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Chapter 26: The Best Laid Plans
Dreadnought posted a City Journal entry in IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN
Hochseeflotte at anchor in the Kieler Hafen – circa 1912. IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP We have, so far, discussed the design, construction, and operational histories of the Imperial German battlecruisers. We are now about to see how they were handled by the Admirals and Captains, and how they preformed when put to the ultimate test – the Battle Of Jutland. I give you fair warning that this may be somewhat confusing. I have never yet examined a clear and concise – detailed – description of this battle. The immense size of the two fleets, and the fact that they were split into four distinct tactical groups – and spread over a large expanse of ocean -- can cause difficulties for anyone trying to write a lucid account of the action. I have tried, as much as possible, to stick to a “historical” chronological time sequence for the different events of interest. This has not been easy to accomplish. In order to maintain some sort of continuity to the story line, we may have to do a “flash-back” or even a “fast-forward” – this allows me to maintain a complete “story line” without splitting it into confusing parts. The keys to keeping everything in order are the quoted “times” in the text. The Choice was made to split the two fleets into separate components because they preformed different actions and maneuvers at similar times, for very different reasons. So the story is sorted into segments on the British Grand Fleet battle line – the British Battlecruiser Fleet – the Imperial Hochseeflotte battle line – and the Imperial 1st Scouting Group battlecruisers. I will try to show what each of these groups was doing at certain specific times of the battle so you will know what “everyone” was up to. Now -- let’s turn to “literary license”. “History” is not just names, dates, and numbers. It could be a high school project paper, a college term paper, a PHD thesis, a reference work, or a “narrative history” – with the writing shaped to the needs of the given work. I will tell you, frankly – each author brings their own view on the subject matter. Six different authors will produce six different views on any given subject. Case in point: many authors will tell you Erwin Rommel was a tactical and strategic genius – others will tell you he was erratic, impulsive, and ineffective. What some writers consider to be accepted historical fact – others will dispute – and produce their own view of those accepted historical facts. My treatment of the Battle of Jutland is no different. While I accept certain aspects of the battle as “hard fact” – other parts are my own particular viewpoint. In many cases, we cannot know what was in the mind of Admiral Tirpitz when he insisted on certain design and tactical aspects of the battlecruisers. And we cannot know, for certain, what was in Admiral Scheer’s mind on that fateful afternoon. But where recorded fact is absent, we may – through the use of logic and available data – extrapolate a more plausible reasoning behind their actions. I have attempted to do that in instances where there is no “accepted fact” or where the facts stated by the participants do not match with their actions. Where the narrative differs from the written word -- it is MY viewpoint – based on logic, human nature, and the physical and political conditions under which they fought. I have also taken the liberty to “call out” the various parties who indulged in “propaganda” -- or “self promotion” to make themselves look better at the expense of others. Having said all of that, I hope you will enjoy reading…... Chapter 26: THE BEST LAID PLANS In January 1916, Vizeadmiral Hugo von Pohl was forced to relinquish command of the Hochseeflotte due to advanced liver cancer (he died within a month of stepping down). Vizeadmiral Reinhard Scheer was chosen as the new Flottenchef. He was of the opinion the fleet had never been handled properly. Scheer knew he had better ships than the British – his men were just as eager for battle as his enemy – and he was inclined toward a more aggressive strategy. But Scheer was also a practical man. With only 27 capital ships he could not possibly engage 37 British capital ships in a straight-up slugging match. Consequently he fell back on the already standard policy of “tip and run raids”. The idea was to cause a public outcry in Britain by bombarding seaside targets -- thereby forcing the Royal Navy to send capital ships in response. Because of their high speed, it was only logical for Scheer to use the Panzerkreuzer as the bombardment group – and the bait for the trap. The Royal Navy, with centuries of aggressive tradition, would also send fast battlecruisers to intercept the raid. Von Hipper’s 1st Scouting Group would then lure the British over the horizon to be ambushed and destroyed by the massed guns of the Hochseeflotte. By