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SMS Hindenburg lying at anchor in Schillig Roads – circa late 1917. IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 41: THE THIRD SISTER Just two weeks after SMS Lutzow’s keel was laid, the first meeting to discuss “Grosse Kreuzer – 1913” was held on 31 May 1912. Chief Architect Burkner presented several proposals for improvements to the Derfflinger Class Panzerkreuzer. It was, of course, standard practice for German battlecruisers to be laid down a year apart, even when they were sister-ships of the same class – and it was not uncommon for succeeding sister-ships to be “improved” versions. Burkner placed six proposals before the committee, the most important of which involved alterations to the ship’s main gun turrets. The usual two-stage hoist, carrying powder and shells to the gunhouse, would be replaced with two hoists. A two-stage hoist would continue to carry powder -- but a second, direct hoist, would carry shells to the gunhouse without interruption. This would speed delivery of the projectiles, while reducing the number of times the powder hoist would have to be opened, thereby reducing powder handling hazards. Burkner also wanted to add the built-in 25-foot rangefinders planned for the Bayern Class battleship turrets. Admiral Gerdes was in favor of this change, while suggesting the diesel dynamo rooms (positioned below the munitions chambers) be relocated as a further safety measure. It was estimated the changes would add about 120 tons to the designed displacement. The secondary battery of 5.9-inch guns was to be increased from 14 to 18, while reducing the 3.4-inch guns to eight. Since the small guns were primarily for anti-aircraft purposes, it was thought advisable to increase the ammunition allowance to 350 rounds per gun. This was estimated at another 120 tons added weight. It was Burkner’s intention to equip the cruiser with the new “Type H” 24-inch torpedo. This model could make 30 knots with a range increase from 8,000 to 12,000 yards. The larger caliber torpedo reloads would add 65 tons. At the same time, Burkner wanted to remove the single stern torpedo tube and replace it with an aft torpedo flat deploying two tubes -- one on either beam -- laterally angled at 10-20 degrees. This change was, however, heavily dependent on space and would require the stern to be lengthened by 3 meters -- adding some 300 tons to displacement. Burkner also wanted to increase the battlecruiser’s speed by a half a knot, but withdrew the suggestion. Other department heads pointed out the required machinery, and additional citadel armor to protect it, would add considerable weight and require a major redesign. Finally, Burkner’s last suggestion was to reinforce the torpedo bulkheads to a 2-inch thickness. After some discussion, the State Secretary, Grossadmiral von Tirpitz, ruled out anything requiring a time-consuming redesign – so the secondary battery was kept at 14 guns and the diesel dynamo room would remain where it was. He approved reducing the 3.4-inch guns to eight, but kept the ammunition allowance at 250 rounds per gun. The changes to the main battery gunhouses and the new torpedoes were approved – but not the complicated aft torpedo flat. At the close of the meeting, Tirpitz requested weight and cost figures for the same Grosse Kreuzer, only with four double turrets mounting 14-inch guns. (It is worth noting Tirpitz persisted in arming the battlecruisers with guns one caliber smaller than the 15-inch-gunned Bayern Class battleships.) The Construction Department replied on 9 September 1912 with two studies: one armed with 14-inch guns, and another one with 15-inch guns. Tirpitz, unwilling to take on the higher cost, flatly ruled out the 15-inch option. And -- equally unwilling to accept any increase in size or displacement, the 14-inch gun caliber could only be accommodated by weight reductions in other areas. In the end, the new design studies were unable to completely compensate for weight increases, and the cost was still 33.3 million Marks – 1.8 million more than the estimated 31.5 million Marks spent on Lutzow. “Grosse Kreuzern 1913 – Erstaz Hertha” profile plan. This working sketch of SMS Lutzow was used as a starting basis for the new cruiser and would visually differ very little when done. Tirpitz considered the increases in displacement, and especially in cost, to be too great -- so it was ultimately decided “Grosse Kreuzer - 1913” would be built as the “third sister” of the Derfflinger Class. The final design was approved by His Majesty, the Kaiser, though there would still be a few minor changes made during construction. A