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Chapter 30: "Something Wrong With Our Bloody Ships"
Dreadnought posted a City Journal entry in IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN
The fast battleships of 5th Battle Squadron, overloading their boilers to exceed their 24-knot design speed. Note the heavy seas taken over the bows as they plunge ahead, trying to catch-up to Beatty’s battle line. HMS Valiant, Warspite, and Malaya as seen from the flagship, HMS Barham. IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 30: "...SOMETHING WRONG WITH OUR BLOODY SHIPS...” Hipper’s 1st Scouting Group was holding a SE course at 22 knots, and maintaining a rapid and accurate fire on the British battlecruisers off their starboard beam. The British had already lost one battlecruiser to the extremely accurate German gunnery, and Hipper was gradually closing the range to inflict even more damage. With each salvo, great masses of gun smoke billowed high into the sky, then blew back across the Panzerkreuzer before trailing away to the ESE. The Gunnery officers waited impatiently until the “fall of shot” clocks sounded the alarm and they watched eagerly as great water columns shot into the air, straddling Beatty’s battlecruisers with a forest of tightly grouped shell splashes. HMS Queen Mary: 26,770 tons – 28 knots – 8x13.5-inch guns – 16x4-inch guns – 2x21-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 9 inches. Queen Mary was the last battlecruiser to join the fleet before World War I, and the last iteration of the Lion Class ships (“The Splendid Cats”). HMS Tiger would soon follow, but her designed appearance was completely different. For the record – the gun turrets are lettered, bow to stern, as “A”, “B”, “Q”, and “X”. Queen Mary has the same basic deck plan as the Lion Class, allowing for a full 8-gun broadside and wide firing arcs for “Q” turret. (Model courtesy of Barroco Hispano.) HMS Queen Mary, third in line, engaged Seydlitz until 16:17, and had been hit several times by the German battlecruiser. One shell landed in the aft 4 inch gun casemates and started an ammunition fire. At 14,800 yards, Seydlitz hit her a second time, on the right side of “Q” turret. The shell failed to penetrate, but the impact was so severe it put the right hand gun out of action. When Lion sheered out of line, Derfflinger took Queen Mary under fire at 14,400 yards and Queen Mary returned Derfflinger’s fire around 16:17. Some nine minutes later, three shells out of a four-gun salvo fired by Seydlitz were seen to strike Queen Mary (an amazingly tight grouping), raising a small smoke cloud amidships, near “Q” turret. Only seconds later, Derfflinger’s salvo landed two 12-inch shells near Queen Mary’s “A” turret -- and a tremendous yellow flame instantly shot into the air. Derfflinger’s Korvettenkapitan Hase wrote…… “Queen Mary and Derfflinger settled into a regular gunnery duel carried out overhead of the torpedo boat and destroyer action raging between the battle lines. The enemy was shooting superbly. Twice Derfflinger came under their fire – and twice she was hit. Queen Mary was also under fire from Seydlitz, who’s Gunnery Control Officer was Korvettenkapitan Foerster – our crack gunnery expert. Since 16:22 every one of our salvos had straddled the enemy, and around 16:25 a salvo (presumably from Seydlitz) was seen to crash into the area of Queen Mary’s “Q” turret, followed by a huge sheet of flame and smoke shooting high into the air. Seconds later, our own salvo landed near her forward turrets. A red flame shot up through her fore-deck, abreast the gun turrets, followed by a visible explosion, and then – a huge explosion amidships. Black smoke began to shoot skyward, filled with debris and parts of the ship. Amid a monstrous black cloud, the enemy ship seemed to lift itself from the water, shuddering, with the middle blown out. A massive cloud towered a thousand feet in the air. The battlecruiser’s masts collapsed inwards into the smoke and nothing more could be seen.” (This was approximately thirty-seven minutes into the battle.) This detail shot of Queen Mary shows her steering SE under fire from Seydlitz and Derfflinger. Seydlitz landed a lethal salvo that penetrated the deck abreast “Q” turret and most likely went on to penetrate the turret’s lower barbette armor. The shells touched off her midships powder magazine. Mere seconds later, Derfflinger landed a salvo abreast of the forward turrets which most likely touched off those magazines as well. The nearly simultaneous explosion of both magazines was more than enough to destroy the battlecruiser. HMS Princess Royal (left of picture) comes under heavy fire as the smoke continues to rise over HMS Queen Mary’s grave. The original of this photo can be found on file in the Imperial War Museum, London. If you think it has been re-touched, you are correct. The original image was faded, grainy, and somewhat over-exposed. Photo experts worked with the light and dark contrasts, and eventually had to “artistically” alter the picture to bring out the details. None of the basic information contained in the original was lost, but this re-touched original makes a stunning and far more dramatic presentation of the cataclysmic event. It was 16:26 when Queen Mary blew up. Beatty and Ernle Chatfield, his Flag-Captain, were standing on Lion’s port bridge wing when the force of the tremendous explosion washed over them. Both men spun round in time to witness the unpleasant spectacle unfolding before their eyes. They remained in stony silence until the gigantic smoke cloud began to dissipate, then Beatty turned to Chatfield...”There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today…”. Chatfield, stunned by the depth of understatement, made no comment. Such prudence would see him promoted Admiral Of The Fleet in 1935. And most historians applaud the cool and collected manner in which Beatty took the catastrophic loss of two capital ships – but few of them point out the obvious – it didn’t have to happen that way. Had Beatty kept the 5th Battle Squadron on a tight leash, it’s entirely possible Hipper might have suffered the losses. But Beatty had charged off after the German battlecruisers in fine “fox-hunting” style and high hubris – ignoring the First Rule Of War – “Never underestimate your enemy”. HMS Queen Mary had broken in two, and the aft portion was still afloat as New Zealand passed by. Only eighteen survivors were plucked out of the water by the destroyers HMS Laurel and Petard, and the German torpedo boat V-28. A total of 1,266 men went down with her. (Every year, on 31 May, at 16:26 – the exact time of her sinking -- a Royal Navy warship is privileged to perform a wreath-laying ceremony over her wreckage.) During the brief exchange, only Seydlitz was hit, with a 13.5 inch shell penetrating the starboard #6 5.9-inch casemate in the secondary battery – putting the gun out of action. Amid all this chaos, SMS Moltke continued to fire on HMS Tiger – though Tiger was engaged with Von der Tann at the time. The German battlecruiser scored a total of five 11-inch hits between 16:05 and 16:35, two of which hit the 6-inch upper belt and the 9-inch lower belt just aft of the forward engine room. The armor was not penetrated, but it was pushed in about four inches, causing several leaks. Tiger, though still full of fight, had been suffering terribly under Moltke’s accurate salvos. There was a great deal of “superficial” damage – gaping holes in superstructure compartments – funnels shot through – a fair number of wounded and dead -- and numerous hits on the armor belt that displaced plates and started leaks. But – so far – there had been nothing critical. Around the same time, Moltke launched four torpedoes toward the British line, three of which were sighted by them, but there were no hits. Aboard SMS Lutzow, amid the swirling smoke and thunderous gunfire, Hipper had already been informed Indefatigable had gone down, and he watched Lion sheer out of line, followed at 16:26 by the signal that Queen Mary had been sunk. Hipper now outnumbered Beatty’s battlecruisers by five-to-four. He was also informed the 5th Battle Squadron had opened fire on the light cruisers of 2nd Scouting Group. The small cruisers were screening the tail of his battle line, but they would have to give way in the face of such a force. Though the battle seemed to be going his way at the moment, the powerful British battleships would soon come in range of Von der Tann – and all Hell would break lose. Hipper signaled the squadron to increase to 23 knots – hoping he could hold the enemy battleships at a distance. He could run away from them – but his job was