this process, the Oberkommando der Marine hoped to whittle down the Grand Fleet to the point where an engagement might become practical. But these raids had not proven particularly successful in the past. Sometimes there was little response to the raids -- and on one occasion, Hipper’s battlecruisers were, themselves, ambushed and nearly destroyed. But more often than not, the German ambushes failed because the Flottenchef “got the wind up”. The battle squadrons of the Hochseeflotte had been hastily withdrawn before the trap could be properly sprung -- on the mere suspicion the Grand Fleet might suddenly appear. The German fleet commanders were not afraid to engage the enemy, but they were keenly aware an encounter with the bulk of the Grand Fleet could have serious consequences. The loss of even a single German capital ship would only make the disparity in numbers worse. And being outnumbered by the British, nearly two to one, could be catastrophic. A single British dreadnought could fire 100 rounds in a brief, five-minute skirmish. Imagine what could happen if only twenty British ships opened fire. This specter haunted German fleet commanders. Always heavily outnumbered, any one of the Flottenchef could have recklessly destroyed the effectiveness of the Hochseeflotte in a single battle gone badly wrong. The German fleet could have been reduced to a mere harbor guard force – and relieved the Royal Navy of the threat of “the fleet in being”. On a very personal level – no admiral wanted the condemnation of his fellow officers that such a mistake would entail. And the Kaiser had made it quite clear he did not want his battle fleet damaged – so there was always that to be considered. Nevertheless, Admiral Scheer was determined to take the war to the British. He intended to launch frequent raids against British coastal towns and support them with the battle fleet lying in ambush. He increased picket forces in Schillig Roads with the intention of launching attacks on British light forces scouting the German Bight. Scheer wanted increased minelaying operations in the Bight and around the British naval bases, and planned to station submarines off the English harbors in ambush. All of this with the goal of attaining some sort of parity with the Grand Fleet so a fleet engagement might be forced on more favorable terms. When the Admiralstab (German Admiralty) was forced to halt unrestricted submarine warfare in April 1916, Scheer was presented with a golden opportunity. The Flottenchef suddenly found himself with a large number of submarines to deploy offshore of British naval bases. But the British were wary of submarines after nearly two years of war, and mostly kept their capital ships at their moorings rather than swanning about in the submarine infested waters of the North Sea. Scheer would still have to come up with a plan to entice the British warships into his submarine ambush zones. GERMAN PLANNING The Hochseeflotte at their moorings in Wilhelmshaven – circa 1916. The large warship on the left is one of the modern Konig Class dreadnought battleships of the III Battle Squadron. Commissioned August 1914 – 25,796 tons – 21 knots – 10x12-inch guns – 14x5.9-inch guns – 5x20-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 13.8 inches. The battlecruiser Seydlitz had suffered mine damage during the Lowestoft Raid, and while waiting for repairs to complete, Scheer worked out a rather complicated plan. The operation was to include minelaying, submarines, air reconnaissance by Zeppelins, and an ambush operation with the Hochseeflotte. A bombardment raid against the British coastal town of Sunderland was the centerpiece of the mission. This was the most elaborate “ambush” yet planned, and the whole affair was scheduled for 17 May. Unfortunately, in early May, condenser problems surfaced in the battleships of the III Battle Squadron and the operation had to be pushed back to 23 May. THE SUBMARINES Here you see a number of Kaiserliche Marine U-Boats “nested” against a long pier within the naval base at Kiel – but this scene could just as well have been Wilhelmshaven. More submarines were employed in the North Sea than in the Baltic, but the scene would have been virtually the same. On the left side of the pier you see an older, dark-hulled warship from the 1880’s -- “retired” and converted to a repair and maintenance tender. The lighter-toned ship with the gangplank extended is another submarine tender – this one to provide crew berths while the submarines are in port. No sense living in a cramped submarine when you can have a bunk in a “floating hotel”. Ten submarines were dispatched during the first week in May. They were to take up assigned patrol stations in the central North Sea between 17 and 22 May, after which, they would move to allotted ambush positions. Two of the boats, U-43 and U-44, were assigned to the Pentland Firth, a particularly treacherous stretch of water between Scotland and the Orkney Islands – the entrance to the Grand Fleet base at