quick-loading device for the broadside torpedo flat was designed and installed, and an additional searchlight was added to the foremast. The middle passageway was laid out to take advantage of protective coal bunkers while reducing the close proximity of the 5.9-inch magazines amidships. Increased ventilation was incorporated for the machinery spaces and boiler rooms. She was given fifty additional crewmen, and the central superstructure on the upper deck was lengthened to provide better cabin accommodations. There was a slight increase in displacement, and an effort was made to compensate the loss in speed by fine-tuning her underwater hull lines. The worrisome diesel dynamo rooms, in the end, were taken from beneath the main gun shell rooms and placed on the Hold Deck – removing a fire hazard from the magazine areas. THE OPPOSITION HMS Repulse: Commissioned August 1916 – 27,200 tons – 31.5 knots – 6x15-inch guns – 17x4-inch guns -- 2x21-inch torpedo tubes – armor belt 6 inches. While the discussions, planning, and cost-cutting for “the third sister” went forward, the British were not idle. “Grosse Kreuzer - 1913”, once laid down, would likely join the Hochseeflotte some time in 1916. Unbeknownst to Tirpitz and the Admiralstab – the new Panzerkreuzer would not be commissioned until 1917. By that time, the Royal Navy would posses 4 battlecruisers with 12-inch guns – HMS Inflexible, Indomitable, New Zealand, Australia – and 3 cruisers with 13.5-inch guns – HMS Lion, Princess Royal, and Tiger. If needed as support, they also had the services of the 15-inch-gunned fast battleships of the Queen Elizabeth Class – HMS Queen Elizabeth, Barham, Warspite, Malaya, and Valiant. And between Jutland in May 1916, and the commissioning of the new Imperial Panzerkreuzer in 1917, the British would add 2 battlecruisers of the 15-inch-gunned Renown Class – HMS Renown and Repulse. In the same year, two 15-inch-gunned ships of the Courageous Class (Courageous and Glorious) would also join the fleet. (I mention these last two only to be statistically correct – they were so thinly armored they could never have survived Jutland. Taking them into battle against anything bigger than a light cruiser would have been an act of self-immolation.) That gave the Grand Fleet a total of 11 battlecruisers and 5 fast battleships capable of opposing the German battlecruisers. By contrast, the Hochseeflotte could only muster five battlecruisers – two of which mounted 12-inch guns. Due to the inability of German builders to turn out capital ships quickly, and the Reichstag’s reluctance to pay for them, von Hipper’s 1st Scouting group was hopelessly outnumbered by 1917. And it was only made worse by von Tirpitz’ fear of spending money on Krupp’s excellent SK-L/50 15-inch rifle. HMS Courageous: Commissioned November 1916 – 19,180 tons – 32 knots – 4x15-inch guns – 18x4-inch guns – 2x21-inch torpedo tubes – armor belt 3 inches. With their 3-inch armor belt, the Courageous Class battlecruisers were considered “death traps” by Royal Navy officers. After the war, they were laid-up “in ordinary” and eventually converted to aircraft carriers. Below are three images of Courageous moored to buoys in the Old Harbor Basin where “retired” ships are kept awaiting final disposition. In the first shot, the old harbor wharf was made with an older brick texture, fronted by “WMP” Seawalls, with a shirt factory building repurposed as a large warehouse. The wharf was “dressed-out” with various props from “PEG’s SNM” naval series, dockyard cranes from “Nob’s 1905 Naval Series”, and a “truck-load” of other props by “AP” and various authors. The offshore mooring buoys are by "AP", as are the various lighters and crane barges scattered about. The elderly warships are from “Nob”, and the fine model of Courageous is courtesy of @Barroco Hispano. The remaining two shots give you a close-up of the battlecruiser. You can see the extremely long and narrow hull designed for great speed and providing the length to pack in the extra boilers. The last shot gives you a good detailed view of the model. Note the triple mountings for 4-inch guns adjacent the bridge and the rear of the superstructure deck. The model pictures her as she would have appeared in 1918, with “flying-off” platforms on her main battery turrets for “Sopwith Pups”. (However, NO place to land.) With only four 15-inch guns, Courageous would have been at a severe disadvantage in an engagement with an Imperial battlecruiser. GROSSE KREUZER – 1913 The construction of “Ersatz Hertha’s” hull is well underway. The “wall” running down the center of the ship is the longitudinal bulkhead that will divide the boiler and