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Chapter 39: The Remains Of The Day
Dreadnought posted a City Journal entry in IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN
The Grand Fleet steaming NW in line-ahead formation -- full daylight on 2 June 1916. IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 39: THE REMAINS OF THE DAY: THE AFTERMATH OF BATTLE The sun rises early in northern latitudes, and as the misty dawn crept above the eastern horizon on 1 June 1916, Vice-Admiral David Beatty’s Battlecruiser Fleet sighted their first German. Lookouts aboard HMS Lion spotted the Zeppelin L-11 as she dipped below the cloud base around 03:30. Nearly as long as a dreadnought, the big airship received a warm reception as Beatty’s ships opened fire – some with their main battery guns. The German air crew reacted quickly, released water ballast, and took their fragile craft back into the clouds. Beatty assumed the airship was scouting ahead of the Hochseeflotte and signaled “clear for action”. But the minutes ticked by with nothing more to be seen. The Battlecruiser Fleet was alone in the choppy waters of the North Sea. (L-11 would stumble into the Grand Fleet a few minutes to the NW, receive the same “hot” reception, and report both encounters to Scheer before being ordered back to Nordholz aerodrome.) Some miles to the north, at 02:47, a heavy mist settled over the sea with the first touch of dawn, and Vice-Admiral John Jellicoe, hopeful of finding the enemy, signaled his fleet to form “line-ahead” battle formation. While the dreadnoughts maneuvered into line, the C.-in-C. set about signaling his light cruiser squadrons and destroyer flotillas to close the battle fleet and assume their assigned stations. The various elements of the Grand Fleet had become disoriented during the night – while SMS Westfalen had scattered and mauled destroyer flotillas much like a fox among barnyard chickens. Jellicoe intended to close Horns Reef and intercept Scheer. About the same time Beatty fired on the Zeppelin, HMS Iron Duke took in a signal from the Admiralty. The Hochseeflotte’s position had been fixed by wireless direction-finding stations an hour earlier (02:30) – 30 miles NE of Iron Duke on a SES course, estimated speed 16 knots – just one hour’s steaming from Horns Reef. The signalman delivered the message to Flag Captain Dreyer on the bridge. Having read it, he shook his head and climbed the ladder to the Admiral’s bridge. Jellicoe read the message with no show of emotion whatsoever. He merely handed the message back...”This signal makes it painfully evident that by no possible means can I catch Scheer before he reaches port – even if I disregard the danger of following him through the minefields…” Jellicoe ordered Dreyer to recall the battlecruisers and alter course for Horns Reef – on the off chance he might snap-up a few German stragglers as he passed by. Jellicoe had trapped Scheer and beaten him – twice – but the sun went down before he could finish the job. In the end, Scheer outmaneuvered and outwitted Jellicoe and escaped the well-laid trap. By sunrise, 2 June, Beatty’s Battlecruiser Fleet was back in Rosyth, Jerram’s 2nd Battle Squadron anchored off Cromarty around 09:00, and the bulk of the Grand Fleet was safely tucked-up in Scapa Flow by noon. But there was little rest to be had. The Fleet took on coal, oil, and ammunition – and, as an afterthought -- a few fresh provisions. At 21:45 that evening, Jellicoe telegraphed London to inform the Admiralty the Grand Fleet was, in all respects, ready for sea. Capital ships of the Grand Fleet lying at anchor in Scapa Flow. The 15-inch gun battleship HMS Revenge is front and center. Around 03:00 1 June, Vizeadmiral Franz von Hipper stood quietly on the bridge of SMS Moltke, the only remaining combat-ready battlecruiser. He held his duty-station ahead of the Hochseeflotte, leading the main body past Horns Reef and toward the Amrum Bank Passage. They would soon pass inshore of the German minefields. Due to the severe damage suffered by SMS Derfflinger and Von der Tann, Scheer ordered them to assemble on Moltke and run into Wilhelmshaven. (SMS Seydlitz was still afloat, but lagging far behind.). As Derfflinger and Von der Tann steamed ahead -- SMS Ostfriesland ran onto a mine. (It was not the minefield Jellicoe had ordered HMS Abdiel to sow – it was another field she had sown a month earlier.) Though considerably damaged, Ostfriesland was able to maintain her place in line. SMS Moltke led the remaining battlecruisers past the outer Jade light ship and anchored in Wilhelmshaven Roads at 14:50. Once the tide came in Derfflinger was able to transit the locks and the Panzerkreuzer ran into the southern harbor basin around 17:15 – badly battered – but covered in Glory and Legend. Vizeadmiral Scheer watched Hipper’s battlecruisers steam off to the south. He would hold the fleet, temporarily, between Horns Reef and the Amrum Bank while he waited for the tide to come in. SMS Konig had led the battle fleet into the gun sights of the Grand Fleet twice, and paid the price. Several large caliber hits (probably 15-inch) badly holed her forward causing serious flooding. Kapitan Bruninghaus had to counter-flood to keep her on an even keel, resulting in the ship taking on 1,600 tons of water. She was down by the bow and forced to wait for the tide (09:30) before trying to navigate Amrum Bank Passage. The fleet eventually cleared Amrum Bank, and a little past midday, Konteradmiral Mauve’s II Battle Squadron was detached for the Elbe River and Cuxhaven. The five old pre-dreadnoughts dropped anchor in Altenbruch Roads around 14:25. After having to beg to be included in the battle fleet’s sortie – and having lost SMS Pommern – the old pre-dreadnoughts had twice steamed into harm’s way to save Hipper’s crippled battlecruisers. They had earned their battle honors. And now every man that crewed the “five-minute-ships” could stand proudly and say...”We were at the battle!” And no one could take that from them. In the gasthauses of old Cuxhaven there would be many stories to tell this night, much beer, and toasts to missing shipmates. As Scheer approached Schillig Roads, five battleships of I Battle Squadron were detached to stand guard. Scheer worried the British might choose this moment to launch a raid on Wilhelmshaven. The remainder of the Hochseeflotte steamed up the deep-water channel to anchor off Wilhelmshaven and wait for the tide to pass through the locks. By 06:30 the following morning (2 June), it was all over – except for the tidying-up. (As an interesting sidelight -- before the battle, Konteradmiral Behncke had made a quick tour of SMS Konig to deliver some words of encouragement to the crew, and the ship’s cat – “Max” – began to follow him. “Max” was a rather large, long-haired, part Norwegian Forest Cat (orange or ginger) with the remainder of his parentage unknown – and he had always had the run of the ship. When Konig finally came to anchor in Wilhelmshaven Roads one of the cook’s assistants thought to feed Max, but he could not be found. Word went around the dreadnought and an informal search was conducted – without success. He was later found in the only place no one had dared to look, the Admiral’s day cabin off the bridge – curled into a neat ball on the Admiral’s cot – sound asleep.) The Hochseeflotte moored quayside in Wilhelmshaven after the battle. Some ships went into dry dock, others made minor repairs and replenished provisions, ammunition, and coal. “The whole situation was difficult to grasp, as I had no real idea of what was going on and we could hardly see anything except flashes of guns, shells falling, ships blowing up, and an occasional glimpse of an enemy vessel…” That is the best one-sentence summary of the Battle of Jutland ever written – and it was in Admiral Jellicoe’s report to the Admiralty. And like the telegram reporting the fleet ready for sea, it may have mollified the Admiralty, but it hardly covered the myriad of details and what followed. Despite the enormous numerical advantage held by the British, the Grand Fleet had been knocked about a bit. Of the 28 British dreadnoughts present at Jutland, 5 were damaged to varying degrees. Of the 9 battlecruisers at Jutland, 3 were sunk and 4 damaged. The official British warship losses at Jutland: Battlecruisers: Queen Mary – Indefatigable – Invincible Battleships: 0 Armored Cruisers: Defence – Warrior – Black Prince Light Cruisers: 0 Destroyers: Tipperary - Nestor - Nomad – Turbulent – Ardent – Fortune – Shark - Sparrowhawk British battlecruisers damaged at Jutland: New Zealand – 1 hit Lion – 14 Princess Royal – 9 Tiger – 21 British battleships damaged at Jutland: Colossus – 2 hits Barham – 6 Malaya – 8 Warspite – 15 Marlborough – 1 torpedo British personnel losses: 6,094 dead – 674 wounded – 177 taken prisoner At first glance, the damage to the Grand Fleet may not seem so bad – but Jellicoe saw things differently the morning after Jutland. He entered the battle with 9 combat-ready battlecruisers. On the morning of 3 June, Beatty’s “Battlecruiser Fleet” was reduced to two undamaged Invincible Class and one lightly damaged Indefatigable Class. ALL of his remaining modern battlecruisers were significantly damaged. A heavily damaged HMS Lion was repaired and returned to duty on 19 July – minus her burnt-out “Q” turret – which could not be replaced until September. Princess Royal received temporary repairs over an eight-day period at Rosyth, then sailed to Plymouth for permanent repairs – and returned to the Grand Fleet on 21 July. Among the “Splendid Cats”, HMS Tiger was peppered pretty heavily by shells, but was repaired at Rosyth Dockyard and returned to the fleet on 1 July. (Incidentally, she fired 303 rounds from her main battery guns and obtained only one hit on SMS Moltke and two on Von der Tann – a 1% hit ratio.) The upshot of this, is Jellicoe had only 4 battlecruisers available for scouting duties during the next six weeks. (HMAS Australia had missed Jutland, but was now available.) This perceived weakness in his scouting forces bothered Jellicoe. HMS Tiger completed repairs and took on coal before rejoining the Battlecruiser Fleet. Three Passat Class and a Nordwind Class tug ease the big battlecruiser against the coaling dock. The docks are 11x3 custom-made lots using an old brick texture and “Paeng’s Grunge Concrete”, fronted by “WMP Seawalls”. The coal cranes are from the “PEG” trash lots, “resized” to fit. The two warehouses left of center are from “Nob’s 1905 Naval Series”. HMS Tiger, the steam locomotive, and coal gondolas are courtesy of Barroco Hispano. The numerous sailors, rope coils, Atlantic fenders, and beautiful tugs are the work of “AP”. The dreadnoughts of the Grand Fleet, as a whole, suffered comparatively little damage – though several individual ships took considerable punishment. HMS Colossus took two shells in the forward superstructure, causing little damage, and returned to duty by 18 June. After nearly being lost to a single torpedo strike, HMS Marlborough received temporary repairs at Hull, then moved to the Armstrong-Whitworth shipyard at Jarrow (Clydebank) for extensive permanent repairs. She returned to the fleet on 5 August. HMS Barham, flagship of the now-famous 5th Battle Squadron “fast battleships”, was a bit “chewed-up”, but returned to the fleet on 5 July. HMS Malaya, another “fast battleship”, survived a great deal of enemy attention and many near misses, but was repaired in the floating dock at Invergordon and returned to the fleet on 4 July. HMS Warspite was the most heavily damaged of the “fast battleships”, but she managed to make port under her own steam and underwent extensive repairs, only returning to the fleet in early August. (Warspite went on to a long and glorious career in WW II. At the Battle of Calabria, 9 June 1940, she opened fire on the Italian battleship Giulio Cesare and scored a hit at the longest known range of 29,000 yards. The record stands unbroken to this day. Warspite was also the first Allied warship to open fire on the Normandy beaches, on June 6, 1944. However, it became something of a standing joke in the Royal Navy that her steering gear problem was never fully cured. For the rest of her service life, Warspite’s steering would, for no apparent reason -- occasionally go “haywire” – and the big ship would “go-walk-about”.) An added stroke of luck came to Jellicoe within days of the battle, when HMS Queen Elizabeth and Emperor of India completed their maintenance and rejoined the fleet. And a few weeks later, the new 15-inch-gunned battleship HMS Royal Sovereign completed her working-up exercises and joined the battle squadrons at Scapa Flow. So – for the next six weeks -- Jellicoe’s “fast battleship” squadron was reduced to two ships – and his total dreadnought battleship strength dropped from 28 to 24 ships. Though this temporary decline in strength preyed on Jellicoe’s mind, the danger was more imagined than real, and he had one obvious and overwhelming advantage. On the morning of 3 June 1916, Jellicoe had an operational battle fleet on two hour’s notice for steam – Admiral Scheer did not. SMS Helgoland undergoes repair in one of the large floating dry docks in Wilhelmshaven that so impressed Jellicoe in the time before the war. The dock is very wide in relation to Helgoland. It was designed to accommodate ships as each class got progressively bigger. Note the funnels on the right of the dock. Boilers and steam engines powered the big pumps used to raise and lower the dock so ships could enter and exit. They also ran generators providing electric light, ventilation fans in the machine shops, and power for the heavy machine tools. Across the North Sea, much the same scene was being played out with the Hochseeflotte. True enough, Scheer had fewer ships to worry about – but more of his were damaged. The size of the British battle fleet, the poor visibility on the day of the battle, and the way in which the battle unfolded, all conspired to concentrate damage to just a portion of the German fleet. The opposing battlecruiser forces engaged early on and stayed engaged for the entire battle – both sides steadily accumulating damage. The British battle fleet was arrayed in such a manner as to be able to bring virtually all their guns