Scapa Flow. The currents could run as fast as 30 knots and were difficult for submarines – but if the Grand Fleet sortied, they would have to pass the submarines. The remainder of the U-boats were positioned around the Firth of Forth to catch the British Battlecruiser Fleet when it departed its base at Rosyth. Each boat had its own patrol area, allowing free movement to prevent detection, but they were under strict orders to avoid being sighted for fear of giving away the operation prematurely. It was arranged for the submarines to receive a coded transmission signaling the start of the operation, when enemy units might be expected to exit their bases. An additional 11 submarines were allocated associated tasks. UB-27 was ordered out with instructions to work past May Island and into the Firth of Forth, while U-47 was sent to patrol offshore of Sunderland prior to the bombardment. On 13 May, U-72 was detailed to lay mines in the Firth of Forth, and on 23 May, U-74 departed to lay mines in the Moray Firth. Moray Firth connected the North Sea to Cromarty Firth, which was the base of the Grand Fleet’s 2nd Battle Squadron. On 24 May, U-75 sailed to lay minefields west of the Orkney Islands, while UB-21 and UB-22 were sent to patrol the Humber River mouth, in the mistaken belief warships were based there. And finally, U-22, U-46, and U-67 were positioned north of Terschelling to act as an ambush screen should the “Harwich Force” attempt to intervene. At first glance, it would appear the submarine deployment had covered all the enemy bases – but events would show otherwise. As all military plans do, this one began to unravel -- as soon as the submarines put to sea. SMS Seydlitz was returned to duty on 21 May, and within hours it was determined she still had serious leaks that had not been fixed. Scheer, to his credit, was unwilling to risk the battlecruiser squadron in an under-strength condition. Seydlitz was returned to the dockyard and the “Sunderland Operation” was pushed back to 29 May. Meanwhile, the submarines had moved to their ambush stations and were experiencing their own difficulties. The English coast was often shrouded in fog – seriously limiting their visibility. The sea conditions were either so calm the slightest ripple from a periscope gave away their position, or, the sea was so rough the submarines were unable to maintain periscope depth without exposing the conning tower. For a variety of reasons, British patrols became aware of an unusual level of submarine activity, and increased their anti-submarine patrols. UB-27 cleared Bell Rock on its way into the Firth of Forth, then suffered engine trouble. After making repairs, the U-boat followed several merchant vessels into Largo Bay, where one of her propellers got tangled in a submarine net, forcing UB-27 to abort the mission and return to base. U-74 was detected by four armed trawlers on 27 May and went down 25 miles southeast of Peterhead. U-72 had to abort her minelaying mission when it was found she was leaving a trail of leaking fuel oil. U-75 succeeded in laying her minefields west of the Orkney Islands, and though they played no part in the Battle Of Jutland, they did claim a significant victim. On 5 June 1916, the British Secretary Of State for War, Field Marshal Lord Kitchener, 1st Earl Kitchener of Khartoum, boarded the armored cruiser HMS Hampshire and sailed for the Russian port of Arkhangelsk -- on a diplomatic mission to the Romanov Court. Around 19:30, in the teeth of a Force 9 gale, Hampshire struck one of U-75’s mines and went down in 18 minutes. The official losses are stated as 737 men, with 12 survivors. Lord Kitchener was last seen on the quarter deck – his body was never recovered. This could very well be one of the U-Boats on patrol in the Pentland Firth. The waters of the North Atlantic and the North Sea met in the firth and set up shifting cross-currents and miserable conditions for the small submarines of that era. Gales were common and rough seas were considered “normal” weather. Fog and haze regularly limited visibility, and the huge rolling breakers often obscured what could be seen from the conning tower of a low-lying submarine. THE ZEPPELINS This is the dreadnought battleship SMS Thuringen at anchor in the Jade Estuary with one of the Imperial airships passing overhead – circa 1913. By 1916, the Imperial Naval Air Service operated a fleet of large airships built by Luftschiffbau Zeppelin -- often referred to by the general term “Zeppelins”. Several airships were operated in the Baltic Sea, but some 15 large airships were based out of Tondern and Cuxhaven for operations in the North Sea. They were commonly used for bombing raids – mostly against English naval bases – and even targeted the occasional ship they came across. But they are usually linked to the more infamous business of bombing English cities in the later stages of the war. (Imperial Army airships carried out the majority of those raids, while the naval airships performed only 50 bombing