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Chapter 39: The Remains Of The Day
Dreadnought posted a City Journal entry in IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN
The Grand Fleet steaming NW in line-ahead formation -- full daylight on 2 June 1916. IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 39: THE REMAINS OF THE DAY: THE AFTERMATH OF BATTLE The sun rises early in northern latitudes, and as the misty dawn crept above the eastern horizon on 1 June 1916, Vice-Admiral David Beatty’s Battlecruiser Fleet sighted their first German. Lookouts aboard HMS Lion spotted the Zeppelin L-11 as she dipped below the cloud base around 03:30. Nearly as long as a dreadnought, the big airship received a warm reception as Beatty’s ships opened fire – some with their main battery guns. The German air crew reacted quickly, released water ballast, and took their fragile craft back into the clouds. Beatty assumed the airship was scouting ahead of the Hochseeflotte and signaled “clear for action”. But the minutes ticked by with nothing more to be seen. The Battlecruiser Fleet was alone in the choppy waters of the North Sea. (L-11 would stumble into the Grand Fleet a few minutes to the NW, receive the same “hot” reception, and report both encounters to Scheer before being ordered back to Nordholz aerodrome.) Some miles to the north, at 02:47, a heavy mist settled over the sea with the first touch of dawn, and Vice-Admiral John Jellicoe, hopeful of finding the enemy, signaled his fleet to form “line-ahead” battle formation. While the dreadnoughts maneuvered into line, the C.-in-C. set about signaling his light cruiser squadrons and destroyer flotillas to close the battle fleet and assume their assigned stations. The various elements of the Grand Fleet had become disoriented during the night – while SMS Westfalen had scattered and mauled destroyer flotillas much like a fox among barnyard chickens. Jellicoe intended to close Horns Reef and intercept Scheer. About the same time Beatty fired on the Zeppelin, HMS Iron Duke took in a signal from the Admiralty. The Hochseeflotte’s position had been fixed by wireless direction-finding stations an hour earlier (02:30) – 30 miles NE of Iron Duke on a SES course, estimated speed 16 knots – just one hour’s steaming from Horns Reef. The signalman delivered the message to Flag Captain Dreyer on the bridge. Having read it, he shook his head and climbed the ladder to the Admiral’s bridge. Jellicoe read the message with no show of emotion whatsoever. He merely handed the message back...”This signal makes it painfully evident that by no possible means can I catch Scheer before he reaches port – even if I disregard the danger of following him through the minefields…” Jellicoe ordered Dreyer to recall the battlecruisers and alter course for Horns Reef – on the off chance he might snap-up a few German stragglers as he passed by. Jellicoe had trapped Scheer and beaten him – twice – but the sun went down before he could finish the job. In the end, Scheer outmaneuvered and outwitted Jellicoe and escaped the well-laid trap. By sunrise, 2 June, Beatty’s Battlecruiser Fleet was back in Rosyth, Jerram’s 2nd Battle Squadron anchored off Cromarty around 09:00, and the bulk of the Grand Fleet was safely tucked-up in Scapa Flow by noon. But there was little rest to be had. The Fleet took on coal, oil, and ammunition – and, as an afterthought -- a few fresh provisions. At 21:45 that evening, Jellicoe telegraphed London to inform the Admiralty the Grand Fleet was, in all respects, ready for sea. Capital ships of the Grand Fleet lying at anchor in Scapa Flow. The 15-inch gun battleship HMS Revenge is front and center. Around 03:00 1 June, Vizeadmiral Franz von Hipper stood quietly on the bridge of SMS Moltke, the only remaining combat-ready battlecruiser. He held his duty-station ahead of the Hochseeflotte, leading the main body past Horns Reef and toward the Amrum Bank Passage. They would soon pass inshore of the German minefields. Due to the severe damage suffered by SMS Derfflinger and Von der Tann, Scheer ordered them to assemble on Moltke and run into Wilhelmshaven. (SMS Seydlitz was still afloat, but lagging far behind.). As Derfflinger and Von der Tann steamed ahead -- SMS Ostfriesland ran onto a mine. (It was not the minefield Jellicoe had ordered HMS Abdiel to sow – it was another field she had sown a month earlier.) Though considerably damaged, Ostfriesland was able to maintain her place in line. SMS Moltke led the remaining battlecruisers past the outer Jade light ship and anchored in Wilhelmshaven Roads at 14:50. Once the tide came in Derfflinger was able to transit the locks and the Panzerkreuzer ran into the southern harbor basin around 17:15 – badly battered – but covered in Glory and Legend. Vizeadmiral Scheer watched Hipper’s battlecruisers steam off to the south. He would hold the fleet, temporarily, between Horns Reef and the Amrum Bank while he waited for the tide to come in. SMS Konig had led the battle fleet into the gun sights of the Grand Fleet twice, and paid the price. Several large caliber hits (probably 15-inch) badly holed her forward causing serious flooding. Kapitan Bruninghaus had to counter-flood to keep her on an even keel, resulting in the ship taking on 1,600 tons of water. She was down by the bow and forced to wait for the tide (09:30) before trying to navigate Amrum Bank Passage. The fleet eventually cleared Amrum Bank, and a little past midday, Konteradmiral Mauve’s II Battle Squadron was detached for the Elbe River and Cuxhaven. The five old pre-dreadnoughts dropped anchor in Altenbruch Roads around 14:25. After having to beg to be included in the battle fleet’s sortie – and having lost SMS Pommern – the old pre-dreadnoughts had twice steamed into harm’s way to save Hipper’s crippled battlecruisers. They had earned their battle honors. And now every man that crewed the “five-minute-ships” could stand proudly and say...”We were at the battle!” And no one could take that from them. In the gasthauses of old Cuxhaven there would be many stories to tell this night, much beer, and toasts to missing shipmates. As Scheer approached Schillig Roads, five battleships of I Battle Squadron were detached to stand guard. Scheer worried the British might choose this moment to launch a raid on Wilhelmshaven. The remainder of the Hochseeflotte steamed up the deep-water channel to anchor off Wilhelmshaven and wait for the tide to pass through the locks. By 06:30 the following morning (2 June), it was all over – except for the tidying-up. (As an interesting sidelight -- before the battle, Konteradmiral Behncke had made a quick tour of SMS Konig to deliver some words of encouragement to the crew, and the ship’s cat – “Max” – began to follow him. “Max” was a rather large, long-haired, part Norwegian Forest Cat (orange or ginger) with the remainder of his parentage unknown – and he had always had the run of the ship. When Konig finally came to anchor in Wilhelmshaven Roads one of the cook’s assistants thought to feed Max, but he could not be found. Word went around the dreadnought and an informal search was conducted – without success. He was later found in the only place no one had dared to look, the Admiral’s day cabin off the bridge – curled into a neat ball on the Admiral’s cot – sound asleep.) The Hochseeflotte moored quayside in Wilhelmshaven after the battle. Some ships went into dry dock, others made minor repairs and replenished provisions, ammunition, and coal. “The whole situation was difficult to grasp, as I had no real idea of what was going on and we could hardly see anything except flashes of guns, shells falling, ships blowing up, and an occasional glimpse of an enemy vessel…” That is the best one-sentence summary of the Battle of Jutland ever written – and it was in Admiral Jellicoe’s report to the Admiralty. And like the telegram reporting the fleet ready for sea, it may have mollified the Admiralty, but it hardly covered the myriad of details and what followed. Despite the enormous numerical advantage held by the British, the Grand Fleet had been knocked about a bit. Of the 28 British dreadnoughts present at Jutland, 5 were damaged to varying degrees. Of the 9 battlecruisers at Jutland, 3 were sunk and 4 damaged. The official British warship losses at Jutland: Battlecruisers: Queen Mary – Indefatigable – Invincible Battleships: 0 Armored Cruisers: Defence – Warrior – Black Prince Light Cruisers: 0 Destroyers: Tipperary - Nestor - Nomad – Turbulent – Ardent – Fortune – Shark - Sparrowhawk British battlecruisers damaged at Jutland: New Zealand – 1 hit Lion – 14 Princess Royal – 9 Tiger – 21 British battleships damaged at Jutland: Colossus – 2 hits Barham – 6 Malaya – 8 Warspite – 15 Marlborough – 1 torpedo British personnel losses: 6,094 dead – 674 wounded – 177 taken prisoner At first glance, the damage to the Grand Fleet may not seem so bad – but Jellicoe saw things differently the morning after Jutland. He entered the battle with 9 combat-ready battlecruisers. On the morning of 3 June, Beatty’s “Battlecruiser Fleet” was reduced to two undamaged Invincible Class and one lightly damaged Indefatigable Class. ALL of his remaining modern battlecruisers were significantly damaged. A heavily damaged HMS Lion was repaired and returned to duty on 19 July – minus her burnt-out “Q” turret – which could not be replaced until September. Princess Royal received temporary repairs over an eight-day period at Rosyth, then sailed to Plymouth for permanent repairs – and returned to the Grand Fleet on 21 July. Among the “Splendid Cats”, HMS Tiger was peppered