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The British Battlecruiser Fleet engaged with Hipper’s 1st Scouting Group – HMS Lion, Princess Royal, Tiger, and New Zealand. The 5th Battle Squadron can be seen far to the rear. IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: dreadnought & AP Chapter 31: RUN TO THE NORTH Vice-Admiral Beatty’s Battlecruiser Fleet was steaming SE at 22 knots, hotly engaged with the Imperial German battlecruisers of the Hochseeflotte’s 1st Scouting Group. The British Admiral had already lost two battlecruisers to enemy fire, but had the overwhelming support of four Queen Elizabeth Class fast-battleships of the 5th Battle Squadron. Heavily armored, with mighty 15-inch guns, they were the most powerful dreadnought battleships in the world. Beatty fully intended to cut off the German squadron’s line of retreat and annihilate it. But the designs of mortal man stand little chance against the whims of “The Gods”. Beatty “the fox-hunter” was about to become “the hunted”. Two wireless sighting reports were received on HMS Lion’s bridge around 16:38 -- almost simultaneously – one from HMS Southampton (Commodore Goodenough) and another from HMS Champion… ”Urgent – Priority – Have sighted enemy battle fleet bearing SE – enemy course N – dreadnoughts in van - my position Lat. 56-34 N – Lng. 6-20 E.” This news came as a great shock to Beatty, and though still engaged with Hipper’s battlecruisers, he immediately altered course toward Southampton’s position. Just five hours ago, he had been informed the German battle fleet was at anchor in the Jade – he needed to see this with his own eyes. Within a very few minutes, the masses of smoke with the long line of battleships beneath came into view. Beatty instantly realized he’d been led into a trap by Hipper. He had to extricate his battered squadrons from certain destruction, and once that was done -- lure both Hipper and Scheer onto the waiting guns of the Grand Fleet. At 16:40, Beatty hoisted the flag signal for a 16 point (180 degree) turn to starboard, “in succession” – then signaled “recall” to his skirmishing destroyers and light cruisers. The big battlecruisers heeled hard over as they swung to starboard at 22 knots, then took up a course NNE. The “Run To The South” was over – but the “Run To The North” was only just beginning. And it was beginning badly. When HMS Southampton sighted the German battle fleet, Evan-Thomas’ 5th Battle Squadron was still eight miles astern of Beatty’s battlecruisers. HMS Barham continued to close the distance, and switched her fire to SMS Moltke, engaging her to great effect. Three certain hits on Moltke were observed, but the Gunnery Officer ordered a switch to the more powerful armor-piercing Lyddite shells, and these were virtually smokeless, so no further hits could be seen. The return fire from Moltke was doing great internal damage to Barham and caused heavy casualties among the crew -- but, curiously, there was little external “scarring”. Beatty relied on flag signals since his dynamos were acting up -- no doubt due to the pounding Lion had received -- and his wireless transmitters were only sending at half-power. Unfortunately, Barham’s Captain Craig could not see the flags. Not only was he trailing far behind the battlecruisers, but the weather had suddenly closed-in and he could hardly see the ships, let alone their flag signals. When Beatty suddenly put-about and headed north, Craig thought they turned to port rather than starboard. He only caught a fleeting glimpse suggesting the German battlecruisers were giving chase and heading north as well. For a few minutes, Evan-Thomas and his staff were puzzled. Was Beatty retreating north with the Germans in hot pursuit? Or were the Germans trying to flee through the Skagerrak to safety in the Baltic? The bewilderment on Barham’s bridge was quite understandable. The battleship’s wireless room had been wrecked, and Beatty had not bothered to repeat Southampton’s sighting report – Evan-Thomas did not even know Scheer’s battle fleet had been sighted. By now, funnel smoke and gun smoke had darkened the sky, and mixed with a steadily thickening mist until it was nearly impossible to tell where the battle was, or where it was going. And so it came to pass that, around 16:48, Evan-Thomas and his four super-dreadnoughts were steaming south at 24 knots, and about to pass Beatty’s battlecruisers steaming north at 22 knots. Just before HMS Barham thundered past, Beatty hoisted the same flag signal ordering a 16 point turn in succession to starboard. Evan-Thomas still hadn’t a clue as to why – but Barham promptly acknowledged the signal. Now “Fate” once again intervened in the guise of Beatty’s hapless flag-lieutenant, Ralph Seymour. Barham waited for the order to “execute” the maneuver. That was standard signaling procedure. When the Admiral commanding wanted the maneuver to begin, he hauled down his signal flags – which was the order to “execute”. Only then, would the receiving ship, or column, begin to turn. As Lion charged past the 5th Battle Squadron, every ship was able to read the flags – because Seymour never hauled them down! In this picture, you see a column of battleships steaming in “line-ahead” formation. They are executing a “16 point turn to starboard in succession”. In the Royal Navy, a “16 point turn” is simply a 180 degree turn, or, reversing course. “In succession” is a bit more complicated. Counting from the rear of the formation (on right) – the 4th ship is about to start it’s turn. The 5th, 6th, and 7th ships are making the turn. And the 8th ship has completed the turn and steadied-up on a NE course. Each ship must, in turn, steam to position #4 to start it’s turn – thereby turning each successive ship in the same spot. (Kind of like racing yachts rounding the same course buoy -- only much more organized). This is an excellent formation for ship handling in large or small formations. It is a simple maneuver, easily executed, and keeps the #8 ship at the head of the formation (possibly the flagship). The maneuver will also work in a sailing formation with multiple columns of battleships. It also helps a commander keep tight control of his ships because it is very “organized” and discourages reckless behavior. However, in Beatty’s particular situation, it was not the wisest choice he could have made (see text below). Notice the width of distance between ship #4 and ship #8. This is the width of the “turning circle” and clearly demonstrates why all ships should be designed with similar turning circles – and as small as possible. Both USS Oklahoma models (ortho & diagonal) provided by @Barroco Hispano. Five minutes may not seem a very long time, but it was long enough to put Evan-Thomas two miles farther along his course, and to put five miles between him and Beatty. To compound the matter, Beatty had ordered a “turn in succession” to starboard – not the best choice he could have made. As seen in the picture above, a “turn in succession” forces all the ships to turn in the very same patch of ocean. Not only does this maneuver take longer to finish, but in battle, it allows an enemy to concentrate their