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SMS Hindenburg lying at anchor in Schillig Roads – circa late 1917. IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 41: THE THIRD SISTER Just two weeks after SMS Lutzow’s keel was laid, the first meeting to discuss “Grosse Kreuzer – 1913” was held on 31 May 1912. Chief Architect Burkner presented several proposals for improvements to the Derfflinger Class Panzerkreuzer. It was, of course, standard practice for German battlecruisers to be laid down a year apart, even when they were sister-ships of the same class – and it was not uncommon for succeeding sister-ships to be “improved” versions. Burkner placed six proposals before the committee, the most important of which involved alterations to the ship’s main gun turrets. The usual two-stage hoist, carrying powder and shells to the gunhouse, would be replaced with two hoists. A two-stage hoist would continue to carry powder -- but a second, direct hoist, would carry shells to the gunhouse without interruption. This would speed delivery of the projectiles, while reducing the number of times the powder hoist would have to be opened, thereby reducing powder handling hazards. Burkner also wanted to add the built-in 25-foot rangefinders planned for the Bayern Class battleship turrets. Admiral Gerdes was in favor of this change, while suggesting the diesel dynamo rooms (positioned below the munitions chambers) be relocated as a further safety measure. It was estimated the changes would add about 120 tons to the designed displacement. The secondary battery of 5.9-inch guns was to be increased from 14 to 18, while reducing the 3.4-inch guns to eight. Since the small guns were primarily for anti-aircraft purposes, it was thought advisable to increase the ammunition allowance to 350 rounds per gun. This was estimated at another 120 tons added weight. It was Burkner’s intention to equip the cruiser with the new “Type H” 24-inch torpedo. This model could make 30 knots with a range increase from 8,000 to 12,000 yards. The larger caliber torpedo reloads would add 65 tons. At the same time, Burkner wanted to remove the single stern torpedo tube and replace it with an aft torpedo flat deploying two tubes -- one on either beam -- laterally angled at 10-20 degrees. This change was, however, heavily dependent on space and would require the stern to be lengthened by 3 meters -- adding some 300 tons to displacement. Burkner also wanted to increase the battlecruiser’s speed by a half a knot, but withdrew the suggestion. Other department heads pointed out the required machinery, and additional citadel armor to protect it, would add considerable weight and require a major redesign. Finally, Burkner’s last suggestion was to reinforce the torpedo bulkheads to a 2-inch thickness. After some discussion, the State Secretary, Grossadmiral von Tirpitz, ruled out anything requiring a time-consuming redesign – so the secondary battery was kept at 14 guns and the diesel dynamo room would remain where it was. He approved reducing the 3.4-inch guns to eight, but kept the ammunition allowance at 250 rounds per gun. The changes to the main battery gunhouses and the new torpedoes were approved – but not the complicated aft torpedo flat. At the close of the meeting, Tirpitz requested weight and cost figures for the same Grosse Kreuzer, only with four double turrets mounting 14-inch guns. (It is worth noting Tirpitz persisted in arming the battlecruisers with guns one caliber smaller than the 15-inch-gunned Bayern Class battleships.) The Construction Department replied on 9 September 1912 with two studies: one armed with 14-inch guns, and another one with 15-inch guns. Tirpitz, unwilling to take on the higher cost, flatly ruled out the 15-inch option. And -- equally unwilling to accept any increase in size or displacement, the 14-inch gun caliber could only be accommodated by weight reductions in other areas. In the end, the new design studies were unable to completely compensate for weight increases, and the cost was still 33.3 million Marks – 1.8 million more than the estimated 31.5 million Marks spent on Lutzow. “Grosse Kreuzern 1913 – Erstaz Hertha” profile plan. This working sketch of SMS Lutzow was used as a starting basis for the new cruiser and would visually differ very little when done. Tirpitz considered the increases in displacement, and especially in cost, to be too great -- so it was ultimately decided “Grosse Kreuzer - 1913” would be built as the “third sister” of the Derfflinger Class. The final design was approved by His Majesty, the Kaiser, though there would still be a few minor changes made during construction. A quick-loading device for the broadside torpedo flat was designed and installed, and an additional searchlight was added to the foremast. The middle passageway was laid out to take advantage of protective coal bunkers while reducing the close proximity of the 5.9-inch magazines amidships. Increased ventilation was incorporated for the machinery spaces and boiler rooms. She was given fifty additional crewmen, and the central superstructure on the upper deck was lengthened to provide better cabin accommodations. There was a slight increase in displacement, and an effort was made to compensate the loss in speed by fine-tuning her underwater hull lines. The worrisome diesel dynamo rooms, in the end, were taken from beneath the main gun shell rooms and placed on the Hold Deck – removing a fire hazard from the magazine areas. THE OPPOSITION HMS Repulse: Commissioned August 1916 – 27,200 tons – 31.5 knots – 6x15-inch guns – 17x4-inch guns -- 2x21-inch torpedo tubes – armor belt 6 inches. While the discussions, planning, and cost-cutting for “the third sister” went forward, the British were not idle. “Grosse Kreuzer - 1913”, once laid down, would likely join the Hochseeflotte some time in 1916. Unbeknownst to Tirpitz and the Admiralstab – the new Panzerkreuzer would not be commissioned until 1917. By that time, the Royal Navy would posses 4 battlecruisers with 12-inch guns – HMS Inflexible, Indomitable, New Zealand, Australia – and 3 cruisers with 13.5-inch guns – HMS Lion, Princess Royal, and Tiger. If needed as support, they also had the services of the 15-inch-gunned fast battleships of the Queen Elizabeth Class – HMS Queen Elizabeth, Barham, Warspite, Malaya, and Valiant. And between Jutland in May 1916, and the commissioning of the new Imperial Panzerkreuzer in 1917, the British would add 2 battlecruisers of the 15-inch-gunned Renown Class – HMS Renown and Repulse. In the same year, two 15-inch-gunned ships of the Courageous Class (Courageous and Glorious) would also join the fleet. (I mention these last two only to be statistically correct – they were so thinly armored they could never have survived Jutland. Taking them into battle against anything bigger than a light cruiser would have been an act of self-immolation.) That gave the Grand Fleet a total of 11 battlecruisers and 5 fast battleships capable of opposing the German battlecruisers. By contrast, the Hochseeflotte could only muster five battlecruisers – two of which mounted 12-inch guns. Due to the inability of German builders to turn out capital ships quickly, and the Reichstag’s reluctance to pay for them, von Hipper’s 1st Scouting group was hopelessly outnumbered by 1917. And it was only made worse by von Tirpitz’ fear of spending money on Krupp’s excellent SK-L/50 15-inch rifle. HMS Courageous: Commissioned November 1916 – 19,180 tons – 32 knots – 4x15-inch guns – 18x4-inch guns – 2x21-inch torpedo tubes – armor belt 3 inches. With their 3-inch armor belt, the Courageous Class battlecruisers were considered “death traps” by Royal Navy officers. After the war, they were laid-up “in ordinary” and eventually converted to aircraft carriers. Below are three images of Courageous moored to buoys in the Old Harbor Basin where “retired” ships are kept awaiting final disposition. In the first shot, the old harbor wharf was made with an older brick texture, fronted by “WMP” Seawalls, with a shirt factory building repurposed as a large warehouse. The wharf was “dressed-out” with various props from “PEG’s SNM” naval series, dockyard cranes from “Nob’s 1905 Naval Series”, and a “truck-load” of other props by “AP” and various authors. The offshore mooring buoys are by "AP", as are the various lighters and crane barges scattered about. The elderly warships are from “Nob”, and the fine model of Courageous is courtesy of @Barroco Hispano. The remaining two shots give you a close-up of the battlecruiser. You can see the extremely long and narrow hull designed for great speed and providing the length to pack in the extra boilers. The last shot gives you a good detailed view of the model. Note the triple mountings for 4-inch guns adjacent the bridge and the rear of the superstructure deck. The model pictures her as she would have appeared in 1918, with “flying-off” platforms on her main battery turrets for “Sopwith Pups”. (However, NO place to land.) With only four 15-inch guns, Courageous would have been at a severe disadvantage in an engagement with an Imperial battlecruiser. GROSSE KREUZER – 1913 The construction of “Ersatz Hertha’s” hull is well underway. The “wall” running down the center of the ship is the longitudinal bulkhead that will divide the boiler and turbine rooms into separate watertight compartments. Under the terms of the Reichstag Fleet Law Amendment of 1906, an elderly warship could be “retired” after 20 years and automatically replaced. The new ship would be designated in the construction contract with the “Ersatz” (replacement) name of the cruiser that had been “retired”. “Grosse Kreuzer – 1913” would hold the builder’s designation of “Ersatz Herta”, replacing the old protected cruiser of 1898 (see Chapter 2 for details of the old cruiser). On 20 April 1913 the contract was awarded to the Kaiserliche Werft Wilhelmshaven. “Ersatz Hertha’s” keel was laid on 1 October 1913 and she would be launched a shockingly slow twenty-three months later on 1 August 1915. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS “Ersatz Hertha” – profile plan as she appeared upon completion. Visually, “Hertha” was a near-identical twin of SMS Lutzow, with the exception of a few minor differences. Her funnels and funnel caps do not match – but each of the three battlecruisers could be identified by their unique funnels and caps. Lutzow had a simple pole mast forward, rather than the substantial tripod mast on “Hertha”. Derfflinger only received her tripod mast during the extensive repair period following Jutland. Beyond that, the differences between the two ships i\was limited to “internal” adjustments (see previous text). The “Grosse Kreuzer Ersatz Hertha” was constructed as the third ship of the Derfflinger Class. As such, there were very few differences in the construction methods, materials, and process. Rather than repeat them here, I refer you to Chapter 23 for details – and will discuss only the differences between “Hertha” and her predecessors. At 26,947 tons, her displacement was some 350 tons greater, and the new cruiser’s hull was a bit longer, at 696 feet. The Derfflinger Class had a wider beam than previous battlecruisers, which allowed for better use of internal subdivision, resulting in an enormous capacity to withstand battle damage. But wider hulls invariably increased the “drag co-efficient” – reducing the ship’s speed. Through further testing of the hull form in the hydraulic tanks, it was determined a slight lengthening of the stern would add a half knot to her speed. This resulted in a 2.5 meter increase in “Hertha’s” overall length. Unlike Derfflinger and Lutzow, the new Panzerkreuzer would not be fitted with torpedo nets and booms, nor did she receive “Frahm” roll-damping tanks. After Jutland, Derfflinger was fitted with a very heavily braced tripod mast of unusual height, with a multi-level foretop for gunnery direction. Well supported by the heavy-duty tripod, the foretop structure was spacious compared to previous arrangements and contained a fire direction and control position, a 25-foot rangefinder, a torpedo direction position, and a night observation position. “Hertha” would receive hers during the fitting-out process. The Bayern Class battleships would also be given tripod foremasts, indicating a new trend in Imperial capital ship design. ARMOR For all practical purposes, “Hertha” was given the same superb armor suite as her sister ships, with all the advantages of protective coal bunkers and even more extensive internal compartmentalization. There were, however, four exceptions. The armor on the sloping portions of the main battery turrets was increased from 4.2 inches to 6 inches. The armor belt on the bow was 4 inches, as in Derfflinger and Lutzow, but in “Hertha” it was discontinued 40 feet from the stem and replaced with a more narrow belt of 1.2 inch plating. The thinner plates were riveted to the hull skin, rather than the standard practice of bolting armor plate to the hull. An armored transverse bulkhead was added midway between “A” turret and the stem. In an effort to compensate for the reduced armor thickness at the stem, “Hertha” was given an additional watertight compartment forward (17 in total) to increase the reserve buoyancy of the bow. The designers did not yet have any battle experience to draw upon, so they had no idea they were making a serious problem even worse. ARMAMENT MAIN BATTERY The main battery arrangements of “Ersatz Hertha” were somewhat different from her two sisters. She duplicated the mounting of eight SK-L/50 12-inch rifles in four twin turrets, but they were installed in the Drh-L-C/1913 gunhouse designed for the Bayern Class dreadnoughts. Each turret had a 25-foot rangefinder installed up forward just beneath the armored roof. The old turret hood was replaced by a traversing-bearing telescope mounted between the guns. Two more bearing telescopes were mounted on either side wall of the gunhouse. The designers, in a rather bold move, took it upon themselves to alter the gunhouses for an elevation of -5 to +16 degrees, bringing them into line with foreign navies and providing a maximum range of 20,000 yards. (The US Army has an old saying...”It is easier to ask forgiveness than it is to get permission.”) Instead of the old manual traverse back-up system, an auxiliary electric motor was provided. The major difference between the gunhouses on Derfflinger and Lutzow, and those on “Hertha” was the new ammunition hoist system. Two shell hoists, one for each gun barrel, ran up the center of the barbette trunk from the shell rooms and handling spaces located on the lower platform deck. The top end of the “express” hoist came out between the guns near the trunnions. An auto-loader pushed the shell back onto a loading tray which swung the shell behind the breech. The hydraulic rammer then pushed the shell into the breech. Each hoist could service either gun. The shell hoists could only be accessed at the top or the bottom – and there were flash-proof automatic doors at either end. The powder hoists ran up from the powder magazines on the upper platform deck to the transfer room three levels below the guns. Here the powder charges were switched from the lower hoist to the upper hoist, and then up to the guns. The upper and lower hoists had flash-proof automatic doors fitted. The powder hoists were always designed with two stages so flash explosions could not shoot straight down into the powder magazines. This new arrangement gave shells their own dedicated, “express” hoist, eliminating the need to handle them twice on the way to the guns, and clearing the powder hoists of the extra work. Even with the new arrangement, shells and powder could be delivered to the guns at the rate of three rounds per minute. SECONDARY BATTERY The 5.9-inch batteries remained the same as Lutzow – fourteen SK-L/45 guns in shielded casemates on the battery deck amidships. The only difference in the guns were the mounts. A new mounting pedestal had been designed for the Bayern Class – an MPL-C/1913 – and it was taken for use on “Hertha” as well. There were minor modifications to the location of the elevation and traverse controls, but the mount was shorter, and sat closer to the deck. This made the casemate compartment somewhat smaller and allowed a few extra degrees of elevation (slightly increased range). TERTIARY BATTERY Originally, twelve 3.4-inch SK-L/45 (QF) high-velocity guns were intended for torpedo boat defense. But war experience proved these light guns useless against modern destroyers. (See Chapter 36 for specifics on gun performance.) In the end, four 3.4-inch “Flak” L/45 cannon mounted in MPL-C/1913 mounts were positioned around the forward funnel – two on either beam. As anti-aircraft weapons, they also proved of little use. British aircraft were generally carried by primitive “aircraft tenders” and proved awkward to operate, difficult to handle, unreliable, and generally incapable of seriously damaging a capital ship. TORPEDO ARMAMENT As was customary, “Ersatz Hertha” was fitted with four submerged torpedo tubes arranged in the standard pattern -- one fore and aft, and one on each beam. Sixteen of the new 24-inch “Type H” torpedoes were carried. They had a speed of 30 knots and a range of 12,000 yards, with a warhead containing 463 lbs of TNT. The Kaiserliche Marine favored a modified version of “TNT” as the bursting charge in all their shells, torpedoes, and mines because of its stable composition. Foreign navies, the British in particular, tended toward acid-based explosive compounds like Cordite and Lyddite – which often crystallized over time – and either became volatile or went inert and failed to explode on impact. A newly designed quick-loading device was installed in the broadside torpedo flat (the bow and stern torpedo flats were too small for the device). The propulsion plant – boilers, turbines, shafts, propellers, and rudders – were identical to Lutzow. The fine tuning of the underwater hull lines and the slightly lengthened stern allowed “Hertha” to achieve a speed of 27.5 knots in shallow water, even with the slightly heavier displacement. All other details of the design and construction – anchors, ship’s boats, electrical plant, searchlights, wireless transmitters and receivers – were the same as Lutzow. The “ring drainage system” was similar to Lutzow’s “improved” capacity, but the pumps were located in different positions in the hull. “Ersatz Hertha” would ship a crew of 45 officers and 1,118 men. “Grosse Kreuzer Esatz Hertha” was built to be just as fast, rugged, and powerful as her sister ships. And – if at all possible – her towering tripod mast made her even more handsome and warlike than her predecessors. Unfortunately, all the efforts of the planners and architects were unable to defeat the accountants – she came in at a “wartime inflation” cost of 59 million Marks – 3 million Marks over budget. The unadorned hull of “Ersatz Hertha” slides down the slipway at the Imperial Dockyard Wilhelmshaven with much rumbling and clanking of drag chains. Though it was a simple ceremony, it was a moment of great pride for the workmen and extreme interest for the naval officers. (Note the file of officers on the stairs right of center, bottom.) On 1 August 1915, after twenty-three long months on the builder’s slip, “Grosse Kreuzer Ersatz Hertha” was launched. After war broke out her construction was delayed, mainly due to workforce shortages. But the Admiralstab also assigned a higher priority to building U-Boats and repairing battle damage. Repairing torpedo and mine damage tied down a large part of Germany’s shipyard capacity. The new battlecruiser was christened SMS Hindenburg – in honor of Feldmarschall Paul von Hindenburg. Warships were not usually named after “living” military figures, but Hindenburg was, perhaps, the only nationally recognized “war hero” – and he was born to the Prussian aristocracy. Hindenburg had retired as a General der Infanterie in 1903, but was recalled in 1914 and won many victories on the Eastern Front. He became chief of the Supreme Army Command (OHL) in 1916 and remained as such until his second retirement on 30 June 1919 as a Generalfeldmarschall. As the most respected man in Germany, he was elected President of the Weimar Republic in 1925 and held the post until his death at age 86 on 2 August 1934. Though SMS Hindenburg was moved directly from the slipway to the fitting-out basin, work proceeded slowly, and she would remain there for another twenty-one months. In June 1916, an unusual delay occurred when specialized building materials and fabricated sections were “borrowed” to repair Derfflinger after Jutland. Judging by previous warship construction, they could have shaved a year off her time on the slipway, and another year off the fitting-out process. The delay was intolerable, and was responsible for Hindenburg’s absence at Jutland. This is an overhead shot – quite possibly taken from a Zeppelin. SMS Hindenburg has slid down the ways of the large construction slip visible in the left of the picture. The construction slips and dry docks of the Kaiserliche Werft construction yard are laid out along the west and north sides of what is the Inner Basin area of Wilhelmshaven. Hindenburg’s repair or maintenance will be carried out in the large dry dock basins to the right, or in one of several large floating docks built to accommodate the larger dreadnought capital ships. Tugs will push Hindenburg down to the “fitting-out” quay at lower left. Due to the somewhat limited facilities at Wilhelmshaven, it was only possible to have one capital ship building, and one fitting-out, at any given time. In this shot, Hindenburg has been moved from the fitting-out quay to one of the larger repair basins for the final stages of her completion. You can see the heavy work – gun turrets, superstructure, masts, and funnels have been completed. There are numerous small, but essential jobs – mostly interior finishing to be done – but there is no large work force, nor any sign of urgency. This is a 3-D artist’s view of SMS Hindenburg as she would have appeared at the time of commissioning. You can see the long, low, profile of the Derfflinger Class has been dramatically altered with the addition of the heavy and unusually tall tripod foremast. Note the large foretop fire control and spotting position. The overall design concentrates the above deck structures in a compact grouping between the gun turrets, while the long, low, hull gives her the look of a greyhound – lean and fast. The addition of the tripod mast only adds to her majestic proportions and elegant lines. SEA TRIALS Commissioned into the Kaiserliche Marine on 10 May 1917, Hindenburg was given to the battle-tested Kapitan zur See von Karpf, the commanding officer of SMS Moltke at Jutland. The new cruiser lay alongside the coaling