast. The control stations were connected to a Central Gunnery Control situated beneath the protective armored deck. Here, the ship’s plotting team received data from the remote stations, calculated target information, and issued azimuth and elevation orders to the “Turret Captains” via telephones or electro-mechanical “repeaters”. SECONDARY BATTERY ”Grosse Kreuzer K” had the standard secondary battery of 5.9-inch guns – the usual SK-L/45 (QF) high velocity weapon. It was an excellent, all-around, complement to the ship’s main battery. The twelve guns were mounted on the Battery Deck, in MPL-C/1906 armored casemates, six amidships on either beam. Unlike preceding battlecruisers, the freeboard had been deliberately lowered in this design to save money and provide a more difficult target for enemy gunners. Consequently, the secondary batteries were too close to the water and were “wet” a good deal of the time. There would be encounters during the war when these guns proved difficult to operate -- but the guns were manned and fought – nonetheless. (See Chapter 17 for specifics on gun performance.) TERTIARY BATTERY Twelve 3.5 inch SK-L/45 (QF) high-velocity guns were provided for torpedo boat defense in the original design. But war experience showed these guns to be useless against modern destroyers, and they were removed. (See Chapter 36 for specifics on gun performance.) During the war, four 3.5-inch “Flak L/45” cannon mounted in MPL-C/1913 mounts were positioned around the forward funnel – two on either beam. They proved of little use during the war since British aircraft were generally unreliable and were, for all practical purposes, incapable of damaging a capital ship. Here we see SMS Derfflinger made fast at a repair dock while the engineering section and dockyard mechanics make repairs to her starboard low-pressure turbine. Unlike the preceding battlecruisers, Derfflinger and her sister-ship Lutzow suffered with frequent turbine damage. Steam turbines were a relatively new propulsion system in the early years of the 20th Century. The turbine was a simple concept on paper, but proved to be a complicated and delicate piece of precision engineering. A very small machining variance could cause no end of trouble. But, it should be noted, no Imperial battlecruiser ever suffered engine failure during a combat operation. TORPEDO ARMAMENT As was customary for the time period, “Grosse Kreuzer K” was fitted with four submerged 20-inch torpedo tubes. They were arranged one tube fore and aft, and one on each beam. Twelve new type G-7 torpedoes were carried. ARMOR “Grosse Kreuzer K”, in common with all Panzerkreuzer, had an extensive armor suite. Having full knowledge the British were now mounting the BL 13.5-inch Mark V/45 – a much more powerful weapon -- the new battlecruiser would have to be armored to withstand these guns. Krupp Cemented Armor, face-hardened with nickel-steel, unlike previous designs, was used more creatively – not just in the “armor belts” and turrets. A new armored plate was employed – a vertical plate – rather than the usual rows of horizontal plates. This formed the main armor belt and took the place of the “citadel” belt as well – so the former two armored belts were replaced by a single, equally large, but homogeneously rolled, “taller” plate. The plate was 12 inches thick on the Main Armor Belt level (amidships) and tapered to 11 inches covering the Citadel Armor Belt above. A separate level above that, the Battery Deck, had a 6 inch belt up to the main deck level, while the 5.9-inch guns mounted there had 3.5-inch casemated shields. In essence, her armor was not only slightly thicker, but harder to penetrate. Due to the differences in the hull form and silhouette, the armoring pattern differed, in certain respects. But with the flush-deck arrangement and considerably lower freeboard, there was actually more armor spread over a smaller area. Reducing her upper-works by one entire deck level early in the design stage not only saved a good deal of money, but was a positive stroke of genius. Imperial German capital ships were consistently built with extensive and unusually thick armor suites by comparison to other navies, but “Grosse Kreuzer K” was very nearly the epitome of the “fast battleship”. (I’m only going into the armoring scheme’s important aspects – see Chapters 15 and 17 for extensive details.) The new battlecruiser was armored throughout with Krupp Cemented Armor, face hardened with nickel steel, and backed with 2 inches of Teak to prevent spalling. Dillingen-Hutte Fabrik provided the structural construction steel. The “protective armored deck”, unlike foreign warships, extended from stem to stern. The main battery turrets were also protected with Krupp Cemented Nickel Steel armor – turret faces 11 inches – sides 9 inches -- and back 10.5 inches – roof 4.5 inches. The forward conning tower was protected by 14-inch armor -- the aft conning tower had 8 inches. The armor scheme was thicker and better arranged, and was, by all standards – impressive. But there were other “passive defense” features. SMS Derfflinger is made fast at her mooring points inside Cuxhaven Roadsted. An Odin Class tug has come alongside with a lighter bearing fresh fruit and vegetables. It would appear the Admiral’s steam launch has hooked onto the end of the boat boom – von Hipper must be staying for dinner. At sea, under combat conditions, the officers and crew would be served coffee, bread, cheese, fruit, and sometimes a hot soup. But in port, full meals could be cooked – usually breakfast, a