to bear on the enemy, while the poor visibility limited their field of vision. This haphazardly resulted in many British ships concentrating their fire on the few visible German dreadnoughts – causing heavy damage. Considering the circumstances, it’s a miracle they survived at all. (Had British gunnery been better, they might not have survived.) Of the 5 German battlecruisers present at Jutland, one was sunk, one was virtually unharmed, two were heavily damaged, and the fifth one was near sinking. Scheer engaged the British with 16 dreadnought battleships – 9 were damaged in varying degrees. Of the 6 pre-dreadnought battleships present, one was lightly damaged and one sunk. (Some authors claim the old battleships were “hit repeatedly” – but there is no evidence in the “BundesArchiv” to support this assertion.) The official German warship losses at Jutland: Battlecruisers: Lutzow Battleships: Pommern (pre-dreadnought) Light Cruisers: Wiesbaden – Elbing – Rostock -- Frauenlob Torpedo Boats: V-48 – S-35 – V-29 – V-27 -- V-4 German battlecruisers damaged: Von der Tann – 4 hits Moltke – 4 Seydlitz – 26, 1 torpedo Derfflinger – 31 German battleships damaged: Rheinland – 1 hit Westfalen – 1 Helgoland – 1 Oldenburg – 1 Kaiser – 2 Ostfriesland – 1 mine Grosser Kurfurst – 8 Konig – 10 Markgraf – 5 Nassau – 2, rammed by destroyer Spitfire German pre-dreadnought battleships damaged: Schleswig-Holstein – 1 hit Schlesien – 1 hit German personnel losses: 2,551 dead – 507 wounded ** (It should be noted no two sources agree on the number of hits taken by the Imperial warships. Consequently, I have taken my numbers from the “BA-MA” – Bundesarchiv – Militararchiv. For purposes of simplification, I have included only hits scored by main and secondary battery guns.) Comparing the numbers, they speak for themselves. In the early decades of the 20th Century, the balance of power was measured in capital ships, and the Royal Navy lost three battlecruisers, while the Kaiserliche Marine lost one battlecruiser and one old pre-dreadnought battleship. If you simply crunch the numbers, the British lost more men and ships. But the immediate balance of power after the battle could be better measured in “repairs” and how long they took to complete. Jellicoe, always worried about maintaining his 2 to 1 margin of superiority, needlessly wrung his hands over a six week repair period. Scheer, on the other hand, did not have imaginary problems – he had real problems. Despite all the grief she inflicted on British destroyer flotillas during the night, SMS Westfalen suffered only minor damage and returned to the fleet in mid-June. She is seen taking on coal from a pair of lighters with a Thor Class tug lashed alongside. Another tug stands by with various ship’s stores. SMS Westfalen courtesy of Barroco Hispano. Tugs, lighters, mooring dolphins, and small boats by AP. Due to the volume of fire directed at them, and the sheer destructive power of the larger British shells, the Imperial capital ships suffered devastating structural damage that would have certainly sunk less well-armored vessels. What’s more – German commercial shipyards and Imperial Dockyards were few in number and scattered between the North Sea and The Baltic. Compounding the difficulty was their limited capacity (hence the numerous floating docks), and their inability to match the speed of English facilities. Scheer was in far worse shape than Jellicoe, and far more worried – and with good reason. A week after the battle of Jutland, Scheer could only muster one slightly damaged battlecruiser (Moltke) and eight undamaged dreadnought battleships. (SMS Konig Albert missed Jutland due to condenser trouble, but was ready for duty on 3 June.) SMS Rheinland was hit only once, and returned to I Battle Squadron by 17 June. A pair of Sophia Class paddle tugs have come alongside to unload their lighters. The first tug is hauling fresh provisions, while the second is transferring dry goods and ship’s stores. A Thor Class tug stands by to top-off Rheinland’s coal bunkers. SMS Westfalen, Rheinland, Helgoland, and Oldenburg were lightly damaged, and returned to service by mid-June (about two weeks), providing a much needed boost in battleship strength. The elderly Schleswig-Holstein and Schlesian (pre-dreadnoughts) were moderately damaged but were repaired dockside at Cuxhaven. Despite being rammed by HMS Spitfire, losing 20 feet or her belt armor, and having a considerable gash above the waterline, SMS Nassau went into Kaiserliche Werft Wilhelmshaven and returned to the fleet on 14 July -- about six weeks. The damage to SMS Grosser Kurfurst was largely superficial, but two hits involved structural damage, so the ship returned to her builder’s yard, A.G. Vulcan, Hamburg. She rejoined the battle fleet on 16 July (approximately six weeks). SMS Nassau was hit by two shells, causing moderate damage – but she was rammed by the destroyer HMS Spitfire. The British ship was passing on an opposite course and seriously damaged the battleship’s port bow and armor belt, with collateral damage along the rest of the port side. Nassau is moored outboard of the dry dock mole undergoing repairs. Two crane barges have been brought alongside to work on the hull plating with a machinists barge to help with the steel work. The steam tug Goliath and the paddle tug Helena are standing by to move the crane barges as needed. SMS Nassau and Goliath are courtesy of “Barroco Hispano”. The mooring dolphins, lighters, tug Helena, and the barges alongside the battleship are all by “AP”, as well as the crane on the left hand barge. There are many props and cranes on the dry dock mole – also by “AP”. The barges and cranes in the left of the picture are from the “PEG” seaports and “SNM Series”. Below is a detail shot. SMS Konig suffered the most serious damage among the Imperial dreadnoughts. She had structural damage to the main armor belt and the forward armored citadel transverse bulkhead. There were also large areas below decks where small compartments were shattered by the blast from armor-piercing shells. (No doubt, 15-inch rounds from HMS Barham, Revenge, or Royal Oak.) Because of her size, Konig required a large floating dock. Wilhelmshaven’s were already occupied, so she transferred to Kaiserliche Werft Kiel for immediate repairs, then to the Howaldtswerk shipyard in the Kieler Hafen to finish the work. She returned to the Jade on 22 July (seven weeks). SMS Ostfriesland is going into dry dock for major repairs to the mine damage on her starboard bow. Once the water is drained they will be able to repair the interior compartments as well as the hull and armor belt. Off her stern are two Passat Class tugs and one older Nordwind Class. While in dock her hull will be cleaned and repainted. The tugs and lighters in the lower left are carrying hundreds of gallons of paint for the purpose. The small dockside cranes are borrowed from the “PEG SNM Series”, while the large 250 ton steam cranes are the meticulous work of “AP”. Ostfriesland is courtesy of “Barroco Hispano”. The tugs, lighters, sailors, and numerous small props dockside are the fine work of “AP”. The mine damage to Ostfriesland, both internal and external, was considerable, but the Imperial Dockyard returned her to duty on 26 July (nearly eight weeks). SMS Markgraf was knocked-about quite a bit – taking at least three 15-inch shells -- but it was a near miss aft that sent her back to the builder’s yard. The force of the detonation alongside (probably another 15-inch round), warped a propeller shaft. Markgraf was escorted to the A.G. Weser Shipyard in Bremen to make use of their large dry dock – and only returned to the Jade on 5 August (roughly nine weeks). SMS Kaiser suffered light damage from 2 hits, but as part of the guard force anchored in Schillig Roads, her repairs were delayed and she only rejoined the battle fleet on 7 August (nine weeks). With Scheer’s battle squadrons once again whole, he received a bit of luck. The new 15-inch-gunned battleship SMS Bayern commissioned into the Kaiserliche Marine on 15 July and was assigned to III Battle Squadron. Due to wartime conditions, the dreadnought battleship SMS Bayern conducted her working-up exercises largely in the Baltic Sea. Urgently needed to strengthen the Hochseeflotte, she was dispatched to Wilhelmshaven with little coal in her bunkers. She anchored in Schillig Roads on 15 July and immediately began coaling ship. Her big 15-inch guns were a welcome addition to III Battle Squadron. Bayern and the steam tug Goliath are courtesy of Barroco Hispano. The Helena Class paddle tug, lighters, small boat, and mooring dolphins are the detailed work of @AP. The repairs to the German battleships had been handled fairly quickly, but then, they had not been under fire for very long. The German battlecruisers were another matter entirely. SMS Moltke only took four hits – but all of them were 15-inch shells. She was holed aft below the armor belt and flooded-down by the stern. On 6 June she was despatched to her builder -- up the Elbe River to the Blohm & Voss Yards. The four big Lyddite shells also caused superficial damage to her hull and decks, but considerably more internal damage to her below deck compartments. Admiral Hipper was finally able to raise his flag aboard Moltke on 14 August (ten weeks). SMS Von der Tann was also hit by four large caliber shells -- two of them 15-inch – one of which struck below the waterline aft, dislodging part of the armor belt and causing serious flooding. Other shells damaged the ship’s upper works, but the most serious problem was with the main gun recoil buffers. During rapid firing early in the battle, Von der Tann’s main battery guns began to overheat, and eventually came out of battery during recoil – effectively putting the guns out of action. A good deal of time was spent overhauling the gun slides and recoil buffers. Repair parts for Von der Tann’s jammed “A” turret were cannibalized from the battleship Rheinland to speed the work. The guns then had to be tested on the Baltic gunnery ranges, and Von der Tann did not rejoin 1st Scouting Group until 15 August (ten weeks). The repair of SMS Seydlitz was one of the most difficult operations ever performed at the Imperial Dockyards Wilhelmshaven. The ship barely made port in a near-sinking condition – and repairs were more like a salvage operation. Almost two weeks were spent sealing holes and lightening the ship enough to get her inside the harbor locks, and then into a floating dock. She absorbed an unbelievable 26 large caliber shells (twelve of them 15-inch) and a torpedo strike. The torpedo, alone, was enough to sink most capital ships of the period. Everything forward of the bridge was riddled with massive shell holes and an utter shambles. Initial repairs were carried out in various floating docks and basins at Wilhelmshaven – then she transferred to Kiel, where more advanced work was undertaken in the construction yard. Seydlitz finally rejoined 1st Scouting Group on 3 November (approximately twenty weeks). SMS Derfflinger was in better shape than Seydlitz, but not by much. She went into a floating dock on 2 June and work was begun draining compartments, plugging holes, and fitting temporary patches to the hull. From 7-9 June she was moored at berth A-5 to clean the ship, remove the torpedo nets and booms, and land part of the ammunition ashore. Derfflinger arrived in Kiel on 11 June where permanent repairs would be carried out in the construction yard. At the same time, the big cruiser received a tall tripod mast -- the signature look for which she is so well known. The new tripod would accommodate a large foretop with an improved 15-foot rangefinder. On 22 June she returned to the floating dock where final repairs were concluded on 15 October. Sea trials and gunnery tests were run to ensure the battlecruiser was combat-ready, and Derfflinger rejoined 1st Scouting Group on 9 November, when they arrived in Kiel for squadron maneuvers and gunnery practice (roughly twenty-one weeks). (Just for the record – If anyone requires proof of the superiority of German armor and its application – Seydlitz and Derfflinger represent tangible proof. Considering the enormous amounts of damage done to these two ships – they should have sunk. But the key philosophy behind German warship construction was survivability. It took, roughly, three years to build SMS Seydlitz, and twenty-nine months for Derfflinger – but it only took five months to make repairs and return them to the fleet. German naval architects understood: it was far cheaper, and much faster, to repair a ship than it was to build a new one.) SMS Derfflinger – circa 1917 – with her tripod foremast and spacious “spotting top”. The legs of the mast were unusually heavy compared to those seen in other navies. German designers made them especially sturdy to eliminate any possibility of vibration that might interfere with the optical rangefinder. The large 15-foot rangefinder would have been installed in the cylindrical shaped, rotating upper level of the spotting top, while the lower level housed the necessary fire control instruments, their operating party, and the firing circuits of the Chief Gunnery Officer. Access to the spotting top would have been via ladders outside the steel mast legs. Oddly enough – none of my extensive research has ever turned up an incident where a spotting top or tripod mast was destroyed by gunfire. There were, of course, numerous instances of rangefinders mounted anywhere on the ship’s superstructure being knocked-out by enemy fire. On 18 August, Vizeadmiral Scheer once again assembled the serviceable units of the Hochseeflotte in Schillig Roads – some 18 dreadnought battleships and 2 battlecruisers. SMS Seydlitz and Derfflinger were not out of the repair yards, so 1st Scouting Group consisted of the battlecruisers SMS Von der Tann and Moltke (flag), reinforced by the battleships Grosser Kurfurst, Markgraf, and the new 15-inch-gunned SMS Bayern. Vizeadmiral Hipper cleared the Jade by 20:00 and set course to the west. An hour later, Admiral Scheer followed with the remaining battleships of the III and I Battle Squadrons. It was Scheer’s intention to show the English, and the rest of the world, the Imperial battle fleet was just as full of fight as ever. In yet another