and munitions piers from 10-21 May, while stores and fresh provisions were taken aboard from lighters. As the goods were stored below, preparations were made to begin sea trials. Unfortunately, Hindenburg’s official trials report did not survive WW II, but Kapitan von Karpf wrote several progress reports for the Admiralstab which are still extant. With the morning tide on 22 May, Hindenburg weighed and passed through the III lock to Wilhelmshaven Roads where compass deviation was determined, followed by engine and steering maneuver tests. Satisfied with her maneuverability, three torpedo boats from the 14th Flotilla assumed escort duties, and von Karpf set course for the mouth of the Elbe River at 18 knots. She anchored overnight in Altenbruch Roads and on the following day made the transit of the Kaiser Wilhelm I Canal, arriving in the Kieler Hafen by late evening. Hindenburg spent 24-29 May in the hands of the Imperial Dockyard Kiel while her machinery was checked and adjustments made. Newly commissioned, SMS Hindenburg is moored at the Munitions Quay”, working quickly to take aboard her “full combat load” so her sea trials can begin. The turret crews are loading shells and powder charges over the port side, while a work detail is preparing to take aboard ship’s stores and fresh provisions over the starboard rail. All of the lighters and tugboats in this picture are the work of “AP”, while his props are – quite literally – all over the munitions complex. Below is another view of the same scene. The staggeringly detailed model of the battlecruiser SMS Hindenburg is the exquisite work of @AP – and is, without doubt, the finest work he has yet produced!! SMS Hindenburg running the “measured mile” in the Kleinen Belt. She is putting out a great deal of smoke and raising a huge bow wave – as well as a turbulent wake (due to shallow water). At 07:00 on 30 May 1917, the Panzerkreuzer put to sea to begin trials in the western Baltic. Two separate forced-draft trials were run to test the operation of the supplemental oil-firing for the boilers. The ship reached 64,862shp and achieved a sustained speed of 25.49 knots. The morning of 4 June, the cruiser ran out for a “measured mile” speed trial in the Kleinen Belt, during which it was noted the condensers were running “warm” – indicating a retarded flow of steam to the turbines. From 1-5 June she was in dockyard hands to correct the problem, while the traversing works of “C” and “D” turrets were tested. On 11 June, Hindenburg returned to the Kleinen Belt for a re-test on the “measured mile”. This time, her engines developed 95,777shp and attained a speed of 26.7 knots. Since the Kleinen Belt is fairly shallow, it was estimated Hindenburg could easily make 28.5 knots in deep water -- without resorting to boiler overloading. During the high speed test, Hindenburg “dug-in”, taking considerable water across the fantail. From 17-20 June, Hindenburg was moored quayside while aircraft handling equipment was installed. The idea had been added during construction, and the plan called for two twin-engine floatplanes to be shipped on either beam, abaft the second funnel. Hindenburg has been moored at the Cuxhaven repair docks while mechanics work on the overheated steam condensers. The steam pipes could be blocked by construction debris, or the pipes may need to be rerouted to improve the flow pattern and steam dispersal. The repair ship Vestal has moored alongside to support any heavy work, while a machinist’s barge has been brought over to help with the precision fitting needs. This angle shows the new tripod foremast with its spacious fire control top. This second view clearly shows the additional length at the stern and the streamlined hull form. The Steam tug Goliath, standing by the machinists barge, is courtesy of @Barroco Hispano. The building on the barge is by “Nob”, while the barges, dockside cranes, small boats, tugboats, and lighters are all by “AP”. The wonderful repair ship Vestal is also by “AP”. And the absolutely fantastic battlecruiser is the handsomely crafted, scratch-built, work of @AP. SMS Hindenburg on the gunnery range. Kapitan von Karpf has worked up to full speed and has opened fire with the main battery on his second run. On 21 June, the wind was from the WSW, force 3, with light cloud as Hindenburg weighed and put to sea for gunnery trials. The main batteries opened fire at 09:45 and continued at a slow and deliberate pace until 14:15 that afternoon. The following day the 5.9-inch secondary batteries were tested between 08:45 and 13:00. On 27 June, His Highness the Grossherzog (Grand Duke) Friedrich-Franz von Mecklenburg-Schwerin was received on board for a tour of the ship and luncheon with the officers. Beginning 18 July, 1st Scouting Group arrived in Kiel and Hindenburg joined them for unit maneuver training. This was followed by torpedo firing practice and main and secondary gunnery practice on the ranges. SMS Hindenburg was officially detached from trials on 20 August 1917, and the squadron shifted to the Mecklenburg Bight to carry out more maneuvers and towed-target gunnery. The Panzerkreuzer remained there until 11 October, when they returned to the Kieler Hafen. SMS Seydlitz (foreground) followed by SMS Hindenburg during squadron maneuvers with the 1st Scouting Group in Mecklenburg Bight. On 15 October, 1st Scouting Group again ran out for training with torpedo boat flotillas. It gave the torpedo boats station-keeping practice cruising with the big ships, while each of the two flotillas took turns making mock-attacks on them. The squadron anchored in the Kieler Hafen that afternoon, and Vizeadmiral Hipper was received on board Hindenburg. He toured the ship and dined with the officers, discussing their opinions of the new warship. During his inspection, he gave special attention to the new ammunition hoist system – climbing around “B” turret like a young naval cadet. At 22:43 on 25 October, SMS Hindenburg entered the south lock at Holtenau and made the transit of the Kaiser Wilhelm I canal, arriving in Brunsbuttel around 11:20 the following morning. There was a bit of fog, so von Karpf secured the services of a pilot boat and continued to the mouth of the Elbe. Once clear of the river, speed was increased to 18 knots and Hindenburg arrived in the Jade at 16:35. Later that evening, Hindenburg received orders assigning her to 1st Scouting Group, and ran into the dockyard for more minor adjustments and some “finish work” that needed to be done. OPERATIONAL HISTORY SMS Hindenburg was the last battlecruiser, and the last dreadnought, commissioned into the Kaiserliche Marine. She was fully operational by 20 August 1917, but the war had only fifteen months to run before the guns went silent. There would be no more major action at sea, and Hindenburg’s career would be both mundane and short. With trials out of the way, the big cruiser settled into the tedious routine of pulling picket duty in the Jade, being on short notice for raising steam (back-up for picket ships), or being in dockyard hands for periodic maintenance. There were no peacetime cruises as in days past – though the new battleship SMS Baden, escorted by Derfflinger, did carry the Kaiser on a Royal visit to Heligoland Island in August 1917. Training exercises were frequent, but were held in the western Baltic or confined to areas of the German Bight protected by minefields. And there was, of course, the occasional enemy intrusion on this tiresome monotony. In the wee hours of the morning on 17 November, SMS Hindenburg was on picket duty in Schillig Roads when a message was received to assume a state of “increased readiness”. There was a reconnaissance by minesweepers (light cruisers in support) in progress in the Bight – scouting out some recently laid British minefields. The Germans were eager to clear the mines, but the British had been particularly active in the area, and they were unsure what they might run into. As a precaution, Kapitan von Karpf ordered all boilers to be lit-off and steam raised for sailing as soon as possible. At 08:51 a wireless came in from the light cruiser SMS Konigsberg...”Enemy light forces in grid square 058 Alpha.” This was followed four minutes later with...”Enemy heavy units in support – 3 battlecruisers – cruisers and destroyers.” Orders went out to Hindenburg and Moltke to standby, and at 09:40 they were ordered to weigh and put to sea in support of the German light forces. Five boats of the XII Torpedo Boat Flotilla tore down the Jade’s deep water channel to get out ahead and form a screen for the big ships. Within minutes, Hindenburg, followed by Moltke, swept down the channel at 15 knots – visibility was just 5 miles. SMS Hindenburg moving to support German light forces operating in the Heligoland Bight. As seen from SMS Moltke. By 10:45, the Panzerkreuzer were passing War Light Vessel “A” off the Jade, making 23 knots. Around 11:16 the wind shifted slightly and a haze began to settle-in to the north and west. With visibility down to 2 miles, Hindenburg increased to 26 knots and gradually pulled ahead of Moltke, who’s best speed was only 23 knots (dirty bottom – bad coal). At 12:10, ships came in sight ahead on both bows and lookouts identified SMS Kaiser and Kaiserin. German torpedo boats could be seen ahead with light cruisers off the starboard bow. Konteradmiral von Reuter signaled Hindenburg and Moltke to fall-in astern and von Karpf took station off the battleship’s starboard quarter. They maintained course NW until 12:40 when a wireless from the Flottenchef (Scheer) ordered the battleships back to the Jade. Vizeadmiral Souchon (returned from Turkey) ordered the battlecruisers to continue scouting to the NW, and they did, until recalled around 15:00. Hindenburg and Moltke dropped anchor in Schillig Roads at 19:45 without sighting a single enemy. It is just as well. The British had been laying minefields close around the German Bight in an attempt to hinder German surface units, and especially U-Boats, from getting into the North Sea. The raid was supposed to discourage German mine-sweeping activity. HMS Renown, Courageous, Glorious, and a light cruiser squadron were to carry out the attack -- supported at a distance by the 1st Battle Squadron of the Grand Fleet. The British charged out of the haze just after sun-up and opened fire. The German minesweepers instantly scattered and laid a very effective smoke screen as they withdrew. Repulse landed one 15-inch shell on the light cruiser Konigsberg and raced ahead at 31 knots to close on her prey – when a great cloud of black smoke was seen rising to the SE. That could only mean one thing – battleships. Repulse quickly put about, recalled her light cruisers and destroyers, and withdrew into the NW haze. On 23 November, Vizeadmiral von Hipper transferred from SMS Seydlitz to SMS Hindenburg, and in a brief ceremony, his flag was hoisted to her forepeak. Hindenburg would remain flagship of the 1st Scouting Group until 21 June 1919. Beyond that bit of naval protocol, Hindenburg’s existence continued in the mundane and tiresome duties of a fleet in harbor: picket duty – escorting minesweepers – squadron evolutions – visits to the dockyard – and, the occasional “war patrol.” SMS Hindenburg on a visit to the dockyard. She is seen here, cradled in one of the large floating docks. Typically, one or two Panzerkreuzer, accompanied by light cruisers and torpedo boats, might sail westward and scout the “Hoofden” area off the Dutch coast in hopes of surprising some British shipping or light forces. Or – they might even run out to the Dogger Bank and scatter British light forces interfering with German minesweeping operations. Even if nothing momentous was achieved, it allowed the battlecruisers some time at sea and gave them practice operating in the wartime environment. In the later part of 1917, Admiral Scheer began harassing the Norwegian convoys to and from Britain. The Royal Navy had begun providing convoy escorts at least a year earlier to keep U-Boats away from the vital cargoes bound for Britain. After Jutland, Scheer was desperate to find some way to hit back at the British while proving the Hochseeflotte was still relevant to the German war effort. On 17 October, the fast minelaying light cruisers SMS Brummer and Bremse intercepted an east-bound convoy of twelve freighters and two destroyers – HMS Mary Rose and Strongbow. The convoy scattered while the German cruisers were distracted by the escorts, but they managed to sink both destroyers and hunt down nine of the freighters before withdrawing at high speed. On 12 December, four German torpedo boats ambushed another convoy of five freighters, again with two escorting destroyers. All five freighters were lost along with one destroyer. Admiral Sir David Beatty, new C.