fire on a single spot and pound each ship as it makes the turn. By now, Evan-Thomas was almost out of sight of Beatty’s battlecruisers, and the reason for Beatty’s sudden course change came steaming over the southeastern Horizon – the whole of the High Sea Fleet. III Battle Squadron of the Hochseeflotte – the eight ships of the Konig and Kaiser Classes in the vanguard (van) of the battle fleet. They are seen in line-ahead steaming north to support Hipper’s Panzerkreuzer. (Claus Bergen) Vizeadmiral Reinhard Scheer, Flottenchef of the Hochseeflotte, stood on the bridge of his flagship, SMS Friedrich der Grosse, as she steamed north at 15 knots. Occasionally, he scanned the northern horizon with his glasses. The wireless room had been receiving regular sighting reports from Vizeadmiral Hipper in SMS Lutzow, so he knew he was approaching the scene of action. What’s more, he would have known he was gradually closing the trap on Beatty’s battlecruisers and the accompanying battleships of the 5th Battle Squadron. And – so far – there had been no evidence placing the Grand Fleet at sea in support of Beatty. This was exactly the kind of ambush the Kaiserliche Marine had been trying to pull off for years. The 4th Scouting Group (light cruisers SMS Stettin, Munchen, Frauenlob, and Stuttgart) and their attendant torpedo boats were deployed about six miles ahead of the battle fleet, while torpedo boat flotillas screened both flanks of the battle line. Around 15:50, Friedrich der Grosse hoisted the signal to “Clear ship for battle” and the klaxons sounded the call. Men dashed about the various decks, running and dodging other men as they made for their assigned stations. The reports began to flow into the Central Command Position deep inside the armored hull...”Artillerie clear” – “Torpedo arm clear” – “Boiler room manned and clear” – “Combat dressing station clear” – “Maschinen spaces clear”. Twelve minutes after the call sounded, “CCP” reported to Kapitan zur See Fuchs...”Ship is clear for battle”. SMS Friedrich der Grosse – Kaiser Class dreadnought battleship – commissioned 1912: 24,724 tons – 22.4 knots – 10x12-inch guns – 14x5.9-inch guns – 12x3.5-inch guns – 5x19.7-inch torpedo tubes. Friedrich der Grosse served as the flagship of the Hochseeflotte from her commissioning until March 1917, when she was replaced with the newly commissioned 15-inch-gunned SMS Baden. The Kaiser Class ships were the second-most modern dreadnoughts of the Kaiserliche Marine and served with the Konig Class in the III Battle Squadron. (Model courtesy of Barroco Hispano.) In the picture below, you will notice that her 565-foot length did not provide sufficient distance between the midships turrets to allow for cross-deck firing. Though possible, the firing arcs would have been woefully inadequate. An additional 60 feet would have made all the difference. The detail of the model is superb, but an error occurred in the arrangement of the midships wing turrets. They are positioned properly on the deck, but the turrets are improperly oriented. German capital ships with this “lozenge pattern” amidships, have the starboard wing turret facing forward, with the port wing turret facing aft. Other than this blindingly obvious “boo-boo” – the model’s detailing is accurate and absolutely exquisite. It is so richly detailed – I simply could not bring myself to leave it out of the CJ. (My apologies.) Around 16:11, with the Hochseeflotte just below the horizon from Hipper, Scheer ordered the battle line to close-up and maintain 500 meters between ships. The gun crews in the big, squat turrets stood frozen, waiting for commands, as the officers behind their rangefinders eagerly scanned the horizon. At 16:30, SMS Konig – leading the battle line – signaled...”Enemy in sight – ahead – 28,000”. As Konteradmiral Behncke watched, the haze and battle smoke rose to reveal a scene of organized chaos. To starboard were Hipper’s Panzerkreuzer on a southerly course, closely engaged with two groups of British capital ships to port – quickly closing the range to the Hochseeflotte. Destroyers, torpedo boats, and light cruisers were swirling and clawing at each other between the big ships, while other British light cruisers could be seen approaching to the west. Scheer signaled for 17 knots to close more quickly. Had the German Flottenchef been more critical in the planning stages of this sortie, he could have ordered 20 or 21 knots – the speed of his dreadnought battleships. But the German battle fleet was hampered by the slow speed of the six pre-dreadnoughts of II Battle Squadron. The old battleships (5 Deutschland Class and 1 Braunschweig Class) were rated at 18 knots, but most likely had to struggle just to sustain 17 knots. The slow speed and comparative vulnerability of the pre-dreadnoughts would limit Scheer’s tactical options and automatically give the Grand Fleet a 4 knot speed advantage. At 16:38, SMS Konig’s foretop lookout reported the British turning onto a northerly course, and two minutes later, Scheer signaled the battleship divisions for a 2 point turn to port, to close the range more quickly. He was within just a few thousand yards of closing the ambush and having Beatty under his guns. He then signaled...”fire distribution order...right to left...ship against ship.” And just two minutes later...”Open fire !” SMS Konig opens fire on Beatty’s battlecruisers at 16:48. Note the massive clouds of Cordite smoke. Now you understand why, after two or three minutes, with ten or twenty ships firing, it would be all but impossible to get a clear view of anything. SMS Konig, leading the battle line, opened at 16:48 – her target HMS Lion – but the range was too great and she ceased fire after two salvos. At this point, it should be remembered Admiral Tirpitz had arbitrarily ruled out the possibility of a fleet engagement beyond 11,000 yards. Consequently, many of the German capital ships were capable of no more than 13.5 degrees of elevation – effectively limiting them to a maximum engagement range of 17,700 yards. When taken under fire, HMS Lion was at approximately 20,500 yards – hopelessly out of range. The failure of Tirpitz to grasp the advances in modern gunnery technology (see chapter 23) had led to poorly designed turrets with too little elevation and range. (After Dogger Bank, German battleships began receiving turret modifications to increase elevation and range – but not all had been completed prior to Jutland.) Tirpitz had given the British a “gift” – and Beatty’s battlecruisers escaped from Scheer’s carefully crafted trap. With Beatty steaming north at high speed, still closely engaged with Hipper’s battlecruisers, 5th Battle Squadron held on -- waiting for Seymour to haul down Lion’s signal flags. Evan-Thomas’ battleships were charging down on the entire High Sea Fleet like the Light Brigade at Balaclava – and that simply would not do. The Admiral finally decided to act on “his own initiative”, and signaled his squadron to...