attempt to ambush a portion of the Grand Fleet, he would carry out the previously aborted Sunderland Raid, complete with U-Boat ambushes, and this time fully covered by Zeppelin reconnaissance. As usual, the British were fully alerted by German wireless traffic and the Grand Fleet, Battlecruiser Fleet, and Tyrwhitt’s Harwich Force had put to sea some five hours ahead of the Germans. The morning of 19 August dawned bright and clear as the Hochseeflotte continued to steer west, interrupted twice by early morning submarine sightings. On both occasions, Hipper immediately turned away from the enemy and signaled submarine warnings to Scheer before swinging back to the west. Unfortunately for the Hochseeflotte battle squadrons, around 06:00, some 60 miles north of Terschelling – the British submarine E-23 slammed a torpedo into SMS Westfalen. Hit amidships, the German dreadnought took onboard 800 tons of water, and was ordered back to Wilhelmshaven under escort. As Hipper’s scouting group proceeded on a westerly course, yet another British submarine, this one on the surface, was sighted by SMS Bayern at 08:43. Wary of the numerous submarine sightings, Hipper increased speed and altered course to WSW. To the north, almost simultaneous to the torpedoing of Westfalen, the Grand Fleet was approaching Dogger Bank. HMS Nottingham (Goodenough’s 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron) was on the extreme east end of the scouting line, 6 miles ahead of the battle fleet. Without warning, a single torpedo fired from U-52 struck the light cruiser in the port engine room -- she barely had time to get out a distress signal before going down. Apparently, the signal was sent in such haste it was unclear whether Nottingham was torpedoed or had struck a mine. Alarmed, Jellicoe feared he had run into a freshly laid minefield, and immediately reversed course. For the next two hours, the Grand Fleet actually steamed to the north -- until it could be confirmed Nottingham had been torpedoed – whereupon, the fleet resumed their southerly course. During the brief detour, a Zeppelin sighted the Grand Fleet and reported its course as north. This alerted Scheer to the fact the Grand Fleet was at sea, and puzzled him because of its direction of travel, but ultimately made no difference in the balance of things. Around 14:20, the wind began to freshen from the NW and belts of rain began blowing in. Shortly thereafter, a signal was picked up from the airship L-13…...”Strong enemy force...SE...30 units including dreadnoughts…”. The report was, of course, inaccurate – it was only the light cruisers and destroyers of the Harwich Force. Nevertheless, Hipper signaled Scheer, and swung his ships to close and investigate the report. He ordered SMS Von der Tann and Moltke to increase speed and take a position four miles in advance of the dreadnoughts in his force. Scheer assumed the Zeppelin report had identified Beatty’s battlecruisers, so he aborted the Sunderland Raid and moved to support Hipper. Hipper and Scheer searched briefly for the enemy to the SE, but Tyrwhitt’s force never turned up. After two more unsuccessful attacks by British submarines, Scheer was becoming nervous about a possible British submarine concentration and ambush. Finally, at 16:15, U-58 accurately reported the main body of the Grand Fleet just 60 miles north of Scheer’s position, so he broke off the fruitless search and set course for the Jade. Around 18:30, Tyrwhitt’s Harwich Force finally came on the scene and sighted the screening light cruisers of Hipper’s 1st Scouting Group far to the east and steaming for home. The British gave chase, briefly, but realized it would be dark before they could catch the retiring German warships. When Tyrwhitt sent in the sighting report, Jellicoe swung the Grand Fleet to the east, but it was more a gesture than an act of aggression. A half hour later, Jellicoe stumbled upon another German submarine ambush (U-63) and the screening light cruiser HMS Falmouth was torpedoed. (U-66 finished the job and sent her to the bottom on 20 August while she was being towed back to port.) That was enough for Jellicoe. He had been nervous about bringing the battle fleet that far south in the first place. Now he was certain it was no longer safe to use the Grand Fleet anywhere south of Horn’s Reef. With the High Sea Fleet steaming for the Jade, the signal lamps flashed up and down the long lines of battleships, and the Grand Fleet was ordered back to its’ various bases. After giving Tyrwhitt’s Harwich Force the slip, Hipper and his ships formed a rearguard for the battle fleet and dropped anchor in Schillig Roads around 09:00, 20 August – with no further incident. For all the bravado, on both sides, two things had become clear: (1) Both battle fleets were now wary of each other – and (2) the North Sea had become infested with submarines hostile to one side or the other. Here are four model views of SMS Derfflinger as she looked with her tripod, after rejoining the fleet – circa 1917. She is preparing to take on coal. In the final picture, it is obvious the rangefinder mounted high in the tripod fighting top has a much better vantage point than the rangefinder on top of the armored conning tower. The increased height not only allowed the fire control team to range farther over the horizon, but it was much more likely to be be free of obstruction from gunnery smoke. Excellent model provided by @Barroco Hispano. NEXT TIME…… IF THE TRUTH BE TOLD MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful warship models. SPECIAL THANKS to my friend and partner, @AP, for his talents, meticulous models, colorful imagination, and extreme dedication. If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496- 2 Comments
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Chapter 38: The Long Journey Home
Dreadnought posted a City Journal entry in IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN
The British 12th Destroyer Flotilla charging into the attack. IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 38: THE LONG JOURNEY HOME Around 02:00 1 June, the half-light of dawn had begun to flicker in the east when the British 12th Destroyer Flotilla spotted a line of battleships to starboard. Captain Stirling, leading in HMS Faulkner, had under his command 14 of the most modern and powerful destroyers available to the Grand Fleet. The big ships were quickly identified as four Kaiser Class battleships, followed by four Konig Class – Scheer’s III Battle Squadron. Three hundred yards astern were the pre-dreadnoughts of the II Battle Squadron – with the damaged SMS Nassau tucked into the center of their line. In a rare act of professionalism, Sterling immediately got off a sighting report...”URGENT – PRIORITY – Enemy battleships in sight. My position 10 miles astern of 1st Battle Squadron – Am attacking.” (With irritating irony, this report was never received by Jellicoe, or anyone else. It could have been a damaged wireless antenna on Faulkner, or possibly the German Wireless operators effectively “jamming” British WT traffic.) Stirling led his boats into the attack, closing the enemy at 25 knots. Fortunately for the British, the Germans expected to see their own torpedo boats appearing to starboard and were exchanging recognition signals with them as the British closed-in from the port side. SMS Markgraf’s lookouts spotted the approaching destroyers, but Kapitan Seiferling thought they might be German and held his fire. HMS Faulkner circled the flotilla around in the dim light and approached the German battleships on an opposite course. Now the Germans could clearly see an “attack run” in progress and SMS Konig’s secondary batteries roared to life, quickly followed by Grosser Kurfurst and Markgraf. As their guns opened a rapid fire, the battleships put their helms hard over, turning away to starboard. The British charged in among the hail of 5.9-inch shells and loosed 12 torpedoes at ranges varying from 3,000 to 1,600 yards. Eight of the torpedoes were fired at the German dreadnoughts, while HMS Onslaught directed all four of hers at the pre-dreadnoughts following behind. HMS Faulkner and her flotilla sheered away to starboard as the torpedoes sped toward the German battleships. One passed close ahead of SMS Grosser Kurfurst, another exploded in the wake of Kronprinz, a third torpedo passed within a hundred feet of Markgraf on a parallel course, and a fourth actually went beneath the ship without detonating. But the last two torpedoes fired by HMS Onslaught ran straight and true. SMS Pommern’s magazines erupt in a ball of flame, the ship broken in half by two torpedoes. Though technically a pre-dreadnought – she still went into the history books as the only battleship sunk at Jutland. At 02:10, SMS Pommern was struck square amidships, and it is generally accepted the detonation of two torpedoes touched off one of the 6.7-inch secondary magazines. This, in turn, set off a lightning-fast chain of explosions. In mere seconds, flames engulfed the ship and rose mast-high before a final massive explosion broke her in half. Large pieces of debris hurtled through the air as the battleship’s bow rose up out of the water, then slid backwards until it disappeared beneath the waves. The stern half of the ship capsized, floated briefly, then went under. Pommern was gone -- taking all 839 of her crew with her. SMS Schlesien had to sheer violently out of line to avoid the capsized stern section, but still received a heavy jolt as she struck some sort of wreckage below the surface. When SMS Hannover passed a few moments later, the upturned stern was disappearing beneath a mass of floating wreckage. The trailing elements of the 12th Destroyer Flotilla launched another five torpedoes at the Germans, but they turned away yet again, and there were no further hits. Pommern was the only battleship, on either side, to be sunk during the Battle of Jutland. (It should be noted, SMS Pommern was also the only capital ship to be sunk by a torpedo. HMS Marlborough and SMS Seydlitz were struck by torpedoes, but did not sink. Apparently, torpedoes were more effective against destroyers, torpedo boats, and light cruisers – probably due to close-range melee combat – and quite possibly purely by accident.) The battleships were still blazing away with their secondary batteries, and at such short range, the shells were landing uncomfortably close to the tiny destroyers. Captain Sterling had fought a text-book engagement against 15 battleships at insanely close range, and managed to sink one of them. With few torpedoes remaining, he wisely chose not to press the issue. Sterling rallied his gallant little boats and HMS Faulkner led them off to resume their position astern of the Grand Fleet. Somewhere in that long line of destroyers slicing through the night, was HMS Morning Star -- with 22-year-old Sub-Lieutenant Philip Vian aboard. Another dark night (26-27 May 1941) would find Captain Vian aboard HMS Cossack, leading a destroyer flotilla – harassing the mighty battleship KM Bismarck. His flotilla obtained no hits, and lost a destroyer to German gunfire, but they kept a tired enemy at their battle stations all night – winning him a second award of the DSO in little more than a year. He died in 1968, at home in his bed, age 73 – an “Admiral Of The Fleet”. Fittingly, his last sea-going command had been C.-in-C. Home Fleet, with HMS Vanguard (the last British battleship) flying his flag. HMS Cossack anchored off a “channel navigation beacon” on the Weser River. Navigation beacons are used primarily at night to keep ship traffic on course within the dredged or deep water parts of a harbor channel or river course. While steaming away from, or toward, one of the beacons, the “pilot” (either a river pilot or harbor pilot) visually keeps the two lights directly in line with one another. Notice the land beacon is taller than the water beacon – so the lights should be directly above each other. If the ship veers off course, the lights will go out of alignment and the vessel is in danger of running aground. The “Nav Beacons” and many of the props on the platform are by "AP". I have modified the beacons to have blinking blue lights. A Tribal Class destroyer, HMS Cossack was one of 27 ships: commissioned 1938 – 1,921 tons – 36 knots – 8x4.7-inch (QF) guns – 1 quadruple 21-inch torpedo tube mount – 20 depth charges – no armor. Their guns were placed in twin mountings behind open gun shields and packed a fair punch. The ships were fast, agile, and the Royal Navy never had enough of them to go around. This highly detailed model is courtesy of Barroco Hispano. Off to the NE, the light cruiser HMS Champion, leading the 13th Destroyer Flotilla, heard the gunfire and spotted the gun flashes of the 12th Flotilla’s last engagement. Captain Farie altered course to investigate, accompanied by the destroyers Obdurate and Moresby, and rang for 28 knots. Along the way, two stragglers were picked up, the destroyers Marksman and Maenad, as the little squadron drove to the SE at high speed. By 02:10, it was already getting light in the east when Champion’s lookouts sighted the last four pre-dreadnought battleships of Mauve’s II Battle Squadron disappearing into the thick mist in the east. Apparently, Captain Farie thought better of engaging four battleships and altered course to the east. The battleships might be old and tired, but their 11-inch guns could shred a light cruiser with ease. However, Lt. Commander Alison, in HMS Moresby, was a “destroyer man” – he closed the target for a few more minutes and loosed a single torpedo on a high-speed setting. As he swung the little destroyer back to rejoin Champion, an explosion was heard and a dull orange glow seen in the eastern mist. The old pre-dreadnoughts steamed on, unaware that they had even been sighted – but the torpedo boat V-4 lost her bow to an explosion. It has never been officially established what caused the explosion – a mine – loose ammunition – a spent torpedo floating on the surface – but it could have been Moresby’s final “shot” at the Battle of Jutland. By 02:40, the Hochseeflotte, spearheaded by the aggressive night tactics of SMS Westfalen, had hacked their way through the rear of the British battle line. And not a moment too soon – daylight was