-in-C. Grand Fleet, could not afford to keep losing destroyers, and was equally reluctant to risk light cruisers. He decided battleships would quickly put an end to the German nuisance raids and attached a Battle Squadron of eight ships to the escort force. This quickly became known to the Admiralstab, and just as quickly, it was seen as the opportunity for which they had been waiting all along. At long last, a manageable portion of the British battle fleet might be isolated and destroyed. This is a view of SMS Hindenburg moored at her berth along the breakwater in Cuxhaven’s roadsted. Built as one of three Derfflinger Class battlecruisers, she is nearly identical to SMS Lutzow. The only visible differences are the tripod foremast with fighting top, and the “cosmetic” appearance of her funnels. You will note, as flagship of Scouting Forces, she is flying a Vizeadmiral’s flag at the forepeak. And -- she is the largest, last, and finest, of all the Imperial battlecruisers. The breakwaters are by “Uki”, and the modified mooring points are by “Mattb325”. The gunboat USS Erie, patrolling off the breakwater, is courtesy of “Barroco Hispano”. The motor launch off the port beam, the boat boom and small boats, the harbor tug with provision lighter – and the superbly crafted model of the SMS Hindenburg is the meticulous work of “AP”. BELOW is a close-up of the detail work on SMS Hindenburg. The massive gun turrets are authentic in every detail, right down to the German version of the “Carley Floats” on their sides. The new tripod foremast and fire control fighting top are clearly visible, with a new black paint scheme for the upper portions. The “signature” boat booms (cranes) and “Kingston Posts” are intricately detailed constructions, and each of the ship’s boats is an individual “work of art” in itself. The soot-stained funnels, weathered decking, and weathered hull are details that are often overlooked. The level of detail is magnificent – and this model is his best work – with more to come. Vizeadmiral von Hipper was tasked with planning the operation and he fell back on the old reliable methods. With the light cruisers of 2nd Scouting Group screening ahead, the Panzerkreuzer of 1st Scouting Group would form the advance screen and convoy strike force. If there were no battleships in the escort, the battlecruisers would make short work of the convoy. If there were British battleships present, Hipper would signal the Hochseeflotte – waiting to the south – just below the horizon. Scheer would outnumber the British battle squadron by nearly 3 to 1. The only real difference in the operational planning was that Hipper imposed strict wireless restrictions on the fleet prior to and during the operation. There would be no gossip on the airwaves. On 23 April 1918, at 05:00, 2nd Scouting Group, followed by 1st Scouting Group cleared the Jade and steered north along the swept channels. But the weather was terrible, with patches of thick fog limiting visibility to as little as 200 meters, and only two and a half miles at best. Navigating minefield channels in such conditions was insanity. Both scouting groups anchored at 11:35, but resumed course and speed at 12:10. By midnight, the two scouting groups had cleared all the British-laid minefields and increased speed to 18 knots. Morning of 24 April dawned bright with a NE breeze and visibility of 34 to 46 miles. Around 09:00 Hipper swung Hindenburg about and led Derfflinger and Seydlitz back to Moltke, lying dead in the water – some fifty miles SW of Bergen, Norway. SMS Moltke had thrown her inboard, starboard propeller, and before the turbines could be shut down, the shaft ran away and caused the couplings to shatter – sending large chunks of metal slicing through the ship. Several boilers were disabled, the hull had been holed and was making water, and only one turbine could be operated. The crew plugged the leak, began sorting out the boilers, and made temporary repairs that would get the ship underway at 4 knots. Fortunately, the main body of the Hochseeflotte drew abreast around 10:25, and the battleship SMS Oldenburg was ordered to take the crippled battlecruiser under tow for the Jade. With Moltke in good hands, Hipper turned north once more in search of the British convoy. By 13:10, 1st Scouting Group was about 60 miles west of Bergen, Norway. Hipper steered a search pattern across the known course of the previous convoys three times. At the top leg of the third pass, he searched about 20 miles farther north, then swung 10 miles inshore and, steering SSE, passed within 40 miles of the fjord mouth. But to no avail – no merchant ships nor warships. It was now past the usual sailing time for the convoys – so they had either sailed early, or canceled the sailing. Hipper swung Hindenburg due south, recalled 2nd Scouting Group from their search pattern, and set course for the Jade. A brief, code-word signal was sent to Scheer, who promptly turned the battle fleet about and also made for Wilhelmshaven. About 01:00 on 25 April, SMS Oldenburg, with Moltke in tow, came into view under a bright moon in a cloudless sky. By this time, Moltke’s crew had made repairs to the engines and the towed battlecruiser was making 13 knots. Hipper reduced speed and 1st Scouting Group took station on the seaward flank of the tow to provide security for the journey home. The group made steady progress southward until about 12:10, when a minesweeper in advance of the group, M-67, struck a mine, broke in half, and sank. Later, around 19:37, Moltke (under tow) was approaching Amrum Bank Passage and the entrance to the German defensive minefields. She was struck in the port side engine room by a torpedo fired from the British submarine E-42. The battlecruiser took on nearly 1,800 tons of water and began listing to port. Kapitan zur See Gygas knew his pumps were holding the water in check, so he maneuvered Moltke into the Amrum Bank Passage and gained the safety of the defensive minefields. Eventually four salvage tugs arrived and helped pump out the flooded compartments, then two of them were lashed alongside, while a third took over the tow from Oldenburg. Around 03:20 on 26 April 1st Scouting Group dropped anchor in Wilhelmshaven Roads, and Moltke went into dry dock soon after daybreak. It was later determined the German agent in Bergen had gotten his information wrong. The convoy was actually scheduled to sail on 25 April – twenty-four hours after Hipper’s visit. But – Hipper’s ban on wireless traffic before and during the sortie proved quite effective. The canny Bavarian had pinpointed the weakness in German operational security. The Room 40 code-breakers in Whitehall never had the slightest notion the Hochseeflotte was loitering about off Norway. A great deal has been written by historians to prove Jutland put the “fear of God” into the Germans and they never again ventured to sea after the battle. The truth, however, is far less complimentary to the British, and a lot less provocative to the Germans. In fact, the entire nature of The Great War at sea changed after Jutland. Submarines and mines were considered far too dangerous in the confined waters of the North Sea. German submarines had become a positive menace to merchant shipping and warships alike. After the battle, Jellicoe arbitrarily decided the Grand Fleet could no longer be risked in the southern portions of the North Sea – it was too close to German submarine bases and too easily mined by German light forces. For his part, Scheer devoted much money and many man-hours to keeping lanes swept through the British-laid minefields, and his warships were constantly stalked by British submarines. The Norwegian sortie proved the German battle fleet could, and would, put to sea – but only when they thought an ambush was possible. The German heavy ships went to sea quite frequently, and sortied outside their own territory, but mostly kept in waters where they could not be easily surprised. So the two greatest battle fleets in the world kept to their own portion of the North Sea – or rode at anchor in “checkmate” of one another. But events in the land war continued to move forward, regardless of the stalemate at sea. And anyone in a position of command knew the war could not last much longer. The British naval blockade had strangled German trade and access to foodstuffs and raw materials – the nation would soon collapse. On 11 August 1918, Hipper was promoted to full Admiral and given command of the Hochseeflotte. Konteradmiral Ludwig von Reuter assumed command of 1st Scouting Group, hoisting his flag aboard SMS Hindenburg the following day. Scheer, having been promoted Chief of the Naval Staff, was determined to inflict as much damage as possible on the Royal Navy in order to obtain a better bargaining position in a negotiated peace. It was early October 1918, and at this point in the game, Scheer was no longer concerned about possible losses to the Hochseeflotte. Scheer’s plan involved two simultaneous raids. One, with torpedo boats and a light cruiser squadron, was to attack British warships operating off the Flanders coast. The other strike by more torpedo boats and light cruisers was to be supported by the Panzerkreuzer of 1st Scouting Group – and would be aimed at the massed shipping in the Thames estuary. No one had attacked the Thames estuary since the Dutch raided the Medway in 1667. This was a spectacularly bold move – guaranteed to bring Beatty and the Grand Fleet south. Once the raids had caused the maximum damage and confusion, the two strike forces would retire and rendezvous with the battle squadrons of the Hochseeflotte. Somewhere off the Texel or Terschelling, Hipper and the Hochseeflotte would offer battle to the Royal Navy. As the Hochseeflotte began to concentrate in the Jade, war-weary sailors became aware of the suicidal nature of the coming operation, and began to jump-ship in large numbers. As Derfflinger and Von der Tann passed through the III Lock into the roadsted, over 300 men from the two ships climbed over the side and disappeared ashore. By 29 October the capital ship crews