“Conform to flagship’s maneuvers”. HMS Barham’s helm went hard-a-starboard and began to turn away from the enemy. Evan-Thomas might have had four of the most powerful battleships afloat – but he was nobody’s fool – he didn’t fancy being outnumbered four-to-one. As 5th Battle Squadron began their turn, the leading German dreadnoughts took Barham under fire, but the range was still too great. However, Admiral Behncke, having missed Beatty’s battlecruisers -- was determined Evan-Thomas’ ships would not get away. On his own initiative, he signaled III Battle Squadron to “...go to utmost speed...everything the engines can do!” The stand-by stokers poured into the stokeholds to lend their muscle, while the engineers opened up the valves on the oil sprayers. Steam pressure in the boilers began to climb and the thick, oily smoke belched from the funnels as the dreadnoughts gathered speed. Suddenly, the tables had turned and Hipper was chasing Beatty, while Behncke was chasing Evan-Thomas. About the same time, German lookouts sighted Goodenough’s 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron approaching from the northwest. Scheer ordered the battle fleet to engage them with the 5.9-inch secondary batteries – to keep them out of torpedo range. Scheer’s dreadnoughts, holding course to the north, continued to close both Evan-Thomas and Beatty. The 5th Battle Squadron had just began to turn away, and the rear of Beatty’s battlecruisers were, actually, still completing their turn. Unfortunately, Beatty’s flag signal had called for a 16 point turn to starboard “in succession” for both groups. That meant the ships had to continue to steam toward the enemy until they reached the appointed position to begin the turn (see picture above). And each ship would have to turn in the exact same spot – while the German battle fleet closed the range. A distinct tactical blunder on Beatty’s part. For the next few minutes, the leading German dreadnoughts (Konig, Grosser Kurfurst, Markgraf, and Kronprinz) fired ranging salvos that fell short. But as HMS Barham completed her turn and steadied-up on a northerly course (about 16:46), she was hit by a heavy caliber shell from Lutzow, penetrating the forecastle deck abaft “A” turret and exploding on the battery deck below, destroying several compartments and starting a considerable fire. As Behncke’s dreadnoughts came into range, a veritable fusillade followed. Around 16:58, another 12-inch shell ripped a 5-foot hole in Barham’s upper deck near the 6-inch casemate battery, before exploding below and ripping a 10-foot hole in the main deck. The blast wrecked the Medical Store and the Auxiliary Wireless Office, with an unusually large chunk of shrapnel penetrating the armor of the lower conning tower. The Platform Deck was also pierced by red-hot shrapnel, starting a fire and filling the 6-inch magazine and shell room with smoke, while disabling two ammunition hoists. Two minutes later, a shell landed on the aft superstructure near the mainmast, taking out several officer’s cabins, starting a large fire, and knocking-out the main wireless station. Around 17:06 a large caliber shell struck the ship’s side in the fantail area, detonating on contact with the main deck and blowing a 7 x 3-foot hole in it, while blowing another hole in the middle deck below. Shell fragments caused extensive damage to the main, middle, and lower decks – starting a large fire that nearly gutted three decks and all the officer’s accommodations. The last shell struck at 17:10, piercing the forecastle deck just forward of the starboard #1 6-inch gun casemate – peeling back the 1.5-inch deck plates, showering the forecastle with splinters, and starting yet another fire. Though still an effective fighting unit, Barham had suffered serious internal damage and taken substantial losses among the crew. HMS Valiant, also turning on the same point in succession, seemed immune to the enemy fire. Though straddled regularly, the decks deluged with thousands of gallons of water thrown up by near-misses, the battleship emerged from the danger zone unscathed. HMS Warspite followed Valiant through the maze of shell splashes – tall water columns erupting on all sides – water cascading down upon her decks – and the thunder of her own guns shaking the ship with each salvo. During the turn to the north, Valiant was hit with three large caliber shells, but the timing was not noted in her log. One shell struck near the stern, punching through the lower strake of the armor belt below the waterline, and detonated after penetrating the aft capstan flat. The blast blew out a bulkhead and flooded both flats on the middle deck. Another shell struck near the stern below the Admiral’s Day Cabin – right on the waterline. This one opened a hole 4 x 3-feet to the sea, and split the hull plates open for some twenty feet – causing even more flooding in the stern. The last shell struck the upper 6-inch armor strake ahead of the starboard #1 6-inch gun and penetrated twenty-five feet before exploding on the battery deck. The blast shattered two compartments and sent large splinters tearing through compartments as far as forty feet away. By comparison, Warspite’s damage was comparatively light. Malaya’s captain, observing the forest of shell splashes ahead, started his turn earlier, but still received the full fury of the German gunners. SMS Von der Tann took Malaya under fire at 17:00, joined by Kronprinz at 17:06, Kaiser at 17:08, and Moltke at 17:27. (SMS Konig, Grosser Kurfurst, and Markgraf were engaging, respectively, HMS Barham, Valiant, and Warspite.) Konteradmiral Behncke’s dreadnoughts had worked-up to 22 knots, but Evan-Thomas’ faster battleships began to pull away to the north. For fully five minutes during the turn, and the following thirty-five minutes after shaping course north, Malaya was the target of the crack gunnery ships of the German III Battle Squadron. Between six and nine salvos per minute rained down around the super-dreadnought. One of Malaya’s turret captains recalled…… “As I trained my turret around to engage over the starboard side, my telescope revealed the battlecruisers some 8,000 yards ahead of us, and it dawned on me that the four of us of the 5th Battle Squadron would now become the sole source of entertainment for the High Sea Fleet...I expected at any moment any one of those shells should hit us in the right place...our speed would be sadly reduced...and we should fall behind and be sunk...” In the first seventeen minutes, Malaya was struck seven times, with the first shell landing around 17:20 and striking the lower 8-inch belt armor abaft “A” turret. The armor was driven in about two inches with the hull plating behind it driven in also – starting several leaks. The second shell struck the roof of “X” turret at 18:27 – detonating on impact. The blast lifted the armored roof clear of the gun house by about three inches, sheered-off many securing bolts, and put the turret’s “local” rangefinder out of action. At 18:30 a large caliber shell struck the superstructure just behind “B” turret and beneath the bridge, blasting a large hole and starting a raging fire. At the same time a second shell, probably from the same salvo, struck the forecastle deck immediately above the #3 6-inch casemate gun. The impact ripped up the deck planking and left a 5 x 3-foot hole before exploding