to lead them to destruction under Scheer’s guns. Still, the old buccaneer sensed an opportunity, and he chose to press his momentary advantage. He signaled a course change -- one point to starboard – to close the range on Beatty. Beatty, fully aware he had lost two battlecruisers, was under a good deal of pressure. Even he realized the damage to his ships continued to mount while the German battlecruisers were still delivering rapid and accurate salvos. HMS Lion (having resumed her position in line) was down to a six-gun broadside with fires raging on the forecastle and amidships, while Princess Royal could only present a four-gun broadside. (Though Beatty was probably unaware of it at the time, the British seemed to be having particularly bad luck with their “Q” turret installations. The designers appear to have thought “amidships” was a good place to locate a main battery turret. It also happened to be where German fire control officers were most likely to place the cross-hairs of their gun-pointers.) In an effort to relieve the pressure, Beatty sent in the 9th Destroyer Flotilla, from the head of his line. HMS Nestor, commanded by Captain Barry Bingham, led the attack. As the British destroyers increased speed and swung about, Kommodore Heinrich (commander torpedo boat flotillas) in the light cruiser SMS Regensburg, spotted them and exercised his own initiative. The Kommodore quickly signaled his torpedo boats and went in to break up the approaching attack. German torpedo boats race toward the British battle line to disrupt an approaching destroyer attack. (Illustration by noted marine artist Willy Stower.) Thick, billowing smoke spewed from the funnels of fifteen German torpedo boats as they lunged forward at full revolutions. Some boats followed their Leader (SMS Regensburg) and cut across Lutzow’s bows to get at the British battlecruisers. Other boats, their captains eager to get at the enemy (and a bit more daring), used their high speed to “cut the line” – slipping through the three hundred yard gaps between the massive battlecruisers. Once on the other side of Hipper’s battle line, the boats rallied briefly, then tore off toward the fast-approaching swarm of British destroyers led by the light cruiser HMS Champion. The tiny German boats plunged headlong into the waves, some managing 33 knots, with their slender hulls bucking and rolling, and masses of funnel smoke trailing away astern. German torpedo boats were just that – torpedo boats. They had a minimal gun armament of two or three 3.4-inch deck guns, but usually carried six torpedo tubes. British destroyers were designed to defend against enemy torpedo boats and usually mounted four 4-inch guns, but only two torpedo tubes. Consequently, as the range between the two swarms closed, the British opened fire first. German captains twisted and turned the hurtling little boats, dodging shellfire while their smaller guns returned fire. Onward, into the midst of the enemy -- commands shouted along decks running knee-deep with seawater – guns blazing away to port and starboard. A fleeting target appears and a torpedo is loosed at an enemy. The helm goes hard over to avoid a collision – more gunfire – a shell passes through the funnel – the little craft slews round and charges toward another enemy. The confused, swirling melee went on for what seemed hours, but was only about fifteen minutes. So many destroyers and torpedo boats were milling about between the lines, it become impossible to tell friend from foe as the thickening smoke clouds hung low on the water. Inevitably, like the terriers they were, a few ships managed to break loose and close on the big ships. Many torpedoes were fired in the melee, both British and German, but Hipper and Beatty turned away from the torpedo attacks (a standard defensive maneuver adopted by both navies). The capital ships escaped unharmed – with the exception of Seydlitz (she was having her share of bad luck). Seydlitz was hit at 16:37 by a torpedo fired from HMS Petard. The torpedo struck the starboard side forward, below the armor belt, and ripped a hole 40 feet long by 13 feet high. Though taking on water, the inner torpedo bulkhead held, and the battlecruiser maintained her speed and place in the battle line. The small craft would continue their vicious dogfight until Beatty recalled his destroyers around 16:40. The ruthless little skirmish had entailed a good deal of sound and fury, resulting in quite a bit of damage and a few “kills”. HMS Petard torpedoed and sank V-29, her second kill of the day. The German V-27 was hit several times and disabled, and battle conditions prohibited towing, so they scuttled her. HMS Nestor and Nomad were dead-in-the-water from gunfire and were eventually sunk by the battleships of the Hochseeflotte as they passed by headed north. Commander Bingham (HMS Nestor) spent the rest of the war as a guest of the German Empire -- but lived to receive the Victoria Cross. The fast battleships of the 5th Battle Squadron closing on 2nd Scouting Group at the rear of Hipper’s battle line. HMS Barham leading and Valiant following – as seen from HMS Warspite. With the opposing battlecruiser squadrons holding course to the SE at high speed, locked in mortal combat, and the destroyer melee between the battle lines in full hue and cry -- things began to go badly at the rear of the German battle line. The light cruisers of 2nd Scouting Group (SMS Frankfurt, Pillau, Elbing, and Wiesbaden) were dutifully screening the tail of Hipper’s column, and Admiral Boedicker had been watching somewhat grimly as Rear-Admiral Sir Hugh Evan-Thomas bore down on him with the powerful 5th Battle Squadron. HMS Barham (flag) was leading the squadron and from the way she plunged into the rolling waves, throwing spray up to the bridge, she was doing every bit of the 24 knots she was designed for. HMS Malaya opening fire with her powerful 15-inch guns. Note the large volume of thick smoke issuing from the gun tubes. A lot of Cordite is required to launch a 1,900-pound shell – and that means voluminous smoke clouds. At 15:58 the first 15-inch shells splashed down 300 meters from SMS Frankfurt. As the salvos began to fall at regular intervals, Boedicker deployed a new device – “smoke floats”. These were ignited and dropped overboard, quickly creating a very effective smokescreen. Barham temporarily ceased fire when her target was obscured, but resumed fire after a short interval, firing into the smoke to no effect. Boedicker sent a contact report to Hipper, then wisely withdrew at high speed to the NE, later altering SE to rejoin Hipper. By 16:06, Barham had closed the tail of the German battlecruiser line and opened on Von der Tann at 20,000 yards. Within minutes the remaining battleships joined in – Barham and Valiant concentrating on Moltke -- with Warspite and Malaya firing on Von der Tann. Whatever temporary advantage Hipper may have had, evaporated like a desert mirage. The German battlecruisers, with 11-inch and 12-inch guns, were now fighting battlecruisers and battleships armed with 13.5-inch and 15-inch guns. Still out of range of Von der Tann’s guns, it was much like target practice for Evan-Thomas’ ships – and all Jellicoe’s training would pay off. It would soon become apparent -- no matter how good the Panzerkreuzer were, or how well they were led – Tirpitz should have given them bigger guns. The strength of the Imperial German battlecruisers, the skill of their Admiral, and the courage of their crews would surely be tested to the limit this day. SMS Moltke, prior to the sortie, taking on provisions and stores while moored in Schillig Roads on picket duty. Alongside, a Thor Class tug is preparing to unload a lighter filled with fresh fruit and vegetables. A Sophia Class paddle tug stands by with two lighters containing various ship’s stores and dry goods. In the picture below, you can see the intricate detail on the battlecruiser, tug, and lighter. The mooring buoys, battlecruiser, tugs, and lighters are all the wonderful work of @AP. SMS Moltke now came under a sustained fire from HMS Barham and Valiant. At 16:16, she was hit by a 15-inch round from Barham. The projectile penetrated the armor below #5 casemate, knocking out the 5.9-inch gun, killing the crew, and penetrating an upper coal bunker before detonating. At 16:23 another 15-inch shell detonated against the waterline belt abreast the forward funnel. It did not penetrate, but displaced the armor plate, rupturing the hull skin and causing flooding in the wing passage and a protective coal bunker. At 16:26 (about the same time Queen Mary was going down), a shell struck aft, underwater, and crossed to the port side before