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Chapter 39: The Remains Of The Day

Dreadnought posted a City Journal entry in IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN

The Grand Fleet steaming NW in line-ahead formation -- full daylight on 2 June 1916. IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 39: THE REMAINS OF THE DAY: THE AFTERMATH OF BATTLE The sun rises early in northern latitudes, and as the misty dawn crept above the eastern horizon on 1 June 1916, Vice-Admiral David Beatty’s Battlecruiser Fleet sighted their first German. Lookouts aboard HMS Lion spotted the Zeppelin L-11 as she dipped below the cloud base around 03:30. Nearly as long as a dreadnought, the big airship received a warm reception as Beatty’s ships opened fire – some with their main battery guns. The German air crew reacted quickly, released water ballast, and took their fragile craft back into the clouds. Beatty assumed the airship was scouting ahead of the Hochseeflotte and signaled “clear for action”. But the minutes ticked by with nothing more to be seen. The Battlecruiser Fleet was alone in the choppy waters of the North Sea. (L-11 would stumble into the Grand Fleet a few minutes to the NW, receive the same “hot” reception, and report both encounters to Scheer before being ordered back to Nordholz aerodrome.) Some miles to the north, at 02:47, a heavy mist settled over the sea with the first touch of dawn, and Vice-Admiral John Jellicoe, hopeful of finding the enemy, signaled his fleet to form “line-ahead” battle formation. While the dreadnoughts maneuvered into line, the C.-in-C. set about signaling his light cruiser squadrons and destroyer flotillas to close the battle fleet and assume their assigned stations. The various elements of the Grand Fleet had become disoriented during the night – while SMS Westfalen had scattered and mauled destroyer flotillas much like a fox among barnyard chickens. Jellicoe intended to close Horns Reef and intercept Scheer. About the same time Beatty fired on the Zeppelin, HMS Iron Duke took in a signal from the Admiralty. The Hochseeflotte’s position had been fixed by wireless direction-finding stations an hour earlier (02:30) – 30 miles NE of Iron Duke on a SES course, estimated speed 16 knots – just one hour’s steaming from Horns Reef. The signalman delivered the message to Flag Captain Dreyer on the bridge. Having read it, he shook his head and climbed the ladder to the Admiral’s bridge. Jellicoe read the message with no show of emotion whatsoever. He merely handed the message back...”This signal makes it painfully evident that by no possible means can I catch Scheer before he reaches port – even if I disregard the danger of following him through the minefields…” Jellicoe ordered Dreyer to recall the battlecruisers and alter course for Horns Reef – on the off chance he might snap-up a few German stragglers as he passed by. Jellicoe had trapped Scheer and beaten him – twice – but the sun went down before he could finish the job. In the end, Scheer outmaneuvered and outwitted Jellicoe and escaped the well-laid trap. By sunrise, 2 June, Beatty’s Battlecruiser Fleet was back in Rosyth, Jerram’s 2nd Battle Squadron anchored off Cromarty around 09:00, and the bulk of the Grand Fleet was safely tucked-up in Scapa Flow by noon. But there was little rest to be had. The Fleet took on coal, oil, and ammunition – and, as an afterthought -- a few fresh provisions. At 21:45 that evening, Jellicoe telegraphed London to inform the Admiralty the Grand Fleet was, in all respects, ready for sea. Capital ships of the Grand Fleet lying at anchor in Scapa Flow. The 15-inch gun battleship HMS Revenge is front and center. Around 03:00 1 June, Vizeadmiral Franz von Hipper stood quietly on the bridge of SMS Moltke, the only remaining combat-ready battlecruiser. He held his duty-station ahead of the Hochseeflotte, leading the main body past Horns Reef and toward the Amrum Bank Passage. They would soon pass inshore of the German minefields. Due to the severe damage suffered by SMS Derfflinger and Von der Tann, Scheer ordered them to assemble on Moltke and run into Wilhelmshaven. (SMS Seydlitz was still afloat, but lagging far behind.). As Derfflinger and Von der Tann steamed ahead -- SMS Ostfriesland ran onto a mine. (It was not the minefield Jellicoe had ordered HMS Abdiel to sow – it was another field she had sown a month earlier.) Though considerably damaged, Ostfriesland was able to maintain her place in line. SMS Moltke led the remaining battlecruisers past the outer Jade light ship and anchored in Wilhelmshaven Roads at 14:50. Once the tide came in Derfflinger was able to transit the locks and the Panzerkreuzer ran into the southern harbor basin around 17:15 – badly battered – but covered in Glory and Legend. Vizeadmiral Scheer watched Hipper’s battlecruisers steam off to the south. He would hold the fleet, temporarily, between Horns Reef and the Amrum Bank while he waited for the tide to come in. SMS Konig had led the battle fleet into the gun sights of the Grand Fleet twice, and paid the price. Several large caliber hits (probably 15-inch) badly holed her forward causing serious flooding. Kapitan Bruninghaus had to counter-flood to keep her on an even keel, resulting in the ship taking on 1,600 tons of water. She was down by the bow and forced to wait for the tide (09:30) before trying to navigate Amrum Bank Passage. The fleet eventually cleared Amrum Bank, and a little past midday, Konteradmiral Mauve’s II Battle Squadron was detached for the Elbe River and Cuxhaven. The five old pre-dreadnoughts dropped anchor in Altenbruch Roads around 14:25. After having to beg to be included in the battle fleet’s sortie – and having lost SMS Pommern – the old pre-dreadnoughts had twice steamed into harm’s way to save Hipper’s crippled battlecruisers. They had earned their battle honors. And now every man that crewed the “five-minute-ships” could stand proudly and say...”We were at the battle!” And no one could take that from them. In the gasthauses of old Cuxhaven there would be many stories to tell this night, much beer, and toasts to missing shipmates. As Scheer approached Schillig Roads, five battleships of I Battle Squadron were detached to stand guard. Scheer worried the British might choose this moment to launch a raid on Wilhelmshaven. The remainder of the Hochseeflotte steamed up the deep-water channel to anchor off Wilhelmshaven and wait for the tide to pass through the locks. By 06:30 the following morning (2 June), it was all over – except for the tidying-up. (As an interesting sidelight -- before the battle, Konteradmiral Behncke had made a quick tour of SMS Konig to deliver some words of encouragement to the crew, and the ship’s cat – “Max” – began to follow him. “Max” was a rather large, long-haired, part Norwegian Forest Cat (orange or ginger) with the remainder of his parentage unknown – and he had always had the run of the ship. When Konig finally came to anchor in Wilhelmshaven Roads one of the cook’s assistants thought to feed Max, but he could not be found. Word went around the dreadnought and an informal search was conducted – without success. He was later found in the only place no one had dared to look, the Admiral’s day cabin off the bridge – curled into a neat ball on the Admiral’s cot – sound asleep.) The Hochseeflotte moored quayside in Wilhelmshaven after the battle. Some ships went into dry dock, others made minor repairs and replenished provisions, ammunition, and coal. “The whole situation was difficult to grasp, as I had no real idea of what was going on and we could hardly see anything except flashes of guns, shells falling, ships blowing up, and an occasional glimpse of an enemy vessel…” That is the best one-sentence summary of the Battle of Jutland ever written – and it was in Admiral Jellicoe’s report to the Admiralty. And like the telegram reporting the fleet ready for sea, it may have mollified the Admiralty, but it hardly covered the myriad of details and what followed. Despite the enormous numerical advantage held by the British, the Grand Fleet had been knocked about a bit. Of the 28 British dreadnoughts present at Jutland, 5 were damaged to varying degrees. Of the 9 battlecruisers at Jutland, 3 were sunk and 4 damaged. The official British warship losses at Jutland: Battlecruisers: Queen Mary – Indefatigable – Invincible Battleships: 0 Armored Cruisers: Defence – Warrior – Black Prince Light Cruisers: 0 Destroyers: Tipperary - Nestor - Nomad – Turbulent – Ardent – Fortune – Shark - Sparrowhawk British battlecruisers damaged at Jutland: New Zealand – 1 hit Lion – 14 Princess Royal – 9 Tiger – 21 British battleships damaged at Jutland: Colossus – 2 hits Barham – 6 Malaya – 8 Warspite – 15 Marlborough – 1 torpedo British personnel losses: 6,094 dead – 674 wounded – 177 taken prisoner At first glance, the damage to the Grand Fleet may not seem so bad – but Jellicoe saw things differently the morning after Jutland. He entered the battle with 9 combat-ready battlecruisers. On the morning of 3 June, Beatty’s “Battlecruiser Fleet” was reduced to two undamaged Invincible Class and one lightly damaged Indefatigable Class. ALL of his remaining modern battlecruisers were significantly damaged. A heavily damaged HMS Lion was repaired and returned to duty on 19 July – minus her burnt-out “Q” turret – which could not be replaced until September. Princess Royal received temporary repairs over an eight-day period at Rosyth, then sailed to Plymouth for permanent repairs – and returned to the Grand Fleet on 21 July. Among the “Splendid Cats”, HMS Tiger was peppered pretty heavily by shells, but was repaired at Rosyth Dockyard and returned to the fleet on 1 July. (Incidentally, she fired 303 rounds from her main battery guns and obtained only one hit on SMS Moltke and two on Von der Tann – a 1% hit ratio.) The upshot of this, is Jellicoe had only 4 battlecruisers available for scouting duties during the next six weeks. (HMAS Australia had missed Jutland, but was now available.) This perceived weakness in his scouting forces bothered Jellicoe. HMS Tiger completed repairs and took on coal before rejoining the Battlecruiser Fleet. Three Passat Class and a Nordwind Class tug ease the big battlecruiser against the coaling dock. The docks are 11x3 custom-made lots using an old brick texture and “Paeng’s Grunge Concrete”, fronted by “WMP Seawalls”. The coal cranes are from the “PEG” trash lots, “resized” to fit. The two warehouses left of center are from “Nob’s 1905 Naval Series”. HMS Tiger, the steam locomotive, and coal gondolas are courtesy of Barroco Hispano. The numerous sailors, rope coils, Atlantic fenders, and beautiful tugs are the work of “AP”. The dreadnoughts of the Grand Fleet, as a whole, suffered comparatively little damage – though several individual ships took considerable punishment. HMS Colossus took two shells in the forward superstructure, causing little damage, and returned to duty by 18 June. After nearly being lost to a single torpedo strike, HMS Marlborough received temporary repairs at Hull, then moved to the Armstrong-Whitworth shipyard at Jarrow (Clydebank) for extensive permanent repairs. She returned to the fleet on 5 August. HMS Barham, flagship of the now-famous 5th Battle Squadron “fast battleships”, was a bit “chewed-up”, but returned to the fleet on 5 July. HMS Malaya, another “fast battleship”, survived a great deal of enemy attention and many near misses, but was repaired in the floating dock at Invergordon and returned to the fleet on 4 July. HMS Warspite was the most heavily damaged of the “fast battleships”, but she managed to make port under her own steam and underwent extensive repairs, only returning to the fleet in early August. (Warspite went on to a long and glorious career in WW II. At the Battle of Calabria, 9 June 1940, she opened fire on the Italian battleship Giulio Cesare and scored a hit at the longest known range of 29,000 yards. The record stands unbroken to this day. Warspite was also the first Allied warship to open fire on the Normandy beaches, on June 6, 1944. However, it became something of a standing joke in the Royal Navy that her steering gear problem was never fully cured. For the rest of her service life, Warspite’s steering would, for no apparent reason -- occasionally go “haywire” – and the big ship would “go-walk-about”.) An added stroke of luck came to Jellicoe within days of the battle, when HMS Queen Elizabeth and Emperor of India completed their maintenance and rejoined the fleet. And a few weeks later, the new 15-inch-gunned battleship HMS Royal Sovereign completed her working-up exercises and joined the battle squadrons at Scapa Flow. So – for the next six weeks -- Jellicoe’s “fast battleship” squadron was reduced to two ships – and his total dreadnought battleship strength dropped from 28 to 24 ships. Though this temporary decline in strength preyed on Jellicoe’s mind, the danger was more imagined than real, and he had one obvious and overwhelming advantage. On the morning of 3 June 1916, Jellicoe had an operational battle fleet on two hour’s notice for steam – Admiral Scheer did not. SMS Helgoland undergoes repair in one of the large floating dry docks in Wilhelmshaven that so impressed Jellicoe in the time before the war. The dock is very wide in relation to Helgoland. It was designed to accommodate ships as each class got progressively bigger. Note the funnels on the right of the dock. Boilers and steam engines powered the big pumps used to raise and lower the dock so ships could enter and exit. They also ran generators providing electric light, ventilation fans in the machine shops, and power for the heavy machine tools. Across the North Sea, much the same scene was being played out with the Hochseeflotte. True enough, Scheer had fewer ships to worry about – but more of his were damaged. The size of the British battle fleet, the poor visibility on the day of the battle, and the way in which the battle unfolded, all conspired to concentrate damage to just a portion of the German fleet. The opposing battlecruiser forces engaged early on and stayed engaged for the entire battle – both sides steadily accumulating damage. The British battle fleet was arrayed in such a manner as to be able to bring virtually all their guns to bear on the enemy, while the poor visibility limited their field of vision. This haphazardly resulted in many British ships concentrating their fire on the few visible German dreadnoughts – causing heavy damage. Considering the circumstances, it’s a miracle they survived at all. (Had British gunnery been better, they might not have survived.) Of the 5 German battlecruisers present at Jutland, one was sunk, one was virtually unharmed, two were heavily damaged, and the fifth one was near sinking. Scheer engaged the British with 16 dreadnought battleships – 9 were damaged in varying degrees. Of the 6 pre-dreadnought battleships present, one was lightly damaged and one sunk. (Some authors claim the old battleships were “hit repeatedly” – but there is no evidence in the “BundesArchiv” to support this assertion.) The official German warship losses at Jutland: Battlecruisers: Lutzow Battleships: Pommern (pre-dreadnought) Light Cruisers: Wiesbaden – Elbing – Rostock -- Frauenlob Torpedo Boats: V-48 – S-35 – V-29 – V-27 -- V-4 German battlecruisers damaged: Von der Tann – 4 hits Moltke – 4 Seydlitz – 26, 1 torpedo Derfflinger – 31 German battleships damaged: Rheinland – 1 hit Westfalen – 1 Helgoland – 1 Oldenburg – 1 Kaiser – 2 Ostfriesland – 1 mine Grosser Kurfurst – 8 Konig – 10 Markgraf – 5 Nassau – 2, rammed by destroyer Spitfire German pre-dreadnought battleships damaged: Schleswig-Holstein – 1 hit Schlesien – 1 hit German personnel losses: 2,551 dead – 507 wounded ** (It should be noted no two sources agree on the number of hits taken by the Imperial warships. Consequently, I have taken my numbers from the “BA-MA” – Bundesarchiv – Militararchiv. For purposes of simplification, I have included only hits scored by main and secondary battery guns.) Comparing the numbers, they speak for themselves. In the early decades of the 20th Century, the balance of power was measured in capital ships, and the Royal Navy lost three battlecruisers, while the Kaiserliche Marine lost one battlecruiser and one old pre-dreadnought battleship. If you simply crunch the numbers, the British lost more men and ships. But the immediate balance of power after the battle could be better measured in “repairs” and how long they took to complete. Jellicoe, always worried about maintaining his 2 to 1 margin of superiority, needlessly wrung his hands over a six week repair period. Scheer, on the other hand, did not have imaginary problems – he had real problems. Despite all the grief she inflicted on British destroyer flotillas during the night, SMS Westfalen suffered only minor damage and returned to the fleet in mid-June. She is seen taking on coal from a pair of lighters with a Thor Class tug lashed alongside. Another tug stands by with various ship’s stores. SMS Westfalen courtesy of Barroco Hispano. Tugs, lighters, mooring dolphins, and small boats by AP. Due to the volume of fire directed at them, and the sheer destructive power of the larger British shells, the Imperial capital ships suffered devastating structural damage that would have certainly sunk less well-armored vessels. What’s more – German commercial shipyards and Imperial Dockyards were few in number and scattered between the North Sea and The Baltic. Compounding the difficulty was their limited capacity (hence the numerous floating docks), and their inability to match the speed of English facilities. Scheer was in far worse shape than Jellicoe, and far more worried – and with good reason. A week after the battle of Jutland, Scheer could only muster one slightly damaged battlecruiser (Moltke) and eight undamaged dreadnought battleships. (SMS Konig Albert missed Jutland due to condenser trouble, but was ready for duty on 3 June.) SMS Rheinland was hit only once, and returned to I Battle Squadron by 17 June. A pair of Sophia Class paddle tugs have come alongside to unload their lighters. The first tug is hauling fresh provisions, while the second is transferring dry goods and ship’s stores. A Thor Class tug stands by to top-off Rheinland’s coal bunkers. SMS Westfalen, Rheinland, Helgoland, and Oldenburg were lightly damaged, and returned to service by mid-June (about two weeks), providing a much needed boost in battleship strength. The elderly Schleswig-Holstein and Schlesian (pre-dreadnoughts) were moderately damaged but were repaired dockside at Cuxhaven. Despite being rammed by HMS Spitfire, losing 20 feet or her belt armor, and having a considerable gash above the waterline, SMS Nassau went into Kaiserliche Werft