below – taking out forecastle deck beams, shredding several compartments, distorting the deck plating on the forecastle and battery decks, and carrying away voice pipes, electrical leads and ventilation trunking, as well as blowing the 6-inch gun overboard and starting yet another fire. Eventually, all the starboard 6-inch casemate guns were put out of action by the fire and 102 men became casualties. The flash from the resulting cordite fires also shot down into the 6-inch shell room, forcing prompt action to flood the magazine. This act most likely prevented the adjacent 15-inch “B” turret magazine from exploding and destroying the ship. As destructive as that single shell had been, two more followed simultaneously at 18:35. Probably from the same tightly grouped salvo, the two 12-inch rounds struck Malaya in almost the same area, but below the waterline and below the belt armor. The first shell detonated after impact, ripping a 7 x 4-foot hole in the inner bottom, and leaving hull plates and inner frames torn and buckled. The second shell punched a large hole in the outer skin, but failed to explode and passed out through the double bottom creating another large hole. The end result was serious flooding of two outer oil bunkers and several wing compartments, causing Malaya to take on a 4-degree starboard list within ten minutes. A final large shell struck the 6-inch side armor between “A” and “B” turrets, but detonated on impact, driving in the armor plate some three inches and showering a vast area with splinters. The 4-degree list actually effected her main gun elevation and shortened her firing range. HMS Malaya returning fire on the Hochseeflotte approximately 17:35. The fore-top of HMS Valiant can just be seen above the gun smoke. Malaya’s thick armor belt was undoubtedly effective, but in all truth, it was the handling skill of Captain Algernon Boyle that saved her. For very nearly an hour, with double helmsmen at the wheel, he made sudden and random course changes, throwing off the aim of the German gunners. In spite of Captain Boyle throwing the massive battleship around like a destroyer, Malaya’s gunnery -- and that of the entire 5th Battle Squadron -- was superb. The four fast-battleships rained down as many as sixteen salvos a minute on their German opponents. Four of Hipper’s battlecruisers (still in range) and two of Konteradmiral Behncke’s dreadnoughts were hit by the 1,900-pound 15-inch shells. Five hits were made on SMS Seydlitz alone, several of which fell on her lightly armored forecastle deck. The shells penetrated the thin decks and the lighter belt armor forward of “A” turret, exploding below decks and opening the ship to the sea. One shell (possibly from Barham) tore a 10x13-foot hole near the waterline which let in vast quantities of water. When Beatty had suddenly turned north, Hipper quickly swung the Panzerkreuzer to follow, but Beatty had gained several thousand yards. As the German battlecruisers focused on trying to catch him, many of their officers and crew were unaware the shells falling around them were not from Beatty’s battlecruisers – but from the battleships of the 5th Battle Squadron. A few gunnery officers were shocked when the big shells began to fall among them, but the smoke and sudden course changes had confused them. The reality set in with the first thunderous hits of the 15-inch shells and the massive damage they caused. But Hipper knew all he could do was outrun the battleships – he had no intention of letting Beatty get away. As the 1st Scouting Group came within gun range of Beatty, Hipper altered course to close and resumed fire around 16:57. Beatty was now under fire from four German battlecruisers and four battleships (Von der Tann was still firing on HMS Malaya). HMS Lion on fire after several hits by SMS Lutzow. The gunnery duel continued with increasing ferocity. Soon, Seydlitz was struck on the face-plate of “B” turret, and the turret went out of action. After some minutes, they restored one of the barrels to service, but then the hydraulic elevating gear failed and the turret went silent. She was now down to two operational turrets, but took HMS Tiger under fire when she appeared clearly out of the smoke and mist. At least two hits were observed and Tiger’s “A” turret stopped firing. SMS Lutzow resumed fire on HMS Lion, obtaining hits at 16:59, 17:01, and 17:02. SMS Derfflinger took Princess Royal under fire for some minutes, but Kapitan Hartog quickly realized he was under fire from the 5th Battle Squadron and shifted fire onto HMS Valiant. SMS Moltke fired on HMS New Zealand, but deteriorating visibility and smoke interfered with ranging, so the fire was only intermittent. It was around this time that SMS Prinzregent Luitpold opened fire on New Zealand and repeatedly straddled her. There were no hits, but splinters from near misses peppered the battlecruiser like buckshot. SMS Von der Tann was nearest to 5th Battle Squadron and attracting more than her share of attention. Gamely, she fought back – taking HMS Malaya under fire with her one remaining main battery turret. At least two significant hits were observed on Malaya, one at 17:03 raising a great sheet of flame and starting a large fire. Unfortunately, at 18:18, the two guns of Von der Tann’s “D” turret overheated and came out of battery (just as those of “B” turret, earlier). Now Von der Tann had no heavy guns in operation. Kapitan Zenker did not sheer out of line in his unarmed condition, but chose to remain in the battle line and draw some of the enemy fire away from the other battlecruisers. Relieved from the necessity of providing a steady course for gunnery, Kapitan Zenker began “chasing salvos”, thereby avoiding further damage from the enemy. While hundreds of big shells roared overhead, the smoke billowed across the water and blotted out the sky. British destroyers continued to mill about between the lines of battlecruisers. The threat of a stray torpedo attack was very real, and the gunnery officers of the German 5.9-inch batteries continually peered into the smokey, misting turmoil. A destroyer would appear out of the smoke, orders were shouted into hand sets, and the medium guns opened a fast and furious fire. Moments later, the target disappeared back into the smoke – and the game would begin again. Farther astern, Scheer’s battleships were being similarly harassed by Commodore Goodenough’s 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron. The 5.9-inch guns fired well, but the lunging and weaving light cruisers seemed to lead charmed lives. However -- if the British approached too close, they received the unwelcome attention of the battleships’ 12-inch guns – instantly sending them scurrying out of range. HMS Birmingham -- 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron –31 May 1916 -- 17:53 – under 12-inch fire from battleships of the Hochseeflotte. After completing his turn and steering north, Beatty was anxious to get out of range of the German battle fleet and increased speed to 24 knots. He needed to lure the Hochseeflotte into Jellicoe’s trap, but he did not want to lose any more battlecruisers in the process. Beatty