pretty heavily by shells, but was repaired at Rosyth Dockyard and returned to the fleet on 1 July. (Incidentally, she fired 303 rounds from her main battery guns and obtained only one hit on SMS Moltke and two on Von der Tann – a 1% hit ratio.) The upshot of this, is Jellicoe had only 4 battlecruisers available for scouting duties during the next six weeks. (HMAS Australia had missed Jutland, but was now available.) This perceived weakness in his scouting forces bothered Jellicoe. HMS Tiger completed repairs and took on coal before rejoining the Battlecruiser Fleet. Three Passat Class and a Nordwind Class tug ease the big battlecruiser against the coaling dock. The docks are 11x3 custom-made lots using an old brick texture and “Paeng’s Grunge Concrete”, fronted by “WMP Seawalls”. The coal cranes are from the “PEG” trash lots, “resized” to fit. The two warehouses left of center are from “Nob’s 1905 Naval Series”. HMS Tiger, the steam locomotive, and coal gondolas are courtesy of Barroco Hispano. The numerous sailors, rope coils, Atlantic fenders, and beautiful tugs are the work of “AP”. The dreadnoughts of the Grand Fleet, as a whole, suffered comparatively little damage – though several individual ships took considerable punishment. HMS Colossus took two shells in the forward superstructure, causing little damage, and returned to duty by 18 June. After nearly being lost to a single torpedo strike, HMS Marlborough received temporary repairs at Hull, then moved to the Armstrong-Whitworth shipyard at Jarrow (Clydebank) for extensive permanent repairs. She returned to the fleet on 5 August. HMS Barham, flagship of the now-famous 5th Battle Squadron “fast battleships”, was a bit “chewed-up”, but returned to the fleet on 5 July. HMS Malaya, another “fast battleship”, survived a great deal of enemy attention and many near misses, but was repaired in the floating dock at Invergordon and returned to the fleet on 4 July. HMS Warspite was the most heavily damaged of the “fast battleships”, but she managed to make port under her own steam and underwent extensive repairs, only returning to the fleet in early August. (Warspite went on to a long and glorious career in WW II. At the Battle of Calabria, 9 June 1940, she opened fire on the Italian battleship Giulio Cesare and scored a hit at the longest known range of 29,000 yards. The record stands unbroken to this day. Warspite was also the first Allied warship to open fire on the Normandy beaches, on June 6, 1944. However, it became something of a standing joke in the Royal Navy that her steering gear problem was never fully cured. For the rest of her service life, Warspite’s steering would, for no apparent reason -- occasionally go “haywire” – and the big ship would “go-walk-about”.) An added stroke of luck came to Jellicoe within days of the battle, when HMS Queen Elizabeth and Emperor of India completed their maintenance and rejoined the fleet. And a few weeks later, the new 15-inch-gunned battleship HMS Royal Sovereign completed her working-up exercises and joined the battle squadrons at Scapa Flow. So – for the next six weeks -- Jellicoe’s “fast battleship” squadron was reduced to two ships – and his total dreadnought battleship strength dropped from 28 to 24 ships. Though this temporary decline in strength preyed on Jellicoe’s mind, the danger was more imagined than real, and he had one obvious and overwhelming advantage. On the morning of 3 June 1916, Jellicoe had an operational battle fleet on two hour’s notice for steam – Admiral Scheer did not. SMS Helgoland undergoes repair in one of the large floating dry docks in Wilhelmshaven that so impressed Jellicoe in the time before the war. The dock is very wide in relation to Helgoland. It was designed to accommodate ships as each class got progressively bigger. Note the funnels on the right of the dock. Boilers and steam engines powered the big pumps used to raise and lower the dock so ships could enter and exit. They also ran generators providing electric light, ventilation fans in the machine shops, and power for the heavy machine tools. Across the North Sea, much the same scene was being played out with the Hochseeflotte. True enough, Scheer had fewer ships to worry about – but more of his were damaged. The size of the British battle fleet, the poor visibility on the day of the battle, and the way in which the battle unfolded, all conspired to concentrate damage to just a portion of the German fleet. The opposing battlecruiser forces engaged early on and stayed engaged for the entire battle – both sides steadily accumulating damage. The British battle fleet was arrayed in such a manner as to be able to bring virtually all their guns to bear on the enemy, while the poor visibility limited their field of vision. This haphazardly resulted in many British ships concentrating their fire on the few visible German dreadnoughts – causing heavy damage. Considering the circumstances, it’s a miracle they survived at all. (Had British gunnery been better, they might not have survived.) Of the 5 German battlecruisers present at Jutland, one was sunk, one was virtually unharmed, two were heavily damaged, and the fifth one was near sinking. Scheer engaged the British with 16 dreadnought battleships – 9 were damaged in varying degrees. Of the 6 pre-dreadnought battleships present, one was lightly damaged and one sunk. (Some authors claim the old battleships were “hit repeatedly” – but there is no evidence in the “BundesArchiv” to support this assertion.) The official German warship losses at Jutland: Battlecruisers: Lutzow Battleships: Pommern (pre-dreadnought) Light Cruisers: Wiesbaden – Elbing – Rostock -- Frauenlob Torpedo Boats: V-48 – S-35 – V-29 – V-27 -- V-4 German battlecruisers damaged: Von der Tann – 4 hits Moltke – 4 Seydlitz – 26, 1 torpedo Derfflinger – 31 German battleships damaged: Rheinland – 1 hit Westfalen – 1 Helgoland – 1 Oldenburg – 1 Kaiser – 2 Ostfriesland – 1 mine Grosser Kurfurst – 8 Konig – 10 Markgraf – 5 Nassau – 2, rammed by destroyer Spitfire German pre-dreadnought battleships damaged: Schleswig-Holstein – 1 hit Schlesien – 1 hit German personnel losses: 2,551 dead – 507 wounded ** (It should be noted no two sources agree on the number of hits taken by the Imperial warships. Consequently, I have taken my numbers from the “BA-MA” – Bundesarchiv – Militararchiv. For purposes of simplification, I have included only hits scored by main and secondary battery guns.) Comparing the numbers, they speak for themselves. In the early decades of the 20th Century, the balance of power was measured in capital ships, and the Royal Navy lost three battlecruisers, while the Kaiserliche Marine lost one battlecruiser and one old pre-dreadnought battleship. If you simply crunch the numbers, the British lost more men and ships. But the immediate balance of power after the battle could be better measured in “repairs” and how long they took to complete. Jellicoe, always worried about maintaining his 2 to 1 margin of superiority, needlessly wrung his hands over a six week repair period. Scheer, on the other hand, did not have imaginary problems – he had real problems. Despite all the grief she inflicted on British destroyer flotillas during the night, SMS Westfalen suffered only minor damage and returned to the fleet in mid-June. She is seen taking on coal from a pair of lighters with a Thor Class tug lashed alongside. Another tug stands by with various ship’s stores. SMS Westfalen courtesy of Barroco Hispano. Tugs, lighters, mooring dolphins, and small boats by AP. Due to the volume of fire directed at them, and the sheer destructive power of the larger British shells, the Imperial capital ships suffered devastating structural damage that would have certainly sunk less well-armored vessels. What’s more – German commercial shipyards and Imperial Dockyards were few in number and scattered between the North Sea and The Baltic. Compounding the difficulty was their limited capacity (hence the numerous floating docks), and their inability to match the speed of English facilities. Scheer was in far worse shape than Jellicoe, and far more worried – and with good reason. A week after the battle of Jutland, Scheer could only muster one slightly damaged battlecruiser (Moltke) and eight undamaged dreadnought battleships. (SMS Konig Albert missed Jutland due to condenser trouble, but was ready for duty on 3 June.) SMS Rheinland was hit only once, and returned to I Battle Squadron by 17 June. A pair of Sophia Class paddle tugs have come alongside to unload their lighters. The first tug is hauling fresh provisions, while the second is transferring dry goods and ship’s stores. A Thor Class tug stands by to top-off Rheinland’s coal bunkers. SMS Westfalen, Rheinland, Helgoland, and Oldenburg were lightly damaged, and returned to service by mid-June (about two weeks), providing a much needed boost in battleship strength. The elderly Schleswig-Holstein and Schlesian (pre-dreadnoughts) were moderately damaged but were repaired dockside at Cuxhaven. Despite being rammed by HMS Spitfire, losing 20 feet or her belt armor, and having a considerable gash above the waterline, SMS Nassau went into Kaiserliche Werft Wilhelmshaven and returned to the fleet on 14 July -- about six weeks. The damage to SMS Grosser Kurfurst was largely superficial, but two hits involved structural damage, so the ship returned to her builder’s yard, A.G. Vulcan, Hamburg. She rejoined the battle fleet on 16 July (approximately six weeks). SMS Nassau was hit by two shells, causing moderate damage – but she was rammed by the destroyer HMS Spitfire. The British ship was