Wilhelmshaven and returned to the fleet on 14 July -- about six weeks. The damage to SMS Grosser Kurfurst was largely superficial, but two hits involved structural damage, so the ship returned to her builder’s yard, A.G. Vulcan, Hamburg. She rejoined the battle fleet on 16 July (approximately six weeks). SMS Nassau was hit by two shells, causing moderate damage – but she was rammed by the destroyer HMS Spitfire. The British ship was passing on an opposite course and seriously damaged the battleship’s port bow and armor belt, with collateral damage along the rest of the port side. Nassau is moored outboard of the dry dock mole undergoing repairs. Two crane barges have been brought alongside to work on the hull plating with a machinists barge to help with the steel work. The steam tug Goliath and the paddle tug Helena are standing by to move the crane barges as needed. SMS Nassau and Goliath are courtesy of “Barroco Hispano”. The mooring dolphins, lighters, tug Helena, and the barges alongside the battleship are all by “AP”, as well as the crane on the left hand barge. There are many props and cranes on the dry dock mole – also by “AP”. The barges and cranes in the left of the picture are from the “PEG” seaports and “SNM Series”. Below is a detail shot. SMS Konig suffered the most serious damage among the Imperial dreadnoughts. She had structural damage to the main armor belt and the forward armored citadel transverse bulkhead. There were also large areas below decks where small compartments were shattered by the blast from armor-piercing shells. (No doubt, 15-inch rounds from HMS Barham, Revenge, or Royal Oak.) Because of her size, Konig required a large floating dock. Wilhelmshaven’s were already occupied, so she transferred to Kaiserliche Werft Kiel for immediate repairs, then to the Howaldtswerk shipyard in the Kieler Hafen to finish the work. She returned to the Jade on 22 July (seven weeks). SMS Ostfriesland is going into dry dock for major repairs to the mine damage on her starboard bow. Once the water is drained they will be able to repair the interior compartments as well as the hull and armor belt. Off her stern are two Passat Class tugs and one older Nordwind Class. While in dock her hull will be cleaned and repainted. The tugs and lighters in the lower left are carrying hundreds of gallons of paint for the purpose. The small dockside cranes are borrowed from the “PEG SNM Series”, while the large 250 ton steam cranes are the meticulous work of “AP”. Ostfriesland is courtesy of “Barroco Hispano”. The tugs, lighters, sailors, and numerous small props dockside are the fine work of “AP”. The mine damage to Ostfriesland, both internal and external, was considerable, but the Imperial Dockyard returned her to duty on 26 July (nearly eight weeks). SMS Markgraf was knocked-about quite a bit – taking at least three 15-inch shells -- but it was a near miss aft that sent her back to the builder’s yard. The force of the detonation alongside (probably another 15-inch round), warped a propeller shaft. Markgraf was escorted to the A.G. Weser Shipyard in Bremen to make use of their large dry dock – and only returned to the Jade on 5 August (roughly nine weeks). SMS Kaiser suffered light damage from 2 hits, but as part of the guard force anchored in Schillig Roads, her repairs were delayed and she only rejoined the battle fleet on 7 August (nine weeks). With Scheer’s battle squadrons once again whole, he received a bit of luck. The new 15-inch-gunned battleship SMS Bayern commissioned into the Kaiserliche Marine on 15 July and was assigned to III Battle Squadron. Due to wartime conditions, the dreadnought battleship SMS Bayern conducted her working-up exercises largely in the Baltic Sea. Urgently needed to strengthen the Hochseeflotte, she was dispatched to Wilhelmshaven with little coal in her bunkers. She anchored in Schillig Roads on 15 July and immediately began coaling ship. Her big 15-inch guns were a welcome addition to III Battle Squadron. Bayern and the steam tug Goliath are courtesy of Barroco Hispano. The Helena Class paddle tug, lighters, small boat, and mooring dolphins are the detailed work of @AP. The repairs to the German battleships had been handled fairly quickly, but then, they had not been under fire for very long. The German battlecruisers were another matter entirely. SMS Moltke only took four hits – but all of them were 15-inch shells. She was holed aft below the armor belt and flooded-down by the stern. On 6 June she was despatched to her builder -- up the Elbe River to the Blohm & Voss Yards. The four big Lyddite shells also caused superficial damage to her hull and decks, but considerably more internal damage to her below deck compartments. Admiral Hipper was finally able to raise his flag aboard Moltke on 14 August (ten weeks). SMS Von der Tann was also hit by four large caliber shells -- two of them 15-inch – one of which struck below the waterline aft, dislodging part of the armor belt and causing serious flooding. Other shells damaged the ship’s upper works, but the most serious problem was with the main gun recoil buffers. During rapid firing early in the battle, Von der Tann’s main battery guns began to overheat, and eventually came out of battery during recoil – effectively putting the guns out of action. A good deal of time was spent overhauling the gun slides and recoil buffers. Repair parts for Von der Tann’s jammed “A” turret were cannibalized from the battleship Rheinland to speed the work. The guns then had to be tested on the Baltic gunnery ranges, and Von der Tann did not rejoin 1st Scouting Group until 15 August (ten weeks). The repair of SMS Seydlitz was one of the most difficult operations ever performed at the Imperial Dockyards Wilhelmshaven. The ship barely made port in a near-sinking condition – and repairs were more like a salvage operation. Almost two weeks were spent sealing holes and lightening the ship enough to get her inside the harbor locks, and then into a floating dock. She absorbed an unbelievable 26 large caliber shells (twelve of them 15-inch) and a torpedo strike. The torpedo, alone, was enough to sink most capital ships of the period. Everything forward of the bridge was riddled with massive shell holes and an utter shambles. Initial repairs were carried out in various floating docks and basins at Wilhelmshaven – then she transferred to Kiel, where more advanced work was undertaken in the construction yard. Seydlitz finally rejoined 1st Scouting Group on 3 November (approximately twenty weeks). SMS Derfflinger was in better shape than Seydlitz, but not by much. She went into a floating dock on 2 June and work was begun draining compartments, plugging holes, and fitting temporary patches to the hull. From 7-9 June she was moored at berth A-5 to clean the ship, remove the torpedo nets and booms, and land part of the ammunition ashore. Derfflinger arrived in Kiel on 11 June where permanent repairs would be carried out in the construction yard. At the same time, the big cruiser received a tall tripod mast -- the signature look for which she is so well known. The new tripod would accommodate a large foretop with an improved 15-foot rangefinder. On 22 June she returned to the floating dock where final repairs were concluded on 15 October. Sea trials and gunnery tests were run to ensure the battlecruiser was combat-ready, and Derfflinger rejoined 1st Scouting Group on 9 November, when they arrived in Kiel for squadron maneuvers and gunnery practice (roughly twenty-one weeks). (Just for the record – If anyone requires proof of the superiority of German armor and its application – Seydlitz and Derfflinger represent tangible proof. Considering the enormous amounts of damage done to these two ships – they should have sunk. But the key philosophy behind German warship construction was survivability. It took, roughly, three years to build SMS Seydlitz, and twenty-nine months for Derfflinger – but it only took five months to make repairs and return them to the fleet. German naval architects understood: it was far cheaper, and much faster, to repair a ship than it was to build a new one.) SMS Derfflinger – circa 1917 – with her tripod foremast and spacious “spotting top”. The legs of the mast were unusually heavy compared to those seen in other navies. German designers made them especially sturdy to eliminate any possibility of vibration that might interfere with the optical rangefinder. The large 15-foot rangefinder would have been installed in the cylindrical shaped, rotating upper level of the spotting top, while the lower level housed the necessary fire control instruments, their operating party, and the firing circuits of the Chief Gunnery Officer. Access to the spotting top would have been via ladders outside the steel mast legs. Oddly enough – none of my extensive research has ever turned up an incident where a spotting top or tripod mast was destroyed by gunfire. There were, of course, numerous instances of rangefinders mounted anywhere on the ship’s superstructure being knocked-out by enemy fire. On 18 August, Vizeadmiral Scheer once again assembled the serviceable units of the Hochseeflotte in Schillig Roads – some 18 dreadnought battleships and 2 battlecruisers. SMS Seydlitz and Derfflinger were not out of the repair yards, so 1st Scouting Group consisted of the battlecruisers SMS Von der Tann and Moltke (flag), reinforced by the battleships Grosser Kurfurst, Markgraf, and the new 15-inch-gunned SMS Bayern. Vizeadmiral Hipper cleared the Jade by 20:00 and set course to the west. An hour later, Admiral Scheer followed with the remaining battleships of the III and I Battle Squadrons. It was Scheer’s intention to show the English, and the rest of the world, the Imperial battle fleet was just as full of fight as ever. In yet another attempt to ambush a portion of the Grand Fleet, he would carry out the previously aborted Sunderland Raid, complete with U-Boat ambushes, and this time fully covered by Zeppelin reconnaissance. As usual, the British were fully alerted by German wireless traffic and the Grand Fleet, Battlecruiser Fleet, and Tyrwhitt’s Harwich Force had put to sea some five hours ahead of the Germans. The morning of 19 August dawned bright and clear as the Hochseeflotte continued to steer west, interrupted twice by early morning submarine sightings. On both occasions, Hipper immediately turned away from the enemy and signaled submarine warnings to Scheer before swinging back to the west. Unfortunately for the Hochseeflotte battle squadrons, around 06:00, some 60 miles north of Terschelling – the British submarine E-23 slammed a torpedo into SMS Westfalen. Hit amidships, the German dreadnought took onboard 800 tons of water, and was ordered back to Wilhelmshaven under escort. As Hipper’s scouting group proceeded on a westerly course, yet another British submarine, this one on the surface, was sighted by SMS Bayern at 08:43. Wary of the numerous submarine sightings, Hipper increased speed and altered course to WSW. To the north, almost simultaneous to the torpedoing of Westfalen, the Grand Fleet was approaching Dogger Bank. HMS Nottingham (Goodenough’s 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron) was on the extreme east end of the scouting line, 6 miles ahead of the battle fleet. Without warning, a single torpedo fired from U-52 struck the light cruiser in the port engine room -- she barely had time to get out a distress signal before going down. Apparently, the signal was sent in such haste it was unclear whether Nottingham was torpedoed or had struck a mine. Alarmed, Jellicoe feared he had run into a freshly laid minefield, and immediately reversed course. For the next two hours, the Grand Fleet actually steamed to the north -- until it could be confirmed Nottingham had been torpedoed – whereupon, the fleet resumed their southerly course. During the brief detour, a Zeppelin sighted the Grand Fleet and reported its course as north. This alerted Scheer to the fact the Grand Fleet was at sea, and puzzled him because of its direction of travel, but ultimately made no difference in the balance of things. Around 14:20, the wind began to freshen from the NW and belts of rain began blowing in. Shortly thereafter, a signal was picked up from the airship L-13…...”Strong enemy force...SE...30 units including dreadnoughts…”. The report was, of course, inaccurate – it was only the light cruisers and destroyers of the Harwich Force. Nevertheless, Hipper signaled Scheer, and swung his ships to close and investigate the report. He ordered SMS Von der Tann and Moltke to increase speed and take a position four miles in advance of the dreadnoughts in his force. Scheer assumed the Zeppelin report had identified Beatty’s battlecruisers, so he aborted the Sunderland Raid and moved to support Hipper. Hipper and Scheer searched briefly for the enemy to the SE, but Tyrwhitt’s force never turned up. After two more unsuccessful attacks by British submarines, Scheer was becoming nervous about a possible British submarine concentration and ambush. Finally, at 16:15, U-58 accurately reported the main body of the Grand Fleet just 60 miles north of Scheer’s position, so he broke off the fruitless search and set course for the Jade. Around 18:30, Tyrwhitt’s Harwich Force finally came on the scene and sighted the screening light cruisers of Hipper’s 1st Scouting Group far to the east and steaming for home. The British gave chase, briefly, but realized it would be dark before they could catch the retiring German warships. When Tyrwhitt sent in the sighting report, Jellicoe swung the Grand Fleet to the east, but it was more a gesture than an act of aggression. A half hour later, Jellicoe stumbled upon another German submarine ambush (U-63) and the screening light cruiser HMS Falmouth was torpedoed. (U-66 finished the job and sent her to the bottom on 20 August while she was being towed back to port.) That was enough for Jellicoe. He had been nervous about bringing the battle fleet that far south in the first place. Now he was certain it was no longer safe to use the Grand Fleet anywhere south of Horn’s Reef. With the High Sea Fleet steaming for the Jade, the signal lamps flashed up and down the long lines of battleships, and the Grand Fleet was ordered back to its’ various bases. After giving Tyrwhitt’s Harwich Force the slip, Hipper and his ships formed a rearguard for the battle fleet and dropped anchor in Schillig Roads around 09:00, 20 August – with no further incident. For all the bravado, on both sides, two things had become clear: (1) Both battle fleets were now wary of each other – and (2) the North Sea had become infested with submarines hostile to one side or the other. Here are four model views of SMS Derfflinger as she looked with her tripod, after rejoining the fleet – circa 1917. She is preparing to take on coal. In the final picture, it is obvious the rangefinder mounted high in the tripod fighting top has a much better vantage point than the rangefinder on top of the armored conning tower. The increased height not only allowed the fire control team to range farther over the horizon, but it was much more likely to be be free of obstruction from gunnery smoke. Excellent model provided by @Barroco Hispano. NEXT TIME…… IF THE TRUTH BE TOLD MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful warship models. SPECIAL THANKS to my friend and partner, @AP, for his talents, meticulous models, colorful imagination, and extreme dedication. If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496
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Chapter 25: Short-Lived And Unlucky

Dreadnought posted a City Journal entry in IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN

SMS Lutzow -- circa 1916 – at sea in heavy weather. IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 25: SHORT-LIVED AND UNLUCKY SMS Lutzow – late 1915 – at cruising speed. With the laying of Derfflinger’s keel on 30 March 1912, the last of the new “Grosse Kreuzer” authorized under the Fleet Law Amendment of 1906 was under construction. Any future building would have to be done under the terms of the “replacement” clause of the Naval Laws. Under this provision, older cruisers (20 years) could be “retired” or sold for scrap, and replaced with new construction. They would be ordered under the “Ersatz” (replacement) designation. The new “Grosse Kreuzer - 1912” would be ordered as the “Ersatz Kaiserin Augusta” – a replacement for the old protected cruiser commissioned in 1892. (See Chapter 2 for details of the old cruiser.) This ship would be built as a sister-ship to Derfflinger and would be the second ship of the class. While SMS Goeben had been built as a sister-ship to Moltke, that choice was made largely as a matter of expedience. The Design Bureau had been over-burdened with work, and the Kaiserliche Marine could not afford to lose a year in the building race against the British. For “Grosse Kreuzer – 1912”, the reason was purely financial. An 18 March 1911 memorandum from Admiral Rollmann stipulated the Naval budget for 1911 and 1912 only allowed 32.3 million Marks for each battlecruiser. The rising annual costs of new ships had not been taken into account by the original Naval Laws, so any cost overruns would have to be covered by public subscription. The only logical way to obtain a new battlecruiser at least equal to Derfflinger’s power – was to build a duplicate. The Imperial economy was already groaning under the weight of the Naval Estimates, and anything larger, or more powerful, was out of the question. For the first time since SMS Blucher was launched at the Imperial Dockyards Kiel Werft, the contract for the new battlecruiser would NOT be given to Blohm & Voss Shipyards in Hamburg. This was an unusual step and has never been fully explained. Blohm & Voss had acquired considerable experience and skill over the years in building battlecruisers. And it is especially odd since the company had also granted large discounts on the building costs. The contract was awarded to the F. Schichau Werk in Danzig, which had previously built the dreadnought battleships SMS Oldenburg and Konig Albert (as well as several pre-dreadnoughts). There has been speculation that the eastern provinces needed a boost in their employment rate, or that more shipyards needed experience in building capital ships, or even the need to break the Blohm & Voss monopoly on turbine technology by encouraging other yards to build them. Regardless of why Schichau got the contract, “Grosse Kreuzer Ersatz Kaiserin Augusta” was ordered as the SMS Lutzow, and her keel was laid on 15 May 1912 – just six weeks after SMS Derfflinger’s keel laying ceremony. Officials estimated she would join the Hochseeflotte in late 1915. And it’s just as well they chose to build her as a