quickly left Scheer’s slow battleships behind in the poor visibility. And since Hipper’s battlecruisers were only making 21 knots (to maintain contact with Scheer), it was simply a matter of a few minutes before he lost sight of them as well. And both Beatty and his hard-pressed squadron needed the breathing room. The prolonged gunnery duel with the German battlecruisers had been far more destructive than anticipated. Hipper’s well-aimed and tightly grouped salvos had destroyed two of his ships and severely mauled the rest. Beatty needed time for his crews to put out their fires, make what repairs they could, and tend to the all too numerous wounded. But – even as the British sought a respite from the enemy guns, the conditions of battle were changing in their favor. Hipper’s gunnery, through no fault of the Germans, was beginning to fall off with the approach of late afternoon. As the sun lowered itself toward the western horizon, it no longer shown down on the British warships – but right into the lenses of the German rangefinders. The only thing to be seen through the smoke, mist, and glare of the sun, were the British gun flashes. Even when the smoke and mist cleared, briefly, there was very little of the enemy to be seen. The shift in the position of the sun disadvantaged Hipper, but only relative to Beatty’s position, and only momentarily. But Hipper’s situation was about to get worse -- at 24 knots, the 5th Battle Squadron was closing on the rear of the Panzerkreuzer even as Beatty was leaving them behind. With the British racing ahead, bearing NW from the German battlecruisers, the German angle of fire changed with each minute that passed. Hipper’s ships were still shrouded in mist and Beatty was still lit by the setting sun – but the sun was no longer glaring into German gun-sights at that angle. Outnumbered five ships to four, and with visibility favoring the Germans, Beatty saw nothing to be gained by continuing the uneven contest. To do so would have risked further losses among his depleted battlecruiser squadrons while his own gunnery would be largely ineffective. Oddly enough, Beatty’s reasoning was sound. During the “Run To The North”, the Imperial Panzerkreuzer (Lutzow) hit HMS Lion with four rounds in quick succession, while Seydlitz landed one on HMS Tiger. By contrast, the British battlecruisers failed to score a single hit. Vice-Admiral Beatty swung onto a NNW course, around 17:35, to open the range -- and disappeared into the smoke and mist. As it turns out, disengaging from Hipper was one of the few smart moves Beatty made that day. Scheer, anxious to “bag” Beatty’s battlecruisers, at 17:20 hoisted the signal “General Chase” to allow the Panzerkreuzer to use their superior speed in an effort to turn Beatty back into the battle fleet’s line of fire. And though willing – Hipper was not sure he could comply. His big cruisers had been steaming at high speed for nearly two hours, rotating stokers in and out of the stokeholds, and shoveling tons and tons of coal into the fireboxes. Not only were the stokers beginning to show signs of exhaustion, but the poor quality of coal was now effecting the speed of the ships. As more and more coal was shoveled into the fireboxes, the quantity of un-burnt “clinkers” rose dramatically. A “clinker” is, simply put, a non-burnable mineral object mixed into the coal – such as too much stone in the mix. Or – a clinker can result from mineral-laden coal ash that melts together and forms large solid blocks inside the firebox. High-grade “Anthracite” coal burns completely – evenly and hot -- a fine gray ash falling through the fire grates into the ash-pan, where it can be raked out with ease. German coal – predominantly “Bituminous” – is rather low-grade and prone to a high proportion of non-burnable clinkers. The clinkers invariably form large chunks that do not fall through the fire grates and have to be raked off the top of the burning mass – sometimes called “trimming a fire”. Basically, the German stokers were shoveling their hearts out, but were fast approaching the point where they would be unable to produce the hot fires needed for the excessively high speeds, of which, their ships were capable. As Hipper chewed his cigar and watched Beatty disappearing from view, he ordered a target shift onto the 5th Battle Squadron. Hipper could not know the full extent of the damage caused by the big guns of the British – but it worried him. He would continue to pursue Beatty to the north, but would, for the moment, turn his guns on those annoying battleships. For almost an hour, beginning with their turn north, 5th Battle Squadron would be Beatty’s rearguard – drawing fire from all the ships within range and fully occupying Hipper’s attention. Evan-Thomas’ super-dreadnoughts were now under fire from both the German battlecruisers to the northeast, and the leading battleships of the Hochseeflotte to the southeast. HMS Barham and Valiant engaged Hipper, while HMS Warspite and Malaya engaged Scheer. During the period after the turn to the north, only HMS Valiant escaped further damage. SMS Derfflinger struck Barham four times, and HMS Malaya was struck by another four shells from the Hochseeflotte battle line. Meanwhile, HMS Warspite was engaged by several battleships of the III Battle Squadron and, in particular, SMS Seydlitz. Around 17:16, a large caliber shell, probably 12-inch, landed on the port side upper deck between “X” and “Y” turrets, smashed a 7 x 3-foot hole in the deck before exploding on the Battery Deck just behind the stern-most 6-inch casemate gun. The “X” turret 15-inch magazine refrigeration unit was destroyed, a fire was started, and the aft fire mains were shot through, flooding three compartments before they could be switched off. Moments later, another shell penetrated the port side upper armor belt between the upper and main decks, but failed to detonate – breaking into large pieces causing splinter damage and ripping out a large section of armor plate on the “X” turret barbette. At 17:19, a shell believed to be from Seydlitz penetrated the hull side plating just below the upper deck, directly in line with the rear portion of “Y” turret barbette. The projectile detonated some 40 feet inside the ship, blowing a 5 x 6-foot hole in the main deck and inflicting severe damage to a dozen different compartments. Captain Philpott’s quarters had a 7 x 4-foot hole blown in the bulkhead, while the escape trunk to the steering compartment was badly damaged and allowed the compartment to flood to a depth of four feet. Two of the aft transverse bulkheads were distorted by the blast with many rivets and bolts sheered-off. The next hit penetrated the armor and wrecked the Captain’s Pantry, while the final hit during this phase (again, from Seydlitz) struck right aft on the waterline – further damaging the stern area and allowing more flooding. Evan-Thomas’ big battleships were far more capable of withstanding this sort of hammering than Beatty’s battlecruisers. None were lost at Jutland, but the super-dreadnoughts were on the receiving end of some of the finest shooting displayed that day. In constant action for just over two