were in full mutiny and the planned operation was abandoned. Events moved quickly as news of the mutiny spread. Demonstrations and outright riots broke out across Germany, and on 9 November, Kaiser Wilhelm II abdicated both the Imperial and Prussian thrones. On 10 November Wilhelm took a train across the Dutch border and went into exile – where he remained, rather well-off, until his death at age 82, in June 1941. On 11 November 1918, the Armistice was signed and the blood-letting stopped. In less than two weeks, 500 years of Hohenzollern rule over Prussia ceased, and the Imperial German Empire became the Wiemar Republic. Under the terms of the Armistice, the bulk of the Imperial Fleet was to be interned at Scapa Flow pending further disposition by a formal treaty. On 21 November 1918, fifteen capital ships (to include all of the battlecruisers), seven light cruisers, and 50 modern torpedo boats, departed German waters for an unknown fate. Prior to departure, Admiral Adolf von Trotha (Admiralstab) made it clear to Konteradmiral von Reuter (commanding), that the interned ships were not to be seized by anyone – under any circumstances. The German fleet remained in an uneasy captivity during the Versailles peace negotiations -- until a copy of the London “Times” informed Reuter the Armistice was to expire at noon on 21 June 1919. This was, of course, the deadline by which Germany was to have signed the peace treaty. But Reuter decided the British intended to seize the German fleet once the Armistice expired. With no ammunition, he could not defend the ships, and they had insufficient coal to reach Germany. The only means to prevent seizure was to scuttle the ships when an opportunity presented itself. Early on the morning of 21 June, the Grand Fleet steamed out of Scapa Flow to conduct training maneuvers. (Yet another blunder by Beatty.) Around 10:00, Reuter made a flag signal ordering the German ships to stand by – and at 11:20 the order to scuttle was sent by semaphore and searchlight. Actions were taken immediately. Seacocks and flood valves were opened, water pipes smashed, porthole scuttles and watertight doors opened, and even condenser covers were removed to facilitate flooding. Without going into the sad details, 15 capital ships, 5 light cruisers, and 32 torpedo boats settled to the bottom of Scapa Flow. SMS Hindenburg was the last to go down around 17:00. Among the capital ships, only the battleship Baden failed to sink – boarded by the British before it was too late. Within the space of a few hours, the second largest Navy in the world all but ceased to exist. Rightly or wrongly – the Imperial Navy officers had performed the only act of defiance within their power. Defeated in war – but not in battle – they could only preserve their honor through destroying the Hochseeflotte by their own hand. By 17:00 on 21 June 1919, this is all of SMS Hindenburg that remained above water. Her Kapitan scuttled the vessel on an even keel – making it easier for the crew to escape. She was raised 11 years later and scrapped at Rosyth. Her ship’s bell was returned to the Bundesmarine in 1959. NEXT TIME…… THE LAST DREAMS OF EMPIRE MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful warship models. SPECIAL THANKS to my friend and partner, @AP, for his talents, meticulous models, colorful imagination, and extreme dedication. If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496

SMS Derfflinger -- circa 1916 – post-Jutland. The distinctive heavy tripod mast was added after the battle. In this unusual photograph, we see the battlecruiser at anchor in Schillig Roads under a heavily overcast sky – possibly a storm moving in from the North Sea. The composition of the picture provides an almost perfect silhouette of the warship – showing her long, low, and graceful lines to advantage. IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 23: THE “IRON DOG” COMETH SMS Derfflinger – late 1914. Her sea trials were a bit unusual in that they were conducted under wartime conditions with fuel and ammunition loads much heavier than normal. Here you see her riding low in the water and at speed. Naval analysts and historians have tried for a century to classify the seven battlecruisers of the Kaiserliche Marine into some sort of cohesive grouping. Most have chosen to assign Von der Tann, Moltke, Goeben, and Seydlitz to a single “class” which, at first glance, is a reasonable theory. All four ships are quite similar in appearance – with the exception of Von der Tann – the FIRST German battlecruiser. With only four main battery turrets, Von der Tann is the “odd-man-out”. Moltke and Goeben were built as “twins”, and the numerical data and visual appearance of the two ships is very nearly identical. But these two were built flush-decked, which set them apart from either Von der Tann or Seydlitz. Finally, Seydlitz, though somewhat similar in design concept to the other three, was different in numerous details – and far more advanced. I have chosen to address this question by listing them as three separate classes -- Von der Tann Class, Moltke Class, and Seydlitz Class. It should be acknowledged that Von der Tann, as the first Imperial battlecruiser, originated the main battery arrangement, the deck layout, the improved propulsion system, and the brilliant armor suite. The remaining three ships, each in its’ turn, was an improvement on that design – Moltke was better than Von der Tann – and Seydlitz was better than Moltke. Had war not broken out in 1914, this pattern of improving each ship over the last would have continued into the foreseeable future (though the budget deficit was becoming a critical issue). In Britain, it was not uncommon to see three, four, or even five ships built in a class. Their dreadnoughts of the battle line were built to a, more or less, standard configuration. (Sort of like the old sailing “ships-of-the-line” – when you got a good design you just built a “flock” of them). And Britain had a ridiculously small army, so the wealth of their empire could be lavished upon the Royal Navy. Imperial Germany could not do that. Their shipyards took between three and four years to build a dreadnought – far too long to compete with England. And Germany simply did not have the economic base to support both a large and well-equipped army, and a technically advanced and extremely costly navy. Tirpitz had gotten the Reichstag to agree to three dreadnoughts and a battlecruiser each year – which sounds fairly competitive. But it was “breaking the bank” in Berlin. Germany’s strong suite in 1914 was its superb army. In 1914, each “tactical army” was composed of anywhere between three and seven army corps. Each army corps consisted of two infantry divisions with associated artillery, light troops, pioneer detachments, etc, etc. The cost of a single battlecruiser would have paid for three army corps. You see the dilemma, here. Consequently, Imperial Germany did not build large numbers of ships in any “class” – but they built each ship better than the last. The idea of “qualitative superiority” was carried to its ultimate expression with the development of the battlecruiser as a “fast battleship”. And Imperial Germany engineered this marvel first. The British claim to have built the first “fast battleship” -- HMS Queen Elizabeth – but that is debatable. (A discussion better saved for another day.) There were other “fast” dreadnoughts – notably, the Italian dreadnoughts and the Japanese Kongo Class – but NONE of the “speedy” dreadnoughts in other navies could compare with the armor protection incorporated into the Imperial battlecruisers. In their balance of guns, armor, and speed, they were far and away superior to their opponents in their ability to fight and survive. But – they had their flaws – as will be seen. GROSSE KREUZER K - 1911 The keel has been laid – circa March 1913 – and the “double bottom” has been plated over in the center, while the hull form continues to expand into the “bilge” areas. Less than two weeks after the contract for SMS Seydlitz was awarded to Blohm & Voss Shipyard (mid-April 1910) the Design Section of the Kaiserliche Marine requested the General Navy Department to set out specifications for the battleship and cruiser designs for 1911. This would allow time to prepare building documents, run formulas, and begin planning sketches. The General Navy Department considered it too early to speculate: firing trials for Krupp’s new 12-inch rifle (destined for the Helgoland Class) had not been completed – a new triple-turret project had just been started by Krupp – and Machinenfabrik Augsburg-Nurnberg (MAN) was developing large marine diesel engines at the Germania Shipyard – all of which could have an effect on the 1911 ships. Nevertheless, Vizeadmiral Paschen (GND) set forth his own suggestions for the “Grossen Kreuzer 1911”… “The new English battlecruisers have been confirmed as mounting 13.5 inch guns, so a battery of ten guns with a caliber increase to 12 inch guns is unavoidable. (My Italics.) The difference of shell weight – 302kg against 600kg – becomes too large. And we must increase our armor protection to allow time for our guns to take effect. The ten 12 inch guns must be placed on centreline, or in the usual diagonal arrangement. Further, we must consider a three-shaft propeller arrangement with the center shaft coupled to a large cruising diesel to provide practical experience with these new engines. And it is my considered opinion that we must re- examine our underwater protection systems in view of the new intelligence concerning English mines and torpedoes.” In this brief statement is the genesis of the battlecruiser that would come to be nicknamed “The Iron Dog” by her opponents. And it is just as well Paschen was thinking along these lines. “Grosse Kreuzer 1911”, once laid down, would likely join the Hochseeflotte some time in 1914. At that point, the Royal Navy would already posses three 13.5-inch-gunned battlecruisers – HMS Lion, Princess Royal, and Queen Mary. And a fourth one, HMS Tiger, would join the Grand Fleet in October 1914. That would give Britain a total of ten battlecruisers. By contrast, the Hochseeflotte would have a total of five battlecruisers – only one of which would mount 12-inch guns (if the option was taken to increase the gun caliber in 1911). HMS Tiger – circa 1914: 28,500 tons – 28 knots – 8x13.5-inch guns – 12x6-inch guns – 4x21-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 9 inches. Often referred to as the “most beautiful warship, ever” -- she is certainly a formidable opponent, but still suffers from thin belt armor – and an “overall” lack of armor protection. HMS Tiger’s “working-up” period was accelerated, ensuring her training was sufficient to allow her to join the Grand Fleet Battle Cruiser Squadron by October 1914. That gave the British five 12-inch-gunned battlecruisers and four more with 13.5-inch guns. (HMAS Australia would be stationed in Australia at the outbreak of hostilities and would remain there until the German East Asiatic Squadron had been dealt with.) This beautiful model of HMS Tiger is courtesy of @Barroco Hispano. While it may be debated as to whether or not Tiger was the “most beautiful warship ever built”, she was certainly the most handsome British battlecruiser. With her superstructure concentrated in a single mass, slightly forward of midships, the uncluttered fore-deck and after deck spaces made her 704-foot