passing on an opposite course and seriously damaged the battleship’s port bow and armor belt, with collateral damage along the rest of the port side. Nassau is moored outboard of the dry dock mole undergoing repairs. Two crane barges have been brought alongside to work on the hull plating with a machinists barge to help with the steel work. The steam tug Goliath and the paddle tug Helena are standing by to move the crane barges as needed. SMS Nassau and Goliath are courtesy of “Barroco Hispano”. The mooring dolphins, lighters, tug Helena, and the barges alongside the battleship are all by “AP”, as well as the crane on the left hand barge. There are many props and cranes on the dry dock mole – also by “AP”. The barges and cranes in the left of the picture are from the “PEG” seaports and “SNM Series”. Below is a detail shot. SMS Konig suffered the most serious damage among the Imperial dreadnoughts. She had structural damage to the main armor belt and the forward armored citadel transverse bulkhead. There were also large areas below decks where small compartments were shattered by the blast from armor-piercing shells. (No doubt, 15-inch rounds from HMS Barham, Revenge, or Royal Oak.) Because of her size, Konig required a large floating dock. Wilhelmshaven’s were already occupied, so she transferred to Kaiserliche Werft Kiel for immediate repairs, then to the Howaldtswerk shipyard in the Kieler Hafen to finish the work. She returned to the Jade on 22 July (seven weeks). SMS Ostfriesland is going into dry dock for major repairs to the mine damage on her starboard bow. Once the water is drained they will be able to repair the interior compartments as well as the hull and armor belt. Off her stern are two Passat Class tugs and one older Nordwind Class. While in dock her hull will be cleaned and repainted. The tugs and lighters in the lower left are carrying hundreds of gallons of paint for the purpose. The small dockside cranes are borrowed from the “PEG SNM Series”, while the large 250 ton steam cranes are the meticulous work of “AP”. Ostfriesland is courtesy of “Barroco Hispano”. The tugs, lighters, sailors, and numerous small props dockside are the fine work of “AP”. The mine damage to Ostfriesland, both internal and external, was considerable, but the Imperial Dockyard returned her to duty on 26 July (nearly eight weeks). SMS Markgraf was knocked-about quite a bit – taking at least three 15-inch shells -- but it was a near miss aft that sent her back to the builder’s yard. The force of the detonation alongside (probably another 15-inch round), warped a propeller shaft. Markgraf was escorted to the A.G. Weser Shipyard in Bremen to make use of their large dry dock – and only returned to the Jade on 5 August (roughly nine weeks). SMS Kaiser suffered light damage from 2 hits, but as part of the guard force anchored in Schillig Roads, her repairs were delayed and she only rejoined the battle fleet on 7 August (nine weeks). With Scheer’s battle squadrons once again whole, he received a bit of luck. The new 15-inch-gunned battleship SMS Bayern commissioned into the Kaiserliche Marine on 15 July and was assigned to III Battle Squadron. Due to wartime conditions, the dreadnought battleship SMS Bayern conducted her working-up exercises largely in the Baltic Sea. Urgently needed to strengthen the Hochseeflotte, she was dispatched to Wilhelmshaven with little coal in her bunkers. She anchored in Schillig Roads on 15 July and immediately began coaling ship. Her big 15-inch guns were a welcome addition to III Battle Squadron. Bayern and the steam tug Goliath are courtesy of Barroco Hispano. The Helena Class paddle tug, lighters, small boat, and mooring dolphins are the detailed work of @AP. The repairs to the German battleships had been handled fairly quickly, but then, they had not been under fire for very long. The German battlecruisers were another matter entirely. SMS Moltke only took four hits – but all of them were 15-inch shells. She was holed aft below the armor belt and flooded-down by the stern. On 6 June she was despatched to her builder -- up the Elbe River to the Blohm & Voss Yards. The four big Lyddite shells also caused superficial damage to her hull and decks, but considerably more internal damage to her below deck compartments. Admiral Hipper was finally able to raise his flag aboard Moltke on 14 August (ten weeks). SMS Von der Tann was also hit by four large caliber shells -- two of them 15-inch – one of which struck below the waterline aft, dislodging part of the armor belt and causing serious flooding. Other shells damaged the ship’s upper works, but the most serious problem was with the main gun recoil buffers. During rapid firing early in the battle, Von der Tann’s main battery guns began to overheat, and eventually came out of battery during recoil – effectively putting the guns out of action. A good deal of time was spent overhauling the gun slides and recoil buffers. Repair parts for Von der Tann’s jammed “A” turret were cannibalized from the battleship Rheinland to speed the work. The guns then had to be tested on the Baltic gunnery ranges, and Von der Tann did not rejoin 1st Scouting Group until 15 August (ten weeks). The repair of SMS Seydlitz was one of the most difficult operations ever performed at the Imperial Dockyards Wilhelmshaven. The ship barely made port in a near-sinking condition – and repairs were more like a salvage operation. Almost two weeks were spent sealing holes and lightening the ship enough to get her inside the harbor locks, and then into a floating dock. She absorbed an unbelievable 26 large caliber shells (twelve of them 15-inch) and a torpedo strike. The torpedo, alone, was enough to sink most capital ships of the period. Everything forward of the bridge was riddled with massive shell holes and an utter shambles. Initial repairs were carried out in various floating docks and basins at Wilhelmshaven – then she transferred to Kiel, where more advanced work was undertaken in the construction yard. Seydlitz finally rejoined 1st Scouting Group on 3 November (approximately twenty weeks). SMS Derfflinger was in better shape than Seydlitz, but not by much. She went into a floating dock on 2 June and work was begun draining compartments, plugging holes, and fitting temporary patches to the hull. From 7-9 June she was moored at berth A-5 to clean the ship, remove the torpedo nets and booms, and land part of the ammunition ashore. Derfflinger arrived in Kiel on 11 June where permanent repairs would be carried out in the construction yard. At the same time, the big cruiser received a tall tripod mast -- the signature look for which she is so well known. The new tripod would accommodate a large foretop with an improved 15-foot rangefinder. On 22 June she returned to the floating dock where final repairs were concluded on 15 October. Sea trials and gunnery tests were run to ensure the battlecruiser was combat-ready, and Derfflinger rejoined 1st Scouting Group on 9 November, when they arrived in Kiel for squadron maneuvers and gunnery practice (roughly twenty-one weeks). (Just for the record – If anyone requires proof of the superiority of German armor and its application – Seydlitz and Derfflinger represent tangible proof. Considering the enormous amounts of damage done to these two ships – they should have sunk. But the key philosophy behind German warship construction was survivability. It took, roughly, three years to build SMS Seydlitz, and twenty-nine months for Derfflinger – but it only took five months to make repairs and return them to the fleet. German naval architects understood: it was far cheaper, and much faster, to repair a ship than it was to build a new one.) SMS Derfflinger – circa 1917 – with her tripod foremast and spacious “spotting top”. The legs of the mast were unusually heavy compared to those seen in other navies. German designers made them especially sturdy to eliminate any possibility of vibration that might interfere with the optical rangefinder. The large 15-foot rangefinder would have been installed in the cylindrical shaped, rotating upper level of the spotting top, while the lower level housed the necessary fire control instruments, their operating party, and the firing circuits of the Chief Gunnery Officer. Access to the spotting top would have been via ladders outside the steel mast legs. Oddly enough – none of my extensive research has ever turned up an incident where a spotting top or tripod mast was destroyed by gunfire. There were, of course, numerous instances of rangefinders mounted anywhere on the ship’s superstructure being knocked-out by enemy fire. On 18 August, Vizeadmiral Scheer once again assembled the serviceable units of the Hochseeflotte in Schillig Roads – some 18 dreadnought battleships and 2 battlecruisers. SMS Seydlitz and Derfflinger were not out of the repair yards, so 1st Scouting Group consisted of the battlecruisers SMS Von der Tann and Moltke (flag), reinforced by the battleships Grosser Kurfurst, Markgraf, and the new 15-inch-gunned SMS Bayern. Vizeadmiral Hipper cleared the Jade by 20:00 and set course to the west. An hour later, Admiral Scheer followed with the remaining battleships of the III and I Battle Squadrons. It was Scheer’s intention to show the English, and the rest of the world, the Imperial battle fleet was just as full of fight as ever. In yet another attempt to ambush a portion of the Grand Fleet, he would carry out the previously aborted Sunderland Raid, complete with U-Boat ambushes, and this time fully covered by Zeppelin reconnaissance. As usual, the British were fully alerted by German wireless