hours, Hipper’s gun crews had continued to fire three salvos per minute – well-aimed, with unbelievably tight shot patterns. HMS Barham suffered significant and extensive internal damage, several fires, and heavy casualties, while HMS Malaya was positively battered – very heavy internal damage, an ammunition fire, a 4 degree list caused by flooding, and unusually heavy casualties among the crew. At the same time, the well-trained gun crews of 5th Battle Squadron fired rapid and accurate salvos. Every thirty seconds, the massive 15-inch shells tore through the air, rumbling like a thousand steam locomotives, before throwing up vast columns of water, or crashing violently into the German battlecruisers. The 5th Battle Squadron quickly proved to be a lethal opponent. SMS Lutzow was hit with four shells, three fell on Derfflinger, a whopping six slammed into Seydlitz, and five fell on Scheer’s battleships. (Only SMS Markgraf among the battle fleet suffered any notable damage.) To the perceptive observer, the determined slugging match between Hipper’s Panzerkreuzer and Evan-Thomas’ battleships more clearly demonstrates the inherent defects of British warship design – even more so than the mauling received by Beatty’s battlecruisers. In as much as two British battlecruisers had been sunk by Hipper’s 11-inch and 12-inch guns, his battlecruisers had, so far, survived a brutal pounding by massive 15-inch shells – and with the exception of Von der Tann – they were all in reasonably good fighting order. But Hipper could see some of the huge shells crashing into his battlecruisers and knew they were now at serious risk. HMS Warspite, followed by Valiant and Malaya, settling onto a northerly course, preparing to open fire on the rear of Hipper’s battle line. Photo taken from HMS Barham. At this stage, as “The Run To The North” comes to a close, it is worth taking a moment to examine the performance of the two antagonists. Both the British and German battlecruisers had been firing briskly for nearly two hours, and the only thing slowing them down was the miserable visibility. The German battlecruisers had taken their share of damage during “The Run To The South” -- Von der Tann continued to engage with her 5.9-inch batteries, but her main battery turrets were out of action. Seydlitz lost two main battery turrets, was fairly battered and on fire, and had taken a torpedo, but remained in the battle line. Beyond some battle induced flooding among the remaining ships, it was nothing serious. The Krupp steel was proving more than adequate to resist the British 12-inch and 13.5-inch shells. The Panzerkreuzer were shooting superbly, especially Lutzow, and Hipper’s squadron had pretty much had it their own way. Beatty, on the other hand, was not doing well. During “The Run To The South”, Beatty had under his command six battlecruisers and four fast battleships. During “The Run To The North”, Beatty still had four battlecruisers and four fast battleships. (Beatty had, after all, lost HMS Indefatigable and Queen Mary.) The British gunnery was not at all good. Serious damage was mounting aboard the thinly armored warships -- both internal and external – wrecked compartments, heavy casualties, blasted superstructure, fires, flooding, and burned-out or jammed turrets. And – Hipper accomplished all of this destruction with just five battlecruisers. Both the British and Germans had particularly bad luck with battle damaged main battery turrets. The British tended to lose the “Q” turret on the more modern Lion Class ships – and the ”X” turret on the older Indefatigable design. The Germans seemed to lose their “C” turrets (Von der Tann, Seydlitz, and Derfflinger). It was quite obvious neither the British nor German designers had adequately armored the roof of the turrets. In all probability, the armor requirements were determined by mathematical formula, rather than actual tests on a gun range. Several turrets were also lost or put out of action due to penetration of the barbette armored trunk. It was common design practice in both navies to reduce the thickness of barbette armor as it extended deeper into the bowels of the ship. It was believed an incoming shell would strike light belt armor, armored bulkheads, and armored decks – either detonating the shell before it reached a barbette, or slowing the shell sufficiently to prevent penetration of the armored trunk. In reality, this was a mistaken belief. On “The Run To The North”, everything changed for Hipper. The setting sun to the west threw off the German rangefinders temporarily, only improving as Beatty pulled ahead, changing the firing angle to the northwest and removing the glare from the optical lenses. Nevertheless, the Panzerkreuzer had continued to inflict damage on the British battlecruisers and received very little in return. This situation was dramatically altered only when Evan-Thomas’ 5th Battle Squadron used their speed advantage to bring all 32 of their big guns into action. From that point forward, Hipper was caught between two fires – Beatty to the northwest and the super-dreadnoughts to the southwest. This is the point at which the tide turned against Hipper. And it should be noted for the record, the majority of the vital damage done to the Imperial battlecruisers at the Battle of Jutland was inflicted by 15-inch guns. It is, in all practicality, impossible to assemble accurate figures on how many of Evan-Thomas’ 15-inch shells landed on the German battlecruisers. What was obvious to the naked eye was the extent of destruction each one of those shells caused. When a 15-inch shell impacted a battlecruiser, the blast of the 1,900 pound shell was horrendous. They bored through decks and exploded, shaking the big ships like an earthquake. Interior compartments were blown into contorted shapes and bulkheads pierced by fist-sized pieces of shrapnel. Foot-thick armor plates were punched five inches into the ship’s side, twisting steel support frames, bowing torpedo bulkheads, sending splinters in all directions, and more often than not – resulting in heavy flooding. Flooding damage is insidious – and cumulative. Heavy shells, without penetrating, can violently displace armor plate, sheering rivets, opening seams, and causing leaks. A flooded compartment, though sealed off, can allow water to leak into adjacent compartments through air ducts, voice tubes, and around electrical conduits – and through shrapnel splinter holes. The biggest threat from a 15-inch shell was its’ capability to blast very large holes in thinner belt armor -- opening the ship directly to the sea. Once a compartment is flooded, it can be difficult or impossible to remove the water – especially if the hole is too large to be ”plugged”. In a worst-case scenario, pumps can fail due to battle damage, electrical failure, water damage, or drains clogged with blast debris. A warship can be blazing away with all guns one moment -- and a moment later -- be in danger of foundering, because there is simply too much water sloshing about inside the hull. From the moment 5th Battle Squadron came into effective range, Hipper’s battlecruisers were in extreme danger. German naval architects