length appear much longer and more graceful. Just as a point of reference, her turrets were lettered, bow to stern – “A”, “B”, “Q”, and “X”. Five of her casemated 6-inch secondary guns were concentrated in a compact arrangement on the Battery Deck alongside the superstructure on either beam. A sixth 6-inch gun was mounted on either beam abaft “Q” turret – an arrangement made necessary by the location of the “Q” turret magazines. A close-up showing the compact nature of Tiger’s superstructure. The tripod mast has the forward bridge and command positions built into it, while the armored conning tower and rangefinder is located in front of it, just to the rear of “B” turret. Unlike previous battlecruisers, Tiger’s boiler rooms were arranged together below decks, allowing the three funnels to be grouped close together in the rear portion of the superstructure. This created a visually pleasing arrangement with the impression of power and speed. The turret arrangements for the Lion Class and HMS Tiger were somewhat odd. British designers had not yet devised a suitable method to allow superfiring turrets to fire one over the other. (The blast over-pressure could cripple the gun crews in the lower turret.) Consequently, “A” turret could fire directly ahead, but “B” turret could only fire at a divergent angle to port or starboard off the bow. “Q” and “X” turret, for maximum efficiency, should have been superfiring -- but the main concern here, seemed to be from Royal Navy officers. They were afraid both stern turrets, grouped so closely, could easily be knocked-out with a single salvo. Needless to say, it is odd the design included superfiring turrets at the bow where the same problem might occur. By late 1911, the British had begun to perceive the threat posed by the Imperial battlecruisers. First Sea Lord, Winston Churchill, still unaware of the power and rugged strength of the Panzekreuzer, was seeking a means to neutralize them in tactical combat. Jackie Fisher had retired from the Admiralty in January, but was in constant correspondence with Churchill – and advocated for a big-gun, armored battleship, fast enough to maneuver against the head (van) of the enemy battle line and concentrate their fire against it. That was the official “Admiralty line” when asking Parliament for the ships. But Churchill’s real purpose in seeking a British “fast battleship” was to neutralize the German battlecruisers and prevent them from maneuvering against the van of the Grand Fleet. Churchill’s solution to the tactical dilemma was the five ships of the Queen Elizabeth Class – HMS Queen Elizabeth, Warspite, Barham, Valiant, and Malaya. Queen Elizabeth would join the fleet in December, 1914. HMS Queen Elizabeth: 32,590 tons – 24 knots – 8x15-inch guns – 16x6-inch guns – 4x21-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 13 inches. Purpose-built as a “fast battleship”, she was heavily armored, with massive 15-inch guns. Though capable of 24 knots, she was only 3 knots faster than the battleships of the Grand Fleet, and when “push came to shove” – she was 3 knots slower than the Imperial battlecruisers. The “QE” would be dangerous -- but could be managed. Soon after Admiral Paschen made his thoughts known, State Secretary von Tirpitz initiated meetings with department heads centered around the armament and propulsion of the new cruiser. Opening the first meeting, Konteradmiral Gerdes, chief of the Weapons Department, presented the results of the latest firing trials and performance diagrams of 11-inch, 12-inch, and 13-inch rifles. The collected data and written notes gave a comparative evaluation of projectile effects at long ranges – with an estimated engagement range of 9,000 – 11,000 yards, and an assumed target armor thickness of 10 inches. Gerdes then went on to say he believed the 11-inch gun was no longer adequate -- especially since the new cruiser would be closely involved with enemy dreadnoughts possessing belt armor of 12 inches or more. He also pointed out the proposed move to eight 12-inch weapons would only entail a weight increase of approximately 40 tons – including increased gun house armor. Von Tirpitz, thoroughly fixated on the 11-inch weapon, disagreed. He could not imagine an engagement range of 11,000 yards – and certainly nothing above that. And believed, even at 11,000 yards, the range would be closed quickly to a much more “close quarters” battle. He further stated the much shorter battle range would favor the five 11-inch turrets over the four 12-inch turret arrangement. From everything I have found in this and numerous similar discussions, the stubborn and short-sighted reluctance to increase the gun caliber can be put down to cost and his out-dated notions of a short-range gun-battle. Unquestionably, his reasoning left a great deal to be desired. The eight 12-inch guns in twin turrets could be procured with only a minimal cost increase over the ten 11-inch guns in twin turrets. Konteradmiral Gerdes had shown the numbers on that and shattered the cost objection. Von Tirpitz’ real objection was that he wanted ten guns in five turrets because he believed more guns in more turrets would be harder to disable in a battle fought at less than 10,000 yards. No doubt this stubborn conviction was born in his days as a young Kapitan -- when Dewey defeated the Spanish at Manila Bay and Togo dismantled the Russian Fleet at Tsushima. To borrow a current tactical philosophy – Tirpitz envisioned re-fighting Tsushima with ships that were twenty times more powerful and vastly more advanced. The old Admiral’s mind simply had not moved with the times. He did not seem to have fully grasped the technological advances in guns and gunnery fire control that had made close quarter combat obsolete. Why close to 10,000 yards when your 12-inch guns could score hits at 16,500 yards? And in all the design discussions I found, only Vizeadmiral Paschen drove the point home about the advantages of bigger guns and bigger shells. The bigger gun (12 inch – 13.5 inch) usually had a greater range – but it invariably had a bigger and more powerful shell. A larger, heavier, shell fell with greater velocity and penetrating power – especially armor-piercing shell. Simply put – it had more kinetic energy and could punch through thicker armor. It also had a larger bursting charge and caused more damage. Early in the war British high explosive shells, in particular, used Lyddite as a more powerful bursting filler -- and it caused tremendous internal damage to lightly armored areas (in addition to turning everything a ghastly shade of yellow). Again, Tirpitz never seemed to understand the value of the larger caliber shell – because he thought the 11 inch could do the same amount of damage at the close battle range he envisioned. “Grosse Kreuzer K” – (SMS Derfflinger) as she would have appeared in late 1914. As the lead ship of the last class of battlecruisers commissioned into the Kaiserliche Marine, she was bigger and more powerful than her predecessors. Note how the superstructure is concentrated in the center of the ship, with the remaining deck space largely free of clutter. The Passat and Nordwind Class tugs are nudging her into a berth in the Old Basin. The docks were re-purposed from “PEG” SNM Series battleship docks and bordered with “WMP” Seawalls to give the appearance of timbered mooring points. The docks were created with red brick texture to give the appearance of older docks (rather than newer concrete). The “Union Warehouse” on the left is from “SM2”, while the row-warehouses on the right were borrowed from “Matb325” and were chosen because of their similarity to structures found in old pictures of the port of Hamburg. The handsome battlecruiser is courtesy of @Barroco Hispano. The tugs, sailors, Atlantic fenders, rope coils, spare anchors, and a bunch of other props were provided by @AP. Stubborn to the last, Tirpitz “tabled” the armament discussion and moved on to what he considered the most important topic – the MAN diesel engines. He saw the emergence of diesel engines as a “...real leap ahead of other navies”. Some department heads did not see it that way – and had issues of their own that needed attention. The Design Bureau was more interested in devising a suitable scheme for underwater protection and reminded Tirpitz a change to diesels would require a new three-shaft design for the propulsion system, and a new hull form for the ship’s stern. Tirpitz was aware of the risk of trying an untested technology, and of the possible delays, but if the situation became critical he could always build the new cruiser as a sister ship to Seydlitz. Reverting to the previous design to save time (and money) had already been done with SMS Goeben -- and the technological changes that should have gone into her had to wait an additional year to be built into Seydlitz. And though the caliber increase to 12-inch guns had been requested on both ships, it was denied on grounds of cost and delay. This “dithering” over gun caliber was, in effect, costing Germany the technological edge their superb armor suit had provided. The British were pushing ahead with higher speeds, bigger guns, and marginal armor increases, while Tirpitz foolishly delayed the inevitable. In essence, Goeben, laid down without technological advances – was a “wasted” ship – a year behind the technology curve. And though improved and updated, and a great ship in her own right, Seydlitz without 12-inch guns, was “wasted” as well. Fortunately, the Construction department did not believe a ship with five 11-inch turrets and diesels to be the most advantageous option. The Design Bureau took the rejected studies from 1910 out of the file cabinets and went to work. By the end of May, a design with four 12-inch turrets on centreline had come together, with another one a month later. At this point, Tirpitz gave way on the gun caliber increase, but clung to his diesel engine until circumstances intervened. In early September 1911, MAN Fabrik determined the experimental diesel, though promising, could not yet develop enough horsepower for capital ships. In a later meeting, several changes were debated and agreed upon, but this resulted in a weight increase and the need to compensate by reducing weight somewhere. A reduction in bow armor was suggested, but Chief Designer Hullmann explained……“With a reduction in belt armor thickness on the bow, it should be understood large caliber shells will inevitably strike the ship there. One must then expect the ship will fill with water forward. If the damage is sufficient, leaks will occur that cannot be sealed with the means available onboard. The ship’s outer hull, to which the armor is secured, will undoubtedly leak, and the forecastle ahead of the citadel transverse bulkhead will certainly fill, and could not be kept drained with the means available onboard”. At that point, the notion of reducing the bow armor thickness was dropped. But tragically, Herr Hullmann had demonstrated remarkable foresight. On 15 June 1911, the Construction Department presented design 5-B. In the ensuing discussions, the ship’s silhouette was lowered by moving the casemates for the 5.9-inch guns to the Battery Deck and eliminating the upper deck where they had been. It was decided to install a splinter shield between the guns in the main battery turrets, and the forward conning tower was reinforced. And in an effort to save additional weight, eight of the