raids -- but over 1,000 reconnaissance missions.) Their chief duty, as far as the Kaiserliche Marine was concerned – and their first priority -- was air reconnaissance over the North Sea, and especially the German Bight. The airships were much better suited to long flights over areas where it was not safe to risk weak scouting forces, and unwise to send small groups of capital ships. The airships were capable of spotting units of the Royal Navy at great distances and giving the Hochseeflotte sufficient advance warning and details of enemy strength. The Flottenchef could then decide to engage or retire, based on his strategic goals and tactical situation. It was decidedly better than groups of opposing cruisers blundering about in the mist-shrouded North Sea – when it worked. The “down side” to Zeppelins was that they were entirely at the mercy of the wind and weather. Airships could easily be destroyed by high winds, and a heavy rain could actually add weight to the outer skin – slowing their speed, reducing their altitude, and increasing fuel consumption. At higher altitudes, “icing” could cause serious problems and, much like sailing ships, going against the wind was difficult. If the wind was strong, or came from the wrong direction, the Zeppelins remained grounded. Scheer’s planned Sunderland Operation intended to deploy two Zeppelins to bomb the town immediately before the bombardment. With their bombs gone, the airships were to spread out offshore and search north along the English coast. Other Zeppelins would search farther north for Beatty’s Battlecruiser Fleet and the Grand Fleet, while one more would keep an eye on the Harwich Force. Unfortunately, once the submarines were in position, the wind refused to cooperate. By 28 May, a strong north-easterly wind continued to blow, and the airships could not be deployed, so the raid was postponed, yet again. Now the submarines became a problem, because they could only remain on station until 1 June. After that, with onboard supplies exhausted, they would have to return to port. On the afternoon of the 28th, orders went out from Scheer to cancel the Sunderland Operation and an alternate plan was substituted. The new plan had the same basic objective; to lure a part of the Grand Fleet into an ambush, thereby making use of the submarines before their time ran out. The plan involved taking the Hochseeflotte north and sending the battlecruiser squadron into the Skagerrak to interdict merchant shipping between Scandinavia and Britain. Raw materials vital to the British war effort were shipped via the Skagerrak in regularly scheduled convoys. A raid by Hipper’s 1st Scouting Group could easily destroy escorting British cruisers and seriously disrupt trade for a number of weeks, if not months. Once Hipper’s presence in the Skagerrak was known, the Royal Navy would respond, and Beatty’s fast battlecruisers would arrive first. It would be Hipper’s task to lure Beatty onto the guns of the waiting battle squadrons of the Hochseeflotte. Scheer felt this operation would be safer -- closer to German ports -- and airship reconnaissance could be dispensed with in favor of scouting forces. The Hochseeflotte assembled in Schillig Roads on the 28th, and was ordered to raise steam and be ready for action by midnight. At 14:00 on 30 May, the wind was still too strong for Zeppelins, so the final decision was made to use the alternative plan. It was the biggest operation yet undertaken by the Hochseeflotte, and though farther away from British naval bases, it was not without considerable risk. Nevertheless, the coded signal "31 May G.G.2490" was transmitted to the fleet, ordering the Skagerrak operation for 31 May. The pre-arranged signal to the submarines was transmitted throughout the day from the E-Dienst radio station at Bruges, and the U-boat tender Arcona anchored at Emden. Only two submarines, U-66 and U-32, ever received the signal. BRITISH RESPONSE The 1st Battlecruiser Squadron lying at anchor off Rosyth in the Firth of Forth. The famous “Forth Bridge” is in the background. The dockyards of Rosyth are on the other side of the bridge. When the big ships had to pass under the bridge to get to them, the topmasts had to be lowered to avoid crashing into the structure. Right to left – HMS Lion, HMS Princess Royal, and HMS Indefatigable – circa 1915. As mentioned in previous chapters, the British had broken the German naval codes early in the war. The code-breaking unit in “Room 40” of the Admiralty building carried out direction finding, interception, and decryption of German naval signals. Though they could not decipher all signals, and some took longer than others to decode, the staff was keenly aware that any sudden increase in signal traffic from the German flagship (SMS Freidrich der Grosse) indicated an operation was in the offing. Around 22 May 1916, Room 40 began picking up heightened levels of wireless traffic, followed by an intercepted signal on 28 May providing "ample evidence the German fleet was stirring