had designed a magnificent armor suite that made the Imperial battlecruisers superior to any British battlecruiser afloat. SMS Von der Tann, with her eight 11-inch guns, had sent HMS Indefatigable to the bottom within minutes. Derfflinger’s eight 12-inch guns had destroyed HMS Queen Mary with a final, well-placed salvo. But the fast battleships of the Queen Elizabeth Class were an entirely different animal. Tirpitz had never wanted the battlecruisers to serve in the battle line, and he had influenced their design to that end. Even with their superb armor scheme, they were not meant to go toe-to-toe with battleships – especially not the most powerful dreadnoughts in the world. The heavy armor scheme of Hipper’s battlecruisers was designed to withstand 12-inch gunfire, keep them in the battle line, and ensure they survived to return home. The armor would keep them afloat and intact long enough for their 11-inch and 12-inch guns to destroy the lightly armored British battlecruisers. But the architects, guided by Tirpitz’ tactical philosophy and financial restraint, were not allowed to armor the ships against 15-inch gunfire – even when they knew their enemy had such weapons. The 15-inch guns aboard HMS Barham and her sisters were the key to the whole issue. One of Barham’s 1,900 pound shells was, in destructive force, the equivalent of three 11-inch shells, or two 12-inch shells. Their destructive power was simply monstrous by comparison. And Barham and her sisters had the thickest armor of all the battleships present at Jutland. The Imperial battlecruisers could bang away at Barham, steadily inflicting damage, but the big 15-inch guns would, literally, dismantle the German cruisers before they could do lethal harm. Not to digress too much, but 15-inch weapons were briefly discussed for SMS Derfflinger, and Tirpitz deemed them too expensive, and the ship was already on the builder’s slipway. The Imperial Navy High Command then forcefully argued Lutzow should be armed with the big guns. Unfortunately, Tirpitz still did not envision his battlecruisers fighting battleships – so he simply did not understand the need for the bigger guns with their heavier shells. In all truth, neither Tirpitz, nor anyone else in the Kaiserliche Marine, had any battle experience of 15-inch shells. They simply did not know how much damage one of those shells could do. SMS Lutzow’s superb marksmanship astonished the British – and Derfflinger’s 12-inch guns and ability to survive were highly regarded by their opponents. The British nicknamed her “The Iron Dog” out of respect. For just a moment, imagine how different the opening phase of Jutland might have been if the two battlecruisers had been armed with the big 15-inch rifles. Dreadnought battleship SMS Bayern – sister ship SMS Baden: 28,530 tons – 22 knots – 8x15-inch guns – 16x5.9-inch guns – 5x24-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 13.8 inches. Only recently commissioned for trials, Bayern was left behind when Scheer sailed for Jutland – the crew had only been in training for three weeks. Her speed was slower than the Queen Elizabeth Class fast battleships, but only by two knots. Had she been leading Scheer’s battle line on 31 May 1916, her 15-inch rifles might have made a difference. When inspected by British dockyard authorities after the war, they found her to be equal or superior to anything in the Royal Navy. Below, two views of her moored in the old fleet anchorage at Bremerhaven. Her “off-duty” crew is being rowed ashore to spend the night in their barracks. If you look closely at the landing, you can see contingents of sailors loading into trucks to be taken to their barracks. Bayern is by Barroco Hispano. The small boats, sailors, and much of the “dock clutter” is by "AP". Seawalls by “NBVC”. The rickety pier is from the “PEG” Cannery lot – and the small office is a re-purposed SFBT railroad signal box. SIDEBAR QUEEN ELIZABETH CLASS Fast-Battleships Queen Elizabeth (1914) – Warspite (1915) – Barham (1915) – Valiant (1916) – Malaya (1916) Displacement: 32,590 tons – Length 643 feet – Speed 24 knots – 8x15-inch guns – 12 to 16x6-inch guns (varies between individual ships) – 4x21-inch torpedo tubes – Armor: main belt 13 inches – barbettes 10 inches – turrets 13 inches – conning tower 13 inches. Complement 930 officers and men. At the time of the Battle of Jutland these five ships were considered to be the mightiest dreadnought battleships in the world. It was not because they were the biggest warships, or the fastest, or because they were more heavily armored, or even had the most guns. Their displacement was, in fact, about 5,000 tons heavier than any of the Imperial battleships and battlecruisers, but their armor plate was nearly an inch thinner than the German Konig Class battleships. The speed of the British warships was about 2 knots faster than the German battleships, but between 2 to 3 knots slower than the Panzerkreuzer. The British dreadnoughts carried eight main battery guns while the most modern German dreadnoughts carried ten. In this case, it was not the number of guns that counted – it was the size and weight of shell that made the Queen Elizabeth’s mighty. These dreadnoughts were the only warships in the world to mount 15-inch guns – the Mk-1 BL (breech-loading) 15-inch L/42 rifle – to be precise. It could be pointed out the Royal Navy already had a 13.5-inch weapon firing a 1,400-lb shell – and the US Navy mounted a standard 14-inch weapon firing a similar size shell. But the unquestioned superiority of the British 15-inch gun was derived from the horrendous destructive power of its 1,900-lb shell. The kinetic penetrating power of such a large shell traveling at 2,450 feet per second (roughly ½ mile per second) was enormous. And once it bludgeoned its way inside an enemy hull, the explosive force and resulting damage was almost beyond human comprehension. BELOW you can see the massive size of the turrets designed to house the 101-ton gun tubes. This is a view of the 5th Battle Squadron of the Grand Fleet as it might have looked moored at their buoys off the Rosyth dockyards – just a few days before their rendezvous off the Jutland coast. Left to right: HMS Barham (flag), Valiant, Malaya, and Warspite. HMS Queen Elizabeth is temporarily in the dockyard for periodic maintenance and did not participate in the battle. All five ships of the class were very nearly identical (or as close to “identical” as possible). The only really noticeable difference was in the number and arrangement of the secondary 6-inch gun battery. Some ships had as few as 12 guns, while others had as many as 16. This is a close-up of HMS Barham. You will note Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, flag officer commanding, has his steam launch tied-up at the aft gangway. On the port side, you see the fuel-oil lighter Harold Smith replenishing Barham’s fuel bunkers. The Queen Elizabeth’s were the first battleships in the Royal Navy to be completely oil-fired. Note the prominence of the large gun houses – they had to be large. The 15-inch guns were gigantic compared to 13.5-inch weapons and actually had a 4-foot recoil when