original boilers were to be changed from coal-firing to oil-firing – thereby making use of their smaller size and weight. On 22 June, His Majesty The Kaiser, signed off on the design. The construction contract for “Grosse Kreuzer K - 1911” was awarded to Blohm & Voss, Hamburg, on 5 September 1911. Along with the new contract came a letter from the Kaiser requesting every effort be made to reduce the construction time from three years to just two. The executives in the Hamburg yard replied they would have no trouble accelerating the hull construction – but Krupp Essen Werk could not possibly produce the required guns, turrets, and face-hardened armor plate in such a short time. In those days, big guns were complicated and took time to cast and assemble, while the face-hardening of armor plate was a time consuming forging process. The final design of “Grosse Kreuzer K” produced a strikingly handsome ship representing the pinnacle of Imperial shipbuilding. Two sister-ships would follow, and there would be future designs – some even began construction -- but none would ever see service. The three Derfflinger’s were the last of their kind -- the final class of Imperial battlecruisers -- and are widely regarded as the best all-around capital ships of The Great War Era. The Panzerkreuzer had long, graceful, lines with a deliberately low freeboard and a much reduced superstructure. Her “Spartan” simplicity makes her, aesthetically, among the most handsome. GROSSE KREUZER K - 1911 “Grosse Kreuzer K – 1911” – profile and deck plan as she would appear upon completion. Note the raised forecastle deck of previous designs has been eliminated in favor of a gently ascending deck, starting at the “A” turret barbette and rising to the stem. This feature allows a flush-deck appearance while using the forecastle peak at the stem to reduce waves taken over the bow. She was completed with simple pole masts, but after Jutland, the foremast would be replaced by an unusually tall and heavy tripod mast with a large fire control top. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS The keel of “Grosse Kreuzer K” was laid on 30 March 1912. She would be launched nearly sixteen months later, on 12 July 1913. At 26,600 tons, her displacement was, roughly, 1,700 tons heavier than Seydlitz. The new cruiser’s hull was longer, at 690 feet, with a new hull form having finer lines, and a redesigned stern configuration. The usual “raised”, forecastle deck forward was dispensed with in favor of the Battery Deck rising gently from “A” turret to the sharp and vertical stem. This shape “cut” through the waves and threw water away from the bow, while giving the battlecruiser a graceful flush-deck appearance. The hull was plated with Siemens-Martin “mild steel” for flexibility and resilience, with a newly designed system of “longitudinal framing”. This system had been in use on commercial ships for more than sixty years, and in 1858 was used by Isambard Kingdom Brunel in his leviathan steamer Great Eastern, but had never been applied to warships. Without going into too much detail, the new system provided a savings in weight while strengthening the outer hull structure. There were sixteen watertight compartments on six deck levels, with a double bottom running 65% of her length. The double bottom and extensive use of internal compartmentalization between watertight transverse bulkheads contributed significantly to her underwater protection. “Docking keels” and bilge keels (slightly lower on the hull) were installed amidships, and anti-torpedo nets were a design feature. The new battlecruiser was outfitted with three, improved, “Frahm” roll-damping tanks to improve stability. The tanks were located amidships on the Hold Deck, Armored Deck, and Upper Deck. Though carefully thought-out, and arranged to achieve the best results, tests during the ship’s trials were inconclusive – just as they had been with Von der Tann. If you examine the profile and deck plan diagrams, you will readily see the efficient grouping and placement of the above-decks elements. The utilitarian superstructure is concentrated around the twin funnels amidships, and between the two superfiring gun turrets at either end. The whole of the superstructure has been deliberately reduced in height, even more so than previous battlecruisers – and the upper deck freeboard was reduced by one deck level – all in an effort to make her a smaller target – with a smaller price tag. You cannot help but admire the symmetry and grace of the big cruiser’s hull lines and form, and the simplicity of the open and uncluttered decks. You will note “C” and “D” turrets are separated by a deck housing. This housing provides a bit of storage for “deck kit” and covers the air intakes for the low pressure turbine rooms below, on the Hold Deck. Tirpitz had always been wary of having the two stern superfiring turrets so close together (battle damage), so this solution provided a degree of safety. All interior decks were steel plated and covered with linoleum, while exterior (“weather”) decks were steel plated with 2.5 inches of Teak planking. The ship’s electrical suite consisted of two Siemens-Schuckert turbo-dynamos and two Blohm & Voss two-stroke diesel dynamos totaling 1,660kw output at 220 volts. As a precaution against battle damage, the turbo-dynamos were mounted above the high-pressure turbines, on the Upper Platform Deck, while the two-stroke diesels were installed to port and starboard on the Hold Deck. As built, the new battlecruiser was equipped with eight 43-inch searchlights -- four each, grouped around the fore funnel and aft funnel. After the Skagerrak Battle, a heavy tripod mast forward replaced the pole mast and two searchlights were moved to the forward legs, while an additional searchlight was mounted in the platform structure of the mast. The new ship continued the extensive “ring” drainage and pump system, with a considerable increase in pumping capacity – a fifth high-capacity centrifugal pump was added on the Hold Deck, aft. In a pinch, portable electric “leak” pumps were also carried, and the powerful condenser pumps could also be used for drainage. The cruiser was equipped with the “standard” two wireless transmitters, three receivers, and as many antennas, with an additional transmitter/receiver installed in the forward conning tower. “Grosse Kreuzer K” would ship a crew of 44 officers and 1,068 men. MACHINERY ”Grosse Kreuzer K” received fourteen coal-fired, Schulz-Thornycroft water-tube boilers. These were the “naval-double-type”, custom-built in the Blohm & Voss Boiler Works to a modified design with four water drums and two steam drums. These more powerful, weight-saving, boilers were first used in Von der Tann. The coal-fired boilers had a total of fifty-six fireboxes and were arranged in the four aft boiler rooms, with each room divided by a longitudinal bulkhead. The new cruiser was also fitted with four double-ended oil-fired boilers as an experimental trial. These would allow the cruiser to raise steam for maneuvering more quickly, could produce a larger volume of steam, avoided problems with inferior coal, and greatly reduced the number of trimmers and stokers in the crew. After 1916, supplemental “oil-firing” was installed on the remaining boilers. Since the ship was designed to carry up to 3,500 tons of coal and 1,000 tons of oil fuel, the protective function of the coal bunkers was not diminished. The boilers fed four sets of Parsons Steam Turbines manufactured (under license) at the Blohm & Voss Engine Works. High-pressure turbines in the forward engine room worked the two outer shafts, while low pressure turbines in the aft engine room worked the two inner shafts. There were reversing arrangements on all four shafts. The forward and aft engine rooms were divided along the centreline by a longitudinal bulkhead. “Grosse Kreuzer K” was designed to generate 63,000shp. The two rudder, tandem centreline arrangement was retained -- each rudder controlled by an auxiliary steering engine connected with a steam-driven spindle drive. In the event of damage, both rudders could be coupled to a single engine, or manually operated. It should be remembered -- the tandem rudders resulted in extremely poor handling at slow speeds – making it virtually impossible to move these ships in harbors or canals without attending tugs. SHIP’S ARMAMENT This is the Krupp Gun Works at Essen – circa 1901. These appear to be 10-inch rifles from that era. The massive armaments works were run by Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach (a close friend of Wilhelm II) and became the chief supplier of guns and armor to both the German Army and the Kaiserliche Marine. The facilities employed some 70,000 workers and supplied weapons to many nations. Prior to 1887, Russia purchased 3,096 pieces of Krupp ordnance, while the Ottomans bought 2,773. By 1912, Turkey had purchased another 3,943 weapons. (The guns guarding the Dardanelles in 1915 were Krupp.) During the same time frame, Romania acquired 1,450 guns – Bulgaria 517 – Greece 356 – Austria-Hungary 298 – Montenegro 25 – and little Serbia, just 6 guns. MAIN BATTERY “Grosse Kreuzer K” finally adopted the 12-inch SK-L/50 (QF) high-velocity gun for the main battery armament. The rifles were mounted in the Drh L-C/1912 gun house which weighed approximately 550 tons. As with all German naval turrets of the period, they had a designed elevation of +13.5 degrees, providing a range of 17,700 yards. After the Battle Of Dogger Bank the turrets were altered and the range increased to 22,300 yards. The gun was capable of firing a 915 lb shell -- either armor-piercing or high-explosive – at the rate of three rounds per minute. Tests showed “capped” armor-piercing shells (base-fused) capable of penetrating 12 inches of armor plate at 14,000 yards. At 16,000 yards, the same shell could only penetrate an 11-inch plate. The high-explosive shell could penetrate before detonating – even on some armored areas. But on unarmored parts, the shell would detonate 2-6 meters behind the point of impact. The gun houses were electrically trained and hydraulically elevated, but could also be operated manually. All turrets were now fitted with 12-foot Zeiss rangefinders, and two gas-expelling fans were mounted on the rear wall of the turret. Due to the increased weight of the new shell and powder charges, manual handling and ramming was no longer possible. A mechanical rammer was installed in the rear of the gun house. The muzzle velocity of 875mps was a bit slower than the 11-inch rifle – but provided a barrel life of 200 rounds. The magazines held 65 armor-piercing and 25 high-explosive shells per gun tube. This is an excellent view of the 12-inch SK-L/50 (QF) high-velocity rifles mounted in a “test” pair of newly designed Drh L-C/1912 gun houses. The new gun was recently accepted for use in the Helgoland Class battleships, and this new variant of the gun house (turret) was created for use in the new battlecruiser. The unusual shape of the sloping roof is clearly visible, while the actual gun house presents a very low profile. (The sloping portions on the side roof would eventually be removed and a new front glacis plate designed before the pattern was approved.) Note the turret height compared to the workman. These are being hand-assembled and tested in the Krupp Turret Assembly Shop before the design is finalized and put into production. Fire Control “ranging