traffic and the Grand Fleet, Battlecruiser Fleet, and Tyrwhitt’s Harwich Force had put to sea some five hours ahead of the Germans. The morning of 19 August dawned bright and clear as the Hochseeflotte continued to steer west, interrupted twice by early morning submarine sightings. On both occasions, Hipper immediately turned away from the enemy and signaled submarine warnings to Scheer before swinging back to the west. Unfortunately for the Hochseeflotte battle squadrons, around 06:00, some 60 miles north of Terschelling – the British submarine E-23 slammed a torpedo into SMS Westfalen. Hit amidships, the German dreadnought took onboard 800 tons of water, and was ordered back to Wilhelmshaven under escort. As Hipper’s scouting group proceeded on a westerly course, yet another British submarine, this one on the surface, was sighted by SMS Bayern at 08:43. Wary of the numerous submarine sightings, Hipper increased speed and altered course to WSW. To the north, almost simultaneous to the torpedoing of Westfalen, the Grand Fleet was approaching Dogger Bank. HMS Nottingham (Goodenough’s 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron) was on the extreme east end of the scouting line, 6 miles ahead of the battle fleet. Without warning, a single torpedo fired from U-52 struck the light cruiser in the port engine room -- she barely had time to get out a distress signal before going down. Apparently, the signal was sent in such haste it was unclear whether Nottingham was torpedoed or had struck a mine. Alarmed, Jellicoe feared he had run into a freshly laid minefield, and immediately reversed course. For the next two hours, the Grand Fleet actually steamed to the north -- until it could be confirmed Nottingham had been torpedoed – whereupon, the fleet resumed their southerly course. During the brief detour, a Zeppelin sighted the Grand Fleet and reported its course as north. This alerted Scheer to the fact the Grand Fleet was at sea, and puzzled him because of its direction of travel, but ultimately made no difference in the balance of things. Around 14:20, the wind began to freshen from the NW and belts of rain began blowing in. Shortly thereafter, a signal was picked up from the airship L-13…...”Strong enemy force...SE...30 units including dreadnoughts…”. The report was, of course, inaccurate – it was only the light cruisers and destroyers of the Harwich Force. Nevertheless, Hipper signaled Scheer, and swung his ships to close and investigate the report. He ordered SMS Von der Tann and Moltke to increase speed and take a position four miles in advance of the dreadnoughts in his force. Scheer assumed the Zeppelin report had identified Beatty’s battlecruisers, so he aborted the Sunderland Raid and moved to support Hipper. Hipper and Scheer searched briefly for the enemy to the SE, but Tyrwhitt’s force never turned up. After two more unsuccessful attacks by British submarines, Scheer was becoming nervous about a possible British submarine concentration and ambush. Finally, at 16:15, U-58 accurately reported the main body of the Grand Fleet just 60 miles north of Scheer’s position, so he broke off the fruitless search and set course for the Jade. Around 18:30, Tyrwhitt’s Harwich Force finally came on the scene and sighted the screening light cruisers of Hipper’s 1st Scouting Group far to the east and steaming for home. The British gave chase, briefly, but realized it would be dark before they could catch the retiring German warships. When Tyrwhitt sent in the sighting report, Jellicoe swung the Grand Fleet to the east, but it was more a gesture than an act of aggression. A half hour later, Jellicoe stumbled upon another German submarine ambush (U-63) and the screening light cruiser HMS Falmouth was torpedoed. (U-66 finished the job and sent her to the bottom on 20 August while she was being towed back to port.) That was enough for Jellicoe. He had been nervous about bringing the battle fleet that far south in the first place. Now he was certain it was no longer safe to use the Grand Fleet anywhere south of Horn’s Reef. With the High Sea Fleet steaming for the Jade, the signal lamps flashed up and down the long lines of battleships, and the Grand Fleet was ordered back to its’ various bases. After giving Tyrwhitt’s Harwich Force the slip, Hipper and his ships formed a rearguard for the battle fleet and dropped anchor in Schillig Roads around 09:00, 20 August – with no further incident. For all the bravado, on both sides, two things had become clear: (1) Both battle fleets were now wary of each other – and (2) the North Sea had become infested with submarines hostile to one side or the other. Here are four model views of SMS Derfflinger as she looked with her tripod, after rejoining the fleet – circa 1917. She is preparing to take on coal. In the final picture, it is obvious the rangefinder mounted high in the tripod fighting top has a much better vantage point than the rangefinder on top of the armored conning tower. The increased height not only allowed the fire control team to range farther over the horizon, but it was much more likely to be be free of obstruction from gunnery smoke. Excellent model provided by @Barroco Hispano. NEXT TIME…… IF THE TRUTH BE TOLD MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful warship models. SPECIAL THANKS to my friend and partner, @AP, for his talents, meticulous models, colorful imagination, and extreme dedication. If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496- 2 Comments
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Chapter 23: The Iron Dog Cometh
Dreadnought posted a City Journal entry in IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN
SMS Derfflinger -- circa 1916 – post-Jutland. The distinctive heavy tripod mast was added after the battle. In this unusual photograph, we see the battlecruiser at anchor in Schillig Roads under a heavily overcast sky – possibly a storm moving in from the North Sea. The composition of the picture provides an almost perfect silhouette of the warship – showing her long, low, and graceful lines to advantage. IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 23: THE “IRON DOG” COMETH SMS Derfflinger – late 1914. Her sea trials were a bit unusual in that they were conducted under wartime conditions with fuel and ammunition loads much heavier than normal. Here you see her riding low in the water and at speed. Naval analysts and historians have tried for a century to classify the seven battlecruisers of the Kaiserliche Marine into some sort of cohesive grouping. Most have chosen to assign Von der Tann, Moltke, Goeben, and Seydlitz to a single “class” which, at first glance, is a reasonable theory. All four ships are quite similar in appearance – with the exception of Von der Tann – the FIRST German battlecruiser. With only four main battery turrets, Von der Tann is the “odd-man-out”. Moltke and Goeben were built as “twins”, and the numerical data and visual appearance of the two ships is very nearly identical. But these two were built flush-decked, which set them apart from either Von der Tann or Seydlitz. Finally, Seydlitz, though somewhat similar in design concept to the other three, was different in numerous details – and far more advanced. I have chosen to address this question by listing them as three separate classes -- Von der Tann Class, Moltke Class, and Seydlitz Class. It should be acknowledged that Von der Tann, as the first Imperial battlecruiser, originated the main battery arrangement, the deck layout, the improved propulsion system, and the brilliant armor suite. The remaining three ships, each in its’ turn, was an improvement on that design – Moltke was better than Von der Tann – and Seydlitz was better than Moltke. Had war not broken out in 1914, this pattern of improving each ship over the last would have continued into the foreseeable future (though the budget deficit was becoming a critical issue). In Britain, it was not uncommon to see three, four, or even five ships built in a class. Their dreadnoughts of the battle line were built to a, more or less, standard configuration. (Sort of like the old sailing “ships-of-the-line” – when you got a good design you just built a “flock” of them). And Britain had a ridiculously small army, so the wealth of their empire could be lavished upon the Royal Navy. Imperial Germany could not do that. Their shipyards took between three and four years to build a dreadnought – far too long to compete with England. And Germany simply did not have the economic base to support both a large and well-equipped army, and a technically advanced and extremely costly navy. Tirpitz had gotten the Reichstag to agree to three dreadnoughts and a battlecruiser each year – which sounds fairly competitive. But it was “breaking the bank” in Berlin. Germany’s strong suite in 1914 was its superb army. In 1914, each “tactical army” was composed of anywhere between three and seven army corps. Each army corps consisted of two infantry divisions with associated artillery, light troops, pioneer detachments, etc, etc. The cost of a single battlecruiser would have paid for three army corps. You see the dilemma, here. Consequently, Imperial Germany did not build large numbers of ships in any “class” – but they built each ship better than the last. The idea of “qualitative superiority” was carried to its ultimate expression with the development of the battlecruiser as a “fast battleship”. And Imperial Germany engineered this marvel first. The British claim to have built the first “fast battleship” -- HMS Queen Elizabeth – but that is debatable. (A discussion better saved