light lunch, and dinner. Simple math says the nearly 1,100 man crew could consume around a ton of provisions per day – not to mention beer and Schnaps. The small ship anchored outside the breakwater is a guard ship. (The gunboat USS Erie was – provided by Barroco Hispano -- see earlier chapters for details.) The battlecruiser and steam launches are also from Barroco Hispano. The mooring points (modified) are from “Mattb325”. Breakwaters by “Uki”. The motor launch out in the roadsted, small boats, sailors, tug, and lighter are all by "AP". The underwater protection of “Grosse Kreuzer K” was slightly improved over that of Seydlitz – several compartments below the Protective Armored Deck were permanently sealed off to provide the forward part of the ship more reserve buoyancy. (This proved to be a good idea – but was hardly sufficient.) Beyond that, the standard pattern was followed with minor variations. Sixteen transverse bulkheads divided the ship into seventeen vertical watertight compartments and the protective armored deck (at the waterline) further divided several compartments horizontally. Between the transverse bulkheads were the usual numerous subdivisions -- each compartment capable of being sealed against flooding with watertight doors. In effect – the interior of the hull was a “honeycomb” designed to keep the ship afloat in the event of damage. There were exceptions to the system, usually in the engineering spaces – boiler rooms and engine rooms – where the compartments were large, and often two or three decks in height. Following her predecessors, the new cruiser was given a built-in, armored torpedo bulkhead running between the fore and aft barbettes, along either beam. “Grosse Kreuzer K” had well over 90 watertight compartments – considerably more than most foreign warships – and she would be able to withstand a great deal of damage. (See Chapter 13 for difficulty sinking Blucher.) As always, the common coal bunker provided yet another layer of protection on Imperial warships. Like Von der Tann, the Moltke’s, and Seydlitz, the new battlecruiser made extensive use of outboard hull spaces as coal bunkers. (See Chapter 17 for specific details.) “Grosse Kreuzer K” was given the full suite of wrap-around coal bunkers. As a simple solution, coal was cheaper than Krupp steel, necessary to power the ship, and could absorb more destructive energy than a thick armor plate. Though other navies used protective coal bunkers, none were as comprehensive as those found on German capital ships. “Grosse Kreuzer K” was, in its own way, a revolutionary improvement over the first four Imperial battlecruisers. Seydlitz had been built to the same basic pattern as the Moltke’s, but had a greatly improved armor suite giving her a rugged strength that would prove itself in battle. The new battlecruiser inherited all the technology incorporated into Seydlitz and was given an even better armor suite. Her main battery was increased to 12-inch caliber, and for the first time, was centreline-mounted in superfiring turrets fore and aft – providing wide and overlapping firing arcs. Combine all that with her long, sleek, lines – lengthened forecastle – low central superstructure – and low freeboard – and you have all the basic components of the “fast battleships” that would fight a quarter of a century later. Her very appearance bespoke speed and power and, literally, set her apart as a creature of a more modern age. “Grosse Kreuzer K” was fast, rugged, powerful, and an immensely handsome warship. She would prove to be lethal in combat and nearly impossible to sink. As the lead ship of her class, she was the precursor of the three best battlecruisers to serve in The Great War and, arguably, the three finest capital ships ever built – in any navy. And all of that – for the paltry sum of 56 million Marks. On 14 June 1913, after fourteen months on the builder’s slip at Blohm & Voss, “Grosse Kreuzer K” was christened SMS Derfflinger – in honor of Georg von Derfflinger (1606-1695) – governor of Pomerania and Feldmarschal to the Great Elector of Brandenburg-Prussia. Von Derfflinger served Prussia in various capacities for the bulk of his long military career, reorganizing and training the cavalry and artillery branches, as well as being instrumental in Friedrich Wilhelm’s 1675 victory over the Swedes at the Battle of Fenrbellin. With the christening ceremony over, the levers were thrown and the giant hull began to slide down the slipway – and promptly stuck fast. Only three sledges (cradles) had been constructed beneath the ship’s keel and the center one had too much pressure. Another attempt was made on the following tide, but Derfflinger refused to move. Eventually, the center sledge was disassembled, rebuilt, and heavily lubricated – and on 12 July 1913 – the new battlecruiser slide into the waters of the Elbe. Though she had shown some reluctance to “get her belly wet” – she would go on to earn the nickname bestowed on her by her English opponents – “The Iron Dog”. SMS Derfflinger under easy steam – circa 1915. NEXT TIME…… CHILD OF STRIFE MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful warship models. MY SPECIAL THANKS to my friend and partner, @AP, for his talents, meticulous detail, colorful imagination, extreme dedication, and wonderful models. We hope you enjoy them just half as much as I do ! If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN https://community.simtropolis.com/journals/journal/5910-imperial-dockyards-wilhelmshaven/ SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496