beginning to glimmer far away on the eastern horizon. Vizeadmiral Hipper’s four badly mauled battlecruisers were no longer a cohesive unit – he didn’t even know where they were -- but the skill and determination of their officers and crew got them through the enemy line. As the old pre-dreadnought Hannover disappeared in the pre-dawn haze to the SE – the battle, for all intents and purposes, came to an end. But there was one final act to be played out. Around 04:20, Kapitainleutnant Richard Bietzen in SMS G-40 was leading the torpedo boats V-45, G-37, and G-38 to the SE at a comfortable 15 knots. Suddenly, out of the dim morning light and haze, 4 points off the starboard bow and proceeding on an opposite course, were the shapes of a light cruiser and several destroyers. It was the wandering Captain Farie, with HMS Champion and four destroyers – HMS Obdurate, Moresby, Marksman, and Maenad. Bietzen’s path home was now blocked, but reluctant to become involved in a chase and running gun battle, he decided to press the element of surprise – and attack! “...Go to utmost speed -- man the guns – all torpedo tubes starboard – fire when you bear on the target…” The first torpedo left the tube and missed the target, but Champion sheered away to the west to avoid the danger. Bietzen then opened a rapid fire on the trailing British destroyer, followed by the guns and torpedoes of the other boats. Seconds later a 6-inch shell slammed into G-40 and disabled the aft steam turbine -- wrecking her steam pipes and leaving her dead in the water. Fortunately, the bold attack paid-off and the British turned away to the west and disappeared into the murk. Arrangements were swiftly made to tow G-40, but the hawsers kept parting in the choppy waters. Finally, an assistant helmsman, with many years experience in the merchant marine, suggested securing G-40’s bow anchor chains to the stern bollards of G-37 to make the tow. With the chains secured, the little flotilla set off once again for the Jade. A distress call was sent out, and SMS Regensburg with four more torpedo boats soon arrived to act as escort. During the startling encounter, Kapitainleutnant Bietzen’s torpedo boats had been encumbered with a precious cargo rescued from a sinking ship, and his swift and decisive action meant they would live to return home. The quick thinking ex-merchant seaman was the rescued assistant helmsman from SMS Lutzow, and Bietzen’s torpedo boats were loaded down with 1,176 of his shipmates. With the battle finally over, the task at hand was to get the wounded steel beasts to safe harbor. Konteradmiral Mauve’s pre-dreadnoughts of the II Battle Squadron alter course to the southeast as they steam off into the pre-dawn haze. They were the last of Scheer’s ships to break through the rear of the Grand Fleet. It had been a long, long, day – and the Imperial battlecruisers had borne the brunt of the battle throughout. The Panzerkreuzer had been designed as fast cruisers with an armor suite that would allow them to serve in the battle line and survive. But they were never meant to take the place of the battle line -- and on 31 May – that is exactly what happened. Any single battlecruiser spent more time under direct enemy fire than nearly all of the Hochseeflotte battleships put together. The unassuming Danish steamer N.J. Fjord had been sighted around 15:00 by the scouting forces of the two opposing fleets, and some forty minutes later, Vizeadmiral Hipper’s battlecruisers were hotly engaged with the British Battlecruiser Fleet. For the next four hours, the Panzerkreuzer were the tip of Scheer’s spear. Wherever the action was hottest, they would be there. And when Scheer called upon them to cover his last retreat, they charged into the teeth of the enemy fire and saved the battle fleet. But at great cost. When Vizeadmiral Hipper was finally able to board SMS Moltke and resume command of his squadron, he ordered them to increase speed to 20 knots and take station ahead of the Hochseeflotte. As Derfflinger and Von der Tann signaled they were unable to comply, Hipper realized his squadron was no longer battle-worthy. Derfflinger and Von der Tann were ordered to the rear of the battle fleet and instructed to keep up as best they could. Moltke, relatively undamaged, and Seydlitz, still capable of high speed, steered for the head of the battle fleet. Some time after 21:57, Moltke sighted what turned out to be the British 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron and turned away to the west. In the process, she lost contact with Seydlitz. About an hour later, Moltke sighted the head of the British battle line (HMS King George V). She altered course to the south, increased speed to 25 knots, then cut across the bow of the British battleships and disappeared into the eastern darkness. Again, she was recognized by the British as an enemy ship, but they did not open fire. In sharp contrast, Thuringen had spotted HMS Black `Prince and did not hesitate to blow her out of the water. SMS Derfflinger dropped astern and took station to the rear of Mauve’s pre-dreadnoughts. Derfflinger had been beaten-up pretty badly, but managed to get one turret back in manual operation. Her forecastle area had been heavily damaged and she was flooded-down by the bow, unable to make more than 18 knots. SMS Von der Tann had no serviceable main battery guns, had flooded by the stern, and was having trouble maintaining the fires in her boilers. The build-up of inferior coal “clinkers” threatened to put the fires out, so Von der Tann was also ordered to the rear so she could clean her fires. Together, the two battlecruisers would slip through the British rearguard covered by the pre-dreadnoughts of II Battle Squadron. SMS Seydlitz, however, was now alone – and in a serious condition. SMS Moltke had used her speed advantage to get across in front of the British battleships, but Seydlitz was incapable of that kind of speed, and in her flooded condition, she was extremely difficult to maneuver. Having veered off to the west when the British were encountered, she returned to her easterly course around midnight, only to find a two-mile gap had developed in the British line. Kapitan von Egidy knew he was in a dangerous position – but he was desperate to save his ship. He rang for all the speed he thought his sluggish ship could manage and steered east across the path of the enemy – who was surely close about. Close, indeed. Seydlitz was spotted in the distance off the bow of the approaching HMS Marlborough, leading Vice-Admiral Burney’s 1st Battle Squadron. Captain Ross did not think Marlborough’s battered bulkheads could withstand the shock of firing her main batteries – and did nothing. Captain Kiddle in HMS Revenge (15-inch guns) challenged the stranger, but was satisfied by the wrong recognition signal -- colored lights – and did nothing. HMS Hercules, apparently, ignored the intruder – no one else seemed in a hurry to open fire. And HMS Agincourt (14x12-inch guns) decided not to challenge, rather than give away the division’s position. And so it was -- Seydlitz, the “lucky ship” -- managed to escape east between the battle squadrons of the Grand Fleet. Upon inspection, it was estimated about 2,600 tons of water had been taken aboard Seydlitz, but the pumps appeared to be controlling the water level inside the ship. Unfortunately, most of the flooding had occurred below the armored deck. Additional flooding had occurred in the port and starboard wing passages forward of the second funnel. She was already considerably down by the bow, and any sort of speed forced water over the forecastle deck. The water then entered the forecastle above the armored deck through the huge holes blasted there. The massive internal blast damage among the compartments below decks now made it impossible to control the flooding above the armored deck. (British shells were designed to be particularly destructive and contained a powerful Picric-Acid-based bursting charge called Lyddite. It was easily identified because the explosion turned the entire surrounding area a ghastly scorched-yellow color. The shells passed through the deck and exploded some fifteen feet inside the ship, causing massive blast damage.) Additionally, the blast from the single torpedo strike caused a serious distortion in the seal between the armored deck and the torpedo bulkhead, admitting more water. Despite the crew’s best efforts, Seydlitz’ bow continued to sink lower and lower -- and the lower she settled, the more water came into the forecastle. Her speed was reduced from 20 knots to 15 knots, and then to 12 knots, because the bow wave was now constantly rolling over the forecastle and the trim of the ship made control more and more difficult. The water on the forward battery deck eventually over-topped the forward transverse bulkhead of the citadel armor, and began to fill more compartments above the armor deck, endangering the ship’s stability. The damage control parties were unable to do more than slow the flooding because the compartments above the armored deck were hopelessly riddled with shell splinters or terribly distorted by the blast of the Lyddite shells. As predicted, years before, the thinly armored bow area had come back to haunt first Lutzow, then Derfflinger, and now Seydlitz. The crew “turned to” and every able-bodied man was put to plugging splinter holes and shell holes. Wooden plugs were pounded into smaller holes, timber patches were fashioned and propped into place with timber shoring, and collision mats reinforced with timber were used to try and cover some of the large openings. The emergency leak pumps were broken out and put into operation – and mercifully, the main pumps continued to function at full capacity. Around 05:45 on 1 June, the sea began to rise and the choppy waves threatened to wash away some of the patches. Soon the water pressure on the forward bulkheads became too great and several below decks compartments were evacuated. Kapitan von Egidy further reduced speed to 10 knots, and then to 7 knots to prevent their collapse. About this time the II Battle Squadron, followed by Derfflinger, passed to starboard, steering for Horns Reef. SMS Seydlitz is seen here after daylight on 1 June, steering for Horns Reef. The ship has already taken on a slight list to port, and she is seriously down by the bow. In her waterlogged condition, the engineers are forced to run her engines at maximum revolutions to produce just 7 knots of forward motion – hence the great volume of smoke emitted by her funnels. Around 07:40, Seydlitz was approaching Horns Reef when both gyro compasses failed. The magnetic compass had suffered a deviation change, and all the charts were either lost, covered in blood, or underwater. By this time, both steering engines had failed and Seydlitz could only be maneuvered, with great difficulty, by the manual apparatus. The wounded battlecruiser had already grounded twice, and navigating Horns Reef and the tricky Amrum Bank Passage with a ship badly down by the bow was deemed doubtful. Von Egidy signaled 2nd Scouting Group for assistance. Soon, five minesweepers arrived to take up anti-submarine patrols, and the light cruiser SMS Pillau arrived to act as a navigational guide for the heavily damaged warship. By 08:40, Seydlitz had gotten past Horns Reef, but the ship was measuring a draft of 43 feet forward and navigating the Amrum Bank Passage was considered impossible. Steering west of Amrum Bank was too risky, so they decided to steer east of the shallows. As they started into the eastern passage, Kapitan von Egidy signaled Wilhelmshaven requesting two pump steamers be sent out and a ship with additional materials to seal leaks. About 09:00, Seydlitz stuck fast abeam the Hornum-Sylt Islands in 45 feet of water. In order to raise the bow as high as possible, von Egidy ordered the center aft trim cell and the port and starboard aft wing passages counter-flooded. This reduced the starboard list considerably, and as the tide rolled in, Seydlitz broke free. SMS Seydlitz trying to navigate the Amrum Bank Passage. She is seriously down by the bow, with only 12 or 18 inches of freeboard at the stem. She is barely able to maintain 7 knots and hardly answers to her helm. If A forward bulkhead were to fail – it would only be moments before she went down. The photo was most likely taken from Pillau’s aft observation top. By 10:25, SMS Seydlitz cleared the Amrum passage and continued to creep toward the safety of Wilhelmshaven. But the flooding began to appear in new compartments as water progressively leaked through splinter-damaged air shafts, ventilators, and electrical conduits. At 12:12, some compartments had been drained with leak pumps, but others were simply too large and no progress could be made. Her starboard list had gradually changed to eight degrees port as several coal bunkers flooded. Around 15:00 Kapitan von Egidy decided the depth of the bow was becoming a risk, and he turned Seydlitz and attempted to steer her “stern-ahead” -- continuing to creep south along the coast in water about 45 feet deep. Around 18:00, some twenty hours into her journey home, Seydlitz was still only mid-way between Horns Reef and safety. With an estimated 5,300 tons of water sloshing about below decks, her bow had sunk so low the waves were breaking against her forward gun turret. Though she was still afloat, the battlecruiser’s buoyancy and stability had become a critical issue. The wounded among the crew were moved topside and the ship’s boats were stocked with provisions. But Seydlitz’ time had not yet come. Around 17:30, with mere minutes remaining before abandoning ship, smoke was sighted to the south. Escorted by torpedo boats, the pump steamers Boreas and Kraft appeared over the horizon. With the pump steamers lashed to either beam, they began pumping and used their engines to help turn the ship when necessary. At one point, Pillau made a futile attempt to tow Seydlitz by the stern but the hawsers kept parting, and it was almost impossible to steer the big cruiser. As the sun went down on 1 June, Pillau cast off the tow and Seydlitz resumed course for Wilhelmshaven – creeping along, stern-ahead. As dawn broke on 2 June, salvage tugs arrived from the Imperial Dockyards and two of them took Seydlitz under