sister to Derfflinger, for the British were pushing ahead with their plans to neutralize the Imperial battlecruisers – any loss in time could have serious consequences. The “fast battleship” HMS Warspite lying at anchor off the naval dockyard of Rosyth, Scotland, while attached to the Battlecruiser Fleet. The Forth Bridge is in the background. She was the second ship of the Queen Elizabeth Class to join the Grand Fleet in March 1915. Displacement 32,590 tons – 24 knots – 8x15-inch guns – 12x6-inch guns – 4x21-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 13 inches. The British already saw the German “Grosse Kreuzer” as a tactical threat to their battle line, but they were focused on the speed and gun power of the cruisers. First Sea Lord Winston Churchill, and his cronies at the Admiralty, knew they would be used for scouting purposes, but they feared the Germans would employ them against the battle fleet (much as cavalry might be employed against an army of infantry). If the German battlecruisers used their speed to get into position across the bows of the battle line, they could concentrate their gun fire on the lead ships and either sink them or force them to turn away. Such a maneuver could throw the Grand Fleet into disarray, resulting in unacceptable losses, and possibly even losing the battle. This was, in fact, what the British feared most, and it was their intention to build a squadron of larger and more powerfully-gunned high-speed battleships to neutralize this threat. (Churchill envisioned two squadrons – the Queen Elizabeth and Revenge classes -- but the naval budget couldn’t support that. The resulting Revenge Class was built with 15-inch guns, but a much reduced propulsion plant – only 22 knots – a significant cost reduction.) HMS Queen Elizabeth, the first of the British fast battleships, joined the Grand Fleet in 1914, and HMS Warspite would go to sea in March 1915, followed by HMS Barham in October 1915 – the same year SMS Lutzow was commissioned into the Kaiserliche Marine. (The following year, prior to the Battle of Jutland, both HMS Valiant and HMS Malaya would join the Grand Fleet – giving the British a squadron of five fast battleships. They would play a critical part in the battle.) The British Admiralty, apparently more interested in speed and big guns than armored protection, placed their reliance on safety in numbers. They continued to build capital ships at a far higher rate than Germany ever could, secure in the belief that when the smoke cleared, the more numerous Royal Navy would be the victor. By the close of 1915, and the first year and a half of the war, Great Britain could count 10 battlecruisers and 3 fast battleships in service. In contrast, Imperial Germany could only muster 5 battlecruisers (SMS Goeben was in Turkish service by that time). Though Germany’s battlecruiser / fast battleships were superior – ship for ship – they were outnumbered nearly three to one. HMS Revenge: 29,590 tons – 21.9 knots – 8x15-inch guns – 14x6-inch guns – 4x21-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 13 inches. She was the lead ship of her class and joined the battle squadrons of the Grand Fleet in February 1916. She made a fine edition to the battle line but was far too slow to keep up with battlecruisers. With such an overriding fear of the tactical employment of the German battlecruisers, the British never seemed to have considered the ships, themselves. Of course they were aware of their high speed, and their big guns were on display for all to see, but beyond that, the British had no hard information. Churchill and the Admiralty Sea Lords naturally assumed with such great speed and a ten-gun main battery, the German battlecruisers could hardly have more armor than their own battlecruisers. They had no idea they would one day be trading salvos with heavily armored “fast-battleships” rather than thin-skinned battlecruisers. It would take the outbreak of war in 1914 to alert the British to the rugged strength and superior design of the German Panzerkreuzer. But it would only be after the war was over that the British learned the full extent of the superior German armor protection. In retrospect, the only real advantage the Queen Elizabeth’s would have were their massive 15-inch guns. Any warship that dared to come within range of them was in serious jeopardy. And the Imperial battlecruisers would have the short end of the stick in this fight – Tirpitz had seen to that. He continued to insist his battlecruisers would only fight other battlecruisers – not dreadnought battleships. Anyone with a logical thought process knows it is impossible to draw such a line. A warship must engage whatever enemy targets it encounters – and in a massive fleet engagement – it is almost certain one of them would be a battleship. The Imperial battlecruisers were faster than British battleships, and their armor was strong enough to withstand damage from the 12 inch and 13.5 inch guns of the Grand Fleet. But the offensive power of the Panzerkreuzer was lacking. SMS Von der Tann was, for various reasons, armed with 11-inch guns even when the British Invincible Class was known to posses 12-inch weapons. To avoid initial construction delays, Von der Tann could have been taken into the dockyards in 1911 or 1912 and re-armed with 12-inch guns. (It would have meant extensive modifications, but there was time for that, and the money could have been found – somewhere.) The Moltke Class should have been designed with 12-inch guns to start with. And when the British switched to the 13.5-inch gun, Seydlitz should have been armed with a 13.8-inch gun being developed by Krupp. German gunnery was excellent – they hit what they aimed at. And bigger shells would have caused much more damage to the British ships. That, alone, could have made all the difference in several major engagements early in the war. But the German battlecruisers were always “a day late and a dollar short” when it came to the guns. They were fast enough – and superbly armored – they simply lacked the broadside “punch”. Here you see SMS Lutzow coaling ship while moored to buoys in the shallows of Schillig Roads. She is on picket duty, but Kapitan Harder didn’t want to risk going into action with nearly empty bunkers. In order to speed things up, coal lighters have been brought alongside either beam of the big battlecruiser. The majority of the crew would be turned-to and the ship’s boat booms pressed into service hoisting aboard cargo nets full of canvas coal sacks. At this point we see the obvious penalty of Tirpitz’ stubborn insistence in clinging to an 11-inch gun long past its usefulness. The 15-inch guns of the British Queen Elizabeth Class could hurl a 1,938 pound shell out to 24,500 yards, twice per minute. The new 12-inch guns chosen for the Derfflinger Class could fire a 915 pound shell out to 17,700 yards, three times per minute – considerably less weight and range than the British. Tirpitz’ out-dated belief that battle ranges would be shorter led to turrets designed with insufficient gun elevation. During testing at the Krupp firing range in Meppin, the SK-L/50 12-inch could fire out to 41,000 yards at maximum possible elevation – a potentially massive advantage over the British – thrown away. Tirpitz and his lack of experience with modern gunnery science, saddled the Kaiserliche Marine with a shell weight half that of the British -- and forced the German ships to close the range by 6,800 yards under fire -- before opening fire themselves! Planning for the British Queen Elizabeth Class started in mid-1911 – approximately the same time as Derfflinger. The German Naval High Command was aware the Vickers Elswick Gun Works had already developed a 14-inch rifle for the Japanese, and though Churchill tried to keep it a secret, word leaked out that a 15-inch gun was under development as well. The Reichsmarineamt should have immediately begun exploring the idea with Krupp – if too late for Derfflinger – then certainly for her follow-on sister-ship Lutzow. But that was not to be. The battleship SMS Bayern would be laid down in 1913 and armed with the new Krupp 15-inch gun. The same year, the Mackensen Class battlecruisers would be laid down and were to be armed with 13.8-inch weapons. In 1915, the Ersatz Yorck Class battlecruisers would finally be designed with a 15-inch main battery – quite literally, years behind the British. But the World War would break out in 1914, slowing or halting construction. Only two of the battleships would ever see service (SMS Bayern and Baden). And the battlecruisers of the Hochseeflotte would go into the greatest naval battle in history – outnumbered and under-gunned. SMS LUTZOW – Derfflinger Class This is an excellent 3-D “cut-away” of the lower decks of SMS Lutzow. Up forward, the top two decks are occupied with Petty Officer’s cabins and large compartments for the crew accommodation. The next deck down shows the Bosun’s Store and Capstan Machinery Room. Below that is the Lower Platform Deck with the Bow Torpedo Flat. Behind that, on the Hold Deck, is the Broadside Torpedo Flat. In the “cut-away” amidships, you can see the two air spaces of the torpedo defense, the passageway, a layer of coal bunkers, the anti-torpedo bulkhead, and then the massive boilers with their uptakes reaching up to the funnels. Behind that, you can see the high and low pressure turbines. Note the very tall “steering guide” mounted at the stem. The keel of the ship that would become SMS Lutzow was laid down in the F. Schichau Werk, Danzig, on 15 May 1912. She would be launched some 18 months later on 29 November 1913 – somewhat longer than it would have taken Blohm & Voss. She was christened in honor of Leutnant-General Ludwig Adolf Wilhelm, Freiherr (Baron) von Lutzow (1782 - 1834). He joined the Prussian Army at age thirteen, fought in the Napoleonic Wars, commanded an Army corps, was wounded twice, and decorated with the Pour le Merite with Oak Leaves. The usual period in the Fitting-Out Basin followed, but it was anything but usual. The Schichau workforce had no experience with the big battlecruisers and things progressed slowly. In August 1914, the war broke out and slowed things down even more. Some of the dockyard work force was called up to serve the colors (unskilled workers), while others were diverted to work on the construction of torpedo boats and submarines – suddenly in great demand. And, if all that was not enough, there was a brutal and hard-fought cruiser war raging in the Baltic Sea. Many man-hours of labor went into repairing mine and torpedo damage, not to mention the gunfire received in close-range skirmishes fought in the foggy narrow sea. SMS Lutzow – profile and deck plan. SMS Lutzow was built as an identical twin to Derfflinger, so there were few differences – some were visible, others were not. Derfflinger’s hull had been composed of sixteen watertight compartments – SMS Lutzow had seventeen. Both of Lutzow’s pole masts were fitted with spotting tops, and the yards – rather than set at right angles – were arranged in and “X” pattern. Both funnels were constructed at equal heights, and both were “half-jacketed”. When completing the detail work at Kiel, the forward funnel was fully jacketed. One significant distinguishing feature on Lutzow was her fourteen 5.9-inch guns mounted in casemates amidships on the battery deck – seven on either beam. In Derfflinger, one gun on either beam was removed to make room for the Frahm Roll-Damping tanks. It was decided the anti-roll tanks were of little value, and the guns were restored in Lutzow. The torpedo armament on Lutzow was different – they were placed in the usual locations, but the tube caliber had been increased to 24-inch with an H-8 type torpedo. Another view of SMS Lutzow coaling ship in Schillig Roads. The only inaccuracy in the battlecruiser model is the way the yards on the fore and aft pole masts are set. On Derfflinger they were set as you see them. On Lutzow they were not set at right angles, but in an “X” pattern – to provide two additional halyards for signaling purposes. One significant difference between Derfflinger and Lutzow was an increase in building costs. Instead of the assumed 56 million Marks paid for Derfflinger – Lutzow cost the Imperial treasury 58 million Marks. This “cost-overrun” could be attributed to several possible reasons: (1) simple inflation – each ship always costs more than the last one; (2) Inexperience in building battlecruisers would naturally lead to higher labor costs – it took much longer to build Lutzow; (3) Blohm & Voss was giving the government big discounts Schichau couldn’t match. Most likely, it was a case of “all of the above”. Twenty months later, on 8 August 1915, SMS Lutzow lay alongside the quay in weak Autumn sunshine with a heavy morning mist hanging close to the surface of the Vistula River. The new crew was arranged on the quarterdeck as Kapitan zur See Victor Harder read the commissioning orders and his orders to take command. He will be Lutzow’s first and only commander. When he finished, three resounding cheers were given as the Imperial Naval Ensign was raised on the mainmast and the commissioning pennant broke at the fore-peak. Lutzow had been commissioned into the wartime Kaiserliche Marine, and the following day she was towed to berth “V” along the Westerplatte. SEA TRIALS Here you see SMS Lutzow moored along the Westerplatte quayside in the Vistula River, Danzig – August 1915. The battlecruiser is coaling from lighters alongside before setting sail for Kiel, where her fitting-out will be completed. Note the crew’s laundry drying on the foremast stays. On 23 August, the new Panzerkreuzer weighed anchor and put to sea on her first cruise – to the Imperial Dockyard, Kiel. With an anti-submarine escort of three torpedo boats – G-192, G-194, G-196 – the small detachment increased speed to 20 knots and steered into the setting sun. At 09:00 the following day, Lutzow made fast to buoy A-11 in the Kieler Hafen. On 26 August the battlecruiser was maneuvered into Kiel’s floating dock to have the 24 inch torpedo tubes installed, and moved yet again on 4 September to the Ordnance Quay where the final pieces of her gunnery fire control equipment were installed and tested. On 13 September Lutzow went to sea for torpedo-firing trials, turning circle tests, and other maneuvering tests – then returned to the dockyard from 26 September to 5 October. On 6 October the new cruiser performed heavy artillery trials and general gunnery drills to ensure the batteries preformed smoothly. These were followed by anchoring and engine trials designed to put the equipment through all possible situations. More maneuvering and engine trials were performed before the cruiser put into the floating dock from 10 to 21 October for adjustments to her machinery. At 08:00 on 25 October 1915, Lutzow cast off and proceeded down the Kieler Hafen for her final engine and maneuvering trials. Around 11:50, the port low-pressure turbine suffered sudden and severe damage and eventual failure. Assisted by two salvage tugs, the new cruiser returned to the Kiel dockyards and began a long period of repair lasting until 2 February 1916. Once the battlecruiser was made fast in the repair basin, the workmen and mechanics lifted the housing cover on the port low-pressure turbine and found extensive damage – a very bad case of “turbine salad”. The mechanics discovered 43 blades and guide vanes had been mangled, in addition to the forward drum labyrinth seal broken, and the aft stuffing box cracked – all of which had to be replaced or mended. The cause of all this damage was also located – the head of a workman’s steel hammer – inscribed with the letters “KWK” (Kaiser Werft Kiel). Accidentally left inside the housing inlet during various machinery adjustments, the hammer had been sucked into the whirling turbine. SMS Lutzow tied-up at the repair wharf. The two Langeoog Class salvage tugs that helped her back to port stand-by. The paddle tug Helena has just made fast the machinists barge alongside the big battlecruiser. The tedious job of inspecting and repairing the damaged turbines will soon begin. Lutzow by “Barroco Hispano”. The buildings on the machinists barge are by “Nob”. The dockside warehouses are from “Mattb325”. The salvage tugs, barge, small boat, and paddle tug are all from “AP”. Subsequently, the remaining three turbines were opened and inspected for damage. The port high-pressure turbine had some blades of the “ahead turbine” damaged by an unknown foreign body, but the damage was minor and could be smoothed out. The starboard high-pressure turbine had insignificant damage to a few blades, but the rear drum labyrinth seal was found to be broken and had to be replaced. The starboard low-pressure turbine had some rotor blades damaged by an unknown foreign body – and several blades and guide vanes were replaced. On 2 February 1916, Lutzow was maneuvered out of the repair basin and shifted to the floating dock where repairs continued until 9 February. Four days later, the battlecruiser was moved to buoy A-15 where lighters were brought alongside and “coaling ship” was carried on for two days, followed by fresh provisions. On 17 February, SMS Lutzow put to sea for her final set of trials and these would mainly focus on testing the turbine repairs, while testing her torpedo shooting, and bringing her big 12-inch rifles to a state of near gunnery perfection. In this view of SMS Lutzow, you can see the sleek lines and low profile of the battlecruiser. The design is uncluttered, utilitarian, and advanced for its time. Lines like these would not be found on warships of other nations for another two decades. OPERATIONAL HISTORY On 19 March, SMS Lutzow was ordered back to her buoy in the Kieler Hafen and made fast just an hour before the 1st Scouting Group arrived from Wilhelmshaven. That evening, Kapitan Harder dinned aboard the flagship with Admiral Hipper and the other ship’s captains. The following day, orders assigned Lutzow to 1st Scouting Group, and on 21 March she put to see with the squadron for torpedo shooting and joint exercises on the gunnery ranges – with battle line training the following day. On 24 March, Lutzow and the rest of the Scouting Group made the transit of the Kaiser Wilhelm I canal, arriving in Wilhelmshaven Roads around 09:52 on the 25th. Soon afterward, a message arrived that enemy units had attacked the German picket forces in the Bight – and Seydlitz, Moltke, and Lutzow weighed and steamed down the Jade channel at 20 knots. Once clear of the estuary, the battlecruisers set course northwest into the open sea. Linking up with Derfflinger, the squadron anchored near Vortrapp Deep lighthouse and set their torpedo nets. Around 01:15 the following morning, the Panzerkreuzer weighed