detonating and caused additional flooding in the stern. Again, at 16:27, a 15-inch shell detonated on the armor belt abreast the aft superstructure and caused more flooding in the wing passage and another protective coal bunker. The hardened Krupp armor proved equal to the task and prevented the shells from penetrating the ship, but the massive concussive force of the 1,900-pound shells was pushing in plates, sheering bolts and rivets, and starting leaks. These four hits, alone, caused Moltke to take on 1,000 tons of water and a three degree starboard list. In order to maintain a level and steady gun platform, Kapitan von Karpf evened the keel by counter-flooding. The 5th battle Squadron continued to fire regular salvos with frequent hits. It should be remembered the battleships had received the benefit of gunnery practice with the Grand Fleet and were also equipped with the new fifteen-foot rangefinders. The heavy shells from HMS Warspite and Malaya raised tall water columns all about Von der Tann -- frequently obscuring her from sight. At 16:09, a 15-inch shell struck to starboard aft, on the joint of two armor plates, and detonated during penetration. Large pieces of shrapnel entered the ship and caused two compartments to take on more water -- some 600 tons. The concussive force of the big shells shook the ship violently and briefly caused a steering engine to malfunction. The engineering staff worked furiously in the stifling heat of the cramped and dimly lit steering engine compartment. They were all aware what the loss of a steering engine could mean at this critical moment – and they quickly brought it back on line. But worse was yet to come. At 16:20, a 15-inch shell penetrated “A” turret barbette. There was little fire damage and no danger of explosion, but the massive blast of the 1,900-pound shell jammed the turret fast – taking it out of action. SMS Von der Tann -- the main battery turrets are lettered from bow to stern: “A” turret, “B” turret (starboard wing), “C” turret (aft), and “D” turret (port wing). Model courtesy of @Barroco Hispano. Below is a close-up of the forecastle and “A” turret. The shell would have struck the starboard side of the barbette where the gunhouse joins to the circular barbette – damaging the turret “race” (the revolving bearings of the training mechanism). At 16:32 another 15-inch shell crashed through Von der Tann’s fantail deck, penetrated to the battery deck, and detonated against the “C” turret barbette. The shock of the massive blast caused the turret to jam, the turning mechanism fouled by bent and distorted steel. The damage outside the barbette was devastating. Surrounding compartments were blown apart and transformed into twisted and shredded steel plates. This shell also caused a more pressing problem. The anti-torpedo nets were blasted loose and left dangling over the side – threatening to foul the propellers – until a crew of brave men went on deck under heavy fire to secure them. The 15-inch shell would have punched a large hole in the fantail deck (or quarter deck) on the starboard side, close to the deck edge -- approximately where the mooring bollards are. The turret would have been trained over the starboard side when the blast jammed it. You can just make out the anti-torpedo netting along the edge of the lower battery deck. The force of the blast and the severe jolt of the explosion would have wrenched the net restraints loose and bent or broken the net booms – leaving the steel mesh nets trailing in the water. When the range fell to 17,000 yards, Von der Tann began hitting back, and at 16:23 landed a shell on Barham’s armor belt forward. The shell did not penetrate, but pushed the armor in three inches and started leaks. At 16:26 she scored a hit on New Zealand which penetrated her deck and punched out a large piece of armor from “X” turret barbette, jamming the turret for some time. By 16:30, Von der Tann was down to only “B” and “D” turrets left in operation (the midships wing turrets) and she was having difficulty acquiring a target due to the restricted firing arcs, but she continued to fire whenever her guns would bear. (This is where it paid off to reinforce the midships deck armor for cross-deck firing.) SMS Von der Tann – midships area. This is a close-up of “B” turret – the starboard “wing” turret, and “D” turret – the “port” wing turret. (Model courtesy of Barroco Hispano.) Shortly thereafter, Von der Tann’s “B” turret (starboard wing) broke down. On the last salvo, the two big 11-inch rifles went “out of battery” and jammed in the recoil position. (The reason is not clear, but it’s possible there was a leak in the hydraulic system, or the prolonged rapid firing caused extreme over-heating.) Von der Tann had suffered a severe pounding at the hands of two Queen Elizabeth Class battleships, and she was down to just two operable gun tubes – but Blohm & Voss had done their work well – she was still afloat and able to maintain her place in the battle line. From Lutzow’s bridge, Hipper could see the forest of shell splashes enveloping the rear of his line and decided, at 16:27, it was time to break off this unequal contest. He signaled his ships to turn away together (a simultaneous turn by all five ships), 122 degrees, to the southeast. At the head of the line, around 16:28, another little drama played out on Lion’s bridge. A well-placed salvo landed around Princess Royal (astern of Lion) and the tightly grouped water columns completely obscured the battlecruiser. An over-excited signalman promptly ran onto the Admiral’s bridge and announced...”Sir! Princess Royal’s blown up!” Beatty and Chatfield dashed out onto the bridge wing and stared aft in disbelief. A moment later, the shell splashes subsided and Princess Royal was still steaming along with guns blazing. Needless to say, Lion’s bridge contained one very angry Admiral, and a signalman about to receive the sharp edge of his tongue. HMS Southampton, flagship 2nd Cruiser Squadron, as she would have appeared on 31 May 1916. Displacement – 5,400 tons – 25.5 knots – 8x6-inch guns – 2x21-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 2 inches. Some two and a half miles to the southeast of all the chaos, the British 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron was fanned out on a wide search pattern ahead of Beatty’s Battlecruiser Fleet. Commodore William Goodenough, his flag in HMS Southampton, was the farthest to the east, with HMS Birmingham, Nottingham, and Dublin stretching toward the west. Goodenough was a “cruiser man”. He relished being out on his own, his cruisers racing along, poking their noses into every little thing to see what was what. Much like the free-wheeling frigate captains of Nelson’s day. He simply didn’t have the restrained and prudent temperament of a “battleship captain”. He had resisted the urge to throw his squadron into the destroyer melee going on astern – which was more to his taste than a docile scouting mission. But the Commodore had acted rashly in the past and was not one of Beatty’s “favorites” – so he thought it better to stick to the rules and “be a good lad”. As he stood on the bridge, possibly regretting his decision, the lookout rang down from the foremast and the Commodore’s ears perked up. Flag-lieutenant Arthur Peters answered the hand-set, then turned slightly...”Smoke, sir – two points off the port bow.” Goodenough snatched up his glasses and focused on the horizon...”Helm – two points to port – make revolutions for 22 knots”. The agile cruiser swung gently, gathering speed as the staff clustered on the small bridge. Moments later, wisps of smoke were seen – gradually building and growing as Southampton approached. Within minutes there was a great pall of smoke trailing to the east. And then suddenly, as if by magic, there were the masts, funnels, and upper-works of battleships rising over the horizon. Peters, a little awed by the sight, spoke as the cruiser raced on...”Look, Sir -- this is a light cruiser’s day of a lifetime! The whole of the High Seas Fleet is before you.” This was their mission – what they had trained for – what they were paid to do. The handset from the fore-top rang again, and the lookout filled in the details: sixteen battleships with a torpedo boat screen on either bow, in single-line-ahead, with six smaller battleships bringing up the rear. For the first time in two years of war, the Royal Navy was witness to the full deployment of the Hochseeflotte battle line. The range, rapidly closing, was about 7 miles – 13,000 yards. Peters was filling out a signal pad, ready to send a wireless to Beatty – the primary reason the cruiser squadron existed. As the range continued