tow. With some of the water pumped out and two tugs straining the hawsers, they were able to proceed at a prudent 10 knots. SMS Pillau continued her piloting duty, but as the wind freshened from NW to force eight, the seas began to rise and waves began to roll aboard the crippled Panzerkreuzer, so Pillau dropped back and formed a lee off her starboard quarter. Sometime after 23:00 Seydlitz, now drawing 46 feet forward, grounded temporarily east of the Weser lightship. At 08:30 on 2 June, Seydlitz crept past the Jade lightship and let go her anchor twenty minutes later off the Jade bar. Pillau and the minesweepers were detached, but the pump steamers and salvage tugs remained. Kapitan von Egidy and his determined crew had fought their ship until she could do no more, and then fought a 31-hour battle against an unforgiving sea – and against all the odds, they brought her into port. But it was not over. The auxiliary hospital ship Hansa and a tug arrived alongside. Hansa took off the wounded and the tug retrieved the dead – at least the ones they could get to. With the high tide, and the assisting salvage tugs, Seydlitz weighed and eased over the bar into Schillig Roads, but the difficulty in maneuvering her in powerful cross currents drove her aground between 16:20 and 21:00 that night. Around midnight the big cruiser finally made it through the Jade submarine net barrier – going sideways. She anchored again around 03:25 in Vareler Deep off Wilhelmshaven, but she drew too much water to get through the III Lock and into a repair dock, so work began to seal and lighten the ship. Seydlitz anchored in Vareler Deep. The big rifles have been removed from “A” turret to reduce weight forward. Every effort is being made to seal and pump out the ship to get into Wilhelmshaven. Note the mass of hawsers, cables, and assorted debris scattered all over the decks. You can see the barrels of the burnt-out “C” turret still trained to starboard. The struggle to return Seydlitz to duty was one of titanic proportions, and there are few surviving details of the work. It was more like a high priority salvage operation – with every available asset employed -- and might have looked much like this. All efforts were focused on lightening the cruiser, pumping her out, and getting her through the III Lock and inside Wilhelmshaven harbor, where proper repairs could be carried out. The repair ship Vestal has been deployed, along with floating cranes, work barge, and a variety of tug boats. The first steps were to patch and seal as many holes as possible using work crews above the waterline and salvage divers on the lower hull. While that was in progress, other repair teams would be removing damaged metal structures, destroyed equipment, and blast debris, before pumping could begin. Here you see “Langer Heinrich” (the world’s largest floating crane) lifting out Seydlitz’ damaged forward gun turret. Removing the gun tubes, gun housing, and the lower handling stages of the turret trunk could eliminate as much as 400 tons in the severely damaged forecastle area. (Again, you have to use your imagination a bit – making “damaged” ship models was out of the question. I simply couldn’t bring myself to impose on “AP’s” time and skills.) Along the port side of the damaged battlecruiser, you see a variety of craft at work. A machinist’s barge has been moored alongside to supply workmen and heavy machining tools to fashion structural supports and custom-made patches for her hull. Near the stern you can see two Langeoog salvage tugs lashed alongside. They connected their powerful pumps via long hoses to begin removing water from various compartments, while others are still being patched. On the starboard side another floating crane is employed lifting out the 42-ton, 11-inch gun tubes. Both stern turrets were damaged, and would have to be removed for repair anyway, but they will both be lifted out to remove another 800 tons of weight. “Lightening ship” will be a lengthy and labor intensive job – but every ton removed would raise Seydlitz a bit higher in the water. The repair ship Vestal has been moored alongside to provide the use of her facilities. Long electric cables from her dynamos have been run throughout Seydlitz to provide power and light to the cruiser’s damaged compartments so work can proceed. Her machine shops are working at maximum capacity, and workmen labor in shifts in a dozen different parts of the damaged ship. Two harbor tugs have tied-up alongside Vestal, in the event her position requires adjustment. Here’s another view of the work going on around the battlecruiser’s stern. The old steam tug Goliath, attending the barge crane, is courtesy of @Barroco Hispano, and the two sheds on the machinist’s barge are from “Nob’s 1905 Naval Series”. EVERYTHING else in the picture is the superbly detailed work of the talented @AP. An amazing amount of work went into crafting the models for this one picture – and I cannot thank him enough. The big cruiser managed to get into Wilhelmshaven roadsted on 6 June, and was finally taken into the large floating dock on 13 June. The repairs to the mauled battlecruiser were extensive. She was the most heavily damaged warship at Jutland – that did not sink. She was simply too tough to die. The naval architects had done their job well. Her armor and internal compartments -- and the skill and dedication of her officers and crew – had brought her home. “Lucky Seydlitz” would return to duty on 2 October 1916. Seydlitz several days later, inside the harbor at a repair quay. Some repairs have already been made to the forecastle deck as they try to seal the bow and pump out enough water to get her into Wilhelmshaven’s big floating dry dock. Seydlitz in the floating dry dock. This is the massive torpedo damage to the starboard bow area. The scale of the ladder gives you a good idea of the dimensions of the hole. This was simply too big to patch – and would have doomed a lesser ship. A 15-inch shell struck the armor belt below the port anchor. It detonated on contact and did not penetrate the hull, but the massive concussive blast dislodged a section of the armor belt and seriously “bowed-in” the inner skin of the ship, causing serious flooding. Another 15-inch shell penetrated “B” turret and put it out of action. Note how the hit distorted the 10-inch armor – and you can see the concentric circles around the hole where the armor has been fractured. SIDEBAR: There has been much discussion of the powerful 15-inch gun and the ships that carried them. Four of the British Queen Elizabeth Class fast-battleships constituted the 5th Battle Squadron of the Grand Fleet at Jutland -- while two, slower, 15-inch-armed Revenge Class battleships were also present in the battle line that day. There is little doubt their heavy armament was a deciding factor in the battle. The Kaiserliche Marine also laid down four 15-inch-gunned Bayern Class battleships between 1913 and 1915 – the first one just a few weeks before Queen Elizabeth herself was launched. Historians have been quick to point out this was no coincidence. Both classes had eight 15-inch guns in twin turrets – superfiring -- two fore and two aft. Both ship’s superstructure elements were tightly grouped amidships with closely spaced twin funnels. The only basic difference between them was the British ships were designed for high speed and had much larger machinery spaces below decks, resulting in a longer hull with the stern turrets placed farther aft. In 1913 there would have been a German naval attache in London and there is every reason to assume he would have forwarded all possible information on the Queen Elizabeth’s to the Admiralstab in Berlin. In the end, SMS Bayern joined the Hochseeflotte in March 1916, with SMS Baden arriving in October 1916. The hulls of SMS Sachsen and Wurttemberg were launched, but due to wartime delays and priorities, they were never completed. These would have been powerful additions to the Imperial fleet and immediate steps could have been taken in 1913 to see that they were laid down and completed with all due haste. (In both World Wars, the German Navy, for the most part, stubbornly adhered to “peacetime” routine rather then speeding-up construction, trials, and working-up periods for the crews.) But that’s where the fantasy part takes over. Had they been rushed to completion – and with a bit of luck – they could have joined the fleet prior to Jutland (maybe). My supposition is that their powerful guns would have been a major asset, and Admiral Scheer would have used the four battleships to form a “heavy squadron” of the Hochseeflotte – the IV Battle Squadron. This “heavy squadron” would have led the battle line into action and their heavy hitting power and longer gun range could have been decisive. Every historian and student of history has their own little fantasy – and since I have some excellent models from "Barroco Hispano" – I could not resist including them in the story. With docks and berthing space at a premium in the crowded anchorage at Wilhelmshaven, the IV Battle Squadron has been temporarily detached to Bremerhaven. The battleships have been moored to dolphins in the stream of the Weser River. Left to right, moored inboard, are SMS Bayern and the squadron flagship, SMS Sachsen. Moored outboard are SMS Wurttemberg and SMS Baden. Their escorting torpedo boats have been moored inside the basin of Bremerhaven’s small harbor. The original landing was renovated, barracks built, and new battleship mooring dolphins constructed to handle the overflow from Wilhelmshaven. (If you recall – the pre-dreadnoughts of the II Battle Squadron were detached to Cuxhaven.) During wartime, sufficient crew would be kept aboard the ships to maintain their “readiness”, while a portion would be rotated ashore to use the facilities of the barracks – sleep, shower, eat in the mess, etc, etc. A section of torpedo boats would patrol off the Weser as a guard/anti-submarine patrol. Here you can see the small boat activity as they go back and forth from ship to shore. Bayern Class battleship: displacement 28,330 tons – 22.25 knots – 8x15-inch guns – 16x5.9-inch guns – 8x3.4-inch AA guns – 5x23.6-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 13.75 inches. Unlike the British Queen Elizabeth Class fast-battleships, the Bayern Class was not designed for high speed. (They were, however, capable of 22 knots – only two knots slower than their British cousins.) Having designed the battleworthy German “Panzerkreuzer as fast-battleships”, the Germans did not feel the need of a “fast wing” for the battle fleet. Not requiring great speed, the ships were equipped with a mix of 3 oil-fired and 11 coal-fired boilers and the space and weight savings were applied to bigger guns and heavy armor. Being comparably shorter and a bit wider in the beam, the German dreadnoughts had much better buoyancy characteristics and far superior internal subdivision. These were the first German capital ships to be designed with a tripod foremast. After the war, The Royal Navy assembled an inspection team and examined every aspect of Baden’s design – even running extensive competitive trials and tests against HMS Revenge. The Chief Naval Constructor assigned to head the team turned in a 465-page report, complete with volumes of data, and pronounced Baden ”...equal, and in many respects superior...to anything in the Royal Navy.” She was just a day late and a dollar short. The Bayern Class were quite handsome ships -- low freeboard with close-set funnels, a compact superstructure, and massive superfiring turrets. Arguably, the Imperial designers and several modern naval architects have considered them to be the apex of battleship design – capital ships built after them were no more than minor variations on the theme. Here you see the nameship of the class, Bayern, moored inboard against sturdy “battleship mooring dolphins”, with SMS Wurttemberg (“nested”) moored outboard. Bayern has launched a small boat seen hooking onto the mooring dolphin so the party of sailors can tighten-up the mooring hawsers – they sometimes stretch when they get wet. Wurttemberg has only just returned from her last three days of sea trials. A Thor Class tug has come alongside with a lighter of fresh provisions. On the port quarter, the old steam tug Goliath has maneuvered a machinist’s barge alongside to assist yard workers with the last of the minor adjustments to be made. A pair of cutters have set off, the officers in the sternsheets bound for the squadron flagship to report the trial results to Konteradmiral Behncke. In this view, you see SMS Sachsen moored against the dolphins, while SMS Baden is moored outboard. Baden is carrying on with normal shipboard routine -- her boat boom is deployed and small boats are going about their business. A motor launch has come alongside Sachsen and tied-up at her mooring dolphin. She is carrying dispatches and mail from the Bremerhaven headquarters. This is a detail shot so you can compare the two models. The sharp-eyed among you will notice there are two basic battleship models employed. Bayern and Baden were laid down first and completed to the same design plans. Sachsen and Wurttemberg were laid down later and would have undergone changes during construction – hence, the two different models. You can readily see Bayern (top) has “half-jacketed” funnels, while Wurttemberg’s funnels are “fully-jacketed”. There are numerous other small differences between these wonderfully detailed models. A true “ship-lover” could spend hours on this picture, alone. I imagine this is what a IV Battle Squadron would have looked like in 1916 – had it ever come into existence. Forgive me for indulging a fantasy. The shore barracks are repurposed from one of the lots in “Morgankirk’s Organwerks”, while other shore-based installations have been discussed in other chapters. The battleship models and the steam tug Goliath are kindly provided by @Barroco Hispano. The machine shop buildings on the barge are small warehouses from “Nob’s 1905 Naval Series”. The battleship mooring points, tugboat Thor, barge and lighters, motor launch, boat booms and small boats – are all the meticulous work of @AP. NEXT TIME…… THE REMAINS OF THE DAY... But first – We return to our tour of the East Mooring Basin of the Cuxhaven naval