and steamed north, but sighting nothing, they put about. On the way back to the Jade, Lutzow was attacked by the British submarine E-24, but the torpedo passed about 75 yards astern. (Unfortunately for E-24, she would not return from her war patrol.) The squadron returned to Wilhelmshaven Roads and anchored at 20:40. On 31 March, Lutzow, Von der Tann, and a torpedo boat escort put to sea to rendezvous with three torpedo boat flotillas returning from a “sweep” beyond the Bight, and on 2 April Lutzow, Von der Tann, the 2nd Scouting Group, and the 3rd Battle Squadron, sailed in support of another torpedo boat “sweep” of “The Broad Fourteens”, west of the Dutch coast. Lying in Wilhelmshaven harbor, the new cruiser was visited by the Flottenchef, Vizeadmiral Scheer, who spent part of his afternoon inspecting the new cruiser. Lutzow spent the remainder of April on picket duty in Schillig Roads, a turn in the dockyard to have her fire control equipment adjusted, various operations in support of light forces, and even a search for a downed floatplane. Contrary to what many historians contend, the Hochseeflotte did not spend the war hiding safe in harbor while their anchor chains rusted. They were quite active from the very first weeks of the war and continued their operations in the North Sea and the German Bight – even after the Battle Of Jutland -- up until the last few months before the 1918 Armistice. The streamlined and graceful hull form is evident in this picture. Gone are the widely flared and protruding ram bows – no more overhanging deck sponsons – no wing turrets -- and no antiquated “tumble-home” along the sides. The smooth and tested hull form produced a large capital ship capable of 29 knots when pushed. And below, you can see the wonderful detail built into these handsome models. The highly detailed battlecruiser is courtesy of @Barroco Hispano and truly a work of art. The size and massive presence of the gun turrets becomes quite clear in this view – they over-shadow all other features on the deck. The channel marker buoys and mooring buoys are by @AP, as are the tugs and lighters in the picture. They are abundantly detailed and superbly textured works of beauty. Notice the large towing winches on the aft deck of the tugs, the level of detail on the lighters, and even the richly textured coal. In late April 1916, German intelligence and wireless intercepts led the Naval High Command to believe a British force would intrude into the waters of the Bight. Unsure of the enemy strength, Admiral Scheer ordered the 1st and 2nd Scouting Groups to conduct a reconnaissance sweep in the likely areas. At 20:50 on 21 April, SMS Lutzow, Von der Tann, and Seydlitz put to sea with the light cruisers and torpedo boats of the 2nd Scouting Group. Once clear of the Jade Estuary, the light cruisers and one torpedo boat flotilla fanned out in a search pattern ahead of the battlecruisers, while the remaining torpedo boats formed an anti-submarine screen around the big ships. Vizeadmiral Hipper (recently promoted) set course northwest at 20 knots, then altered course due north once clear of Heligoland Island. Around 00:25 in the morning darkness of 22 April, the light cruiser SMS Graudenz struck a mine some 15 miles southwest of Amrum Bank. The light cruiser was damaged, but remained under her own power, and was ordered to return to Wilhelmshaven escorted by four torpedo boats. Hipper’s battlecruisers lingered in the area until 05:20, when Seydlitz reported a submarine. About 20 minutes later, Hipper put about, and the squadron retraced its course without sighting any British warships. Lutzow and Von der Tann dropped anchor around 13:00 in Schillig Roads as “picket ships” while the rest of the force carried on to Wilhelmshaven Roads. On 24 April, SMS Lutzow sortied with 1st Scouting Group on the Lowestoft Raid. (See Chapter 16 for operational details.) During the mission Lutzow engaged a single enemy aircraft off Lowestoft with her 8.8cm Flak guns and brought the plane down with her second shot. Later, another plane approached and the entire squadron opened fire, driving it away. (So much for the effectiveness of early aircraft against warships.) Commodore Tyrwhitt’s Harwich Force arrived on the scene and was taken under fire by the battlecruisers, inflicting severe damage on the flagship, the light cruiser HMS Conquest. The British immediately turned away and retired behind a smoke screen. Lutzow’s secondary batteries also dueled with the escorting destroyers and damaged HMS Laertes. During the bombardment of Lowestoft and Great Yarmouth, and the skirmish with the Harwich Force, Lutzow fired twenty 12-inch explosive shells with half-charges, and forty-one 12-inch explosive shells with full charges – in addition to 168 shells from the 5.9-inch secondary batteries. SMS Lutzow returned to the Jade without further incident. On 26 April 1916, Lutzow went into the dockyard and was “out of action” for some thirty-six hours while repairs were made to the main maneuver valve on the starboard high-pressure turbine. She then returned to a mixed routine of picket duty, escort support for returning naval airships and light forces, “sweeps” into the Bight and off Heligoland Island, and more picket duty. On 15 May, Lutzow was detached for exercises in the Baltic and arrived in the Kieler Hafen the next day. After a two hour lay-over – mostly to drop a mail bag and take on fresh fruit and vegetables – the Panzerkreuzer immediately weighed and headed for the gunnery ranges. Both the main and secondary batteries were drilled and practice fired until darkness closed in. The following day, the big cruiser returned to the ranges for gun calibration and more gunnery practice. On 17 May gunnery drill and practice shooting was resumed at 07:00 with full charges. The Kaiserliche Marine had developed a practice of firing four-gun salvos in rotation – both forward turrets, followed by both stern turrets. This actually saved ammunition while “walking” the salvos onto the target. Once the target was “acquired”, the bow and stern turrets could be fired quickly with only a four-second delay between them. This morning, on the third salvo, the gyroscopic firing gear of “A” turret failed. (This was part of the mechanical computer system used when firing in “director mode”, and received data from Fire Control Central to keep the turret trained on target at all times using “electro-magnetic repeaters”.) “A” turret was immediately switched to “local control” and commands were passed by telephone from “Fire Control Central” to the Turret Captain and gun-layers. Firing continued until mid-day, when Lutzow hove-to so “A” turret could be inspected. The failure of the gyroscopic firing instruments was caused by broken gear axles – apparently shattered by the vibration of the gunfire. This was a unique problem. Derfflinger had the same model turret, but she suffered no such problem, and this one would not go away. Lutzow returned to the gunnery range near Stollergrund on 18 May, and at 09:30 made her first run on the target ship – the old Panzerkorvette Oldenburg. I quote Fahnrich zur See (Ensign) Mardersteig aboard Lutzow…… “We approached the target ship at 20 knots with all guns fully charged and loaded. Commandant Harder gave ‘permission to fire’ and with a single thunderclap, the forward two- turret salvo roared off into the distance. The fall of shot was short. ‘Four forwards’ ordered Gunnery Officer Paschen, ‘Fire!’ The aft part of the ship rumbled as the guns crashed out. The fall of shot was over. Now the target was properly bracketed. The forward turrets adjusted, fired again, and an armor-piercing shell struck the target. The target ship fired a red flare and ‘Cease fire immediately – run concluded’ came through all telephones.” Lutzow had struck the target in textbook fashion – with the third salvo – gyroscope problems notwithstanding. The battlecruiser returned to her buoy in the Kieler Hafen and, as a reward for the crew, Kapitan Harder ordered a special dinner with a fresh-baked strudel for desert – topped-off with Schnapps. SMS Lutzow working up to maximum speed during the Measured Mile run off Alsen Island, May 1916. At 07:00 the next morning, Lutzow weighed and ran out of the Kieler Hafen for torpedo firing practice, and then moved to the “Measured Mile Course” off the island of Alsen. All the aft portholes, armored screens (on the 5.9-inch batteries), and skylights were battened down to prevent flooding over the fantail during the speed trials. Double stoker teams were laid on in the boiler rooms and a full head of steam was raised. The “Speed Trial” flag broke at the masthead and ‘All ahead full” was ordered. The bridge engine repeaters clanged and Lutzow sprang forward like a greyhound unleashed. The four screws dug in as the battlecruiser surged forward and high rollers washed across the fantail nearly flooding the turbine air intakes. It should be noted Lutzow’s speed trial was conducted with the ship in a full “Combat Load” condition. On the run up and back, the average speed was recorded at 27.9 knots – and the Alsen Island course was in shallow water. Had the trials been conducted in deeper water, the hydraulic tank engineers estimated an additional two knots could be achieved – possibly more. There was little doubt on Lutzow’s bridge that she was the fastest warship in the Hochseeflotte and a match for anything in the Royal Navy. SMS Lutzow returned to the Kieler Hafen and spent 20 May coaling, and the crew was given a day of rest on the 21st. The following morning the Panzerkreuzer cast off and entered the Kaiser Wilhelm I canal via the Holtenau Lock, anchoring in Wilhelmshaven Roads around 23:45. On 24 May, Lutzow steamed out to Schillig Roads for a four-day stretch of picket duty, followed on the 28th by a brief ceremony raising Vizeadmiral Franz von Hipper’s flag aboard. Lutzow would serve as flagship, 1st Scouting Group, for the remainder of her brief but eventful career. Later that day, orders came down from Vizeadmiral Scheer for all units to assemble on their buoys in Schillig Roads, to raise and maintain steam, and to be ready for action from midnight. Around 15:30, the big cruiser cast off and steered out to Schillig Roads, making fast to tactical buoy A-5. Most of the following day, 29 May, was involved in making the ship ready for whatever orders were to come. The crew was fed three hot meals during the day, and their regular beer ration was issued, but only part of their day could be considered “a day of rest”. Lutzow’s officers and petty officers went round the ship, checking their stations, seeing to “ready” supplies, medical stores, and sealing watertight compartments that would not be used in the coming days. On 30 May, full watches of stokers and trimmers were detailed to the boiler rooms and the engineering watches were laid-on. Officers and petty officers went about the ship double-checking battle stations while the ship’s galleys laid on three hearty meals with an extra beer ration in the evening. Later that night, officers took the opportunity to shave and change their shirts, for none knew when they might get another chance. Once the squadron had put to sea, their cabins aft would have the portholes sealed, blacked-out, and dogged – and their watertight doors would be closed and sealed against flooding in case of damage. During a wartime operation there would be little sleep for officers – and that was only allowed in the Infirmary. By 02:00 on Wednesday 31 May, 1916, the weather – hardly good to start with – had worsened. Clouds hung low over the sea and belts of rain blew in from the north-northwest adding to the discomfort of the officers and crew closed up at their sailing stations. Hipper stood motionless on the bridge wing, staring into the darkness, a scarf tucked into the turned-up collar of his leather great coat to keep the rain out. The light cruisers and torpedo boats of the 2nd Scouting Group had just steamed down the Jade channel, their wakes still roiling and bright. They would form the advance scouting line for the battlecruisers of the 1st Scouting Group. Hipper turned and nodded to his Signal Officer and Kapitan Harder. The signal lamps flashed back along the line of moored ships and they came to life. Lutzow slipped her buoy and the port turbines roared into operation as she sheered to starboard into the Jade channel. Speed was increased to 18 knots, stirring up the muddy bottom, and Lutzow led the way to the open sea – followed by Derfflinger (Kapitan Hartog), Seydlitz (Kapitan von Egidy), Moltke (Kapitan von Karpf), and Von der Tann (Kapitan Zenker). The next 36 hours would be etched into the minds of thousands of men for the rest of their lives. AND – there I must leave SMS Lutzow, but there will be more of her later. For the moment, we have introduced all the characters. It only remains to present the “play”…… NEXT TIME…… THE BEST LAID PLANS… MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful warship models. SPECIAL THANKS to my friend and partner, @AP, for his talents, meticulous models, colorful imagination, and extreme dedication. If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496
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Chapter 24: Child Of Strife

Dreadnought posted a City Journal entry in IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN

SMS Derfflinger as she appeared when she came out of the repair docks – after the Battle of Jutland in 1916. The veteran battlecruiser underwent a refit and modernization at the same time the battle damage was repaired. The first thing to go was the anti-torpedo net system – they proved useless against modern torpedoes and were a liability in battle. The forward pole mast has been replaced with the distinctive heavy tripod mast and large fire control foretop -- setting her apart from her sister ships. Oddly enough, fewer pictures survive of Derfflinger with her pole mast – most photos show her with the tripod mast – which gave her a legendary profile. IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 24: CHILD OF STRIFE THE DERFFLINGER CLASS SMS Derfflinger in the Fitting-Out Basin at Blohm & Voss Shipyard, Hamburg. The basic elements of the superstructure have already been built, and “A” and “D” turrets have been installed. Notice that her heavy armor belt plate has not been installed and her stem is actually riding high out of the water. The Blohm & Voss floating dock is to the left of the picture. After a somewhat inauspicious start at her launching ceremony, on 12 July 1913, the Blohm & Voss tugs finally worked Derfflinger into the Fitting-Out Basin, and the complicated process was begun. The last connections, ducts, and pipes for the boilers and turbines were installed and the machinery spaces plated over. From the “flush” weather deck up, the superstructure had to be assembled and riveted together – much like building a house – only with half-inch thick steel plates. Each level had to be built up – one deck at a time – installing bulkheads, ventilator shafts, various auxiliary engines and pumps, plumbing and lighting – before it could be plated over to begin the next level. Holes had to be left to fit the armored funnel uptakes from the boilers, and the funnels, themselves. Eventually, the steel structure amidships would rise to a sufficient height and the new battlecruiser’s heavy gun houses would be assembled atop their barbettes so the big rifles could be hoisted into their gun cradles. And, at some point, she would have to be moved into the floating dock so her armor belt could be bolted into place. The work moved along well enough, and was nearing completion when, on 28 June 1914, an assassin’s bullet passed through the neck of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary. Within a matter of hours, the well organized world of the Blohm & Voss Shipyard went into over-drive. The news of the assassination left little doubt that war in Europe had become a very real possibility. SMS Derfflinger would need to join the Hochseeflotte as soon as possible. A reinforced work crew swarmed over the new battlecruiser and temporary lighting was strung along the docks and the warship’s decks so work could continue around the clock. Structures that would have taken a week to build were finished in three days. Teams went throughout the ship inspecting the progress and “finishing” the compartments -- cleaning and painting, and furnishing them with the necessities. Even the anti-torpedo net system, usually installed at Wilhelmshaven after trials, was shipped to Hamburg and installed by the dockyard workers. In a matter of three weeks, the tugs eased Derfflinger out of the basin and moved her to the coaling docks. The battlecruiser took on only 800 tons of coal. The trials – due to wartime conditions – were to be carried out in the Baltic, and the battlecruiser would have to transit the Kaiser Wilhelm I canal. The widening of the canal had just finished, and some of the dredging was still to be done, so capital ships were required to make the trip with a reduced draft to avoid grounding. The Oberkommando der Marine officially issued a directive on 1 August, accelerating the completion of Derfflinger, making her readiness for sea a high priority. (This was a notable exception to their usual tardiness in responding to emergency situations.) A crew was assembled from sailors recently rotated back to Germany from Tsingtao. (Part of an established system to rotate personnel in and out of the East Asiatic Squadron.) The battlecruiser would receive a trained crew made up of experienced, veteran, seamen that had served aboard SMS Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. They were steady and dependable, physically fit, comfortable with shipboard life and discipline, and knew their way around the guns and machinery of a warship. Within hours of stepping off the trains from Wilhelmshaven, newly assigned officers had classified the men according to skills, assigned them to a “watch bill”, and given them a hammock berth. The commissioning commander, Kapitan zur See Ludwig von Reuter, was granted permission to commission the ship ahead of schedule so the pre-trials and acceptance tests could begin immediately. The morning of 19 August, the new cruiser was shifted to the replenishment docks and provisions and ship’s stores were taken aboard (both from the dock, and lighters alongside to speed the process). The following day, Derfflinger was shifted to the munitions pier in Hamburg and a combat load of shells and powder was brought aboard and stowed in the magazines and shell rooms. On 1 September 1914, at high noon, Kapitan von Reuter had the commissioning pennant hoisted at the fore-peak and SMS Derfflinger officially joined the Kaiserliche Marine. The big battlecruiser would