for another day.) There were other “fast” dreadnoughts – notably, the Italian dreadnoughts and the Japanese Kongo Class – but NONE of the “speedy” dreadnoughts in other navies could compare with the armor protection incorporated into the Imperial battlecruisers. In their balance of guns, armor, and speed, they were far and away superior to their opponents in their ability to fight and survive. But – they had their flaws – as will be seen. GROSSE KREUZER K - 1911 The keel has been laid – circa March 1913 – and the “double bottom” has been plated over in the center, while the hull form continues to expand into the “bilge” areas. Less than two weeks after the contract for SMS Seydlitz was awarded to Blohm & Voss Shipyard (mid-April 1910) the Design Section of the Kaiserliche Marine requested the General Navy Department to set out specifications for the battleship and cruiser designs for 1911. This would allow time to prepare building documents, run formulas, and begin planning sketches. The General Navy Department considered it too early to speculate: firing trials for Krupp’s new 12-inch rifle (destined for the Helgoland Class) had not been completed – a new triple-turret project had just been started by Krupp – and Machinenfabrik Augsburg-Nurnberg (MAN) was developing large marine diesel engines at the Germania Shipyard – all of which could have an effect on the 1911 ships. Nevertheless, Vizeadmiral Paschen (GND) set forth his own suggestions for the “Grossen Kreuzer 1911”… “The new English battlecruisers have been confirmed as mounting 13.5 inch guns, so a battery of ten guns with a caliber increase to 12 inch guns is unavoidable. (My Italics.) The difference of shell weight – 302kg against 600kg – becomes too large. And we must increase our armor protection to allow time for our guns to take effect. The ten 12 inch guns must be placed on centreline, or in the usual diagonal arrangement. Further, we must consider a three-shaft propeller arrangement with the center shaft coupled to a large cruising diesel to provide practical experience with these new engines. And it is my considered opinion that we must re- examine our underwater protection systems in view of the new intelligence concerning English mines and torpedoes.” In this brief statement is the genesis of the battlecruiser that would come to be nicknamed “The Iron Dog” by her opponents. And it is just as well Paschen was thinking along these lines. “Grosse Kreuzer 1911”, once laid down, would likely join the Hochseeflotte some time in 1914. At that point, the Royal Navy would already posses three 13.5-inch-gunned battlecruisers – HMS Lion, Princess Royal, and Queen Mary. And a fourth one, HMS Tiger, would join the Grand Fleet in October 1914. That would give Britain a total of ten battlecruisers. By contrast, the Hochseeflotte would have a total of five battlecruisers – only one of which would mount 12-inch guns (if the option was taken to increase the gun caliber in 1911). HMS Tiger – circa 1914: 28,500 tons – 28 knots – 8x13.5-inch guns – 12x6-inch guns – 4x21-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 9 inches. Often referred to as the “most beautiful warship, ever” -- she is certainly a formidable opponent, but still suffers from thin belt armor – and an “overall” lack of armor protection. HMS Tiger’s “working-up” period was accelerated, ensuring her training was sufficient to allow her to join the Grand Fleet Battle Cruiser Squadron by October 1914. That gave the British five 12-inch-gunned battlecruisers and four more with 13.5-inch guns. (HMAS Australia would be stationed in Australia at the outbreak of hostilities and would remain there until the German East Asiatic Squadron had been dealt with.) This beautiful model of HMS Tiger is courtesy of @Barroco Hispano. While it may be debated as to whether or not Tiger was the “most beautiful warship ever built”, she was certainly the most handsome British battlecruiser. With her superstructure concentrated in a single mass, slightly forward of midships, the uncluttered fore-deck and after deck spaces made her 704-foot length appear much longer and more graceful. Just as a point of reference, her turrets were lettered, bow to stern – “A”, “B”, “Q”, and “X”. Five of her casemated 6-inch secondary guns were concentrated in a compact arrangement on the Battery Deck alongside the superstructure on either beam. A sixth 6-inch gun was mounted on either beam abaft “Q” turret – an arrangement made necessary by the location of the “Q” turret magazines. A close-up showing the compact nature of Tiger’s superstructure. The tripod mast has the forward bridge and command positions built into it, while the armored conning tower and rangefinder is located in front of it, just to the rear of “B” turret. Unlike previous battlecruisers, Tiger’s boiler rooms were arranged together below decks, allowing the three funnels to be grouped close together in the rear portion of the superstructure. This created a visually pleasing arrangement with the impression of power and speed. The turret arrangements for the Lion Class and HMS Tiger were somewhat odd. British designers had not yet devised a suitable method to allow superfiring turrets to fire one over the other. (The blast over-pressure could cripple the gun crews in the lower turret.) Consequently, “A” turret could fire directly ahead, but “B” turret could only fire at a divergent angle to port or starboard off the bow. “Q” and “X” turret, for maximum efficiency, should have been superfiring -- but the main concern here, seemed to be from Royal Navy officers. They were afraid both stern turrets, grouped so closely, could easily be knocked-out with a single salvo. Needless to say, it is odd the design included superfiring turrets at the bow where the same problem might occur. By late 1911, the British had begun to perceive the threat posed by the Imperial battlecruisers. First Sea Lord, Winston Churchill, still unaware of the power and rugged strength of the Panzekreuzer, was seeking a means to neutralize them in tactical combat. Jackie Fisher had retired from the Admiralty in January, but was in constant correspondence with Churchill – and advocated for a big-gun, armored battleship, fast enough to maneuver against the head (van) of the enemy battle line and concentrate their fire against it. That was the official “Admiralty line” when asking Parliament for the ships. But Churchill’s real purpose in seeking a British “fast battleship” was to neutralize the German battlecruisers and prevent them from maneuvering against the van of the Grand Fleet. Churchill’s solution to the tactical dilemma was the five ships of the Queen Elizabeth Class – HMS Queen Elizabeth, Warspite, Barham, Valiant, and Malaya. Queen Elizabeth would join the fleet in December, 1914. HMS Queen Elizabeth: 32,590 tons – 24 knots – 8x15-inch guns – 16x6-inch guns – 4x21-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 13 inches. Purpose-built as a “fast battleship”, she was heavily armored, with massive 15-inch guns. Though capable of 24 knots, she was only 3 knots faster than the battleships of the Grand Fleet, and when “push came to shove” – she was 3 knots slower than the Imperial battlecruisers. The “QE” would be dangerous -- but could be managed. Soon after Admiral Paschen made his thoughts known, State Secretary von Tirpitz initiated meetings with department heads centered around the armament and propulsion of the new cruiser. Opening the first meeting, Konteradmiral Gerdes, chief of the Weapons Department, presented the results of the latest firing trials and performance diagrams of 11-inch, 12-inch, and 13-inch rifles. The collected data and written notes gave a comparative evaluation of projectile effects at long ranges – with an estimated engagement range of 9,000 – 11,000 yards, and an assumed target armor thickness of 10 inches. Gerdes then went on to say he believed the 11-inch gun was no longer adequate -- especially since the new cruiser would be closely involved with enemy dreadnoughts possessing belt armor of 12 inches or more. He also pointed out the proposed move to eight 12-inch weapons would only entail a weight increase of approximately 40 tons – including increased gun house armor. Von Tirpitz, thoroughly fixated on the 11-inch weapon, disagreed. He could not imagine an engagement range of 11,000 yards – and certainly nothing above that. And believed, even at 11,000 yards, the range would be closed quickly to a much more “close quarters” battle. He further stated the much shorter battle range would favor the five 11-inch turrets over the four 12-inch turret arrangement. From everything I have found in this and numerous similar discussions, the stubborn and short-sighted reluctance to increase the gun caliber can be put down to cost and his out-dated notions of a short-range gun-battle. Unquestionably, his reasoning left a great deal to be desired. The eight 12-inch guns in twin turrets could be procured with only a minimal cost increase over the ten 11-inch guns in twin turrets. Konteradmiral Gerdes had shown the numbers on that and shattered the cost objection. Von Tirpitz’ real objection was that he wanted ten guns in five turrets because he believed more guns in more turrets would be harder to disable in a battle fought at less than 10,000 yards. No doubt this stubborn conviction was born in his days as a young Kapitan -- when Dewey defeated the Spanish at Manila Bay and Togo dismantled the Russian Fleet at Tsushima. To borrow a current tactical philosophy – Tirpitz envisioned re-fighting Tsushima with ships that were twenty times more powerful and vastly