base. This is another overview of the light cruiser berths in the basin. Left of center are three of four Kolberg Class light cruisers – SMS Kolberg, Mainz, and Coln. Kolberg survived the war, but Mainz and Coln were lost at the First Battle of Heligoland Bight in August 1914. Right of center are the two light cruisers of the Pillau Class – SMS Pillau and Elbing. Elbing was lost during the night action at Jutland when she was accidentally rammed by the battleship SMS Posen – and later scuttled. Pillau survived the war, was ceded to Italy as war reparations, and was sunk by US Army bombers in 1943. This is a close-up of the Kolberg Class light cruisers nested along the quayside. Originally armed with twelve 4.1-inch guns, Kolberg was later modernized to carry eight 5.9-inch guns. At 25.5 knots, the ships had a fair turn of speed and Kolberg was frequently used on minelaying operations. Model by Barroco Hispano. These are the Pillau Class light cruisers – SMS Pillau and Elbing. They conformed to the German light cruiser standards – roughly 4,400 tons – 27.5 knots – 8x5.9-inch guns. But they started life at the Schichau-Werk, Danzig, as a pair of light cruisers destined for the Imperial Russian Navy. When war broke out, the German government confiscated the pair and finished them for the Kaiserliche Marine. Pillau was commissioned in December 1914, and Elbing in September 1915. This is the Italian light cruiser Raimondo Montecuccoli. Built between the wars, she was part of the third batch of Condottieri Class light cruisers. The Marina Regia had opted for cruiser warfare in the narrow seas of the Mediterranean, with a medium-sized battle fleet to supply a respectable amount of muscle. She was larger, much longer, and better protected than her predecessors. Model courtesy of Barroco Hispano. Raimondo Montecuccoli was commissioned in 1935: 7,523 tons – 37 knots – 6x6-inch (QF) guns – 4x21-inch torpedo tubes – 2 aircraft – belt armor 2.4 inches. Extremely fast, with a respectable main battery, these cruisers were more than capable of interdicting trade at any of the various “choke-points” in the Mediterranean. Raimondo Montecuccoli survived WW II and served in the Italian Navy until decommissioned in 1964. This is a close-up of a pair of sailing brigs made fast to mooring dolphins at the end of the mole. Though brig-rigged (sometimes brigantine-rigged) these small cargo carriers are often lumped into the same category with “luggers”. Luggers are small sailing ships (often smaller than a brig) specializing in short-haul coastal trading. The small ships are very handy in shallow, confined waters, and require only a small crew to sail. Sailing ships, both large and small, could still be found in harbors the world over up through the 1940’s, and turned impressive profit margins in the days before WW II. These beautiful and impressively detailed models are the work of @AP. SMS Strassburg – a Magdeburg Class light cruiser – sister ships were SMS Magdeburg, Breslau, and Stralsund. (Details on this class were covered in Chapter 01.) HMS Weymouth was the name ship of one of the seven sub-classes of Town Class light cruisers (totaling 21 ships). I have included her here because she is the only British WW I light cruiser model I have – and – it is a very fine model. The Town Class were long range cruisers designed to either scout for the fleet, or take care of business in the far flung corners of empire. Commissioned in 1911, she was: 5,275 tons – 25 knots – 8x6-inch guns – 2x21-inch torpedo tubes – no belt armor. This is a tug station tucked into the lower end of one of the basins. There are two older Nordwind tugs in the first row, with five Passat Class making up the balance. The Nordwind’s were originally designed by the Norddeutscher Line to handle large ocean liners and, at the Kaiser’s request, were also leased to the Kaiserliche Marine to handle dreadnought warships. As warships and liners grew larger, the Nordwind’s were updated and modernized, resulting in the improved Passat design. Notice the control tower on the mole and the dockside activity. The “new & improved” Passat Class tugs retained the basic design of the original Nordwind’s, but the wheelhouse was fully enclosed so they could operate better in inclement weather. And larger engines and boilers were installed to boost horsepower – along with heavier towing tackle. This close-up catches the fine detailing on the tugs as well as the activity around the control station. USS Marblehead – an Omaha Class Scout Cruiser. The United States Navy had known since the Spanish-American War their fleet had insufficient cruisers to preform scouting duties. As usual, Congress was in no hurry to spend money on ships, so the situation remained in “limbo”. With the outbreak of war in Europe, the Navy got busy and began designing a “fleet scout cruiser”. The initial 1914 design went through several iterations before they were finally ordered in 1916. The model shown is of the “third” design from April 1915. This close-up of Marblehead shows the original gun armament of six 6-inch guns placed on pedestal mounts without shields – two forward of the bridge – two amidships, and two on the fantail. The cruiser would have displaced approximately 7,000 tons with a speed of 35 knots. She was also armed with 4x21-inch torpedo tubes and was capable of carrying 224 mines (notice the mine rails on the fantail). Early versions of the design also carried two Curtis floatplanes. And quite unusual for this period – USS Marblehead was designed with a 3-inch belt armor. In the final design the armament and it’s placement was completely altered – to include twin 6-inch turrets fore and aft. But this is a classic example of the original concept of a “scout cruiser” – long, narrow-hulled, four funnels, and shockingly fast for a WW I era cruiser. This beautifully detailed model is courtesy of @Barroco Hispano. MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful warship models. SPECIAL THANKS to my friend and partner, @AP, for his talents, meticulous models, colorful imagination, and extreme dedication. If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496- 4 Comments
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Chapter 21: Grosse Kreuzer J - 1910
Dreadnought posted a City Journal entry in IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN
A beautiful painting of SMS Seydlitz lying at anchor in Schillig Roads on a foggy morning early in 1917. Note the new “Carley Floats” mounted on the main battery turrets. As an item of interest, the stern anchor pictured weighs approximately 8 tons. IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 21: GROSSE KREUZER “J” - 1910 SMS Seydlitz – circa 1913 – lying moored to a buoy in the Kieler Hafen. Seydlitz had supremely graceful lines while presenting a low profile with a squat and powerful appearance. Three months after SMS Moltke’s keel was laid, the preliminary discussions about “Grosse Kreuzer J – 1910” were already beginning. In keeping with their policy of improving each new warship, Korvettenkapitan Vollerthun of the General Navy Department sent a memorandum to State Secretary von Tirpitz on 8 March 1909. The topic was the Grosse Kreuzer’s development in comparison to navies of other nations…… “The development of our grossen kreuzer since 1907 has been inspired by the English Invincible Class, but we have increasingly pursued the qualities of a fast battleship. It has been our intention to make the authorized number of large ships, as far as possible, capable of also fighting in the battle line. This approach has given our grossen Kreuzer a different character than the English, and has brought their displacement to that of the battleships. The English pattern has heavy artillery (12-inch guns) and extreme speed (allegedly 26.5 to 27 knots), but it is bought at the expense of armor (belt only 6 inches) – and, therefore, is of limited suitability for the battle line. Against an enemy with heavy artillery, this type of ship is severely compromised – even at long ranges. In effect, the English ‘Battleship-Cruisers’ stand against our ‘Cruiser-Battleships”. In those very few words, Vollerthun had accurately defined the Anglo-German Arms race and the battlecruisers it produced. He went on to say…… “Future grossen kreuzer should continue to be patterned after contemporary battleship development in regard to combat power. The superiority in speed, necessary to maintain the character of cruisers, has to be bought (compliant with the Naval laws) with a modest sacrifice in combat power – or by an increase in displacement above that of the battleship. Speed must also be maintained with an advantage of 3.5 to 4 knots over the battleship.” Since 1909, contemporary battleships in both Britain and Germany had made a further jump in armament and displacement, and it was recommended the new Grossen Kreuzer do likewise. The five 11-inch gun turrets should be replaced with four 12-inch gun turrets – though Vollerthun hedged the point by saying the 11-inch gun was still sufficient to penetrate the armor of foreign navies. (Personally – I consider it extraordinarily backward not to increase the gun power. The bigger shell would, of course, deliver more destructive force – and not using it – gave the enemy an advantage.) At a 4 April conference, the Naval Budget Office rejected an increased expenditure for the 1910 cruiser, and von Tirpitz discouraged improvements entailing higher costs. The discussions, somewhat understandably, seemed to cease at that point. Cost – more than any other factor – would be the driving element in the design of “Grosse Kreuzer J”. By 1909, Imperial Germany was just beginning to feel the financial strain of supporting a world-class army while creating a first-class navy. Tsarist Russia had the largest army in Europe, while Germany diligently maintained a slight edge in troop strength over the French. But the “Kaiserliche Heer” was, without doubt, the best trained and finest equipped army in all of Europe – and that cost a lot of money. With the emergence of Admiral von Tirpitz, warship construction assumed an importance never before experienced – at an unheard of cost. Around five years later, the “dreadnought” battleship appeared and costs became astronomical. Germany’s last pre-dreadnought battleship (SMS Deutschland) had cost in the neighborhood of 5 million Marks in 1903 (the entire class of five ships cost about 26 million Marks). By 1909, the cost of a single Moltke Class battlecruiser was in excess of 44 million Marks – roughly nine times that of a single pre-dreadnought. And there was also the operating costs to be considered. By 1912, the annual expense of daily operation and maintenance of a dreadnought was roughly 2 million Marks per ship. As discussed in Chapter 1, “national wealth” had its limits – and excessive taxation could cause financial collapse. In August 1909, the Construction Department raised the issue of deadlines that had to be met in preparing documents, and for Krupp to be able to deliver the gun turrets on schedule. Discussions began again, but Chancellor von Bulow had been replaced by an even more frugal von Bethman-Hollweg, so no budget increase would be allowed. By 23 September, several designs had been produced – almost all with a cost increase over the Moltke Class of 750,000 to one million Marks. Consequently talks were started with Blohm & Voss to see if construction discounts could be obtained on the hull and engines. Both Krupp Armaments and Dillingen-Hutte Fabrik were also brought into discussions to possibly obtain discounts. (Krupp provided the naval rifles and face-hardened exterior armor belts, while Dillingen-Hutte produced the hull plates, girders, interior deck plates, and non-face-hardened armored areas.) At this point, the design studies had been whittled down to just two choices – Study IIc, which was an improved version of SMS Goeben – and Study IVe, with five twin turrets on the centreline (two superfiring forward, two superfiring aft, and one amidships). Design IVe was favored both structurally and tactically by several bureau chiefs. On 21 December 1909, Admiral von Tirpitz convened yet another meeting. He opened by reassuring the Budget Office that a one million Mark increase was acceptable to the Reichstag. Whereupon, their representative urged the State Secretary to make a decision quickly so advantage could be taken of favorable negotiations with Blohm & Voss. Early on in the lengthy meeting, any discussion of design IVe was shelved. Von Tirpitz was opposed to the superfiring turrets forward (he had not liked the superfiring stern turrets on Moltke and Goeben, either). He felt superfiring turrets were too close together, and risked having two turrets put out of action by a single shell. (Ironically, this would actually come to pass – see Chapter 13 – Seydlitz -- Dogger Bank.) A further discussion was held about going to a three-shaft propeller arrangement to improve ship-handling at lower speeds. But the rudders would have to be redesigned, the aft torpedo tube moved, and the stern reconfigured. When a long delay was mentioned, von Tirpitz rejected that notion. On 7 January 1910, a final meeting was held and design IIc was altered to include a raised forecastle deck, the forward turret barbette was raised by 1.6 meters, main belt armor increased, turret armor increased, boilers increased, and machinery output boosted to a designed 63,000shp to compensate for weight increases. The budget was estimated at 45.83 million Marks, and the Kaiser approved the design concept on 27 January 1910. Detailed design drawings, mechanical pages, final cost estimates, and the finished blueprints were prepared over eight weeks. On 26 March 1910, Kaiser Wilhelm II signed the builder’s order in the Royal Palace, Berlin. His Majesty could not have known at the time, but he had just ordered the construction of one of the toughest and most battle-worthy ships ever built. The Imperial battlecruisers would become, perhaps, the finest dreadnought warships ever built. But “Grosse Kreuzer J” would be the finest of them all. SEYDLITZ CLASS BATTLECRUISER The final design of “Grosse Kreuzer J” as she would have appeared at her commissioning. There are a few details missing from this “plan profile” – notably no ship’s boats or launches which would have been stowed on deck amidships. But the plan gives you an excellent idea of the deck layout, the placement of the turrets, and the wide range of the firing arcs. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS The contract for “Grosse Kreuzer J” was awarded to Blohm & Voss Dockyards, Hamburg, on 2 April 1910, and her keel was laid on 4 February 1911. She would be launched thirteen months later, on 30 March 1912. Thirteen months on the builder’s slip was very good time – even for Blohm & Voss. The main design features of the new cruiser (an “improved” Moltke) were limited somewhat by budgetary constraints but, significantly, returned to the raised forecastle deck formula – incorporating the forward bridge and funnel elements. This feature was thought necessary to keep the fore-ship as “dry” as possible. At 24,988 tons, her displacement was nearly 2,000 tons heavier than Moltke. The new cruiser’s hull was longer, at 656 feet, with a newly tested hull form having finer lines and a slightly reduced beam. The reduction in beam was unusual for German capital ships, and was made possible by a more refined armor scheme. The new hull design also resulted in a nearly vertical-cut stem and the elimination of the ponderous “ram bow”. The hull was constructed of transverse and longitudinal framing, and plated with Siemens-Martin “mild steel” for flexibility and resilience. There were sixteen watertight compartments (one more than in Moltke) on seven deck levels, with a double bottom running 76% of her length. The double bottom and extensive use of internal compartmentalization between the watertight transverse bulkheads contributed significantly to her underwater protection -- slowing flooding and confining it to a smaller area. Bilge keels – or anti-roll keels -- were included in the original design to improve stability, and anti-torpedo nets were a design feature. SMS Seydlitz (“Grosse Kreuzer J”) laying at anchor off a warehousing area. Alongside you can see a steam tug with two lighters full of fresh vegetables ready to be transferred aboard the battlecruiser. This view clearly shows the arrangement of the three different deck levels – the Forecastle Deck – Battery Deck – and the Fantail Deck. All interior decks were steel plated and covered with linoleum, while exterior (“weather”) decks were steel plated with 2.5 inches of teak planking. The “flush deck” design of Moltke was done away with, and a Forecastle Deck was raised by one level. The Forecastle Deck ran aft from the stem, over the Battery Deck, to include the conning tower, forward bridge, and mainmast, then angled gracefully toward the centreline to wrap around the first funnel housing and boiler room air intakes. This compact arrangement (similar to Von der Tann) was designed to reduce the water taken over the bow in heavy weather. The Battery Deck (just below the Forecastle Deck) ran aft and angled into the barbette of superfiring “Caesar” turret. One deck below that, on the fantail, was turret “David”. So the “weather decks” on the new cruiser were on three different levels. This close-up shows the arrangement of the various superstructure elements – the forecastle with “A” turret, bridge, and first funnel housing -- midships gun turrets – the second funnel housing – the aft control structure – and the two superfiring turrets. This also shows the ship’s small boats stowed on deck amidships. The boat derrick abaft the second funnel is seen hoisting out a steam launch across the top of “B” turret. If you examine the ship and crew carefully, you will see many small details and scenes built into this wonderfully detailed model by @AP. The steam tug "gifted" by “WolfZe” – and the two lighters are also “AP’s” work. The deck layout was very similar to Von der Tann -- and especially Moltke. Behind “A” turret was the forward superstructure housing the Navigation Bridge, the forward armored Conning Tower with rangefinder, a Chart Room, the forward pole mast (steel with wooden yards), and the Flag Bridge. The forward funnel was incorporated into the rear of this structure. The funnels on this class were not as large in circumference as Motlke’s, but they were raised an additional ten feet, and a further ten-foot “boot cap” was designed on the forward funnel to keep smoke off the bridge and searchlight areas. Searchlight platforms were attached directly to the funnel casing – one pair facing forward, with single searchlights on either side. Air intakes for the boiler rooms were found at the rear base of the funnel. Like Von der Tann and Moltke, there was another “lozenge-shaped” funnel housing with air intakes and boat derricks located amidships between “B” and “E” wing turrets. The “lozenge” shape was a special design element to improve the main battery firing arcs, and allow cross-deck firing. The aft superstructure block included the secondary conning tower with rangefinder, four searchlights on two platforms stepped against the after mast, and air intakes around the base. Beyond that were two main battery turrets – “C” turret superfiring over “D” turret. The same machinery layout below decks as her predecessors, allowed the funnels and superstructure groups to be placed well clear of the main battery and firing arcs. Wide firing arcs were a critical element in Imperial Navy design, while foreign navies, like the British, crowded their decks with bulky superstructures -- restricting their firing arcs – a noted fault of the Invincible Class battlecruisers. “Grosse Kreuzer J” would ship a crew of 43 officers and 1,025 men. Close-up of the aft superfiring main battery turrets and the aft superstructure block. This shows the newly designed “Drh-L-C/1910” gun houses – a bit lower in profile and slightly broader. Note the rangefinder sighting hood on the top turret, while the roof of the bottom turret is clear to avoid damage from over-blast pressure. Behind “C” turret is the aft armored conning tower and fire control rangefinder, with engine room air intakes built into the housing around it. Here you can see the searchlight platforms stepped against the aft mast. Seydlitz is taking on fresh provisions. The barge crane is shifting them from lighters to the fantail deck where sailors are carrying them below through deck hatches. Some may be destined for an Admiral’s table while some might even be earmarked for the Kapitan. It was accepted practice for an admiral to have his own “chef”, “mess steward’, and store of delicacies. And it was quite common for the (usually) well-to-do Kapitans to have similar arrangements. The ship’s electrical suite was boosted over that of Moltke -- six turbo-generators totaling 1,800kw output at 220 volts. As a precaution against battle damage, the generators were divided between four dynamo rooms – one each to port and starboard of the forward engine room, and two more on the centreline, all on the Upper Platform Deck. The new ship retained Von der Tann’s extensive drainage and pumping system, with three high-capacity centrifugal pumps (two steam driven – one electrical) mounted on the Hold Deck. Several portable, electric “leak” pumps were carried to deal with “hard to reach” areas. In an emergency, the condenser pumps could be connected to the drainage system. Because of the obvious problems with visual communications between ships; ships operating out of sight of one another – bad weather – smoke or haze limiting visibility. In 1907, the Hochseeflotte began installing “wireless” telegraphy transmitters developed by the physicist Heinrich Hertz. They used an encrypted form of “Morse Code” to communicate between ships. By 1909, every ship in the Kaiserliche Marine had its own wireless transmission (WT) office equipped with at least one Telefunken vacuum tube wireless apparatus. The Grosse Kreuzer and other capital ships were equipped with the “standard” two wireless transmitters, three receivers, and as many antennas, and prior to 1914, an additional transmitter/receiver was installed in the forward conning tower. The devices were usually installed in at least three different locations to avoid loss of communication to battle damage. Unfortunately, for proper operation, the wireless antennas could only be strung between the foremast and mainmast – leaving them open to damage by gunfire. The bulk of these early vacuum tube transmitters had a tactical range of between 20 and 30 miles (just over the horizon). For longer range communication or, ship-to-shore traffic, larger sets were installed in the fleet, squadron, and division flagships. These bulky transmitters were capable of sending signals anywhere within the North Sea area – possibly 300 miles – but were, of course, subject to good or bad “atmospherics”. PROPULSION PLANT ”Grosse Kreuzer J” received a completely redesigned propulsion system with more powerful engines and an increase to twenty-seven naval-type Schulz-Thornycroft water-tube boilers. These were custom-built in the Blohm & Voss Boiler Works to a modified design. Six different sizes and shapes of boilers were specifically designed to conform to the ship’s hull contours, and the available space. Specially developed for the Kaiserliche Marine, the boilers were, for the most part, smaller and built of lighter, weight-saving materials. The double-ended, coal-fired boilers could deliver more steam, under higher pressure, and with lower coal consumption than other contemporary designs. They were arranged in five boiler rooms – two ahead of the “B” turret barbette – and three aft. Each of the three aft boiler rooms was divided into three compartments by two longitudinal bulkheads. There were 52 fire boxes, and from 1916, supplemental “oil-firing” was installed. Maximum bunker capacity was 3,460 tons of coal, providing an operating radius of 4,440 miles at 14 knots. “Grosse Kreuzer J” was designed for 63,000shp, to provide 25.5 knots. The boilers fed four sets of Parsons Steam Turbines manufactured at the Blohm & Voss Engine Works. High pressure turbines in the forward engine room worked two outer shafts, while low pressure cruising turbines in the aft engine room worked two inner shafts. There were reversing arrangements on all four shafts. The forward and aft engine rooms were divided along the centreline by a longitudinal bulkhead. Once again, two rudders were fitted, “in tandem”, along the centreline – irrespective of Moltke’s poor handling characteristics at low speeds. During design meetings, the subject of changing the new cruiser’s rudder arrangement had been taken up, but was dismissed due to long delays in redesigning the shape of the ship’s stern. Mostly by default, the “tandem rudder feature” would become standard on battlecruisers. Each rudder was driven by an auxiliary steam steering engine. In the event of damage, both rudders could be coupled to a single engine, or manually operated. Here you see SMS Seydlitz tied up at her berth along the breakwater in Cuxhaven Roadsted. Anchored ahead of her is SMS Moltke. Astern of her is SMS Derfflinger. This would have been the appearance of an average day in the main anchorage – each ship at its assigned berth, going about the every-day business of running a big warship. Warships are rarely, if ever, serene and peaceful – there is always work to be done – a complex piece of machinery to be tended – a thousand mouths to be fed – and a small floating city to be administered. SMS Derfflinger is courtesy of @Barroco Hispanoand the breakwaters are by “Uki”. The mooring points are by @mattb325, modified for use in my harbors. The white steam tug is by “WolfZe” – and EVERYTHING else is the wonderful work of "AP". SHIP’S ARMAMENT MAIN BATTERY “Grosse Kreuzer J” was armed with the same main battery as the preceding Moltke Class battlecruisers -- the Krupp 11-inch SK-L/50 (QF) high-velocity gun. The gun came into service in 1911 with an increased barrel length of 50 calibers – specifically designed to improve the velocity and accuracy of the previous SK-L/45 gun. Like Moltke, the gun houses (turrets) only allowed a +13.5 degree elevation, which limited the range to approximately 19,800 yards. After experiencing the battle ranges at Dogger Bank in 1915, the turrets were modified and the range increased to 20,900 yards. The prevailing poor visibility in the North Sea meant battle ranges varied considerably. On a rainy, hazy day, with blowing squalls – visibility could be intermittent – and only five miles. On better days (there is rarely a “good” day) visibility might vary between eight to ten miles – well within the maximum range of the guns. Mounted in five twin turrets, the guns were well placed: “A” turret (Albert) forward on the forecastle deck – “B” turret (Berta) in the starboard “forward wing” position – the aft superfiring turret “C” (Caesar), and “D” turret (David), aft on the fantail deck, with “E” turret (Emil) in the port “aft wing” position. By carefully positioning the turrets and superstructure, and keeping the “deck clutter” to an absolute minimum, the architects enabled her to “cross-deck fire” with the midships “wing turrets” on a 75 degree firing arc. This is a closer view of Seydlitz. She has a boat boom rigged-out and smaller boats are going and coming. A Thor Class harbor tug has pulled a barge crane alongside to transfer cargo to the battlecruiser. A Helena Class paddle tug has towed three lighters of fresh provisions out from shore and is standing-by to unload. A small cutter from the tug is trying to “hook-on” to the third lighter to work it into position. A small steam tug is passing to port with more fresh provisions, headed for another warship. The white steam tug is from “WolfZe” – the crane on the barge was borrowed from the “PEG” trash lots – and the mooring points are from “Mattb325”. The breakwaters are by “Uki” – but everything else is by "AP" – including the diagonal paddle tug and a lighter to match! Yet another new main battery gun house (turret) design was developed for “Grosse Kreuzer J” to replace the Drh-L-C/1908 (turntable mounting model 1908). The new Drh-L-C/1910 gun house had been designed with several changes in mind. But at the last minute, it was found these changes could not be implemented without major redesign of the ammunition hoists. However, some alterations to the turret roofs were carried out. The