in the North Sea". As further signals were intercepted, some decoded and some not, it became abundantly clear a major operation was likely. At 11:00 on 30 May, Admiral John Jellicoe (commander Grand Fleet) was warned the German fleet was preparing to sail the following morning. By 17:00, Room 40 had intercepted and deciphered the special signal from Scheer to the U-boats -- "31 May G.G.2490" – and that sealed the deal. Action was imminent. With no knowledge of actual German plans, Jellicoe and his staff decided on a response every bit as large as Scheer’s intended ambush. The combined elements of the Grand Fleet would be positioned in a central location – roughly 100 miles west by south of Lindesnes, Norway. This would place the Grand Fleet in a position to cut the Germans off from the North Atlantic shipping lanes, as well as denying them access to the Skagerrak, thereby protecting the Scandinavian shipping routes and denying the German fleet an avenue of retreat. Once the fleet had rendezvoused, the British would either spring the trap, or sweep down the coast of Denmark in search of their prey. THE DIE IS CAST The 1st Division of Jerram’s 2nd Battle Squadron putting to sea from Cromarty Firth. HMS King George V leads the line, followed by Ajax, Centurion, and Erin – 30 May 1916. With steam up, and the crews closed-up at sailing stations, junior officers throughout the fleet stood stiffly on the bridge wings as bands of rain blew in from the northwest. It was not a cold rain, but the darkness all around made it no less miserable. At 23:30 on May 30, the signal lamps flashed and the moored ships cast off from their buoys. Jellicoe was putting to sea early enough to ensure he arrived at the likely point of interception before the Germans. Mist and funnel smoke hung low over the sea as the 16 dreadnought battleships of the 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons, and the 3 battlecruisers of the 3rd Battlecruiser Squadron, steam out of Scapa Flow. Once clear of Hoxa Sound, the warships increased to 14 knots and set course to the ESE. They would shortly link-up with the 8 battleships of Vice-Admiral Martyn Jerram’s 2nd Battle Squadron coming out of Cromarty Firth. Admiral Beatty’s 6 battlecruisers of the 1st and 2nd Battlecruiser Squadrons, and the 4 fast battleships of Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas’ 5th Battle Squadron, weighed anchor and sortied from the Firth of Forth at about the same time. It was Jellicoe’s intention to rendezvous with Beatty’s ships off the mouth of the Skagerrak, near the Jutland coast of Denmark. The first three ships are battlecruisers of the 1st Scouting Group, leading the Hochseeflotte out of the Jade Estuary. The date and occasion are unknown. Lutzow and Derfflinger are leading the line, and the picture was likely taken from Derfflinger’s fantail. Following are Seydlitz, Moltke, and Von der Tann. It can be seen they are altering course to steam out ahead of the battle line. Notice the mist and haze has obscured the low coastline, and the waters of the estuary are smooth as glass. Around 02:00 on 31 May 1916, Admiral Hipper’s raiding force cleared Schillig Roads. The light cruisers and torpedo boats of the 2nd Scouting Group swept down the Jade’s deep-water channel at 14 knots, closely followed by the big battlecruisers. Once clear of the estuary, a half-flotilla of torpedo boats would drop back to screen the seaward flank of the big ships. The light cruisers, their funnels spouting clouds of smoke, strained their engines to reach ahead, where they would take up their advance scouting positions. As the Panzerkreuzer nosed into the rolling swell of the Bight, speed was increased to 18 knots and the squadron steered northwest, then north, skirting the west shore of Heligoland Island via a cleared channel through the minefields. The Hochseeflotte is seen on maneuvers, possibly early in the war. The eight battleships of the III Battle Squadron are leading the line, followed by the I Battle Squadron. The photo was taken from the fantail of a Helgoland Class dreadnought. Note the choppy seas and the funnel smoke drifting to leeward. Admirals had to be careful not to let their own funnel smoke mask the view of the fire control rangefinders. An hour and a half later, Admiral Scheer ordered the Hochseeflotte’s main body to weight anchor and proceed to sea. The advance screen of light cruisers and torpedo boats went first, followed by the sixteen lumbering dreadnought battleships of the I and III Battle Squadrons. They, too, steered northwest from the Jade and would rendezvous around 04:00 with the six pre-dreadnought battleships of II Battle Squadron, coming out of Cuxhaven, on the Elbe River. Historians have given Scheer more than his share of criticism for bringing the II Battle Squadron to Jutland. The first of the old battleships, SMS Deutschland, was commissioned in 1906 – and the last, SMS Schlesien, in 1908. The class displaced only 13,000 tons – half the tonnage of HMS Iron Duke. They