fired. You will also notice the small boat traffic between ships and ship-to-shore. HMS Malaya is standing by to unload two lighters full of ship’s stores. “Ship’s Stores” could include such items as canvas tarps, machine oil, rope and hawsers, balk timber, nails and spikes, tools, caulking iron, mops and brooms, galley supplies, leather goods, machine parts, and the inevitable toilet tissue. Malaya clearly demonstrates one of the chief characteristics of all British capital ships – the tall, bulky, built-up design of the fore and aft superstructures, with twin funnels grouped close behind the bridge. Of course, there is also the “trademark” of all English battleships – the soaring tripod foremast with a spotting top. Right next to the voluminous clouds of smoke, the spotting tops appearing over the horizon alerted an enemy to the presence of battleships. HMS Valiant has received a motor launch alongside, no doubt delivering mail bags from ashore. The hull form is shorter, and a bit on the “stubby” side -- but from her foremast to her mainmast – Valiant’s insides are crowded with twenty-four boilers to guarantee her status as a 24-knot fast-battleship. HMS Warspite has two lighters alongside and an Odin Class harbor tug is pushing a third lighter into position. Once the lighters are secured, the ship’s boat boom will hoist cargo nets full of crated fresh provisions aboard. The fuel-oil lighter Harold Smith, the Admiral’s steam launch, and the exquisite battleship model were graciously and expeditiously provided by @Barroco Hispano. The lighters, tugboats, small boats, boat boom, motor launch, and battleship mooring buoys made the creation of these scenes possible – and are generously provided by @AP. Just for those of you that might be curious about the fuel-oil lighter Harold Smith – here is a close-up shot to show the detailing. NEXT TIME…… THE TRAP IS SPRUNG BUT – before you go – we will finish the tour of the ammunition handling facilities…… This is an overview showing the route from the distribution docks (bottom center) back to the ammunition storage bunker complex (top left of center). The road and rail line runs back through a valley between the hills. The bunker complex was built on the far side of the hills to mitigate the effects of any accidental explosions. This is an overview of the bunker complex. You can see a rail line loading dock outside the bunker compound where shells and powder can be brought into the complex by rail or road – and can be sent out to the distribution docks in the harbor. Another loading dock and rail line can be seen inside the compound in the upper left. This one is strictly for the receiving and distribution of torpedoes. This is the receiving and distribution dock for shells and powder. Ammunition can be brought in by rail or sent out to the replenishment docks in the harbor. The loading dock was deliberately built outside the bunker complex and offset from the entrance to the compound to reduce the possibilities of damage in the event of an “accident”. Two shuttle engines with loaded rail cars are preparing to leave for the ammunition piers. To the rear of the loading dock, trucks can be seen unloading shells they have brought out from the bunker complex. To the right of the dock area are the administrative offices of the complex. In this close-up of the dock, you can see full shell racks lined up and waiting to be loaded onto the next available train. You have an excellent view of one of the shuttle engines and the ammunition rail cars. At the rear of the dock a 20-ton crane is unloading shells from the trucks. A railroad crane and shuttle engine are standing by on a siding – in case one of the dockside cranes breaks down. The loading dock is re-purposed from the “PEG SNM Battleship Docks”. The dockside cranes are from the “PEG” trash lots. The railroad crane is from “Simmer2” while its shuttle engine is from “PEG”. The small shuttle engines and ammunition cars are by “AP” – as are the 20-ton cranes, shells, and some of the sailors. The water tower was borrowed from the Maxis Movie Studio lot. This is the main bunker complex. Powder charges are stored in the four large bunkers on the left, while the shells are stored in the smaller bunkers on the right. As you can see, there are practically no structures in the compound other than the bunkers – no need to build anything that might, literally, go up in a large puff of smoke. The bunkers are thick, concrete structures buried under an earthen mound and can be found in the “PEG SNM Series”. This is a close-up of one of the fire-fighting water towers. Beside it, the fire brigade is undergoing training and maintenance of their equipment. The landscape has just a few trees, with some berry bushes scattered about, on gravel-covered terrain. The concrete road sections are “Paeng’s Grunge Concrete” sections with tire tracks -- some of them have been modified for lighting. The fire brigade and their equipment is by “AP”. The trees and berry bushes are by @Girafe and the gravely-looking areas are actually “Heblem” grey sand. This is a view of the outer wall of the bunker complex. This consists of a 16-meter earthen berm built-up around the whole complex, then layered with reinforced concrete on the inner side and a thinner layer on top of the berm. The outer side of the mound has been left natural and a controlled amount of vegetation has been allowed to grow to prevent erosion of the soil. The bunker complex has been built as close as possible to the hills. The building on the left is used for storage of small goods, supplies, and tools, with office space for clerical work and record keeping. The right hand building is used for periodic inspection, maintenance, and testing of the various lots of stored powder and shells. This is the torpedo loading dock on the far side of the compound. A separate dock was provided to reduce the congestion on the main compound. The dockside cranes are 100 ton capacity, while the cranes on the lower level are of 20 ton capacity. When needed, torpedoes are removed from the bunkers on the left, transported by truck to the loading dock, then hoisted across and placed in special railways cars to be carried to the replenishment docks. In this close-up, you get an excellent view of the small shuttle engines and the torpedo laden rail cars. If you look closely, you can see the torpedoes in the back of a truck waiting to be unloaded, while working parties behind the truck are inspecting and preparing other torpedoes that will be hoisted up onto the loading dock in their turn. The cranes, torpedoes, Imperial officers and sailors (black & white uniforms), fire brigade personnel, small shuttle engines and torpedo railway cars -- are all the intricate work of "AP". Without these specialized props, the degree of detail portrayed in this scene simply would not be possible. MANY, MANY, THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful warship models and continued support. SPECIAL THANKS to my friend and partner, @AP, for his talents, patience, meticulous models, colorful imagination, and extreme dedication. If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496