more advanced. The old Admiral’s mind simply had not moved with the times. He did not seem to have fully grasped the technological advances in guns and gunnery fire control that had made close quarter combat obsolete. Why close to 10,000 yards when your 12-inch guns could score hits at 16,500 yards? And in all the design discussions I found, only Vizeadmiral Paschen drove the point home about the advantages of bigger guns and bigger shells. The bigger gun (12 inch – 13.5 inch) usually had a greater range – but it invariably had a bigger and more powerful shell. A larger, heavier, shell fell with greater velocity and penetrating power – especially armor-piercing shell. Simply put – it had more kinetic energy and could punch through thicker armor. It also had a larger bursting charge and caused more damage. Early in the war British high explosive shells, in particular, used Lyddite as a more powerful bursting filler -- and it caused tremendous internal damage to lightly armored areas (in addition to turning everything a ghastly shade of yellow). Again, Tirpitz never seemed to understand the value of the larger caliber shell – because he thought the 11 inch could do the same amount of damage at the close battle range he envisioned. “Grosse Kreuzer K” – (SMS Derfflinger) as she would have appeared in late 1914. As the lead ship of the last class of battlecruisers commissioned into the Kaiserliche Marine, she was bigger and more powerful than her predecessors. Note how the superstructure is concentrated in the center of the ship, with the remaining deck space largely free of clutter. The Passat and Nordwind Class tugs are nudging her into a berth in the Old Basin. The docks were re-purposed from “PEG” SNM Series battleship docks and bordered with “WMP” Seawalls to give the appearance of timbered mooring points. The docks were created with red brick texture to give the appearance of older docks (rather than newer concrete). The “Union Warehouse” on the left is from “SM2”, while the row-warehouses on the right were borrowed from “Matb325” and were chosen because of their similarity to structures found in old pictures of the port of Hamburg. The handsome battlecruiser is courtesy of @Barroco Hispano. The tugs, sailors, Atlantic fenders, rope coils, spare anchors, and a bunch of other props were provided by @AP. Stubborn to the last, Tirpitz “tabled” the armament discussion and moved on to what he considered the most important topic – the MAN diesel engines. He saw the emergence of diesel engines as a “...real leap ahead of other navies”. Some department heads did not see it that way – and had issues of their own that needed attention. The Design Bureau was more interested in devising a suitable scheme for underwater protection and reminded Tirpitz a change to diesels would require a new three-shaft design for the propulsion system, and a new hull form for the ship’s stern. Tirpitz was aware of the risk of trying an untested technology, and of the possible delays, but if the situation became critical he could always build the new cruiser as a sister ship to Seydlitz. Reverting to the previous design to save time (and money) had already been done with SMS Goeben -- and the technological changes that should have gone into her had to wait an additional year to be built into Seydlitz. And though the caliber increase to 12-inch guns had been requested on both ships, it was denied on grounds of cost and delay. This “dithering” over gun caliber was, in effect, costing Germany the technological edge their superb armor suit had provided. The British were pushing ahead with higher speeds, bigger guns, and marginal armor increases, while Tirpitz foolishly delayed the inevitable. In essence, Goeben, laid down without technological advances – was a “wasted” ship – a year behind the technology curve. And though improved and updated, and a great ship in her own right, Seydlitz without 12-inch guns, was “wasted” as well. Fortunately, the Construction department did not believe a ship with five 11-inch turrets and diesels to be the most advantageous option. The Design Bureau took the rejected studies from 1910 out of the file cabinets and went to work. By the end of May, a design with four 12-inch turrets on centreline had come together, with another one a month later. At this point, Tirpitz gave way on the gun caliber increase, but clung to his diesel engine until circumstances intervened. In early September 1911, MAN Fabrik determined the experimental diesel, though promising, could not yet develop enough horsepower for capital ships. In a later meeting, several changes were debated and agreed upon, but this resulted in a weight increase and the need to compensate by reducing weight somewhere. A reduction in bow armor was suggested, but Chief Designer Hullmann explained……“With a reduction in belt armor thickness on the bow, it should be understood large caliber shells will inevitably strike the ship there. One must then expect the ship will fill with water forward. If the damage is sufficient, leaks will occur that cannot be sealed with the means available onboard. The ship’s outer hull, to which the armor is secured, will undoubtedly leak, and the forecastle ahead of the citadel transverse bulkhead will certainly fill, and could not be kept drained with the means available onboard”. At that point, the notion of reducing the bow armor thickness was dropped. But tragically, Herr Hullmann had demonstrated remarkable foresight. On 15 June 1911, the Construction Department presented design 5-B. In the ensuing discussions, the ship’s silhouette was lowered by moving the casemates for the 5.9-inch guns to the Battery Deck and eliminating the upper deck where they had been. It was decided to install a splinter shield between the guns in the main battery turrets, and the forward conning tower was reinforced. And in an effort to save additional weight, eight of the original boilers were to be changed from coal-firing to oil-firing – thereby making use of their smaller size and weight. On 22 June, His Majesty The Kaiser, signed off on the design. The construction contract for “Grosse Kreuzer K - 1911” was awarded to Blohm & Voss, Hamburg, on 5 September 1911. Along with the new contract came a letter from the Kaiser requesting every effort be made to reduce the construction time from three years to just two. The executives in the Hamburg yard replied they would have no trouble accelerating the hull construction – but Krupp Essen Werk could not possibly produce the required guns, turrets, and face-hardened armor plate in such a short time. In those days, big guns were complicated and took time to cast and assemble, while the face-hardening of armor plate was a time consuming forging process. The final design of “Grosse Kreuzer K” produced a strikingly handsome ship representing the pinnacle of Imperial shipbuilding. Two sister-ships would follow, and there would be future designs – some even began construction -- but none would ever see service. The three Derfflinger’s were the last of their kind -- the final class of Imperial battlecruisers -- and are widely regarded as the best all-around capital ships of The Great War Era. The Panzerkreuzer had long, graceful, lines with a deliberately low freeboard and a much reduced superstructure. Her “Spartan” simplicity makes her, aesthetically, among the most handsome. GROSSE KREUZER K - 1911 “Grosse Kreuzer K – 1911” – profile and deck plan as she would appear upon completion. Note the raised forecastle deck of previous designs has been eliminated in favor of a gently ascending deck, starting at the “A” turret barbette and rising to the stem. This feature allows a flush-deck appearance while using the forecastle peak at the stem to reduce waves taken over the bow. She was completed with simple pole masts, but after Jutland, the foremast would be replaced by an unusually tall and heavy tripod mast with a large fire control top. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS The keel of “Grosse Kreuzer K” was laid on 30 March 1912. She would be launched nearly sixteen months later, on 12 July 1913. At 26,600 tons, her displacement was, roughly, 1,700 tons heavier than Seydlitz. The new cruiser’s hull was longer, at 690 feet, with a new hull form having finer lines, and a redesigned stern configuration. The usual “raised”, forecastle deck forward was dispensed with in favor of the Battery Deck rising gently from “A” turret to the sharp and vertical stem. This shape “cut” through the waves and threw water away from the bow, while giving the battlecruiser a graceful flush-deck appearance. The hull was plated with Siemens-Martin “mild steel” for flexibility and resilience, with a newly designed system of “longitudinal framing”. This system had been in use on commercial ships for more than sixty years, and in 1858 was used by Isambard Kingdom Brunel in his leviathan steamer Great Eastern, but had never been applied to warships. Without going into too much detail, the new system provided a savings in weight while strengthening the outer hull structure. There were sixteen watertight compartments on six deck levels, with a double bottom running 65% of her length. The double bottom and extensive use of internal compartmentalization between watertight transverse bulkheads contributed significantly to her underwater protection. “Docking keels” and bilge keels (slightly lower on the hull) were installed amidships, and anti-torpedo nets were a design feature. The new battlecruiser was outfitted with three, improved, “Frahm” roll-damping tanks to improve stability. The tanks were located amidships