to close, Commander Edward Rushton remarked...”If you’re going to make that signal, you’d better do it now, Sir – you may never make another”. Peters had already sent the signal, and Goodenough smiled, but did not lower his glasses. Rushton, getting a bit tense, said, as if to himself...”This is madness.” The Commodore lowered the glasses and laughed...”No, no, Commander. Clearly I can do no wrong this day – whatever stupidities I may have committed on other days.” SMS Konig – Konig Class dreadnought battleship – 4 ships commissioned in 1912 and 1913: 25,796 tons – 21 knots – 10x12-inch guns – 14x5.9-inch guns – 5x19.7-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 13.8 inches. Designed in 1910-1911, these were the most modern and most powerful battleships in the Kaiserliche Marine when war broke out in 1914. They were also the first and only German capital ships to have five main battery turrets on the centreline. On 31 May 1916, Konig was flying the flag of Konteradmiral Paul Behncke, leading the III Battle Squadron, in the vanguard of the Hochseeflotte. Her image would have loomed large and menacing as Commodore Goodenough closed the range from the NW. Unfortunately, I do not have a model of Konig as she would have appeared during the war. This one represents a 1932 design study done by the Reichsmarine in the Wiemar Republic period. However, the Reichsmarine was working within a tight budget, with reduced staff, and fewer design facilities at their disposal. Consequently, they largely kept to the original design parameters and only updated them to reflect technological advances. The changes to the original plan are, for the most part, in their machinery – or are largely visual. In short – they would have been a few knots faster, and looked more modern – but the guns, hull form, and armor would have remained the same as in 1913. This is a comparison between SMS Konig and Derfflinger. The obvious difference in length is entirely due to the difference in speed. At 28 knots, Derfflinger’s considerably longer hull was designed to accommodate the more numerous boilers required to generate that power. The battleship was only designed for 21 knots, so she did not require the elongated hull – but she did pack a more powerful punch into the shorter hull. You will note the similarity in basic design: superfiring 12-inch turrets fore and aft (but with a fifth turret amidships) – twin funnels – and the secondary battery of 5.9-inch guns arrayed in casemates on the Battery Deck. In this detailed comparison, you can pick out the differences and, perhaps, imagine what the battleship might have looked like in 1913. First: there would have been a pole mast forward on the battleship instead of the cumbersome 1932 “military mast”. Second: the funnels would have been larger, and without the “raked” funnel caps. Third: there would be no aircraft catapult on the midships turret. And fourth: the forward and aft superstructure elements would not be as heavy, tall, and built-up as they are in the 1932 version. The bridge and superstructure elements of the 1913 Konig would have looked very similar to what you see on Derfflinger – visually simple, utilitarian, and not more than one deck higher than the armored conning tower. In my opinion, the Konig of 1913 would have been just as powerful, but far more pleasing to the eye than the 1932 design study. (Models courtesy of Barroco Hispano.) Southampton closed to within 12,000 yards – close enough to identify the flag of Konteradmiral Paul Behncke flying above SMS Konig. Any one of fifty 12-inch guns could have blown the little cruiser to oblivion – but the German gunnery officers were having trouble identifying the hazy bow-on view. When they did open fire, Southampton’s helm instantly went hard over and she increased speed to 25 knots. The narrow-hulled cruiser leaned so far into the turn her railings nearly brushed the water. She signaled her consorts (Birmingham, Nottingham, and Dublin) and made off on a zig-zag course as huge fountains of water erupted all about her. Goodenough was determined to maintain contact with the German battle fleet so he could send regular sighting reports to Beatty. But with the mist and haze being what it was, he could only do that if he remained within gun range of the German battleships. Well over forty large shells had already fallen within 75 yards of Southampton, so this was going to be sticky business. Lieutenant Ralph Ireland, the navigation officer, put into action a plan he had worked out some time before – “salvo chasing”. He directed the helmsman to steer the ship toward the last splash of an enemy salvo. The German gunnery officers would make corrections when shells fell “over” or “short” – so by steering toward the splashes, Ireland ensured the ship would never be where they thought. (This was a brilliant idea – but only if the Germans didn’t catch-on to the trick.) SMS Konig, leading the Imperial battle fleet, takes Goodenough’s cruisers under fire as they close the range and signal the position of the German warships to Admiral Jellicoe. HMS Lion picked up Southampton’s sighting report (as did Admiral Jellicoe) and Beatty altered course toward her position. Lion was still in line, but she was in bad shape. One of her four turrets was knocked out and the fires on her forecastle and midships were still raging. She’d been hit in the aft superstructure, leaving a gaping hole in the deck, and two demolished steam launches. Two shells had plunged through the weather deck only feet apart and exploded on the Mess Deck, starting yet another raging fire. Her unreliable dynamos were still functioning, but not at full power, and the mains had been hit in several places so parts of the below-decks were in darkness. The lack of electrical strength had reduced Beatty to using Princess Royal as a “relay” signaling ship for long-range WT traffic. Within minutes, Beatty had visual confirmation the Hochseeflotte was NOT at anchor in the Jade. It was just 12 miles away in line-ahead battle formation and already firing hotly on his scouting cruisers. Beatty had very nearly fallen into the trap set by Scheer. In a matter of moments, he would signal the remaining ships of the Battlecruiser Fleet to turn 16 points to starboard “in succession” – reversing his course. His duty now – was to lure Scheer’s fleet into Jellicoe’s trap. At this point, the “run to the south” is over – but it is worth taking stock. Between 15:48, when the engagement began, to 16:54 (one hour and six minutes), when Beatty reversed course to the NW – the 1st Scouting Group (Imperial battlecruisers) obtained an estimated forty-four 11-inch and 12-inch hits on the British battlecruisers; 9 on Lion – 6 on Princess Royal – 7 on Queen Mary – 14 on Tiger – 1 on New Zealand – 5 on Indefatigable – and 2 on the battleship Barham. By comparison, The Battlecruiser Fleet obtained only eleven 13.5-inch and six 15-inch hits on the German Panzerkreuzer: 4 on Lutzow – 4 on Seydlitz – 2 on Moltke – 1 on Von der Tann, and with 15-inch shells: 1 on Seydlitz – 4 on Moltke – and 1 on Von der Tann. By the end of the “run to the south”, the British had lost 2 battlecruisers and 2 destroyers – while the Germans lost 2 torpedo boats. Again, I have provided a concise map to help you keep track of the confused action. If you have questions – feel free to ask – and I will do my best to answer. BATTLECRUISER ACTION – “RUN TO THE SOUTH” (1) 15:22 - Hipper sights Beatty. (2) 15:48 - First shots fired by Hipper's squadron. (3) 16:00 -16:05 - Indefatigable explodes, leaving two survivors. (4) 16:25 - Queen Mary explodes, eighteen survive. (5) 16:45 - Beatty's battlecruisers move out of range – “Run To The North”. (6) 16:54 - Evan-Thomas's battleships turn north behind Beatty. NEXT TIME…… THE RUN TO THE NORTH MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful warship models. SPECIAL THANKS to my friend and partner, @AP, for his talents, meticulous models, colorful imagination, and extreme dedication. If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496- 3 Comments
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Chapter 25: Short-Lived And Unlucky
Dreadnought posted a City Journal entry in IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN
SMS Lutzow -- circa 1916 – at sea in heavy weather. IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 25: SHORT-LIVED AND UNLUCKY SMS Lutzow – late 1915 – at cruising speed. With the laying of Derfflinger’s keel on 30 March 1912, the last of the new “Grosse Kreuzer” authorized under the Fleet Law Amendment of 1906 was under construction. Any future building would have to be done under the terms of the “replacement” clause of the Naval Laws. Under this provision, older cruisers (20 years) could be “retired” or sold for scrap, and replaced with new construction. They would be ordered under the “Ersatz” (replacement) designation. The new “Grosse Kreuzer - 1912” would be ordered as the “Ersatz Kaiserin Augusta” – a replacement for the old protected cruiser commissioned in 1892. (See Chapter 2 for details of the old cruiser.) This ship would be built as a sister-ship to Derfflinger and would be the second ship of the class. While SMS Goeben had been built as a sister-ship to Moltke, that choice was made largely as a matter of expedience. The Design Bureau had been over-burdened with work, and the Kaiserliche Marine could not afford to lose a year in the building race against the British. For “Grosse Kreuzer – 1912”, the reason was purely financial. An 18 March 1911 memorandum from Admiral Rollmann stipulated the Naval budget for 1911 and 1912 only allowed 32.3 million Marks for each battlecruiser. The rising annual costs of new ships had not been taken into account by the original Naval Laws, so any cost overruns would have to be covered by public subscription. The only logical way to obtain a new battlecruiser at least equal to Derfflinger’s power – was to build a duplicate. The Imperial economy was already groaning under the weight of the Naval Estimates, and anything larger, or more powerful, was out of the question. For the first time since SMS Blucher was launched at the Imperial Dockyards Kiel Werft, the contract for the new battlecruiser would NOT be given to Blohm & Voss Shipyards in Hamburg. This was an unusual step and has never been fully explained. Blohm & Voss had acquired considerable experience and skill over the years in building battlecruisers. And it is especially odd since the company had also granted large discounts on the building costs. The contract was awarded to the F. Schichau Werk in Danzig, which had previously built the dreadnought battleships SMS Oldenburg and Konig Albert (as well as several pre-dreadnoughts). There has been speculation that the eastern provinces needed a boost in their employment rate, or that more shipyards needed experience in building capital ships, or even the need to break the Blohm & Voss monopoly on turbine technology by encouraging other yards to build them. Regardless of why Schichau got the contract, “Grosse Kreuzer Ersatz Kaiserin Augusta” was ordered as the SMS Lutzow, and her keel was laid on 15 May 1912 – just six weeks after SMS Derfflinger’s keel laying ceremony. Officials estimated she would join the Hochseeflotte in late 1915. And it’s just as well they chose to build her as a sister to Derfflinger, for the British were pushing ahead with their plans to neutralize the Imperial battlecruisers – any loss in time could have serious consequences. The “fast battleship” HMS Warspite lying at anchor off the naval dockyard of Rosyth, Scotland, while attached to the Battlecruiser Fleet. The Forth Bridge is in the background. She was the second ship of the Queen Elizabeth Class to join the Grand Fleet in March 1915. Displacement 32,590 tons – 24 knots – 8x15-inch guns – 12x6-inch guns – 4x21-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 13 inches. The British already saw the German “Grosse Kreuzer” as a tactical threat to their battle line, but they were focused on the speed and gun power of the cruisers. First Sea Lord Winston Churchill, and his cronies at the Admiralty, knew they would be used for scouting purposes, but they feared the Germans would employ them against the battle fleet (much as cavalry might be employed against an army of infantry). If the German battlecruisers used their speed to get into position across the bows of the battle line, they could concentrate their gun fire on the lead ships and either sink them or force them to turn away. Such a maneuver could throw the Grand Fleet into disarray, resulting in unacceptable losses, and possibly even losing the battle. This was, in fact, what the British feared most, and it was their intention to build a squadron of larger and more powerfully-gunned high-speed battleships to neutralize this threat. (Churchill envisioned two squadrons – the Queen Elizabeth and Revenge classes -- but the naval budget couldn’t support that. The resulting Revenge Class was built with 15-inch guns, but a much reduced propulsion plant – only 22 knots – a significant cost reduction.) HMS Queen Elizabeth, the first of the British fast battleships, joined the Grand Fleet in 1914, and HMS Warspite would go to sea in March 1915, followed by HMS Barham in October 1915 – the same year SMS Lutzow was commissioned into the Kaiserliche Marine. (The following year, prior to the Battle of Jutland, both HMS Valiant and HMS Malaya would join the Grand Fleet – giving the British a squadron of five fast battleships. They would play a critical part in the battle.) The British Admiralty, apparently more interested in speed and big guns than armored protection, placed their reliance on safety in numbers. They continued to build capital ships at a far higher rate than Germany ever could, secure in the belief that when the smoke cleared, the more numerous Royal Navy would be the victor. By the close of 1915, and the first year and a half of the war, Great Britain could count 10 battlecruisers and 3 fast battleships in service. In contrast, Imperial Germany could only muster 5 battlecruisers (SMS Goeben was in Turkish service by that time). Though Germany’s battlecruiser / fast battleships were superior – ship for ship – they were outnumbered nearly three to one. HMS Revenge: 29,590 tons – 21.9 knots – 8x15-inch guns – 14x6-inch guns – 4x21-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 13 inches. She was the lead ship of her class and joined the battle squadrons of the Grand Fleet in February 1916. She made a fine edition to the battle line but was far too slow to keep up with battlecruisers. With such an overriding fear of the tactical employment of the German battlecruisers, the British never seemed to have considered the ships, themselves. Of course they were aware of their high speed, and their big guns were on display for all to see, but beyond that, the British had no hard information. Churchill and the Admiralty Sea Lords naturally assumed with such great speed and a ten-gun main battery, the German battlecruisers could hardly have more armor than their own battlecruisers. They had no idea they would one day be trading salvos with heavily armored “fast-battleships” rather than thin-skinned battlecruisers. It would take the outbreak of war in 1914 to alert the British to the rugged strength and superior design of the German Panzerkreuzer. But it would only be after the war was over that the British learned the full extent of the superior German armor protection. In retrospect, the only real advantage the Queen Elizabeth’s would have were their massive 15-inch guns. Any warship that dared to come within range of them was in serious jeopardy. And the Imperial battlecruisers would have the short end of the stick in this fight – Tirpitz had seen to that. He continued to insist his battlecruisers would only fight other battlecruisers – not dreadnought battleships. Anyone with a logical thought process knows it is impossible to draw such a line. A warship must engage whatever enemy targets it encounters – and in a massive fleet engagement – it is almost certain one of them would be a battleship. The Imperial battlecruisers were faster than British battleships, and their armor was strong enough to withstand damage from the 12 inch and 13.5 inch guns of the Grand Fleet. But the offensive power of the Panzerkreuzer was lacking. SMS Von der Tann was, for various reasons, armed with 11-inch guns even when the British Invincible Class was known to posses 12-inch weapons. To avoid initial construction delays, Von der Tann could have been taken into the dockyards in 1911 or 1912 and re-armed with 12-inch guns. (It would have meant extensive modifications, but there was time for that, and the money could have been found – somewhere.) The Moltke Class should have been designed with 12-inch guns to start with. And when the British switched to the 13.5-inch gun, Seydlitz should have been armed with a 13.8-inch gun being developed by Krupp. German gunnery was excellent – they hit what they aimed at. And bigger shells would have caused much more damage to the British ships. That, alone, could have made all the difference in several major engagements early in the war. But the German battlecruisers were always “a day late and a dollar short” when it came to the guns. They were fast enough – and superbly armored – they simply lacked the broadside “punch”. Here you see SMS Lutzow coaling ship while moored to buoys in the shallows of Schillig Roads. She is on picket duty, but Kapitan Harder didn’t want to risk going into action with nearly empty bunkers. In order to speed things up, coal lighters have been brought alongside either beam of the big battlecruiser. The majority of the crew would be turned-to and the ship’s boat booms pressed into service hoisting aboard cargo nets full of canvas coal sacks. At this point we see the obvious penalty of Tirpitz’ stubborn insistence in clinging to an 11-inch gun long past its usefulness. The 15-inch guns of the British Queen Elizabeth Class could hurl a 1,938 pound shell out to 24,500 yards, twice per minute. The new 12-inch guns chosen for the Derfflinger Class could fire a 915 pound shell out to 17,700 yards, three times per minute – considerably less weight and range than the British. Tirpitz’ out-dated belief that battle ranges would be shorter led to turrets designed with insufficient gun elevation. During testing at the Krupp firing range in Meppin, the SK-L/50 12-inch could fire out to 41,000 yards at maximum possible elevation – a potentially massive advantage over the British – thrown away. Tirpitz and his lack of experience with modern gunnery science, saddled the Kaiserliche Marine with a shell weight half that of the British -- and forced the German ships to close the range by 6,800 yards under fire -- before opening fire themselves! Planning for the British Queen Elizabeth Class started in mid-1911 – approximately the same time as Derfflinger. The German Naval High Command was aware the Vickers Elswick Gun Works had already developed a 14-inch rifle for the Japanese, and though Churchill tried to keep it a secret, word leaked out that a 15-inch gun was under development as well. The Reichsmarineamt should have immediately begun exploring the idea with Krupp – if too late for Derfflinger – then certainly for her follow-on sister-ship Lutzow. But that was not to be. The battleship SMS Bayern would be laid down in 1913 and armed with the new Krupp 15-inch gun. The same year, the Mackensen Class battlecruisers would be laid down and were to be armed with 13.8-inch weapons. In 1915, the Ersatz Yorck Class battlecruisers would finally be designed with a 15-inch main battery – quite literally, years behind the British. But the World War would break out in 1914, slowing or halting construction. Only two of the battleships would ever see service (SMS Bayern and Baden). And the battlecruisers of the Hochseeflotte would go into the greatest naval battle in history – outnumbered and under-gunned. SMS LUTZOW – Derfflinger Class This is an excellent 3-D “cut-away” of the lower decks of SMS Lutzow. Up forward, the top two decks are occupied with Petty Officer’s cabins and large compartments for the crew accommodation. The next deck down shows the Bosun’s Store and Capstan Machinery Room. Below that is the Lower Platform Deck with the Bow Torpedo Flat. Behind that, on the Hold Deck, is the Broadside Torpedo Flat. In the “cut-away” amidships, you can see the two air spaces of the torpedo defense, the passageway, a layer of coal bunkers, the anti-torpedo bulkhead, and then the massive boilers with their uptakes reaching up to the funnels. Behind that, you can see the high and low pressure turbines. Note the very tall “steering guide” mounted at the stem. The keel of the ship that would become SMS Lutzow was laid down in the F. Schichau Werk, Danzig, on 15 May 1912. She would be launched some 18 months later on 29 November 1913 – somewhat longer than it would have taken Blohm & Voss. She was christened in honor of Leutnant-General Ludwig Adolf Wilhelm, Freiherr (Baron) von Lutzow (1782 - 1834). He joined the Prussian Army at age thirteen, fought in the Napoleonic Wars, commanded an Army corps, was wounded twice, and decorated with the Pour le Merite with Oak Leaves. The usual period in the Fitting-Out Basin followed, but it was anything but usual. The Schichau workforce had no experience with the big battlecruisers and things progressed slowly. In August 1914, the war broke out and slowed things down even more. Some of the dockyard work force was called up to serve the colors (unskilled workers), while others were diverted to work on the construction of torpedo boats and submarines – suddenly in great demand. And, if all that was not enough, there was a brutal and hard-fought cruiser war raging in the Baltic Sea. Many man-hours of labor went into repairing mine and torpedo damage, not to mention the gunfire received in close-range skirmishes fought in the foggy narrow sea. SMS Lutzow – profile and deck plan. SMS Lutzow was built as an identical twin to Derfflinger, so there were few differences – some were visible, others were not. Derfflinger’s hull had been composed of sixteen watertight compartments – SMS Lutzow had seventeen. Both of Lutzow’s pole masts were fitted with spotting tops, and the yards – rather than set at right angles – were arranged in and “X” pattern. Both funnels were constructed at equal heights, and both were “half-jacketed”. When completing the detail work at Kiel, the forward funnel was fully jacketed. One significant distinguishing feature on Lutzow was her fourteen 5.9-inch guns mounted in casemates amidships on the battery deck – seven on either beam. In Derfflinger, one gun on either beam was removed to make room for the Frahm Roll-Damping tanks. It was decided the anti-roll tanks were of little value, and the guns were restored in Lutzow. The torpedo armament on Lutzow was different – they were placed in the usual locations, but the tube caliber had been increased to 24-inch with an H-8 type torpedo. Another view of SMS Lutzow coaling ship in Schillig Roads. The only inaccuracy in the battlecruiser model is the way the yards on the fore and aft pole masts are set. On Derfflinger they were set as you see them. On Lutzow they were not set at right angles, but in an “X” pattern – to provide two additional halyards for signaling purposes. One significant difference between Derfflinger and Lutzow was an increase in building costs. Instead of the assumed 56 million Marks paid for Derfflinger – Lutzow cost the Imperial treasury 58 million Marks. This “cost-overrun” could be attributed to several possible reasons: (1) simple inflation – each ship always costs more than the last one; (2) Inexperience in building battlecruisers would naturally lead to higher labor costs – it took much longer to build Lutzow; (3) Blohm & Voss was giving the government big discounts Schichau couldn’t match. Most likely, it was a case of “all of the above”. Twenty months later, on 8 August 1915, SMS Lutzow lay alongside the quay in weak Autumn sunshine with a heavy morning mist hanging close to the surface of the Vistula River. The new crew was arranged on the quarterdeck as Kapitan zur See Victor Harder read the commissioning orders and his orders to take command. He will be Lutzow’s first and only commander. When he finished, three resounding cheers were given as the Imperial Naval Ensign was raised on the mainmast and the commissioning pennant broke at the fore-peak. Lutzow had been commissioned into the wartime Kaiserliche Marine, and the following day she was towed to berth “V” along the Westerplatte. SEA TRIALS Here you see SMS Lutzow moored along the Westerplatte quayside in the Vistula River, Danzig – August 1915. The battlecruiser is coaling from lighters alongside before setting sail for Kiel, where her fitting-out will be completed. Note the crew’s laundry drying on the foremast stays. On 23 August, the new Panzerkreuzer weighed anchor and put to sea on her first cruise – to the Imperial Dockyard, Kiel. With an anti-submarine escort of three torpedo boats – G-192, G-194, G-196 – the small detachment increased speed to 20 knots and steered into the setting sun. At 09:00 the following day, Lutzow made fast to buoy A-11 in the Kieler Hafen. On 26 August the battlecruiser was maneuvered into Kiel’s floating dock to have the 24 inch torpedo tubes installed, and moved yet again on 4 September to the Ordnance Quay where the final pieces of her gunnery fire control equipment were installed and tested. On 13 September Lutzow went to sea for torpedo-firing trials, turning circle tests, and other maneuvering tests – then returned to the dockyard from 26 September to 5 October. On 6 October the new cruiser performed heavy artillery trials and general gunnery drills to ensure the batteries preformed smoothly. These were followed by anchoring and engine trials designed to put the equipment through all possible situations. More maneuvering and