and spotting” was handled from the fore or aft conning towers, whose upper floors housed the Fire Control Party operating Zeiss 15-foot stereoscopic rangefinders mounted on the roof. Other, smaller, rangefinders were installed in various locations -- even a crow’s nest Fire Control position and rangefinder was built into the foremast. The control stations were connected to a Central Gunnery Control situated beneath the protective armored deck. Here, the ship’s plotting team received data from the remote stations, calculated target information, and issued azimuth and elevation orders to the “Turret Captains” via telephones or electro-mechanical “repeaters”. SECONDARY BATTERY ”Grosse Kreuzer K” had the standard secondary battery of 5.9-inch guns – the usual SK-L/45 (QF) high velocity weapon. It was an excellent, all-around, complement to the ship’s main battery. The twelve guns were mounted on the Battery Deck, in MPL-C/1906 armored casemates, six amidships on either beam. Unlike preceding battlecruisers, the freeboard had been deliberately lowered in this design to save money and provide a more difficult target for enemy gunners. Consequently, the secondary batteries were too close to the water and were “wet” a good deal of the time. There would be encounters during the war when these guns proved difficult to operate -- but the guns were manned and fought – nonetheless. (See Chapter 17 for specifics on gun performance.) TERTIARY BATTERY Twelve 3.5 inch SK-L/45 (QF) high-velocity guns were provided for torpedo boat defense in the original design. But war experience showed these guns to be useless against modern destroyers, and they were removed. (See Chapter 36 for specifics on gun performance.) During the war, four 3.5-inch “Flak L/45” cannon mounted in MPL-C/1913 mounts were positioned around the forward funnel – two on either beam. They proved of little use during the war since British aircraft were generally unreliable and were, for all practical purposes, incapable of damaging a capital ship. Here we see SMS Derfflinger made fast at a repair dock while the engineering section and dockyard mechanics make repairs to her starboard low-pressure turbine. Unlike the preceding battlecruisers, Derfflinger and her sister-ship Lutzow suffered with frequent turbine damage. Steam turbines were a relatively new propulsion system in the early years of the 20th Century. The turbine was a simple concept on paper, but proved to be a complicated and delicate piece of precision engineering. A very small machining variance could cause no end of trouble. But, it should be noted, no Imperial battlecruiser ever suffered engine failure during a combat operation. TORPEDO ARMAMENT As was customary for the time period, “Grosse Kreuzer K” was fitted with four submerged 20-inch torpedo tubes. They were arranged one tube fore and aft, and one on each beam. Twelve new type G-7 torpedoes were carried. ARMOR “Grosse Kreuzer K”, in common with all Panzerkreuzer, had an extensive armor suite. Having full knowledge the British were now mounting the BL 13.5-inch Mark V/45 – a much more powerful weapon -- the new battlecruiser would have to be armored to withstand these guns. Krupp Cemented Armor, face-hardened with nickel-steel, unlike previous designs, was used more creatively – not just in the “armor belts” and turrets. A new armored plate was employed – a vertical plate – rather than the usual rows of horizontal plates. This formed the main armor belt and took the place of the “citadel” belt as well – so the former two armored belts were replaced by a single, equally large, but homogeneously rolled, “taller” plate. The plate was 12 inches thick on the Main Armor Belt level (amidships) and tapered to 11 inches covering the Citadel Armor Belt above. A separate level above that, the Battery Deck, had a 6 inch belt up to the main deck level, while the 5.9-inch guns mounted there had 3.5-inch casemated shields. In essence, her armor was not only slightly thicker, but harder to penetrate. Due to the differences in the hull form and silhouette, the armoring pattern differed, in certain respects. But with the flush-deck arrangement and considerably lower freeboard, there was actually more armor spread over a smaller area. Reducing her upper-works by one entire deck level early in the design stage not only saved a good deal of money, but was a positive stroke of genius. Imperial German capital ships were consistently built with extensive and unusually thick armor suites by comparison to other navies, but “Grosse Kreuzer K” was very nearly the epitome of the “fast battleship”. (I’m only going into the armoring scheme’s important aspects – see Chapters 15 and 17 for extensive details.) The new battlecruiser was armored throughout with Krupp Cemented Armor, face hardened with nickel steel, and backed with 2 inches of Teak to prevent spalling. Dillingen-Hutte Fabrik provided the structural construction steel. The “protective armored deck”, unlike foreign warships, extended from stem to stern. The main battery turrets were also protected with Krupp Cemented Nickel Steel armor – turret faces 11 inches – sides 9 inches -- and back 10.5 inches – roof 4.5 inches. The forward conning tower was protected by 14-inch armor -- the aft conning tower had 8 inches. The armor scheme was thicker and better arranged, and was, by all standards – impressive. But there were other “passive defense” features. SMS Derfflinger is made fast at her mooring points inside Cuxhaven Roadsted. An Odin Class tug has come alongside with a lighter bearing fresh fruit and vegetables. It would appear the Admiral’s steam launch has hooked onto the end of the boat boom – von Hipper must be staying for dinner. At sea, under combat conditions, the officers and crew would be served coffee, bread, cheese, fruit, and sometimes a hot soup. But in port, full meals could be cooked – usually breakfast, a light lunch, and dinner. Simple math says the nearly 1,100 man crew could consume around a ton of provisions per day – not to mention beer and Schnaps. The small ship anchored outside the breakwater is a guard ship. (The gunboat USS Erie was – provided by Barroco Hispano -- see earlier chapters for details.) The battlecruiser and steam launches are also from Barroco Hispano. The mooring points (modified) are from “Mattb325”. Breakwaters by “Uki”. The motor launch out in the roadsted, small boats, sailors, tug, and lighter are all by "AP". The underwater protection of “Grosse Kreuzer K” was slightly improved over that of Seydlitz – several compartments below the Protective Armored Deck were permanently sealed off to provide the forward part of the ship more reserve buoyancy. (This proved to be a good idea – but was hardly sufficient.) Beyond that, the standard pattern was followed with minor variations. Sixteen transverse bulkheads divided the ship into seventeen vertical watertight compartments and the protective armored deck (at the waterline) further divided several compartments horizontally. Between the transverse bulkheads were the usual numerous subdivisions -- each compartment capable of being sealed against flooding with watertight doors. In effect – the interior of the hull was a “honeycomb” designed to keep the ship afloat in the event of damage. There were exceptions to the system, usually in the engineering spaces – boiler rooms and engine rooms – where the compartments were large, and often two or three decks in height. Following her predecessors, the new cruiser was given a built-in, armored torpedo bulkhead running between the fore and aft barbettes, along either beam. “Grosse Kreuzer K” had well over 90 watertight compartments – considerably more than most foreign warships – and she would be able to withstand a great deal of damage. (See Chapter 13 for difficulty sinking Blucher.) As always, the common coal bunker provided yet another layer of protection on Imperial warships. Like Von der Tann, the Moltke’s, and Seydlitz, the new battlecruiser made extensive use of outboard hull spaces as coal bunkers. (See Chapter 17 for specific details.) “Grosse Kreuzer K” was given the full suite of wrap-around coal bunkers. As a simple solution, coal was cheaper than Krupp steel, necessary to power the ship, and could absorb more destructive energy than a thick armor plate. Though other navies used protective coal bunkers, none were as comprehensive as those found on German capital ships. “Grosse Kreuzer K” was, in its own way, a revolutionary improvement over the first four Imperial battlecruisers. Seydlitz had been built to the same basic pattern as the Moltke’s, but had a greatly improved armor suite giving her a rugged strength that would prove itself in battle. The new battlecruiser inherited all the technology incorporated into Seydlitz and was given an even better armor suite. Her main battery was increased to 12-inch caliber, and for the first time, was centreline-mounted in superfiring turrets fore and aft – providing wide and overlapping firing arcs. Combine all that with her long, sleek, lines – lengthened forecastle – low central superstructure – and low freeboard – and you have all the basic components of the “fast battleships” that would fight a quarter of a century later. Her very appearance bespoke speed and power and, literally, set her apart as a creature of a more modern age. “Grosse Kreuzer K” was fast, rugged, powerful, and an immensely handsome warship. She would prove to be lethal in combat and nearly impossible to sink. As the lead ship of her class, she was the precursor of the three best battlecruisers to serve in The Great War and, arguably, the three finest capital ships ever built – in any navy. And all of that – for the paltry sum of 56 million Marks. On 14 June 1913, after fourteen months on the builder’s slip at Blohm & Voss, “Grosse Kreuzer K” was christened SMS Derfflinger – in honor of Georg von Derfflinger (1606-1695) – governor of Pomerania and Feldmarschal to the Great Elector of Brandenburg-Prussia. Von Derfflinger served Prussia in various capacities for the bulk of his long military career, reorganizing and training the cavalry and artillery branches, as well as being instrumental in Friedrich Wilhelm’s 1675 victory over the Swedes at the Battle of Fenrbellin. With the christening ceremony over, the levers were thrown and the giant hull began to slide down the slipway – and promptly stuck fast. Only three sledges (cradles) had been constructed beneath the ship’s keel and the center one had too much pressure. Another attempt was made on the following tide, but Derfflinger refused to move. Eventually, the center sledge was disassembled, rebuilt, and heavily lubricated – and on 12 July 1913 – the new battlecruiser slide into the waters of the Elbe. Though she had shown some reluctance to “get her belly wet” – she would go on to earn the nickname bestowed on her by her English opponents – “The Iron Dog”. SMS Derfflinger under easy steam – circa 1915. NEXT TIME…… CHILD OF STRIFE MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful warship models. MY SPECIAL THANKS to my friend and partner, @AP, for his talents, meticulous detail, colorful imagination, extreme dedication, and wonderful models. We hope you enjoy them just half as much as I do ! If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN https://community.simtropolis.com/journals/journal/5910-imperial-dockyards-wilhelmshaven/ SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496