on the Hold Deck, Armored Deck, and Upper Deck. Though carefully thought-out, and arranged to achieve the best results, tests during the ship’s trials were inconclusive – just as they had been with Von der Tann. If you examine the profile and deck plan diagrams, you will readily see the efficient grouping and placement of the above-decks elements. The utilitarian superstructure is concentrated around the twin funnels amidships, and between the two superfiring gun turrets at either end. The whole of the superstructure has been deliberately reduced in height, even more so than previous battlecruisers – and the upper deck freeboard was reduced by one deck level – all in an effort to make her a smaller target – with a smaller price tag. You cannot help but admire the symmetry and grace of the big cruiser’s hull lines and form, and the simplicity of the open and uncluttered decks. You will note “C” and “D” turrets are separated by a deck housing. This housing provides a bit of storage for “deck kit” and covers the air intakes for the low pressure turbine rooms below, on the Hold Deck. Tirpitz had always been wary of having the two stern superfiring turrets so close together (battle damage), so this solution provided a degree of safety. All interior decks were steel plated and covered with linoleum, while exterior (“weather”) decks were steel plated with 2.5 inches of Teak planking. The ship’s electrical suite consisted of two Siemens-Schuckert turbo-dynamos and two Blohm & Voss two-stroke diesel dynamos totaling 1,660kw output at 220 volts. As a precaution against battle damage, the turbo-dynamos were mounted above the high-pressure turbines, on the Upper Platform Deck, while the two-stroke diesels were installed to port and starboard on the Hold Deck. As built, the new battlecruiser was equipped with eight 43-inch searchlights -- four each, grouped around the fore funnel and aft funnel. After the Skagerrak Battle, a heavy tripod mast forward replaced the pole mast and two searchlights were moved to the forward legs, while an additional searchlight was mounted in the platform structure of the mast. The new ship continued the extensive “ring” drainage and pump system, with a considerable increase in pumping capacity – a fifth high-capacity centrifugal pump was added on the Hold Deck, aft. In a pinch, portable electric “leak” pumps were also carried, and the powerful condenser pumps could also be used for drainage. The cruiser was equipped with the “standard” two wireless transmitters, three receivers, and as many antennas, with an additional transmitter/receiver installed in the forward conning tower. “Grosse Kreuzer K” would ship a crew of 44 officers and 1,068 men. MACHINERY ”Grosse Kreuzer K” received fourteen coal-fired, Schulz-Thornycroft water-tube boilers. These were the “naval-double-type”, custom-built in the Blohm & Voss Boiler Works to a modified design with four water drums and two steam drums. These more powerful, weight-saving, boilers were first used in Von der Tann. The coal-fired boilers had a total of fifty-six fireboxes and were arranged in the four aft boiler rooms, with each room divided by a longitudinal bulkhead. The new cruiser was also fitted with four double-ended oil-fired boilers as an experimental trial. These would allow the cruiser to raise steam for maneuvering more quickly, could produce a larger volume of steam, avoided problems with inferior coal, and greatly reduced the number of trimmers and stokers in the crew. After 1916, supplemental “oil-firing” was installed on the remaining boilers. Since the ship was designed to carry up to 3,500 tons of coal and 1,000 tons of oil fuel, the protective function of the coal bunkers was not diminished. The boilers fed four sets of Parsons Steam Turbines manufactured (under license) at the Blohm & Voss Engine Works. High-pressure turbines in the forward engine room worked the two outer shafts, while low pressure turbines in the aft engine room worked the two inner shafts. There were reversing arrangements on all four shafts. The forward and aft engine rooms were divided along the centreline by a longitudinal bulkhead. “Grosse Kreuzer K” was designed to generate 63,000shp. The two rudder, tandem centreline arrangement was retained -- each rudder controlled by an auxiliary steering engine connected with a steam-driven spindle drive. In the event of damage, both rudders could be coupled to a single engine, or manually operated. It should be remembered -- the tandem rudders resulted in extremely poor handling at slow speeds – making it virtually impossible to move these ships in harbors or canals without attending tugs. SHIP’S ARMAMENT This is the Krupp Gun Works at Essen – circa 1901. These appear to be 10-inch rifles from that era. The massive armaments works were run by Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach (a close friend of Wilhelm II) and became the chief supplier of guns and armor to both the German Army and the Kaiserliche Marine. The facilities employed some 70,000 workers and supplied weapons to many nations. Prior to 1887, Russia purchased 3,096 pieces of Krupp ordnance, while the Ottomans bought 2,773. By 1912, Turkey had purchased another 3,943 weapons. (The guns guarding the Dardanelles in 1915 were Krupp.) During the same time frame, Romania acquired 1,450 guns – Bulgaria 517 – Greece 356 – Austria-Hungary 298 – Montenegro 25 – and little Serbia, just 6 guns. MAIN BATTERY “Grosse Kreuzer K” finally adopted the 12-inch SK-L/50 (QF) high-velocity gun for the main battery armament. The rifles were mounted in the Drh L-C/1912 gun house which weighed approximately 550 tons. As with all German naval turrets of the period, they had a designed elevation of +13.5 degrees, providing a range of 17,700 yards. After the Battle Of Dogger Bank the turrets were altered and the range increased to 22,300 yards. The gun was capable of firing a 915 lb shell -- either armor-piercing or high-explosive – at the rate of three rounds per minute. Tests showed “capped” armor-piercing shells (base-fused) capable of penetrating 12 inches of armor plate at 14,000 yards. At 16,000 yards, the same shell could only penetrate an 11-inch plate. The high-explosive shell could penetrate before detonating – even on some armored areas. But on unarmored parts, the shell would detonate 2-6 meters behind the point of impact. The gun houses were electrically trained and hydraulically elevated, but could also be operated manually. All turrets were now fitted with 12-foot Zeiss rangefinders, and two gas-expelling fans were mounted on the rear wall of the turret. Due to the increased weight of the new shell and powder charges, manual handling and ramming was no longer possible. A mechanical rammer was installed in the rear of the gun house. The muzzle velocity of 875mps was a bit slower than the 11-inch rifle – but provided a barrel life of 200 rounds. The magazines held 65 armor-piercing and 25 high-explosive shells per gun tube. This is an excellent view of the 12-inch SK-L/50 (QF) high-velocity rifles mounted in a “test” pair of newly designed Drh L-C/1912 gun houses. The new gun was recently accepted for use in the Helgoland Class battleships, and this new variant of the gun house (turret) was created for use in the new battlecruiser. The unusual shape of the sloping roof is clearly visible, while the actual gun house presents a very low profile. (The sloping portions on the side roof would eventually be removed and a new front glacis plate designed before the pattern was approved.) Note the turret height compared to the workman. These are being hand-assembled and tested in the Krupp Turret Assembly Shop before the design is finalized and put into production. Fire Control “ranging and spotting” was handled from the fore or aft conning towers, whose upper floors housed the Fire Control Party operating Zeiss 15-foot stereoscopic rangefinders mounted on the roof. Other, smaller, rangefinders were installed in various locations -- even a crow’s nest Fire Control position and rangefinder was built into the foremast. The control stations were connected to a Central Gunnery Control situated beneath the protective armored deck. Here, the ship’s plotting team received data from the remote stations, calculated target information, and issued azimuth and elevation orders to the “Turret Captains” via telephones or electro-mechanical “repeaters”. SECONDARY BATTERY ”Grosse Kreuzer K” had the standard secondary battery of 5.9-inch guns – the usual SK-L/45 (QF) high velocity weapon. It was an excellent, all-around, complement to the ship’s main battery. The twelve guns were mounted on the Battery Deck, in MPL-C/1906 armored casemates, six amidships on either beam. Unlike preceding battlecruisers, the freeboard had been deliberately lowered in this design to save money and provide a more difficult target for enemy gunners. Consequently, the secondary batteries were too close to the water and were “wet” a good deal of the time. There would be encounters during the war when these guns proved difficult to operate -- but the guns were manned and fought – nonetheless. (See Chapter 17 for specifics on gun performance.) TERTIARY BATTERY Twelve 3.5 inch SK-L/45 (QF) high-velocity guns were provided for torpedo boat defense in the original design. But war experience showed these guns to be useless against modern destroyers, and they were removed. (See Chapter 36 for specifics on gun performance.) During the war, four 3.5-inch “Flak L/45” cannon mounted in MPL-C/1913 mounts were positioned around the forward funnel – two on either beam. They proved of little use during the