engine trials were performed before the cruiser put into the floating dock from 10 to 21 October for adjustments to her machinery. At 08:00 on 25 October 1915, Lutzow cast off and proceeded down the Kieler Hafen for her final engine and maneuvering trials. Around 11:50, the port low-pressure turbine suffered sudden and severe damage and eventual failure. Assisted by two salvage tugs, the new cruiser returned to the Kiel dockyards and began a long period of repair lasting until 2 February 1916. Once the battlecruiser was made fast in the repair basin, the workmen and mechanics lifted the housing cover on the port low-pressure turbine and found extensive damage – a very bad case of “turbine salad”. The mechanics discovered 43 blades and guide vanes had been mangled, in addition to the forward drum labyrinth seal broken, and the aft stuffing box cracked – all of which had to be replaced or mended. The cause of all this damage was also located – the head of a workman’s steel hammer – inscribed with the letters “KWK” (Kaiser Werft Kiel). Accidentally left inside the housing inlet during various machinery adjustments, the hammer had been sucked into the whirling turbine. SMS Lutzow tied-up at the repair wharf. The two Langeoog Class salvage tugs that helped her back to port stand-by. The paddle tug Helena has just made fast the machinists barge alongside the big battlecruiser. The tedious job of inspecting and repairing the damaged turbines will soon begin. Lutzow by “Barroco Hispano”. The buildings on the machinists barge are by “Nob”. The dockside warehouses are from “Mattb325”. The salvage tugs, barge, small boat, and paddle tug are all from “AP”. Subsequently, the remaining three turbines were opened and inspected for damage. The port high-pressure turbine had some blades of the “ahead turbine” damaged by an unknown foreign body, but the damage was minor and could be smoothed out. The starboard high-pressure turbine had insignificant damage to a few blades, but the rear drum labyrinth seal was found to be broken and had to be replaced. The starboard low-pressure turbine had some rotor blades damaged by an unknown foreign body – and several blades and guide vanes were replaced. On 2 February 1916, Lutzow was maneuvered out of the repair basin and shifted to the floating dock where repairs continued until 9 February. Four days later, the battlecruiser was moved to buoy A-15 where lighters were brought alongside and “coaling ship” was carried on for two days, followed by fresh provisions. On 17 February, SMS Lutzow put to sea for her final set of trials and these would mainly focus on testing the turbine repairs, while testing her torpedo shooting, and bringing her big 12-inch rifles to a state of near gunnery perfection. In this view of SMS Lutzow, you can see the sleek lines and low profile of the battlecruiser. The design is uncluttered, utilitarian, and advanced for its time. Lines like these would not be found on warships of other nations for another two decades. OPERATIONAL HISTORY On 19 March, SMS Lutzow was ordered back to her buoy in the Kieler Hafen and made fast just an hour before the 1st Scouting Group arrived from Wilhelmshaven. That evening, Kapitan Harder dinned aboard the flagship with Admiral Hipper and the other ship’s captains. The following day, orders assigned Lutzow to 1st Scouting Group, and on 21 March she put to see with the squadron for torpedo shooting and joint exercises on the gunnery ranges – with battle line training the following day. On 24 March, Lutzow and the rest of the Scouting Group made the transit of the Kaiser Wilhelm I canal, arriving in Wilhelmshaven Roads around 09:52 on the 25th. Soon afterward, a message arrived that enemy units had attacked the German picket forces in the Bight – and Seydlitz, Moltke, and Lutzow weighed and steamed down the Jade channel at 20 knots. Once clear of the estuary, the battlecruisers set course northwest into the open sea. Linking up with Derfflinger, the squadron anchored near Vortrapp Deep lighthouse and set their torpedo nets. Around 01:15 the following morning, the Panzerkreuzer weighed and steamed north, but sighting nothing, they put about. On the way back to the Jade, Lutzow was attacked by the British submarine E-24, but the torpedo passed about 75 yards astern. (Unfortunately for E-24, she would not return from her war patrol.) The squadron returned to Wilhelmshaven Roads and anchored at 20:40. On 31 March, Lutzow, Von der Tann, and a torpedo boat escort put to sea to rendezvous with three torpedo boat flotillas returning from a “sweep” beyond the Bight, and on 2 April Lutzow, Von der Tann, the 2nd Scouting Group, and the 3rd Battle Squadron, sailed in support of another torpedo boat “sweep” of “The Broad Fourteens”, west of the Dutch coast. Lying in Wilhelmshaven harbor, the new cruiser was visited by the Flottenchef, Vizeadmiral Scheer, who spent part of his afternoon inspecting the new cruiser. Lutzow spent the remainder of April on picket duty in Schillig Roads, a turn in the dockyard to have her fire control equipment adjusted, various operations in support of light forces, and even a search for a downed floatplane. Contrary to what many historians contend, the Hochseeflotte did not spend the war hiding safe in harbor while their anchor chains rusted. They were quite active from the very first weeks of the war and continued their operations in the North Sea and the German Bight – even after the Battle Of Jutland -- up until the last few months before the 1918 Armistice. The streamlined and graceful hull form is evident in this picture. Gone are the widely flared and protruding ram bows – no more overhanging deck sponsons – no wing turrets -- and no antiquated “tumble-home” along the sides. The smooth and tested hull form produced a large capital ship capable of 29 knots when pushed. And below, you can see the wonderful detail built into these handsome models. The highly detailed battlecruiser is courtesy of @Barroco Hispano and truly a work of art. The size and massive presence of the gun turrets becomes quite clear in this view – they over-shadow all other features on the deck. The channel marker buoys and mooring buoys are by @AP, as are the tugs and lighters in the picture. They are abundantly detailed and superbly textured works of beauty. Notice the large towing winches on the aft deck of the tugs, the level of detail on the lighters, and even the richly textured coal. In late April 1916, German intelligence and wireless intercepts led the Naval High Command to believe a British force would intrude into the waters of the Bight. Unsure of the enemy strength, Admiral Scheer ordered the 1st and 2nd Scouting Groups to conduct a reconnaissance sweep in the likely areas. At 20:50 on 21 April, SMS Lutzow, Von der Tann, and Seydlitz put to sea with the light cruisers and torpedo boats of the 2nd Scouting Group. Once clear of the Jade Estuary, the light cruisers and one torpedo boat flotilla fanned out in a search pattern ahead of the battlecruisers, while the remaining torpedo boats formed an anti-submarine screen around the big ships. Vizeadmiral Hipper (recently promoted) set course northwest at 20 knots, then altered course due north once clear of Heligoland Island. Around 00:25 in the morning darkness of 22 April, the light cruiser SMS Graudenz struck a mine some 15 miles southwest of Amrum Bank. The light cruiser was damaged, but remained under her own power, and was ordered to return to Wilhelmshaven escorted by four torpedo boats. Hipper’s battlecruisers lingered in the area until 05:20, when Seydlitz reported a submarine. About 20 minutes later, Hipper put about, and the squadron retraced its course without sighting any British warships. Lutzow and Von der Tann dropped anchor around 13:00 in Schillig Roads as “picket ships” while the rest of the force carried on to Wilhelmshaven Roads. On 24 April, SMS Lutzow sortied with 1st Scouting Group on the Lowestoft Raid. (See Chapter 16 for operational details.) During the mission Lutzow engaged a single enemy aircraft off Lowestoft with her 8.8cm Flak guns and brought the plane down with her second shot. Later, another plane approached and the entire squadron opened fire, driving it away. (So much for the effectiveness of early aircraft against warships.) Commodore Tyrwhitt’s Harwich Force arrived on the scene and was taken under fire by the battlecruisers, inflicting severe damage on the flagship, the light cruiser HMS Conquest. The British immediately turned away and retired behind a smoke screen. Lutzow’s secondary batteries also dueled with the escorting destroyers and damaged HMS Laertes. During the bombardment of Lowestoft and Great