turret sighting hood was removed and its telescope was installed in the forward face of the turret, between the two guns, in a manner similar to the gun cradle telescopes. The “Turret Captain’s” hood was retained on top of “A”, “B”, “C”, and “E” turrets – but was removed from “D” turret because that one had “C” turret firing over the top. Each Turret Captain’s hood (or cupola) was equipped with a nine foot Zeiss rangefinder. If the Central Director Fire Control was disabled, the turret could be switched to “local control” and fired using the Zeiss optics. As in Moltke, an apparatus was installed coupling the barrels together for elevation and aiming in “director fire”. The gun houses were electrically trained, with an electrohydraulic elevating system for the gun tubes. The SK-L/50 rifle could fire a 666 lb armor-piercing shell at the rate of 3 rounds per minute. The shell was propelled by a “fore charge” of 58 lbs in a double silk bag – and a main charge of 175 lbs in a brass case. The brass case had two advantages; (1) the Krupp guns used a horizontal “sliding wedge breech”, sealed by the rear rim of the shell casing (an obturator seal) – and (2) “cased” charges were far less likely to burn or explode in an accident. The shells were capable of penetrating 11 inches of nickel-steel at 11,000 yards, and 8 inches at 13,000 yards. The magazines stored a total of 870 rounds. Fire Control “ranging and spotting” was handled from the fore or aft conning towers, whose upper floors housed the Fire Control Party operating Zeiss 12-foot stereoscopic rangefinders mounted on the roof. Other, smaller rangefinders were installed in various locations, and after 1914, a crow’s nest Fire Control position and rangefinder was added to the foremast. The control stations were connected to a Central Gunnery Control situated beneath the protective armored deck. Here, the ship’s Gunnery Officer received data from the remote stations, calculated target information, and issued firing orders to the “Turret Captains” via telephones or electro-mechanical “repeaters”. This view of SMS Seydlitz gives you a really good idea of just how sleek her hull form really was. At 656 feet in length, she was long for her day, and (as was common to German warships) just a bit wider in the beam than some foreign warships. But her hull model was “tank tested” and altered several times to get the optimum shape for high speed. She had powerful engines and “clean” underwater lines that made her faster than her opponents. SECONDARY BATTERY ”Grosse Kreuzer G” followed the now-standard pattern, and carried a strong secondary battery of 5.9-inch guns – the usual SK-L/45 (QF) high velocity weapon. It was an excellent, all-around, complement to the ship’s main battery. The twelve guns were mounted on the Battery Deck, in MPL-C/1906 armored casemates, six amidships on either beam. Like Moltke, the freeboard had been raised on Seydlitz and the Battery Deck guns were dry in all but the worst weather. (See Chapter 17 for specifics on gun performance.) TERTIARY BATTERY Twelve 3.5 inch SK-L/45 (QF) high-velocity guns were provided for torpedo boat defense in the original design. But war experience proved these light guns useless against modern destroyers, and they were gradually removed. In the end, the 5.9-inch guns were more than adequate for the job. (See Chapter 15 for specifics on gun performance.) TORPEDO ARMAMENT As was customary for the time period, all German capital ships carried a torpedo armament. “Grosse Kreuzer J” was fitted with four submerged 20-inch torpedo tubes. They were arranged in the standard pattern -- one fore and aft, and one on each beam. Eleven type G-7 torpedoes were carried. This view of Seydlitz shows the details of the uniquely designed forecastle deck and forward bridge structure. The graceful angles merging into the curves of the hull are classic design elements found in no other era of naval construction. The bridge superstructure, seemingly complicated, is – in fact – minimalist and utilitarian. One unusual feature is the upper “flying bridge” (Sometimes referred to as the Admiral’s bridge.) – extending out from both sides to provide a better view ahead and to make “docking” easier. It is set much higher than the navigation bridge and armored conning tower, and was preferred by both Kapitans and Admirals as a “command” position. Beside “A” turret you can see 11-inch shells, recently brought aboard, being stowed below by a work party. ARMOR “Grosse Kreuzer J” was an “improved” Moltke Class, and in keeping with that theory, her armor suite was laid out in an almost identical manner, but “tweaked” a bit – moving a bit from over here to over there – where it would do more good. And naval Intelligence had determined the British were replacing their 12-inch gun with the new BL 13.5-inch Mark V/45 – a much more powerful weapon. The new battlecruiser would have to be armored to withstand battle damage from these guns – so the three side belts (main, citadel, and battery) were thickened, and Krupp Cemented Armor, face-hardened with nickel-steel, was used in more places than previous designs. In essence, her armor was not only thicker, but harder to penetrate. German designers had to strike a delicate balance between guns, armor, and speed when designing their “Battleship-Cruisers” – as Korvettenkapitan Vollerthun called them. Eventually, they arrived at a very complicated and comprehensive layout compatible with the gun and speed requirements of a fast-battleship. Imperial German capital ships were consistently built with extensive and unusually thick armor suites by comparison to other navies. (I’m only going into the armoring scheme’s important aspects – see Chapters 15 and 17 for extensive details.) The new battlecruiser was armored throughout with Krupp Cemented Armor, face hardened with nickel steel, and backed with 2 inches of Teak to prevent spalling. (Dillingen-Hutte Werk provided the structural steel for construction and hull plating – not for armoring purposes.) The “protective armored deck”, unlike foreign warships, extended from stem to stern. The main belt armor was 11.8 inches of face-hardened nickel steel. The Citadel armor (the next level up) ran from barbette to barbette with 10.5 inches of armor – increasing to 11 inches in the area of the “wing turrets”. The Casemate armor (the final layer reaching the deck level) ran barbette to barbette and was 5.9 inches thick. The main battery turrets were also protected with Krupp Cemented Nickel Steel armor – turret faces 9.2 inches – sides and back 7.3 inches – roof 3.9 inches. The forward conning tower was protected by 12-inch armor -- the aft conning tower had 8 inches. The armor scheme was thicker and better arranged, and was, by itself, an achievement of some merit – but there were other factors to be considered. Another view of the forecastle. You can clearly see the navigation bridge to the rear of “A” turret, with the armored conning tower and rangefinder behind that. This is also a better view of the “flying bridge”. The boat boom, small cutter, and motor launch (by “AP”) were all placed on a stand-alone 1x1 lot plopped adjacent to the battlecruiser. The work party on the Mooring Points (by Mattb325) is preparing to tighten up the slack in the mooring hawsers – they often stretch after mooring (dampness). Note the fine detail on the small boats, motor launch, and the diagonal Helena Class paddle tug (also “AP”). The underwater protection of “Grosse Kreuzer J” was even more extensive than that of the Moltke Class battlecruisers. Sixteen transverse bulkheads divided the ship into seventeen vertical watertight compartments (two more than in Moltke). The protective armored deck (at the waterline) further divided some compartment horizontally – effectively creating twenty-two watertight compartments above and below the waterline. Between the transverse bulkheads -- within each of those “armored, watertight boxes” -- were numerous subdivisions. These were lighter steel bulkheads (in a house, you would call them “walls”) forming individual compartments (rooms) throughout the hull – Damage Control Center, Boatswain’s Store, Sail Locker, Capstan Engine Room, etc, etc. Each compartment could be sealed against flooding with watertight doors. In effect – the interior of the hull was a labyrinth of passageways, small compartments, and watertight doors – a “honeycomb” designed to keep the ship afloat in the event of damage. There were exceptions to the system, usually in the engineering spaces – boiler rooms and engine rooms – where the compartments were large, and often two or three decks in height. But “Grosse Kreuzer J” had well over 85 watertight subdivisions in her design – considerably more than most foreign warships – and she would be able to withstand a great deal of damage before sinking. (See Chapter 13 for difficulty sinking Blucher.) Here are two wider views of Seydlitz taking on stores and fresh provisions. “AP’s” battlecruiser model is highly detailed, Hi-Def, historically accurate, and a thing of beauty. In the second picture you have a clear view of the second funnel. Apparently, Seydlitz has just returned from a sortie into the North Sea, for her second funnel is still painted red. It was customary for German warships to paint their second funnels red upon leaving port -- as a recognition device. The red funnel could be more easily spotted in the dark and hazy North Sea conditions – thus preventing other German ships from exchanging fire with their own side. The white circles on the turret roof are for aerial recognition. German Zeppelins were notorious for mistaking German ships for British – and dropping bombs. Fortunately, they invariably missed. Some designers found watertight transverse bulkheads difficult to work with. In order to be effective, they must be solid, with no openings – or the openings must be sealed with watertight doors capable of withstanding immense water pressure. Warships are packed full of electrical lines, communication lines, water pipes, ventilation systems, and steam pipes -- running, in some cases, from end to end of the ship. It would be impractical to run a drain line from the Hold Deck up a bulkhead to the top, then down the other side, and back to the Hold Deck. Consequently, holes are often cut in bulkheads to run pipes, lines, and ventilation ducts. Anywhere one of these “lines or “pipes” goes through a bulkhead, it must be sealed – and sealed properly. Unfortunately, many dockyard workmen were never sufficiently impressed with the need to seal these openings securely. (This was to prove a curse to many dreadnoughts of the era.) And – it was not uncommon for a ventilation duct to be damaged by an explosion that flooded the compartment – allowing water to get into the duct – and flood a compartment on the other side of the bulkhead. Many possibilities for problems. Consequently, to make things less difficult in the design and construction phase, designers attempted to limit the number of watertight bulkheads they would have to deal with (the usual British solution). Following her predecessors, the new cruiser was given a built-in, armored torpedo bulkhead. (See Chapter 15 for details.) This was still a novel innovation and not at all common in foreign navies. But it was easier to repair a damaged ship than to build a replacement. As always, the ubiquitous coal bunker provided another layer of protection for Imperial warships. Like Von der Tann and the Moltke’s, the new battlecruiser made extensive use of outboard hull spaces as coal bunkers. (See Chapter 17 for specific details.) “Grosse Kreuzer J” was given the full suite of wrap-around coal bunkers. As a simple solution, coal was cheaper than Krupp steel, necessary to power the ship, and could absorb more destructive energy than a thick armor plate. Though other navies used protective coal bunkers, none were as comprehensive as those found on German capital ships. This is a close-up of the offshore replenishment. There are many details in the picture, especially among the sailors at work or in the boats. With the exception of the breakwater, mooring points, and – of course – the sea gulls – everything in the scene is courtesy of “AP”. (Note the gangway on the barge deck – nice touch.) A few of the props on the barge (gray barrels and crates) are from “Historic Harbors” and the crane is re-purposed from the “PEG” Trash lots. And special attention for the two diagonal models – many more to follow. “Grosse Kreuzer J” was, indeed, an improvement over the Moltke Class, but – as with all capital ships -- it was a vastly complicated, technically superior, and carefully conceived engineering marvel. And all of that – for the bargain price (after discounts) of 44.685 million Marks. It was during the First World War that German capital ships earned a reputation for being lethal in combat and almost impossible to sink – and “Grosse Kreuzer J” would be largely responsible for that reputation. She would prove to be – very nearly – the perfect “fast battleship” of her day. On 30 March 1912, “Grosse Kreuzer J” was christened SMS Seydlitz – in honor of the Prussian Lieutenant General der Cavallerie. Friedrich Wilhelm Seydlitz – ranked as, quite possibly, the greatest of all Prussian cavalry commanders. He became legendary for his reckless bravery, expert horsemanship, and tactical acumen. Brilliant leadership of Seydlitz’ massed cavalry squadrons were largely responsible for Frederick The Great’s victories at the battles of Kundersdorf, Kolin, Zorndorf, Leuthen, and especially Rossbach. He fought in the War Of The Austrian Succession and the Seven Year’s War – and was awarded both the Pour le Merite and the Prussian Order Of The Black Eagle. As SMS Seydlitz slid down the Blohm & Voss slipway at Hamburg, none could know she would embody the very spirit of her illustrious namesake. SMS Seydlitz under easy steam – circa 1915. NEXT TIME…… THE FLAGSHIP MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful warship models. SPECIAL THANKS to my friend and partner, @AP, for his talents, meticulous detail, colorful imagination, and wonderful models. Wt hope you enhoy them just half as much as I do ! If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496- 4 Comments
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