never know the peacetime frivolities of “port calls”, state visits, or yachting regattas. Commissioned just a month after hostilities commenced, she was “a child of strife” – born into a war and destined to die in the uneasy truce that followed. SMS Derfflinger with her crew and dockyard workers aboard as she prepares to get underway for trials. You can see the building gantry of the Imperial Dockyards, Kiel, in the background as she waits in the channel for tugs to assist. This is one of the rare photos showing the forward pole mast. SEA TRIALS Just after midnight on 2 September, Derfflinger put to sea from Hamburg, made the transit of the Kaiser Wilhelm I canal, and made fast to buoy A-8 in the Kieler Hafen around 16:00. Pre-trials and acceptance of the ship’s hull, engines, auxiliary machinery, and weapons were begun the next day. Instead of the long ritual of peacetime trials, the pre-trials would be made jointly by the yard officials, builders, and mechanics – as well as the ship’s crew. This move would significantly reduce the trials period – at least, that was the plan. However, on 4 September the battlecruiser was maneuvering east of the Kieler Hafen when a shudder was felt in the ship and the port low-pressure turbine began to make noise. But the trials continued – combat training, compass calibration, transferring torpedoes, boat handling, and munitions handling for the 12-inch guns. On 11 September Derfflinger, running on the starboard engines and assisted by two salvage tugs, entered the Imperial Dockyard for repairs. The housing on the port low-pressure turbine was lifted off, the blades of the third, fourth, and fifth stages were replaced, and the housing closed again – the work taking five weeks. Here we see SMS Derfflinger in the repair basin at Kiel dockyard. In this case a dry dock has been used, but it was not drained in the interest of speeding up the work. The procedure involved lifting off the upper casing of the port low-pressure turbine so the interior works could be examined and repairs performed. All this could be accomplished within the confines of the engine room (that compartment is several decks in height) and did not require removal of any overhead deck plating. Within the picture, you see a wide variety of props and models, many of which have been discussed before. The vast majority of props are already in the game and have either been re-lotted, or re-purposed for use in the Imperial Dockyard Series. This is another shot of the repair basin providing a better view of the quayside activity and a nice broadside view of the battlecruiser. It should be noted Derfflinger is shown in her 1914 configuration with the pole mast forward. On 9 October gunnery practice was carried out, and the following day Grossadmiral Prince Heinrich (the Kaiser’s brother) visited the ship. But during maneuvers on 15 October, damage occurred to the starboard low-pressure turbine – and this time there was a significant vibration when going from “ahead” to “astern”. It was determined that switching from forward to reverse set up a vibration creating a resonance in the blades of the third, fourth, and fifth stages – causing them to strike the guide vanes in between – thereby resulting in “turbine salad” (mangled blades). Repairs to the starboard low-pressure turbine were undertaken, while the port low-pressure turbine was also opened up and corrections made to prevent future damage. The repairs were finished by 9 November and the trials were carried on – wrapping-up on 13 November. The Trials Report was, for the most part, satisfactory – the turbine issues notwithstanding. The Blohm & Voss team had been on hand, quickly diagnosed the problem, and preformed the necessary work to ensure there would be no further difficulties. The ship met all the contract specifications, and the hull, engines, and boilers were all in good condition when the ship was officially handed over. Derfflinger maneuvered exceptionally well at high speed, though (as expected) her low-speed handling was barely adequate. And, as with most big ships, her performance in shallow water effected both her speed and handling. The provision and stores rooms were of sufficient size – though the positioning of the meat locker above a fuel oil cell was criticized and had to be relocated. Overall ventilation was considered more than adequate, though the lack of any wooden furniture (a wartime fire risk) was considered a bit harsh. Strangely enough, the view forward from the conning tower was obstructed by “B” turret, making it impossible for the helmsman to see the bow. The quick-fix was to erect a fourteen foot “steering guide” (jackstaff) at the tip of the stem (much like a tall flagstaff). The bridge also suffered from being too low, and without a clear, all-around, view of the horizon. (One would think the designers could have been more careful.) The machinery preformed well above specifications. Designed for 63,000shp and a speed of 25.5 knots, Derfflinger achieved 76,634shp and 26.5 knots on trials. During operational service, the Panzerkreuzer would attain 28.5 knots when pushed. Her coal consumption was well below estimates and she was calculated to have an operating radius of 5,400 miles at 14 knots. The boiler plant preformed exceptionally well, and it was found only half the turbo fans were required to provide forced-draught to the boilers. The electrical system, over all, preformed well – though the newly designed diesel-powered dynamos required a few adjustments. Gunnery exercises went smoothly, as was to be expected from an experienced and well-trained crew. Handling procedures for the powder and shells were followed to the letter, and the newly designed “1913 Model” gun houses functioned flawlessly. The big 12-inch rifles performed without incident and the new mechanical rammers made shell handling much easier. OPERATIONAL HISTORY At 01:00 on 14 November, SMS Derfflinger weighed anchor and steamed out of the Kieler Hafen bound for Wilhelmshaven via the Kaiser Wilhelm I canal. After a day’s lay-over at the docks in Brunsbuttelkoog to take on provisions, the new battlecruiser dropped anchor in Schillig Roads on 16 November. Two days later, Konteradmiral Hipper (Commander Scouting Forces, Hochseeflotte) came aboard to inspect the ship and was invited to stay for luncheon with the ship’s officers. On 19 November 1914, Derfflinger received orders to join the 1st Scouting Group and was assigned tactical number three (third slot in the battle line). Tactical exercises with the group followed on the 20th, 24th, and 25th, with the intent of integrating the new cruiser into the squadron. With the formalities out of the way, Derfflinger settled into the tedious routine of pulling picket duty in the Jade – and being on short notice for raising steam. At 04:00 on 15 December, SMS Derfflinger weighed and sortied with the battlecruiser squadron on the Scarborough, Hartlepool, and Whitby Raid. (See Chapter 12 for details.) During the course of the bombardment, the battlecruiser fired 203 shells from her 5.9-inch secondary batteries, and the ship was called on to maneuver at a sustained speed of 23 knots for an extended period of time. The following day, while returning to the Jade, the weather took a turn for the worse and the wind howled in from the northwest at Force 8, with a swell at strength 6. Kapitan von Reuter ordered the ship “battened-down” for heavy weather as the big cruiser plowed on through the rising seas at 23 knots on an easterly course. This was Derfflinger’s first test in deep water and heavy seas, and she proved herself an exceptionally seaworthy vessel. Von Reuter had ordered the upper roll-damping tanks filled and the ship’s movements appeared to be slower and less exaggerated than the other battlecruisers. But under combat conditions it was impossible to run “rolling tests”, so the validity of the tank’s performance was never certified. However, the sloshing of the water inside the tanks, and the noise of air rushing back and forth through the air channel, adversely effected the conditions in the nearby wireless transmission room. With the swell coming in on the port quarter of the battlecruiser, a good deal of water was taken over the fantail and even managed to force its way into the secured casemates of the port side secondary batteries – but though spray was thrown to unusual heights up forward, no breakers were taken over the newly designed bow. SMS Derfflinger’s next combat operation came on 23 January 1915, when she weighed and put to sea in the wee hours of the morning as the squadron’s “tactical #3” once again. The weather was reasonably fair and the night clear as they steamed northwest towards what would become the Battle Of Dogger Bank. (See Chapter 13 for details of the action.) Early on, British destroyers closed the tail of the German column around 09:42, and engaged SMS Blucher with gun fire. Admiral von Hipper ordered Blucher to return fire, and von Reuter, eager to get into the fight, sheered Derfflinger out of line to assist – but Hipper signaled her to fall back into column. Around 09:55 Derfflinger came under fire from unidentified ships off the port quarter and immediately responded with eight-gun salvos – switching to four-gun salvos once the target was straddled. The Panzerkreuzer remained engaged until hits were observed on the first two enemy ships, whereupon, they turned away. For twelve minutes around noon, two British destroyers were engaged and turned away under heavy fire from the 5.9-inch secondary batteries. Over the course of the smoke-shrouded “dogfight”, Derfflinger fired 234 12-inch armor-piercing shells, 76 12-inch high explosive shells, and 48 5.9-inch rounds. During the encounter, Derfflinger was struck only once by a 13.5 inch shell (probably from HMS Lion). The shell hit the waterline belt armor directly below the forward funnel, but failed to penetrate the 12-inch plate. Six other large caliber shells fell close alongside, mostly to starboard and port of the fantail. The base-fused shells exploded shortly after impacting the water, sending large shrapnel splinters in all directions. Some of the splinters tore through the lightly armored sections of the stern and caused some minor flooding. Around 19:40 on 24 January, Derfflinger dropped anchor in Schillig Roads and the following day ran into the Imperial Dockyard for repairs – including a stretch in the floating dock to see to the flooding aft. Repair reports indicate the large caliber hit on the belt armor failed to penetrate, but the plate was pushed in about 4 inches, with an indentation about one inch deep, and concentric rings about 6 feet across. The torpedo nets, spars, and brackets were badly damaged, and the outer hull skin below the hit was bowed-in for quite a large area. The starboard wing passage and several coal bunkers were flooded, and some water made it into the boiler room, but the pumps easily removed it. The near misses aft caused a leak in the starboard outer shaft tunnel and sheered or sprung various rivets, resulting in the initial flooding in that area. On 16 February, Derfflinger was pronounced “combat-ready”, and moved to the coaling docks, then took on fresh provisions, before running out to Schillig Roads to begin a long stretch of picket duty. The monotony was rudely interrupted on 11 March by a late-night explosion in the anchorage. The battlecruiser’s searchlights were switched on and it became apparent there had been a boiler explosion aboard the torpedo boat S-35. Derfflinger returned to the dockyard from 21-25 March to have supplemental oil-firing installed in her coal-fired boilers, and she participated in a “fleet advance” on 29-30 March, along with Von der Tann and Moltke. Four days in early April were occupied with training in the Baltic – torpedo shooting, searchlight practice, gunnery practice, night gunnery, battle line training, and acting as a target for torpedo boat training. On 17 April, Derfflinger sortied to cover a minelaying operation carried out by the light cruisers SMS Stralsund and Strassburg – and again in May when mines were laid near the Dogger Bank. In late May, the entire 1st Scouting Group put to sea to escort the auxiliary cruiser Meteor out to sea on a commerce raiding mission. In June 1915, SMS Derfflinger and Von der Tann went to Kiel for training, but Derfflinger was involved in a near-collision with the old pre-dreadnought SMS Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse. (As previously mentioned, collisions between capital ships were a lot more common than you might think.) Due to her poor handling characteristics at low speed, the battlecruiser’s bow suddenly swung to port and came dangerously close to the anchored pre-dreadnought. A collision was narrowly averted, but von Reuter was forced to go “all astern – maximum power”. There was a heavy vibration throughout the ship, and then the starboard low-pressure turbine ceased to respond. Later, when the turbine housing was lifted, it was found the turbine blades and guide vanes had been shredded in the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh stages. It was decided the sudden application of extreme reverse power had set up a fatal oscillation, resulting in turbine failure. The battlecruiser went into the Kiel dockyard for repairs lasting until 26 August. In the following sequence of pictures, we see SMS Derfflinger being maneuvered into the Inner Basin for another round of turbine repairs. Ahead are two salvage tugs towing the big battlecruiser with a third salvage tug on a stern hawser acting as a “brake”. Four harbor tugs (two Passat Class and two Nordwind Class) are stationed close to the bow and stern. Due to the battlecruiser’s known tendency to sheer to port or starboard at low speed -- especially in shallow water -- the four harbor tugs are an absolute necessity. The admiral commanding has private quarters ashore – the white house in the lower left. This is a close-up of the beautifully detailed model of Derfflinger provided courtesy of @Barroco Hispano – and the equally detailed models of the Passat Class tugs (off the bow) and the Nordwind Class tugs (off the stern) – scratch-built by @AP. This is a close-up view of the Langeoog Class salvage tug scratch-built by “AP” for the Imperial Dockyard Series. The model is based on the tug “Foundation Franklin” which was launched in 1918 from John Lewis & Sons Shipbuilding, in Aberdeen, Scotland, as HMS Frisky. She had an active and truly remarkable 30-year career – mostly performing deep sea salvage and legendary rescue missions out of Halifax, Nova Scotia. She was justly immortalized in Farley Mowat’s book “The Grey Seas Under” – which is well worth a good read. And there was many a pint downed in her name when “old-timers” gathered at a tavern. “FF” was about 600 tons and 150 feet in length, with triple-expansion engines generating 1,200shp for a respectable speed of 15 knots. In 1948, she went out in the teeth of an Atlantic hurricane to rescue a large freighter disabled by the storm. She saved the ship and the men aboard her, but was so badly damaged by the storm she was sold for scrap. “AP” has “done the old girl proud” with his detailed and handsome model. She was a truly “great” ship, and I consider this to be some of his finest work. (The model can be downloaded from the STEX – Historic Navies 1900: Volume 17.) Here are three views of SMS Derfflinger being maneuvered into the repair basin / dry dock. Before returning to Wilhelmshaven, Derfflinger carried out trials with a floatplane. The floatplane was maneuvered alongside, hoisted aboard the battlecruiser, and a test cruise taken off the Kieler Hafen. Though the idea of carrying aircraft aboard a warship might have been considered “progressive” in 1915, having to “launch” a plane much like a small boat proved problematic with big-gun ships. Even decades later, carrying float-planes on battleships was not popular with captains. The ship had to come to a complete stop to launch or recover the aircraft, and planes were prone to bursting into flame when hit by shell fragments – causing significant damage and possibly illuminating the ship during night engagements. (Navies would later develop steam operated catapults to launch floatplanes from battleships and heavy cruisers, but the ships still had to come to a complete stop to hoist them back aboard. And – the US Navy was plagued by burning floatplanes during night actions with the Imerpial Japanese Navy in WW II.) The big cruiser arrived back in Wilhelmshaven on 31 August, just in time for Kapitan von Reuter to turn over command to Kapitan zur See Paul Heinrich. The remainder of the year was spent in the usual tasks – picket duty, minelaying operations, maneuvers with Battleship Division 6, fleet maneuvers in October, and the occasional “fleet advance”. In late October Derfflinger and the torpedo boat V-30 carried out a successful ship-to-ship underway fuel oil transfer test. In early November there was a brief training period in the Baltic followed by picket duty in Schillig Roads. Again, in late November, the cruiser returned to Kiel for training, but was delayed when she grounded, hard and fast, near the “Kilometer 29” marker in the Kaiser Wilhelm I canal – largely as a result of her poor handling characteristics at slow speed in shallow waters. Once in Kiel, Derfflinger carried out training in torpedo firing, exercises with torpedo boat flotillas, and several days spent on the gunnery ranges. Having returned to the Jade in early December, the battlecruiser went into the dockyard on the 16th for the final work on her new director fire control system. The installation and “dry testing” of the system lasted until 15 January 1916, when the ship was moved out of the dock. Gunnery trials with the new equipment lasted from 19-26 January and were considered a great success. The year 1916 brought a new commander for the Hochseeflotte, Vizeadmiral Reinhard Scheer, and an increased level of activity. The new commander’s more aggressive attitude was aimed at bringing the enemy to battle – forcing a favorable situation -- rather than waiting for an opportunity. Early 1916 started out with Derfflinger and Von der Tann searching for the missing airship L-19 – a sortie in support of torpedo boat flotillas in action with British light forces in the western Bight – battle line practice – and escorting the auxiliary cruiser Mowe into Wilhelmshaven after a commerce raiding cruise. On 5 March, Derfflinger was with the 1st Scouring Group when the Hochseeflotte made an aggressive combat sweep into the “Hoofden” – an area along ”The Broad Fourteens” off western Holland. No enemy shipping or naval units were encountered by the latitude of Haarlem, so the fleet put about and returned to the Jade. The seaplane tender