were armed with four 11 inch guns – half the broadside of SMS Von der Tann. And their triple expansion engines were rated at only 18 knots. This alone, would impose a serious limitation on the Hochseeflotte’s ability to maneuver. Their liabilities were no secret. Their own crews dubbed them “the five-minute ships” – for they were unlikely to last longer against the powerful British dreadnoughts. During the early planning stages, it had been intended to leave II Battle Squadron behind, as a guard force for the German Bight. And in later years, in his memoirs, Scheer claimed he only agreed to take them at the last moment because Konterdmiral Franz Mauve (flag-officer, commanding II Battle Squadron) had argued passionately to sail with the fleet. Mauve insisted his ships were battle-ready -- and it would be an insult to his ships, his men, and himself, to be left behind when their comrades were sailing against the English. Several historians have actually suggested Scheer may have intended to sacrifice the old ships if things went badly – allowing the modern dreadnoughts to escape, while II Battle Squadron was being shot to pieces. But there is no evidence – then or now -- to support such a notion. The decision to take Mauve’s ships to sea did more credit to Scheer as a man than as an admiral. Scheer had no wish to break the spirit of such brave men – especially in a squadron he, himself, had once commanded. The pre-dreadnought battleships of the II Battle Squadron very early in the war. Not long after hostilities commenced, two of the older Braunschweig Class ships were retired. Note the high volume of funnel smoke produced by the older ships. This would be visible to an enemy many miles away. Forty miles north of Scheer, Hipper’s flag flew at the forepeak of SMS Lutzow, and the Admiral stood on the weather side of the bridge, drinking coffee, and watching the rain and mist mixing with the funnel smoke. With any luck, the weather would clear around 05:00 – daybreak – and he’d have good visibility for convoy-hunting. They might even catch a few British cruisers…… The stage has now been set, and “the play” is about to begin. But first – we should know a bit more about the “players”…… NEXT TIME…… THOSE WHO LEAD BUT – we are not quite finished. Since I could find no way to include game-related pictures on this particular subject matter, we will take another small tour of the Cuxhaven map tile. Below is a shot of the western portion of the Cuxhaven naval establishment (fictional geography, of course). And on the left side, you have an overview of the West Loch anchorage. You have already seen some portions of the lower loch area, but we will focus on the upper portion. I included this “overview” to provide some sort of geographic context. The West Loch was originally intended as an anchorage for the Scouting forces of the Hochseeflotte. As the years passed and the ships became more numerous, the loch became a bit crowded. With the introduction of dreadnought warships in the early 1900’s, it quickly became apparent their larger size could not be accommodated in West Loch. A larger, and more modern facility was constructed on the north shoreline (visible at the top and right of the picture. The new “main anchorage” was much expanded in size, with longer docks and piers to accommodate larger ships, expanded coaling and fuel oil replenishment, and ( for the first time) a dry dock was constructed for the larger cruisers. For our purposes, West Loch was designed to berth the “evolutionary” cruisers of the Kaiserliche Marine -- from the post-ironclad era (late 1880’s), through the armored cruiser period, and including the introduction of dreadnought battlecruisers. This is a view of the northeast corner of West Loch. At the right, you can see the large quay where ship’s stores and various pieces of equipment can be taken aboard. Minor repairs and maintenance can also be accomplished at this quay. (Coaling, ammunition replenishment, or extensive repair jobs, must be handled in the “Main Anchorage” or at the dockyard facilities in Wilhelmshaven.) Directly behind the quays are the warehouses serving them, and across the tracks are more warehouses, work shops, and machine shops. Even small repairs to engines and other machinery often require parts to be cast, machined, and made to order. To the left of the industrial zone is a rail siding where locomotives and rail cars can wait until unloaded, or hauled away if empty. Below that is a tugboat station with a small mooring area for lighters. The quays are modified “battleship docks” from the “PEG SNM Series” of naval lots. “WMP” Seawalls have been added to the piers to make them appear more “turn-of-the-Century”. The “100 ton cranes” on the quay are by “AP”. The long warehouses were borrowed from the “PEG” Seaport lots. The trackside cranes are from the “PEG SNM Dry Dock” lot, and the steam locomotives are “PEG”. Some of the features are “custom re-lotted” in various sizes, while much of the area was put together