war since British aircraft were generally unreliable and were, for all practical purposes, incapable of damaging a capital ship. Here we see SMS Derfflinger made fast at a repair dock while the engineering section and dockyard mechanics make repairs to her starboard low-pressure turbine. Unlike the preceding battlecruisers, Derfflinger and her sister-ship Lutzow suffered with frequent turbine damage. Steam turbines were a relatively new propulsion system in the early years of the 20th Century. The turbine was a simple concept on paper, but proved to be a complicated and delicate piece of precision engineering. A very small machining variance could cause no end of trouble. But, it should be noted, no Imperial battlecruiser ever suffered engine failure during a combat operation. TORPEDO ARMAMENT As was customary for the time period, “Grosse Kreuzer K” was fitted with four submerged 20-inch torpedo tubes. They were arranged one tube fore and aft, and one on each beam. Twelve new type G-7 torpedoes were carried. ARMOR “Grosse Kreuzer K”, in common with all Panzerkreuzer, had an extensive armor suite. Having full knowledge the British were now mounting the BL 13.5-inch Mark V/45 – a much more powerful weapon -- the new battlecruiser would have to be armored to withstand these guns. Krupp Cemented Armor, face-hardened with nickel-steel, unlike previous designs, was used more creatively – not just in the “armor belts” and turrets. A new armored plate was employed – a vertical plate – rather than the usual rows of horizontal plates. This formed the main armor belt and took the place of the “citadel” belt as well – so the former two armored belts were replaced by a single, equally large, but homogeneously rolled, “taller” plate. The plate was 12 inches thick on the Main Armor Belt level (amidships) and tapered to 11 inches covering the Citadel Armor Belt above. A separate level above that, the Battery Deck, had a 6 inch belt up to the main deck level, while the 5.9-inch guns mounted there had 3.5-inch casemated shields. In essence, her armor was not only slightly thicker, but harder to penetrate. Due to the differences in the hull form and silhouette, the armoring pattern differed, in certain respects. But with the flush-deck arrangement and considerably lower freeboard, there was actually more armor spread over a smaller area. Reducing her upper-works by one entire deck level early in the design stage not only saved a good deal of money, but was a positive stroke of genius. Imperial German capital ships were consistently built with extensive and unusually thick armor suites by comparison to other navies, but “Grosse Kreuzer K” was very nearly the epitome of the “fast battleship”. (I’m only going into the armoring scheme’s important aspects – see Chapters 15 and 17 for extensive details.) The new battlecruiser was armored throughout with Krupp Cemented Armor, face hardened with nickel steel, and backed with 2 inches of Teak to prevent spalling. Dillingen-Hutte Fabrik provided the structural construction steel. The “protective armored deck”, unlike foreign warships, extended from stem to stern. The main battery turrets were also protected with Krupp Cemented Nickel Steel armor – turret faces 11 inches – sides 9 inches -- and back 10.5 inches – roof 4.5 inches. The forward conning tower was protected by 14-inch armor -- the aft conning tower had 8 inches. The armor scheme was thicker and better arranged, and was, by all standards – impressive. But there were other “passive defense” features. SMS Derfflinger is made fast at her mooring points inside Cuxhaven Roadsted. An Odin Class tug has come alongside with a lighter bearing fresh fruit and vegetables. It would appear the Admiral’s steam launch has hooked onto the end of the boat boom – von Hipper must be staying for dinner. At sea, under combat conditions, the officers and crew would be served coffee, bread, cheese, fruit, and sometimes a hot soup. But in port, full meals could be cooked – usually breakfast, a light lunch, and dinner. Simple math says the nearly 1,100 man crew could consume around a ton of provisions per day – not to mention beer and Schnaps. The small ship anchored outside the breakwater is a guard ship. (The gunboat USS Erie was – provided by Barroco Hispano -- see earlier chapters for details.) The battlecruiser and steam launches are also from Barroco Hispano. The mooring points (modified) are from “Mattb325”. Breakwaters by “Uki”. The motor launch out in the roadsted, small boats, sailors, tug, and lighter are all by "AP". The underwater protection of “Grosse Kreuzer K” was slightly improved over that of Seydlitz – several compartments below the Protective Armored Deck were permanently sealed off to provide the forward part of the ship more reserve buoyancy. (This proved to be a good idea – but was hardly sufficient.) Beyond that, the standard pattern was followed with minor variations. Sixteen transverse bulkheads divided the ship into seventeen vertical watertight compartments and the protective armored deck (at the waterline) further divided several compartments horizontally. Between the transverse bulkheads were the usual numerous subdivisions -- each compartment capable of being sealed against flooding with watertight doors. In effect – the interior of the hull was a “honeycomb” designed to keep the ship afloat in the event of damage. There were exceptions to the system, usually in the engineering spaces – boiler rooms and engine rooms – where the compartments were large, and often two or three decks in height. Following her predecessors, the new cruiser was given a built-in, armored torpedo bulkhead running between the fore and aft barbettes, along either beam. “Grosse Kreuzer K” had well over 90 watertight compartments – considerably more than most foreign warships – and she would be able to withstand a great deal of damage. (See Chapter 13 for difficulty sinking Blucher.) As always, the common coal bunker provided yet another layer of protection on Imperial warships. Like Von der Tann, the Moltke’s, and Seydlitz, the new battlecruiser made extensive use of outboard hull spaces as coal bunkers. (See Chapter 17 for specific details.) “Grosse Kreuzer K” was given the full suite of wrap-around coal bunkers. As a simple solution, coal was cheaper than Krupp steel, necessary to power the ship, and could absorb more destructive energy than a thick armor plate. Though other navies used protective coal bunkers, none were as comprehensive as those found on German capital ships. “Grosse Kreuzer K” was, in its own way, a revolutionary improvement over the first four Imperial battlecruisers. Seydlitz had been built to the same basic pattern as the Moltke’s, but had a greatly improved armor suite giving her a rugged strength that would prove itself in battle. The new battlecruiser inherited all the technology incorporated into Seydlitz and was given an even better armor suite. Her main battery was increased to 12-inch caliber, and for the first time, was centreline-mounted in superfiring turrets fore and aft – providing wide and overlapping firing arcs. Combine all that with her long, sleek, lines – lengthened forecastle – low central superstructure – and low freeboard – and you have all the basic components of the “fast battleships” that would fight a quarter of a century later. Her very appearance bespoke speed and power and, literally, set her apart as a creature of a more modern age. “Grosse Kreuzer K” was fast, rugged, powerful, and an immensely handsome warship. She would prove to be lethal in combat and nearly impossible to sink. As the lead ship of her class, she was the precursor of the three best battlecruisers to serve in The Great War and, arguably, the three finest capital ships ever built – in any navy. And all of that – for the paltry sum of 56 million Marks. On 14 June 1913, after fourteen months on the builder’s slip at Blohm & Voss, “Grosse Kreuzer K” was christened SMS Derfflinger – in honor of Georg von Derfflinger (1606-1695) – governor of Pomerania and Feldmarschal to the Great Elector of Brandenburg-Prussia. Von Derfflinger served Prussia in various capacities for the bulk of his long military career, reorganizing and training the cavalry and artillery branches, as well as being instrumental in Friedrich Wilhelm’s 1675 victory over the Swedes at the Battle of Fenrbellin. With the christening ceremony over, the levers were thrown and the giant hull began to slide down the slipway – and promptly stuck fast. Only three sledges (cradles) had been constructed beneath the ship’s keel and the center one had too much pressure. Another attempt was made on the following tide, but Derfflinger refused to move. Eventually, the center sledge was disassembled, rebuilt, and heavily lubricated – and on 12 July 1913 – the new battlecruiser slide into the waters of the Elbe. Though she had shown some reluctance to “get her belly wet” – she would go on to earn the nickname bestowed on her by her English opponents – “The Iron Dog”. SMS Derfflinger under easy steam – circa 1915. NEXT TIME…… CHILD OF STRIFE MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful warship models. MY SPECIAL THANKS to my friend and partner, @AP, for his talents, meticulous detail, colorful imagination, extreme dedication, and wonderful models. We hope you enjoy them just half as much as I do ! If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN https://community.simtropolis.com/journals/journal/5910-imperial-dockyards-wilhelmshaven/ SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496- 5 Comments
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