HMS Vindex – circa 1915: 2,950 tons – 23 knots – 4x3-inch guns – 7 floatplanes. Notice her appearance. She is nothing more than a floating hanger for floatplanes. The floatplanes are hoisted outboard and take off from the water. Upon their return, they taxi up to the ship, are hoisted aboard, and pushed into the hanger. Nothing like the aircraft carriers still 25 years in the future. On 25 March the British launched a raid from the seaplane-tender HMS Vindex against the German airship base in Tondern, but the raid was a complete fiasco. They did not know the correct location of the airship base and bombed Hoyer in error. German seaplanes from land bases attacked the British ships with bombs, and the Harwich Force destroyers HMS Laverock and Medusa collided in the confusion. Medusa was badly damaged and later abandoned. German torpedo boats on duty in the area sparred with the British forces and the light cruiser HMS Cleopatra rammed and sank G-194 – but was, in turn, rammed by HMS Undaunted. With the weather deteriorating, the British forces withdrew (with Cleopatra), but it took Undaunted four days to limp back to port. The Hochseeflotte put to sea in support on the 26th, but arrived in the area far too late to be of use. On 16 April 1916, Derfflinger and her newly commissioned sister-ship, SMS Lutzow, sortied on a search mission looking for a downed aircraft, but found nothing and returned to Schillig Roads without incident. A little over a week later (24 April), the 1st Scouting Group weighed anchor around 10:45 and slipped out of Schillig Roads, steamed down the Jade channel, and made for the open sea. In a matter of hours, Derfflinger would be in action on the Lowestoft Raid. (See Chapter 16 for details.) For most of May 1916, Derfflinger and portions of the 1st Scouting Group made several sorties into the North sea for various tasks – sightings of enemy forces in the Bight – a suspected second attack on the Tondern airfields – and generally making life hazardous for British light forces in the area. From 22-26 May the battlecruiser was in dockyard hands for scheduled maintenance and a bottom cleaning. The pre-dawn darkness of 31 May was hard and forbidding. The wind was coming in from the north-northwest at Force 3 and bands of rain scudded across the big warships anchored in long lines in Schillig Roads. It was 03:00, and the sailors on the big dreadnought battleships of the 1st and 3rd Battle Squadrons were closed-up at sailing stations. The officers on their various bridges had watched through the pelting rain and poor visibility as the 2nd Scouting Group steamed down the Jade channel and disappeared into the night haze on their way to open water. Minutes later all eyes watched – not a few with envy -- as SMS Lutzow, Derfflinger, Seydlitz, Moltke, and Von der Tann swept down the channel at 18 knots, close on the heels of their advance screen of light cruisers. Even in the darkness and haze, the long, low battlecruisers were mighty and menacing. Thick clouds of smoke belched from their funnels and hung close to the water as the bow waves and wakes sparkled bright and luminescent. The big gun turrets, so prominently displayed on their decks, clearly bespoke their purpose. Soon, they would clear the mouth of the Jade and steer north to bring those guns into action off a quiet little corner of Denmark – along the Jutland coast. SMS Derfflinger as she would appear in late 1916. Notice the massive, squat, size of the main battery gun turrets in relation to the rest of the ship. And here you see her with the distinctive, heavy, tripod foremast and the large fire control top that gave her an iconic silhouette. Not only was the Derfflinger Class the largest and most powerful of the Imperial battlecruisers – they were, quite possibly, the most elegant and handsome capital ships ever built. Again – I must leave the rest of SMS Derfflinger’s story for later…… SIDEBAR: Standard Tactical Deployment Of The Hochseeflotte Scouting Forces As Admiral Hipper’s scouting forces steered to the north that day, they were deployed in a standard tactical formation that had been developed over many years – both before and during the war. Lacking reliable air reconnaissance – and with radar still far in the future – the only reliable information about an enemy fleet had to be obtained by cruisers scouting ahead of the battle fleet. Admiral Hipper was in overall command of ALL scouting forces in the Hochseeflotte, while the various “scouting groups” were directly handled by subordinate admirals. Above you see the 1st and 2nd Scouting groups deployed in their “scouting” and “screening” formation. In the lead are the light cruisers and torpedo boats of the 2nd Scouting Group, spread out as a screening force across the bows of the Panzerkreuzer of 1st Scouting Group. The light cruiser screen, steaming in advance of the battlecruisers, acts as a scouting force to locate an enemy force for the battlecruisers to attack – or – they can screen the battlecruisers to prevent enemy cruisers from gaining knowledge of their approach. (NOTE: In all pictures the distance between the various groups, and individual ships, has been considerably reduced in order to get everything into the picture.) This is a closer shot of the advance screen composed of the 2nd Scouting Group commanded by Konteradmiral Boedicker. His force is deployed seven miles ahead of Hipper’s heavy units. There are five light cruisers, from left to right – SMS Elbing, Wiesbaden, Frankfurt (flag), Pillau, and Regensburg. Visibility before the battle began could be anywhere from 12 to 15 miles, and the five light cruiser groups would be “spread out” -- while maintaining visual contact with the next adjacent group. This arrangement would allow Boedicker’s cruisers to visually search an area about 57 miles wide. This is SMS Frankfurt, Boedicker’s flagship, deployed in the center of the search line – making it easier to control the cruiser groups on the extreme ends of the line. Each of the cruisers is screened by a gaggle of torpedo boats from the II and VI Flotillas. The standard flotilla consisted of a “Flotilla Leader” and ten torpedo boats. But wartime losses and repair work inevitably left them under strength. Another view of the Frankfurt group, below. This is a view of the cruiser group on the extreme right of the line. SMS Regensburg is the flagship of Kommodore Heinrich, Commander Torpedo Boat Flotillas. Admiral Hipper was in overall command of both scouting groups, but during battle it was understood he would be busy with other matters. Accordingly, Boedicker would be responsible for the direct command of the light cruisers in 2nd Scouting Group, while Kommodore Heinrich would maintain control of the torpedo boats. It might, at first, seem like a lot of senior officers looking for a job to do – but once battle was joined – it proved a successful division of authority. Below is another view of the Regensburg group. This is the Elbing group operating at the extreme western end of the light cruiser screen. As the light cruiser continues to search, the torpedo boats form an anti-submarine screen around her. (Again – the distance between the cruiser and her torpedo boats would be much greater than in this representation.) Submarines were still relatively unsophisticated weapons and screening destroyers or torpedo boats were usually sufficient to keep them at a distance – where their torpedoes were likely to miss the target. If smoke from an unknown vessel is sighted on the horizon, Elbing’s Fregattenkapitan Madlung would order two of his torpedo boats to peel out of formation and close to investigate the approaching stranger. If it was a steamer, it would most likely be a neutral, and she might be stopped to check her registry papers – then sent on her way. If she carried enemy cargo (contraband), she could either be boarded and sent into a German port – or possibly sunk after removing the crew. If the approaching vessel was a warship, she would almost certainly be British. A brief skirmish might ensue, or it could very well lead to a collision between opposing fleets. Light cruisers and torpedo boats were “little ships” – but they preformed vital scouting and screening functions that could have consequences all out of proportion to their size. Following seven miles astern of 2nd Scouting Group are the battlecruisers of 1st Scouting Group in “line ahead” formation under the direct command of Vizeadmiral Hipper. Leading the line (on the left) is SMS Lutzow (flag), followed by Derfflinger, Seydlitz, Moltke, and Von der Tann. Hipper did not feel the need for complicated or “fancy” sailing formations. He maintained tight control of his heavy ships and knew they were fast enough to preform any maneuver he might wish. In the event the light cruisers of the 2nd Scouting Group encountered a British force, Hipper would immediately alter course and bring the battlecruisers up in support. Screening his Panzerkreuzer ahead and on both flanks were the eleven torpedo boats of the IX Flotilla. This is a closer view of Lutzow and Derfflinger and the screening torpedo boats. You will note there are five torpedo boats clustered around Lutzow – three around the bow, and two more along her port and starboard quarter. This “concentration of force” is deliberate. Attacking submarines invariably launched torpedoes from a position ahead and to one side of their target. This meant the torpedo and the ship were running toward each other – shortening the range and closing more quickly – thereby increasing the odds of a hit. Firing from astern actually gave the target an opportunity to outrun the torpedo. This is a close-up of SMS V-25 alongside SMS Lutzow. The IX Flotilla screening the battlecruisers was composed of “V Class” boats. Early on in the development of torpedo craft in the Imperial Navy, it was decided their primary mission was to operate in support of the battle fleet. This almost guaranteed the German boats would be bigger than those of most other navies, and the design emphasis focused on torpedoes, speed, and seaworthiness. The Royal Navy preferred the gun as their weapon of choice, so their destroyers were equally large, but carried more guns than torpedoes, and were intended to protect the battle line against enemy torpedo boats. This theory was rejected by the Imperial Navy. Employing their torpedo boats to defend against attack was of secondary importance. The German torpedo boats were solely designed to deliver massed torpedo attacks against the enemy battle line. In the Kaiserliche Marine torpedo attacks were considered a primary aggressive tactical tool. Consequently, German torpedo boats carried fewer guns, but usually mounted two or three times as many torpedo tubes as their British counterparts. As demonstrated on V-25, there are only three 4.1-inch guns – but there are six 19.7-inch torpedo tubes carried in two single mounts forward of the bridge, with two double torpedo tube mountings nearer the stern. By virtue of their size, German torpedo boats were more difficult to sink by gunfire, and their more numerous torpedoes made them potentially deadly. Torpedo boat and light cruiser models courtesy of "Barroco Hispano". NEXT TIME…… SHORT-LIVED AND UNLUCKY BUT – as an afterthought – you might like to see how Vizeadmiral Franz von Hipper lives when he’s ashore. Admiral Hipper was born in Bavaria and joined the Imperial Navy at age 18. Known as an active and energetic officer, he was much respected within the Kaiserliche Marine – and his years commanding armored cruisers demonstrated his gift for tactics and love of fast warships. Most of his career was spent at sea, in one capacity or another, and he was most often to be found in his quarters aboard ship. Appointed to command of the 1st Scouting Group in 1913, he was aged 51 when war broke out the following year. Von Hipper inherited comfortable quarters ashore from the previous Scouting Group Commander (Admiral Bachmann) and found the need to rest or work from them from time to time. Life at sea, even for an admiral, can be hard and stressful. The quarters were also useful for entertaining visiting dignitaries, his squadron captains and their wives, and even the junior officers on occasion. Here you see the Admiral’s comfortable, two-story dwelling – large enough to billet his immediate aides and enlisted attendants. There is a comfortable dinning room with an adjacent ballroom for formal occasions on the ground floor -- with just enough room for a kitchen tucked away in a corner. The third floor is partitioned-off for the Staff Officers and enlisted attendants. The second floor holds the Admiral’s sleeping quarters, with an outer officer for the staff officers, and an inner office overlooking the harbor for the Admiral. The building is located on the east side of the ship channel into the Inner Basin, and the Admiral often takes breakfast on the terrace (when ashore). A short distance to the right of the building is the Admiral’s landing where his “barge” (steam launch) is moored. In this shot we see the Admiral stepping off the special train returning him from an Imperial Staff conference in Berlin. The Kaiser was kind enough to provide the Admiral with his private train to ensure his speedy return to his wartime command. After all, when an officer wears the Prussian Order Of The Red Eagle, he must not be kept from his duties. The model of the “20th Century Limited” locomotive is courtesy of Barroco Hispano. (I had to work that into a naval base somewhere. Right next to battleships, I’m very fond of old steam trains.) MANY THANKS – as always -- to @Barroco Hispano for his many beautiful models. SPECIAL THANKS to my collaborating partner, @AP, for his wonderful, models – and all the hard work that has gone into them. If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496
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Chapter 23: The Iron Dog Cometh

Dreadnought posted a City Journal entry in IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN

SMS Derfflinger -- circa 1916 – post-Jutland. The distinctive heavy tripod mast was added after the battle. In this unusual photograph, we see the battlecruiser at anchor in Schillig Roads under a heavily overcast sky – possibly a storm moving in from the North Sea. The composition of the picture provides an almost perfect silhouette of the warship – showing her long, low, and graceful lines to advantage. IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 23: THE “IRON DOG” COMETH SMS Derfflinger – late 1914. Her sea trials were a bit unusual in that they were conducted under wartime conditions with fuel and ammunition loads much heavier than normal. Here you see her riding low in the water and at speed. Naval analysts and historians have tried for a century to classify the seven battlecruisers of the Kaiserliche Marine into some sort of cohesive grouping. Most have chosen to assign Von der Tann, Moltke, Goeben, and Seydlitz to a single “class” which, at first glance, is a reasonable theory. All four ships are quite similar in appearance – with the exception of Von der Tann – the FIRST German battlecruiser. With only four main battery turrets, Von der Tann is the “odd-man-out”. Moltke and Goeben were built as “twins”, and the numerical data and visual appearance of the two ships is very nearly identical. But these two were built flush-decked, which set them apart from either Von der Tann or Seydlitz. Finally, Seydlitz, though somewhat similar in design concept to the other three, was different in numerous details – and far more advanced. I have chosen to address this question by listing them as three separate classes -- Von der Tann Class, Moltke Class, and Seydlitz Class. It should be acknowledged that Von der Tann, as the first Imperial battlecruiser, originated the main battery arrangement, the deck layout, the improved propulsion system, and the brilliant armor suite. The remaining three ships, each in its’ turn, was an improvement on that design – Moltke was better than Von der Tann – and Seydlitz was better than Moltke. Had war not broken out in 1914, this pattern of improving each ship over the last would have continued into the foreseeable future (though the budget deficit was becoming a critical issue). In Britain, it was not uncommon to see three, four, or even five ships built in a class. Their dreadnoughts of the battle line were built to a, more or less, standard configuration. (Sort of like the old sailing “ships-of-the-line” – when you got a good design you just built a “flock” of them). And Britain had a ridiculously small army, so the wealth of their empire could be lavished upon the Royal Navy. Imperial Germany could not do that. Their shipyards took between three and four years to build a dreadnought – far too long to compete with England. And Germany simply did not have the economic base to support both a large and well-equipped army, and a technically advanced and extremely costly navy. Tirpitz had gotten the Reichstag to agree to three dreadnoughts and a battlecruiser each year – which sounds fairly competitive. But it was “breaking the bank” in Berlin. Germany’s strong suite in 1914 was its superb army. In 1914, each “tactical army” was composed of anywhere between three and seven army corps. Each army corps consisted of two infantry divisions with associated artillery, light troops, pioneer detachments, etc, etc. The cost of a single battlecruiser would have paid for three army corps. You see the dilemma, here. Consequently, Imperial Germany did not build large numbers of ships in any “class” – but they built each ship better than the last. The idea of “qualitative superiority” was carried to its ultimate expression with the development of the battlecruiser as a “fast battleship”. And Imperial Germany engineered this marvel first. The British claim to have built the first “fast battleship” -- HMS Queen Elizabeth – but that is debatable. (A discussion better saved for another day.) There were other “fast” dreadnoughts – notably, the Italian dreadnoughts and the Japanese Kongo Class – but NONE of the “speedy” dreadnoughts in other navies could compare with the armor protection incorporated into the Imperial battlecruisers. In their balance of guns, armor, and speed, they were far and away superior to their opponents in their ability to fight and survive. But – they had their flaws – as will be seen. GROSSE KREUZER K - 1911 The keel has been laid – circa March 1913 – and the “double bottom” has been plated over in the center, while the hull form continues to expand into the “bilge” areas. Less than two weeks after the contract for SMS Seydlitz was awarded to Blohm & Voss Shipyard (mid-April 1910) the Design Section of the Kaiserliche Marine requested the General Navy Department to set out specifications for