Yarmouth, and the skirmish with the Harwich Force, Lutzow fired twenty 12-inch explosive shells with half-charges, and forty-one 12-inch explosive shells with full charges – in addition to 168 shells from the 5.9-inch secondary batteries. SMS Lutzow returned to the Jade without further incident. On 26 April 1916, Lutzow went into the dockyard and was “out of action” for some thirty-six hours while repairs were made to the main maneuver valve on the starboard high-pressure turbine. She then returned to a mixed routine of picket duty, escort support for returning naval airships and light forces, “sweeps” into the Bight and off Heligoland Island, and more picket duty. On 15 May, Lutzow was detached for exercises in the Baltic and arrived in the Kieler Hafen the next day. After a two hour lay-over – mostly to drop a mail bag and take on fresh fruit and vegetables – the Panzerkreuzer immediately weighed and headed for the gunnery ranges. Both the main and secondary batteries were drilled and practice fired until darkness closed in. The following day, the big cruiser returned to the ranges for gun calibration and more gunnery practice. On 17 May gunnery drill and practice shooting was resumed at 07:00 with full charges. The Kaiserliche Marine had developed a practice of firing four-gun salvos in rotation – both forward turrets, followed by both stern turrets. This actually saved ammunition while “walking” the salvos onto the target. Once the target was “acquired”, the bow and stern turrets could be fired quickly with only a four-second delay between them. This morning, on the third salvo, the gyroscopic firing gear of “A” turret failed. (This was part of the mechanical computer system used when firing in “director mode”, and received data from Fire Control Central to keep the turret trained on target at all times using “electro-magnetic repeaters”.) “A” turret was immediately switched to “local control” and commands were passed by telephone from “Fire Control Central” to the Turret Captain and gun-layers. Firing continued until mid-day, when Lutzow hove-to so “A” turret could be inspected. The failure of the gyroscopic firing instruments was caused by broken gear axles – apparently shattered by the vibration of the gunfire. This was a unique problem. Derfflinger had the same model turret, but she suffered no such problem, and this one would not go away. Lutzow returned to the gunnery range near Stollergrund on 18 May, and at 09:30 made her first run on the target ship – the old Panzerkorvette Oldenburg. I quote Fahnrich zur See (Ensign) Mardersteig aboard Lutzow…… “We approached the target ship at 20 knots with all guns fully charged and loaded. Commandant Harder gave ‘permission to fire’ and with a single thunderclap, the forward two- turret salvo roared off into the distance. The fall of shot was short. ‘Four forwards’ ordered Gunnery Officer Paschen, ‘Fire!’ The aft part of the ship rumbled as the guns crashed out. The fall of shot was over. Now the target was properly bracketed. The forward turrets adjusted, fired again, and an armor-piercing shell struck the target. The target ship fired a red flare and ‘Cease fire immediately – run concluded’ came through all telephones.” Lutzow had struck the target in textbook fashion – with the third salvo – gyroscope problems notwithstanding. The battlecruiser returned to her buoy in the Kieler Hafen and, as a reward for the crew, Kapitan Harder ordered a special dinner with a fresh-baked strudel for desert – topped-off with Schnapps. SMS Lutzow working up to maximum speed during the Measured Mile run off Alsen Island, May 1916. At 07:00 the next morning, Lutzow weighed and ran out of the Kieler Hafen for torpedo firing practice, and then moved to the “Measured Mile Course” off the island of Alsen. All the aft portholes, armored screens (on the 5.9-inch batteries), and skylights were battened down to prevent flooding over the fantail during the speed trials. Double stoker teams were laid on in the boiler rooms and a full head of steam was raised. The “Speed Trial” flag broke at the masthead and ‘All ahead full” was ordered. The bridge engine repeaters clanged and Lutzow sprang forward like a greyhound unleashed. The four screws dug in as the battlecruiser surged forward and high rollers washed across the fantail nearly flooding the turbine air intakes. It should be noted Lutzow’s speed trial was conducted with the ship in a full “Combat Load” condition. On the run up and back, the average speed was recorded at 27.9 knots – and the Alsen Island course was in shallow water. Had the trials been conducted in deeper water, the hydraulic tank engineers estimated an additional two knots could be achieved – possibly more. There was little doubt on Lutzow’s bridge that she was the fastest warship in the Hochseeflotte and a match for anything in the Royal Navy. SMS Lutzow returned to the Kieler Hafen and spent 20 May coaling, and the crew was given a day of rest on the 21st. The following morning the Panzerkreuzer cast off and entered the Kaiser Wilhelm I canal via the Holtenau Lock, anchoring in Wilhelmshaven Roads around 23:45. On 24 May, Lutzow steamed out to Schillig Roads for a four-day stretch of picket duty, followed on the 28th by a brief ceremony raising Vizeadmiral Franz von Hipper’s flag aboard. Lutzow would serve as flagship, 1st Scouting Group, for the remainder of her brief but eventful career. Later that day, orders came down from Vizeadmiral Scheer for all units to assemble on their buoys in Schillig Roads, to raise and maintain steam, and to be ready for action from midnight. Around 15:30, the big cruiser cast off and steered out to Schillig Roads, making fast to tactical buoy A-5. Most of the following day, 29 May, was involved in making the ship ready for whatever orders were to come. The crew was fed three hot meals during the day, and their regular beer ration was issued, but only part of their day could be considered “a day of rest”. Lutzow’s officers and petty officers went round the ship, checking their stations, seeing to “ready” supplies, medical stores, and sealing watertight compartments that would not be used in the coming days. On 30 May, full watches of stokers and trimmers were detailed to the boiler rooms and the engineering watches were laid-on. Officers and petty officers went about the ship double-checking battle stations while the ship’s galleys laid on three hearty meals with an extra beer ration in the evening. Later that night, officers took the opportunity to shave and change their shirts, for none knew when they might get another chance. Once the squadron had put to sea, their cabins aft would have the portholes sealed, blacked-out, and dogged – and their watertight doors would be closed and sealed against flooding in case of damage. During a wartime operation there would be little sleep for officers – and that was only allowed in the Infirmary. By 02:00 on Wednesday 31 May, 1916, the weather – hardly good to start with – had worsened. Clouds hung low over the sea and belts of rain blew in from the north-northwest adding to the discomfort of the officers and crew closed up at their sailing stations. Hipper stood motionless on the bridge wing, staring into the darkness, a scarf tucked into the turned-up collar of his leather great coat to keep the rain out. The light cruisers and torpedo boats of the 2nd Scouting Group had just steamed down the Jade channel, their wakes still roiling and bright. They would form the advance scouting line for the battlecruisers of the 1st Scouting Group. Hipper turned and nodded to his Signal Officer and Kapitan Harder. The signal lamps flashed back along the line of moored ships and they came to life. Lutzow slipped her buoy and the port turbines roared into operation as she sheered to starboard into the Jade channel. Speed was increased to 18 knots, stirring up the muddy bottom, and Lutzow led the way to the open sea – followed by Derfflinger (Kapitan Hartog), Seydlitz (Kapitan von Egidy), Moltke (Kapitan von Karpf), and Von der Tann (Kapitan Zenker). The next 36 hours would be etched into the minds of thousands of men for the rest of their lives. AND – there I must leave SMS Lutzow, but there will be more of her later. For the moment, we have introduced all the characters. It only remains to present the “play”…… NEXT TIME…… THE BEST LAID PLANS… MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful warship models. SPECIAL THANKS to my friend and partner, @AP, for his talents, meticulous models, colorful imagination, and extreme dedication. If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496- 3 Comments
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