with 1x1 “custom-made filler lots” of various types. Many of the hundreds of props used to “dress-out” these lots were selected at random from “Lot EDITOR” and are likely available to members on the “STEX” (If they have any interest in industrial zones in their cities). This “detail shot” shows two Emden Class light cruisers “nested” along the quay. They are taking aboard ship’s stores on the odd chance they may be ordered to the Far East on short notice. If ordered to the China Station, they will be moved to the Replenishment Piers to take on fresh provisions. These gorgeous models were provided courtesy of Barroco Hispano. This is one of the two tugboat stations in West Loch. The tug dispatch tower is borrowed from the small Maxis airport. The tug piers are re-purposed from the “Somy Japanese Tug” lot. The Quonset Hut is from the “PEG SNM Series”. The water tower (for fire-fighting) was re-purposed from the Maxis Movie Studio “reward” lot. The roads are Paeng’s Grunge Concrete, and concrete textured lots were “custom-made” as 1x1 filler lots with various activity in progress. Another view of the tug station. This is a “detail shot” of the tugboat models. The white steam tugs were provided by “WolfZe”, and are similar to small harbor tugs of the 1920’s to 1940’s in such places as New York and Philadelphia. The rest of the tugs are the excellent modeling work of “AP”. Left to right is a Midgard Class, a Thor Class, the larger Passat Class, and two Odin Class tugs nested against the seawall. Rather than make them all look alike, we researched dozens and dozens of photos to select individual tugs with the proper “look” and “feel” for their duties and the period. This angle gives you a detailed look at the profiles of the tugs. “AP” put a lot of work into these little beauties. A great deal of detail and custom texturing has been worked into them. These little boats have a very “authentic” look to them – neat and “ship-shape” – but “worn” and “lived-in” as well. Historical accuracy is a good thing – but realism is just as important. At the bottom of the picture you can see a formation of sailors, with other sailors working with Atlantic fenders. The sailors, officers, Atlantic Fenders, and rope coils are all by “AP”. This is a small mooring basin adjacent to the tug station. If room is available, you can park the odd tug, or squeeze in just one more lighter while someone figures out what to do with it. A Sophia Class steam paddle tug stands by while the small boat crews hook up a tow line to the lighter with the red barrels. The Sophia is a diagonal model – part of our goal to increase the number of diagonal models in the game. The large lighter on the left carries powder charges, while the one next to it is carrying ammunition for 5.9-inch cruiser guns. Several of the cruisers in the West Loch may be ordered abroad and will fill their magazines before departure. This view shows the excellent detail on the Sophia Class paddle tug. Coal-fired, steam paddle tugs were common all over the world from the Victorian Era well into the 1950’s. The lighters are moored to wooden structures known as “mooring dolphins”. These are quite common, to this day, in harbors all over Europe (Hamburg, etc) – and in many places along navigable rivers (the Rhine and Main). If you want to see highly detailed, authentic models – just look at “AP’s” lighters and cargo. He has taken a simple barge and turned each one into a world of its own. I have counted 11 separate details on just one of the barges – any of which could have been made quicker and easier by not including them. Just look at the stacked bags in the small lighters – or the odd planks and boxes carelessly left in the large lighter – or the different textures in the bottom planks of the empty one. Marvelous detail, and very imaginative. And this is a close-up of the rail siding. The buildings are re-lotted from SFBT models. The siding with the steam locomotives was re-lotted from “NBVC” oil filling lots and the locomotives, again are “PEG”, modified to have “steam”. One of the boxcar sidings is re-lotted from an NBVC track with assorted cars – the other is a slightly modified triple-siding from “Simmer2”. Note the landscaping around the siding. Heavily wooded slopes on the right, the retaining wall in the center, and the sandy slopes and small hills on the left. All of it has been “painted” with MMP work, while the heavily wooded areas are a combination of custom-made 1x1 tree-filler lots, and MMP work to blend it all together. Very tedious work – but quite realistic. MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful warship models. SPECIAL THANKS to my friend and partner, @AP, for his talents, colorful imagination, and extreme dedication. If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN https://community.simtropolis.com/journals/journal/5910-imperial-dockyards-wilhelmshaven/ SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496- 12 Comments
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