the battleship and cruiser designs for 1911. This would allow time to prepare building documents, run formulas, and begin planning sketches. The General Navy Department considered it too early to speculate: firing trials for Krupp’s new 12-inch rifle (destined for the Helgoland Class) had not been completed – a new triple-turret project had just been started by Krupp – and Machinenfabrik Augsburg-Nurnberg (MAN) was developing large marine diesel engines at the Germania Shipyard – all of which could have an effect on the 1911 ships. Nevertheless, Vizeadmiral Paschen (GND) set forth his own suggestions for the “Grossen Kreuzer 1911”… “The new English battlecruisers have been confirmed as mounting 13.5 inch guns, so a battery of ten guns with a caliber increase to 12 inch guns is unavoidable. (My Italics.) The difference of shell weight – 302kg against 600kg – becomes too large. And we must increase our armor protection to allow time for our guns to take effect. The ten 12 inch guns must be placed on centreline, or in the usual diagonal arrangement. Further, we must consider a three-shaft propeller arrangement with the center shaft coupled to a large cruising diesel to provide practical experience with these new engines. And it is my considered opinion that we must re- examine our underwater protection systems in view of the new intelligence concerning English mines and torpedoes.” In this brief statement is the genesis of the battlecruiser that would come to be nicknamed “The Iron Dog” by her opponents. And it is just as well Paschen was thinking along these lines. “Grosse Kreuzer 1911”, once laid down, would likely join the Hochseeflotte some time in 1914. At that point, the Royal Navy would already posses three 13.5-inch-gunned battlecruisers – HMS Lion, Princess Royal, and Queen Mary. And a fourth one, HMS Tiger, would join the Grand Fleet in October 1914. That would give Britain a total of ten battlecruisers. By contrast, the Hochseeflotte would have a total of five battlecruisers – only one of which would mount 12-inch guns (if the option was taken to increase the gun caliber in 1911). HMS Tiger – circa 1914: 28,500 tons – 28 knots – 8x13.5-inch guns – 12x6-inch guns – 4x21-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 9 inches. Often referred to as the “most beautiful warship, ever” -- she is certainly a formidable opponent, but still suffers from thin belt armor – and an “overall” lack of armor protection. HMS Tiger’s “working-up” period was accelerated, ensuring her training was sufficient to allow her to join the Grand Fleet Battle Cruiser Squadron by October 1914. That gave the British five 12-inch-gunned battlecruisers and four more with 13.5-inch guns. (HMAS Australia would be stationed in Australia at the outbreak of hostilities and would remain there until the German East Asiatic Squadron had been dealt with.) This beautiful model of HMS Tiger is courtesy of @Barroco Hispano. While it may be debated as to whether or not Tiger was the “most beautiful warship ever built”, she was certainly the most handsome British battlecruiser. With her superstructure concentrated in a single mass, slightly forward of midships, the uncluttered fore-deck and after deck spaces made her 704-foot length appear much longer and more graceful. Just as a point of reference, her turrets were lettered, bow to stern – “A”, “B”, “Q”, and “X”. Five of her casemated 6-inch secondary guns were concentrated in a compact arrangement on the Battery Deck alongside the superstructure on either beam. A sixth 6-inch gun was mounted on either beam abaft “Q” turret – an arrangement made necessary by the location of the “Q” turret magazines. A close-up showing the compact nature of Tiger’s superstructure. The tripod mast has the forward bridge and command positions built into it, while the armored conning tower and rangefinder is located in front of it, just to the rear of “B” turret. Unlike previous battlecruisers, Tiger’s boiler rooms were arranged together below decks, allowing the three funnels to be grouped close together in the rear portion of the superstructure. This created a visually pleasing arrangement with the impression of power and speed. The turret arrangements for the Lion Class and HMS Tiger were somewhat odd. British designers had not yet devised a suitable method to allow superfiring turrets to fire one over the other. (The blast over-pressure could cripple the gun crews in the lower turret.) Consequently, “A” turret could fire directly ahead, but “B” turret could only fire at a divergent angle to port or starboard off the bow. “Q” and “X” turret, for maximum efficiency, should have been superfiring -- but the main concern here, seemed to be from Royal Navy officers. They were afraid both stern turrets, grouped so closely, could easily be knocked-out with a single salvo. Needless to say, it is odd the design included superfiring turrets at the bow where the same problem might occur. By late 1911, the British had begun to perceive the threat posed by the Imperial battlecruisers. First Sea Lord, Winston Churchill, still unaware of the power and rugged strength of the Panzekreuzer, was seeking a means to neutralize them in tactical combat. Jackie Fisher had retired from the Admiralty in January, but was in constant correspondence with Churchill – and advocated for a big-gun, armored battleship, fast enough to maneuver against the head (van) of the enemy battle line and concentrate their fire against it. That was the official “Admiralty line” when asking Parliament for the ships. But Churchill’s real purpose in seeking a British “fast battleship” was to neutralize the German battlecruisers and prevent them from maneuvering against the van of the Grand Fleet. Churchill’s solution to the tactical dilemma was the five ships of the Queen Elizabeth Class – HMS Queen Elizabeth, Warspite, Barham, Valiant, and Malaya. Queen Elizabeth would join the fleet in December, 1914. HMS Queen Elizabeth: 32,590 tons – 24 knots – 8x15-inch guns – 16x6-inch guns – 4x21-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 13 inches. Purpose-built as a “fast battleship”, she was heavily armored, with massive 15-inch guns. Though capable of 24 knots, she was only 3 knots faster than the battleships of the Grand Fleet, and when “push came to shove” – she was 3 knots slower than the Imperial battlecruisers. The “QE” would be dangerous -- but could be managed. Soon after Admiral Paschen made his thoughts known, State Secretary von Tirpitz initiated meetings with department heads centered around the armament and propulsion of the new cruiser. Opening the first meeting, Konteradmiral Gerdes, chief of the Weapons Department, presented the results of the latest firing trials and performance diagrams of 11-inch, 12-inch, and 13-inch rifles. The collected data and written notes gave a comparative evaluation of projectile effects at long ranges – with an estimated engagement range of 9,000 – 11,000 yards, and an assumed target armor thickness of 10 inches. Gerdes then went on to say he believed the 11-inch gun was no longer adequate -- especially since the new cruiser would be closely involved with enemy dreadnoughts possessing belt armor of 12 inches or more. He also pointed out the proposed move to eight 12-inch weapons would only entail a weight increase of approximately 40 tons – including increased gun house armor. Von Tirpitz, thoroughly fixated on the 11-inch weapon, disagreed. He could not imagine an engagement range of 11,000 yards – and certainly nothing above that. And believed, even at 11,000 yards, the range would be closed quickly to a much more “close quarters” battle. He further stated the much shorter battle range would favor the five 11-inch turrets over the four 12-inch turret arrangement. From everything I have found in this and numerous similar discussions, the stubborn and short-sighted reluctance to increase the gun caliber can be put down to cost and his out-dated notions of a short-range gun-battle. Unquestionably, his reasoning left a great deal to be desired. The eight 12-inch guns in twin turrets could be procured with only a minimal cost increase over the ten 11-inch guns in twin turrets. Konteradmiral Gerdes had shown the numbers on that and shattered the cost objection. Von Tirpitz’ real objection was that he wanted ten guns in five turrets because he believed more guns in more turrets would be harder to disable in a battle fought at less than 10,000 yards. No doubt this stubborn conviction was born in his days as a young Kapitan -- when Dewey defeated the Spanish at Manila Bay and Togo dismantled the Russian Fleet at Tsushima. To borrow a current tactical philosophy – Tirpitz envisioned re-fighting Tsushima with ships that were twenty times more powerful and vastly more advanced. The old Admiral’s mind simply had not moved with the times. He did not seem to have fully grasped the technological advances in guns and gunnery fire control that had made close quarter combat obsolete. Why close to 10,000 yards when your 12-inch guns could score hits at 16,500 yards? And in all the design discussions I found, only Vizeadmiral Paschen drove the point home about the advantages of bigger guns and bigger shells. The bigger gun (12 inch – 13.5 inch) usually had a greater range – but it invariably had a bigger and more powerful shell. A larger, heavier, shell fell with greater velocity and penetrating power – especially armor-piercing shell. Simply put – it had more kinetic energy and could punch through thicker armor. It also had a larger bursting charge and caused more damage. Early in the war British high explosive shells, in particular, used Lyddite as a more powerful bursting filler -- and it caused tremendous internal damage to lightly armored areas (in addition to turning everything a ghastly shade of yellow). Again, Tirpitz never seemed to understand the value of the larger caliber shell – because he thought the 11 inch could do the same amount of damage at the close battle range he envisioned. “Grosse Kreuzer K” – (SMS Derfflinger) as she would have appeared in late 1914. As the lead ship of the last class of battlecruisers commissioned into the Kaiserliche Marine, she was bigger and more powerful than her predecessors. Note how the superstructure is concentrated in the center of the ship, with the remaining deck space largely free of clutter. The Passat and Nordwind Class tugs are nudging her into a berth in the Old Basin. The docks were re-purposed from “PEG” SNM Series battleship docks and bordered with “WMP” Seawalls to give the appearance of timbered mooring points. The docks were created with red brick texture to give the appearance of older docks (rather than newer concrete). The “Union Warehouse” on the left is from “SM2”, while the row-warehouses on the right were borrowed from “Matb325” and were chosen because of their similarity to structures found in old pictures of the port of Hamburg. The handsome battlecruiser is courtesy of @Barroco Hispano. The tugs, sailors, Atlantic fenders, rope coils, spare anchors, and a bunch of other props were provided by @AP. Stubborn to the last, Tirpitz “tabled” the armament discussion and moved on to what he considered the most important topic – the MAN diesel engines. He saw the emergence of diesel engines as a “...real leap ahead of other navies”. Some department heads did not see it that way – and had issues of their own that needed attention. The Design Bureau was more interested in devising a suitable scheme for underwater protection and reminded Tirpitz a change to diesels would require a new three-shaft design for the propulsion system, and a new hull form for the ship’s stern. Tirpitz was aware of the risk of trying an untested technology, and of the possible delays, but if the situation became critical he could always build the new cruiser as a sister ship to Seydlitz. Reverting to the previous design to save time (and money) had already been done with SMS Goeben -- and the technological changes that should have gone into her had to wait an additional year to be built into Seydlitz. And though the caliber increase to 12-inch guns had been requested on both ships, it was denied on grounds of cost and delay. This “dithering” over gun caliber was, in effect, costing Germany the technological edge their superb armor suit had provided. The British were pushing ahead with higher speeds, bigger guns, and marginal armor increases, while Tirpitz foolishly delayed the inevitable. In essence, Goeben, laid down without technological advances – was a “wasted” ship – a year behind the technology curve. And though improved and updated, and a great ship in her own right, Seydlitz without 12-inch guns, was “wasted” as well. Fortunately, the Construction department did not believe a ship with five 11-inch turrets and diesels to be the most advantageous option. The Design Bureau took the rejected studies from 1910 out of the file cabinets and went to work. By the end of May, a design with four 12-inch turrets on centreline had come together, with another one a month later. At this point, Tirpitz gave way on the gun caliber increase, but clung to his diesel engine until circumstances intervened. In early September 1911, MAN Fabrik determined the experimental diesel, though promising, could not yet develop enough horsepower for capital ships. In a later meeting, several changes were debated and agreed upon, but this resulted in a weight increase and the need to compensate by reducing weight somewhere. A reduction in bow armor was suggested, but Chief Designer Hullmann explained……“With a reduction in belt armor thickness on the bow, it should be understood large caliber shells will inevitably strike the ship there. One must then expect the ship will fill with water forward. If the damage is sufficient, leaks will occur that cannot be sealed with the means available onboard. The ship’s outer hull, to which the armor is secured, will undoubtedly leak, and the forecastle ahead of the citadel transverse bulkhead will certainly fill, and could not be kept drained with the means available onboard”. At that point, the notion of reducing the bow armor thickness was dropped. But tragically, Herr Hullmann had demonstrated remarkable foresight. On 15 June 1911, the Construction Department presented design 5-B. In the ensuing discussions, the ship’s silhouette was lowered by moving the casemates for the 5.9-inch guns to the Battery Deck and eliminating the upper deck where they had been. It was decided to install a splinter shield between the guns in the main battery turrets, and the forward conning tower was reinforced. And in an effort to save additional weight, eight of the original boilers were to be changed from coal-firing to oil-firing – thereby making use of their smaller size and weight. On 22 June, His Majesty The Kaiser, signed off on the design. The construction contract for “Grosse Kreuzer K - 1911” was awarded to Blohm & Voss, Hamburg, on 5 September 1911. Along with the new contract came a letter from the Kaiser requesting every effort be made to reduce the construction time from three years to just two. The executives in the Hamburg yard replied they would have no trouble accelerating the hull construction – but Krupp Essen Werk could not possibly produce the required guns, turrets, and face-hardened armor plate in such a short time. In those days, big guns were complicated and took time to cast and assemble, while the face-hardening of armor plate was a time consuming forging process. The final design of “Grosse Kreuzer K” produced a strikingly handsome ship representing the pinnacle of Imperial shipbuilding. Two sister-ships would follow, and there would be future designs – some even began construction -- but none would ever see service. The three Derfflinger’s were the last of their kind -- the final class of Imperial battlecruisers -- and are widely regarded as the best all-around capital ships of The Great War Era. The Panzerkreuzer had long, graceful, lines with a deliberately low freeboard and a much reduced superstructure. Her “Spartan” simplicity makes her, aesthetically, among the most handsome. GROSSE KREUZER K - 1911 “Grosse Kreuzer K – 1911” – profile and deck plan as she would appear upon completion. Note the raised forecastle deck of previous designs has been eliminated in favor of a gently ascending deck, starting at the “A” turret barbette and rising to the stem. This feature allows a flush-deck appearance while using the forecastle peak at the stem to reduce waves taken over the bow. She was completed with simple pole masts, but after Jutland, the foremast would be replaced by an unusually tall and heavy tripod mast with a large fire control top. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS The keel of “Grosse Kreuzer K” was laid on 30 March 1912. She would be launched nearly sixteen months later, on 12 July 1913. At 26,600 tons, her displacement was, roughly, 1,700 tons heavier than Seydlitz. The new cruiser’s hull was longer, at 690 feet, with a new hull form having finer lines, and a redesigned stern configuration. The usual “raised”, forecastle deck forward was dispensed with in favor of the Battery Deck rising gently from “A” turret to the sharp and vertical stem. This shape “cut” through the waves and threw water away from the bow, while giving the battlecruiser a graceful flush-deck appearance. The hull was plated with Siemens-Martin “mild steel” for flexibility and resilience, with a newly designed system of “longitudinal framing”. This system had been in use on commercial ships for more than sixty years, and in 1858 was used by Isambard Kingdom Brunel in his leviathan steamer Great Eastern, but had never been applied to warships. Without going into too much detail, the new system provided a savings in weight while strengthening the outer hull structure. There were sixteen watertight compartments on six deck levels, with a double bottom running 65% of her length. The double bottom and extensive use of internal compartmentalization between watertight transverse bulkheads contributed significantly to her underwater protection. “Docking keels” and bilge keels (slightly lower on the hull) were installed amidships, and anti-torpedo nets were a design feature. The new battlecruiser was outfitted with three, improved, “Frahm” roll-damping tanks to improve stability. The tanks were located amidships on the Hold Deck, Armored Deck, and Upper Deck. Though carefully thought-out, and arranged to achieve the best results, tests during the ship’s trials were inconclusive – just as they had been with Von der Tann. If you examine the profile and deck plan diagrams, you will readily see the efficient grouping and placement of the above-decks elements. The utilitarian superstructure is concentrated around the twin funnels amidships, and between the two superfiring gun turrets at either end. The whole of the superstructure has been deliberately reduced in height, even more so than previous battlecruisers – and the upper deck freeboard was reduced by one deck level – all in an effort to make her a smaller target – with a smaller price tag. You cannot help but admire the symmetry and grace of the big cruiser’s hull lines and form, and the simplicity of the open and uncluttered decks. You will note “C” and “D” turrets are separated by a deck housing. This housing provides a bit of storage for “deck kit” and covers the air intakes for the low pressure turbine rooms below, on the Hold Deck. Tirpitz had always been wary of having the two stern superfiring turrets so close together (battle damage), so this solution provided a degree of safety. All interior decks were steel plated and covered with linoleum, while exterior (“weather”) decks were steel plated with 2.5 inches of Teak planking. The ship’s electrical suite consisted of two Siemens-Schuckert turbo-dynamos and two Blohm & Voss two-stroke diesel dynamos totaling 1,660kw output at 220 volts. As a precaution against battle damage, the turbo-dynamos were mounted above the high-pressure turbines, on the Upper Platform Deck, while the two-stroke diesels were installed to port and starboard on the Hold Deck. As built, the new battlecruiser was equipped with eight 43-inch searchlights -- four each, grouped around the fore funnel and aft funnel. After the Skagerrak Battle, a heavy tripod mast forward replaced the pole mast and two searchlights were moved to the forward legs, while an additional searchlight was mounted in the platform structure of the mast. The new ship continued the extensive “ring” drainage and pump system, with a considerable increase in pumping capacity – a fifth high-capacity centrifugal pump was added on the Hold Deck, aft. In a pinch, portable electric “leak” pumps were also carried, and the powerful condenser pumps could also be used for drainage. The cruiser was equipped with the “standard” two wireless transmitters, three receivers, and as many antennas, with an additional transmitter/receiver installed in the forward conning tower. “Grosse Kreuzer K” would ship a crew of 44 officers and 1,068 men. MACHINERY ”Grosse Kreuzer K” received fourteen coal-fired, Schulz-Thornycroft water-tube boilers. These were the “naval-double-type”, custom-built in the Blohm & Voss Boiler Works to a modified design with four water drums and two steam drums. These more powerful, weight-saving, boilers were first used in Von der Tann. The coal-fired boilers had a total of fifty-six fireboxes and were arranged in the four aft boiler rooms, with each room divided by a longitudinal bulkhead. The new cruiser was also fitted with four double-ended oil-fired boilers as an experimental trial. These would allow the cruiser to raise steam for maneuvering more quickly, could produce a larger volume of steam, avoided problems with inferior coal, and greatly reduced the number of trimmers and stokers in the crew. After 1916, supplemental “oil-firing” was installed on the remaining boilers. Since the ship was designed to carry up to 3,500 tons of coal and 1,000 tons of oil fuel, the protective function of the coal bunkers was not diminished. The boilers fed four sets of Parsons Steam Turbines manufactured (under license) at the Blohm & Voss Engine Works. High-pressure turbines in the forward engine room worked the two outer shafts, while low pressure turbines in the aft engine room worked the two inner shafts. There were reversing arrangements on all four shafts. The forward and aft engine rooms were divided along the centreline by a longitudinal bulkhead. “Grosse Kreuzer K” was designed to generate 63,000shp. The two rudder, tandem centreline arrangement was retained -- each rudder controlled by an auxiliary steering engine connected with a steam-driven spindle drive. In the event of damage, both rudders could be coupled to a single engine, or manually operated. It should be remembered -- the tandem rudders resulted in extremely poor handling at slow speeds – making it virtually impossible to move these ships in harbors or canals without attending tugs. SHIP’S ARMAMENT This is the Krupp Gun Works at Essen – circa 1901. These appear to be 10-inch rifles from that era. The massive armaments works were run by Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach (a close friend of Wilhelm II) and became the chief supplier of guns and armor to both the German Army and the Kaiserliche Marine. The facilities employed some 70,000 workers and supplied weapons to many nations. Prior to 1887, Russia purchased 3,096 pieces of Krupp ordnance, while the Ottomans bought 2,773. By 1912, Turkey had purchased another 3,943 weapons. (The guns guarding the Dardanelles in 1915 were Krupp.) During the same time frame, Romania acquired 1,450 guns – Bulgaria 517 – Greece 356 – Austria-Hungary 298 – Montenegro 25 – and little Serbia, just 6 guns. MAIN BATTERY “Grosse Kreuzer K” finally adopted the 12-inch SK-L/50 (QF) high-velocity gun for the main battery armament. The rifles were mounted in the Drh L-C/1912 gun house which weighed approximately 550 tons. As with all German naval turrets of the period, they had a designed elevation of +13.5 degrees, providing a range of 17,700 yards. After the Battle Of Dogger Bank the turrets were altered and the range increased to 22,300 yards. The gun was capable of firing a 915 lb shell -- either armor-piercing or high-explosive – at the rate of three rounds per minute. Tests showed “capped” armor-piercing shells (base-fused) capable of penetrating 12 inches of armor plate at 14,000 yards. At 16,000 yards, the same shell could only penetrate an 11-inch plate. The high-explosive shell could penetrate before detonating – even on some armored areas. But on unarmored parts, the shell would detonate 2-6 meters behind the point of impact. The gun houses were electrically trained and hydraulically elevated, but could also be operated manually. All turrets were now fitted with 12-foot Zeiss rangefinders, and two gas-expelling fans were mounted on the rear wall of the turret. Due to the increased weight of the new shell and powder charges, manual handling and ramming was no longer possible. A mechanical rammer was installed in the rear of the gun house. The muzzle velocity of 875mps was a bit slower than the 11-inch rifle – but provided a barrel life of 200 rounds. The magazines held 65 armor-piercing and 25 high-explosive shells per gun tube. This is an excellent view of the 12-inch SK-L/50 (QF) high-velocity rifles mounted in a “test” pair of newly designed Drh L-C/1912 gun houses. The new gun was recently accepted for use in the Helgoland Class battleships, and this new variant of the gun house (turret) was created for use in the new battlecruiser. The unusual shape of the sloping roof is clearly visible, while the actual gun house presents a very low profile. (The sloping portions on the side roof would eventually be removed and a new front glacis plate designed before the pattern was approved.) Note the turret height compared to the workman. These are being hand-assembled and tested in the Krupp Turret Assembly Shop before the design is finalized and put into production. Fire Control “ranging and spotting” was handled from the fore or aft conning towers, whose upper floors housed the Fire Control Party operating Zeiss 15-foot stereoscopic rangefinders mounted on the roof. Other, smaller, rangefinders were installed in various locations -- even a crow’s nest Fire Control position and rangefinder was built into the foremast. The control stations were connected to a Central Gunnery Control situated beneath the protective armored deck. Here, the ship’s plotting team received data from the remote stations, calculated target information, and issued azimuth and elevation orders to the “Turret Captains” via telephones or electro-mechanical “repeaters”. SECONDARY BATTERY ”Grosse Kreuzer K” had the standard secondary battery of 5.9-inch guns – the usual SK-L/45 (QF) high velocity weapon. It was an excellent, all-around, complement to the ship’s main battery. The twelve guns were mounted on the Battery Deck, in MPL-C/1906 armored casemates, six amidships on either beam. Unlike preceding battlecruisers, the freeboard had been deliberately lowered in this design to save money and provide a more difficult target for enemy gunners. Consequently, the secondary batteries were too close to the water and were “wet” a good deal of the time. There would be encounters during the war when these guns proved difficult to operate -- but the guns were manned and fought – nonetheless. (See Chapter 17 for specifics on gun performance.) TERTIARY BATTERY Twelve 3.5 inch SK-L/45 (QF) high-velocity guns were provided for torpedo boat defense in the original design. But war experience showed these guns to be useless against modern destroyers, and they were removed. (See Chapter 36 for specifics on gun performance.) During the war, four 3.5-inch “Flak L/45” cannon mounted in MPL-C/1913 mounts were positioned around the forward funnel – two on either beam. They proved of little use during the war since British aircraft were generally unreliable and were, for all practical purposes, incapable of damaging a capital ship. Here we see SMS Derfflinger made fast at a repair dock while the engineering section and dockyard mechanics make repairs to her starboard low-pressure turbine. Unlike the preceding battlecruisers, Derfflinger and her sister-ship Lutzow suffered with frequent turbine damage. Steam turbines were a relatively new propulsion system in the early years of the 20th Century. The turbine was a simple concept on paper, but proved to be a complicated and delicate piece of precision engineering. A very small machining variance could cause no end of trouble. But, it should be noted, no Imperial battlecruiser ever suffered engine failure during a combat operation. TORPEDO ARMAMENT As was customary for the time period, “Grosse Kreuzer K” was fitted with four submerged 20-inch torpedo tubes. They were arranged one tube fore and aft, and one on each beam. Twelve new type G-7 torpedoes were carried. ARMOR “Grosse Kreuzer K”, in common with all Panzerkreuzer, had an extensive armor suite. Having full knowledge the British were now mounting the BL 13.5-inch Mark V/45 – a much more powerful weapon -- the new battlecruiser would have to be armored to withstand these guns. Krupp Cemented Armor, face-hardened with nickel-steel, unlike previous designs, was used more creatively – not just in the “armor belts” and turrets. A new armored plate was employed – a vertical plate – rather than the usual rows of horizontal plates. This formed the main armor belt and took the place of the “citadel” belt as well – so the former two armored belts were replaced by a single, equally large, but homogeneously rolled, “taller” plate. The plate was 12 inches thick on the Main Armor Belt level (amidships) and tapered to 11 inches covering the Citadel Armor Belt above. A separate level above that, the Battery Deck, had a 6 inch belt up to the main deck level, while the 5.9-inch guns mounted there had 3.5-inch casemated shields. In essence, her armor was not only slightly thicker, but harder to penetrate. Due to the differences in the hull form and silhouette, the armoring pattern differed, in certain respects. But with the flush-deck arrangement and considerably lower freeboard, there was actually more armor spread over a smaller area. Reducing her upper-works by one entire deck level early in the design stage not only saved a good deal of money, but was a positive stroke of genius. Imperial German capital ships were consistently built with extensive and unusually thick armor suites by comparison to other navies, but “Grosse Kreuzer K” was very nearly the epitome of the “fast battleship”. (I’m only going into the armoring scheme’s important aspects – see Chapters 15 and 17 for extensive details.) The new battlecruiser was armored throughout with Krupp Cemented Armor, face hardened with nickel steel, and backed with 2 inches of Teak to prevent spalling. Dillingen-Hutte Fabrik provided the structural construction steel. The “protective armored deck”, unlike foreign warships, extended from stem to stern. The main battery turrets were also protected with Krupp Cemented Nickel Steel armor – turret faces 11 inches – sides 9 inches -- and back 10.5 inches – roof 4.5 inches. The forward conning tower was protected by 14-inch armor -- the aft conning tower had 8 inches. The armor scheme was thicker and better arranged, and was, by all standards – impressive. But there were other “passive defense” features. SMS Derfflinger is made fast at her mooring points inside Cuxhaven Roadsted. An Odin Class tug has come alongside with a lighter bearing fresh fruit and vegetables. It would appear the Admiral’s steam launch has hooked onto the end of the boat boom – von Hipper must be staying for dinner. At sea, under combat conditions, the officers and crew would be served coffee, bread, cheese, fruit, and sometimes a hot soup. But in port, full meals could be cooked – usually breakfast, a light lunch, and dinner. Simple math says the nearly 1,100 man crew could consume around a ton of provisions per day – not to mention beer and Schnaps. The small ship anchored outside the breakwater is a guard ship. (The gunboat USS Erie was – provided by Barroco Hispano -- see earlier chapters for details.) The battlecruiser and steam launches are also from Barroco Hispano. The mooring points (modified) are from “Mattb325”. Breakwaters by “Uki”. The motor launch out in the roadsted, small boats, sailors, tug, and lighter are all by "AP". The underwater protection of “Grosse Kreuzer K” was slightly improved over that of Seydlitz – several compartments below the Protective Armored Deck were permanently sealed off to provide the forward part of the ship more reserve buoyancy. (This proved to be a good idea – but was hardly sufficient.) Beyond that, the standard pattern was followed with minor variations. Sixteen transverse bulkheads divided the ship into seventeen vertical watertight compartments and the protective armored deck (at the waterline) further divided several compartments horizontally. Between the transverse bulkheads were the usual numerous subdivisions -- each compartment capable of being sealed against flooding with watertight doors. In effect – the interior of the hull was a “honeycomb” designed to keep the ship afloat in the event of damage. There were exceptions to the system, usually in the engineering spaces – boiler rooms and engine rooms – where the compartments were large, and often two or three decks in height. Following her predecessors, the new cruiser was given a built-in, armored torpedo bulkhead running between the fore and aft barbettes, along either beam. “Grosse Kreuzer K” had well over 90 watertight compartments – considerably more than most foreign warships – and she would be able to withstand a great deal of damage. (See Chapter 13 for difficulty sinking Blucher.) As always, the common coal bunker provided yet another layer of protection on Imperial warships. Like Von der Tann, the Moltke’s, and Seydlitz, the new battlecruiser made extensive use of outboard hull spaces as coal bunkers. (See Chapter 17 for specific details.) “Grosse Kreuzer K” was given the full suite of wrap-around coal bunkers. As a simple solution, coal was cheaper than Krupp steel, necessary to power the ship, and could absorb more destructive energy than a thick armor plate. Though other navies used protective coal bunkers, none were as comprehensive as those found on German capital ships. “Grosse Kreuzer K” was, in its own way, a revolutionary improvement over the first four Imperial battlecruisers. Seydlitz had been built to the same basic pattern as the Moltke’s, but had a greatly improved armor suite giving her a rugged strength that would prove itself in battle. The new battlecruiser inherited all the technology incorporated into Seydlitz and was given an even better armor suite. Her main battery was increased to 12-inch caliber, and for the first time, was centreline-mounted in superfiring turrets fore and aft – providing wide and overlapping firing arcs. Combine all that with her long, sleek, lines – lengthened forecastle – low central superstructure – and low freeboard – and you have all the basic components of the “fast battleships” that would fight a quarter of a century later. Her very appearance bespoke speed and power and, literally, set her apart as a creature of a more modern age. “Grosse Kreuzer K” was fast, rugged, powerful, and an immensely handsome warship. She would prove to be lethal in combat and nearly impossible to sink. As the lead ship of her class, she was the precursor of the three best battlecruisers to serve in The Great War and, arguably, the three finest capital ships ever built – in any navy. And all of that – for the paltry sum of 56 million Marks. On 14 June 1913, after fourteen months on the builder’s slip at Blohm & Voss, “Grosse Kreuzer K” was christened SMS Derfflinger – in honor of Georg von Derfflinger (1606-1695) – governor of Pomerania and Feldmarschal to the Great Elector of Brandenburg-Prussia. Von Derfflinger served Prussia in various capacities for the bulk of his long military career, reorganizing and training the cavalry and artillery branches, as well as being instrumental in Friedrich Wilhelm’s 1675 victory over the Swedes at the Battle of Fenrbellin. With the christening ceremony over, the levers were thrown and the giant hull began to slide down the slipway – and promptly stuck fast. Only three sledges (cradles) had been constructed beneath the ship’s keel and the center one had too much pressure. Another attempt was made on the following tide, but Derfflinger refused to move. Eventually, the center sledge was disassembled, rebuilt, and heavily lubricated – and on 12 July 1913 – the new battlecruiser slide into the waters of the Elbe. Though she had shown some reluctance to “get her belly wet” – she would go on to earn the nickname bestowed on her by her English opponents – “The Iron Dog”. SMS Derfflinger under easy steam – circa 1915. NEXT TIME…… CHILD OF STRIFE MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful warship models. MY SPECIAL THANKS to my friend and partner, @AP, for his talents, meticulous detail, colorful imagination, extreme dedication, and wonderful models. We hope you enjoy them just half as much as I do ! If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN https://community.simtropolis.com/journals/journal/5910-imperial-dockyards-wilhelmshaven/ SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496
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