turbine rooms into separate watertight compartments. Under the terms of the Reichstag Fleet Law Amendment of 1906, an elderly warship could be “retired” after 20 years and automatically replaced. The new ship would be designated in the construction contract with the “Ersatz” (replacement) name of the cruiser that had been “retired”. “Grosse Kreuzer – 1913” would hold the builder’s designation of “Ersatz Herta”, replacing the old protected cruiser of 1898 (see Chapter 2 for details of the old cruiser). On 20 April 1913 the contract was awarded to the Kaiserliche Werft Wilhelmshaven. “Ersatz Hertha’s” keel was laid on 1 October 1913 and she would be launched a shockingly slow twenty-three months later on 1 August 1915. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS “Ersatz Hertha” – profile plan as she appeared upon completion. Visually, “Hertha” was a near-identical twin of SMS Lutzow, with the exception of a few minor differences. Her funnels and funnel caps do not match – but each of the three battlecruisers could be identified by their unique funnels and caps. Lutzow had a simple pole mast forward, rather than the substantial tripod mast on “Hertha”. Derfflinger only received her tripod mast during the extensive repair period following Jutland. Beyond that, the differences between the two ships i\was limited to “internal” adjustments (see previous text). The “Grosse Kreuzer Ersatz Hertha” was constructed as the third ship of the Derfflinger Class. As such, there were very few differences in the construction methods, materials, and process. Rather than repeat them here, I refer you to Chapter 23 for details – and will discuss only the differences between “Hertha” and her predecessors. At 26,947 tons, her displacement was some 350 tons greater, and the new cruiser’s hull was a bit longer, at 696 feet. The Derfflinger Class had a wider beam than previous battlecruisers, which allowed for better use of internal subdivision, resulting in an enormous capacity to withstand battle damage. But wider hulls invariably increased the “drag co-efficient” – reducing the ship’s speed. Through further testing of the hull form in the hydraulic tanks, it was determined a slight lengthening of the stern would add a half knot to her speed. This resulted in a 2.5 meter increase in “Hertha’s” overall length. Unlike Derfflinger and Lutzow, the new Panzerkreuzer would not be fitted with torpedo nets and booms, nor did she receive “Frahm” roll-damping tanks. After Jutland, Derfflinger was fitted with a very heavily braced tripod mast of unusual height, with a multi-level foretop for gunnery direction. Well supported by the heavy-duty tripod, the foretop structure was spacious compared to previous arrangements and contained a fire direction and control position, a 25-foot rangefinder, a torpedo direction position, and a night observation position. “Hertha” would receive hers during the fitting-out process. The Bayern Class battleships would also be given tripod foremasts, indicating a new trend in Imperial capital ship design. ARMOR For all practical purposes, “Hertha” was given the same superb armor suite as her sister ships, with all the advantages of protective coal bunkers and even more extensive internal compartmentalization. There were, however, four exceptions. The armor on the sloping portions of the main battery turrets was increased from 4.2 inches to 6 inches. The armor belt on the bow was 4 inches, as in Derfflinger and Lutzow, but in “Hertha” it was discontinued 40 feet from the stem and replaced with a more narrow belt of 1.2 inch plating. The thinner plates were riveted to the hull skin, rather than the standard practice of bolting armor plate to the hull. An armored transverse bulkhead was added midway between “A” turret and the stem. In an effort to compensate for the reduced armor thickness at the stem, “Hertha” was given an additional watertight compartment forward (17 in total) to increase the reserve buoyancy of the bow. The designers did not yet have any battle experience to draw upon, so they had no idea they were making a serious problem even worse. ARMAMENT MAIN BATTERY The main battery arrangements of “Ersatz Hertha” were somewhat different from her two sisters. She duplicated the mounting of eight SK-L/50 12-inch rifles in four twin turrets, but they were installed in the Drh-L-C/1913 gunhouse designed for the Bayern Class dreadnoughts. Each turret had a 25-foot rangefinder installed up forward just beneath the armored roof. The old turret hood was replaced by a traversing-bearing telescope mounted between the guns. Two more bearing telescopes were mounted on either side wall of the gunhouse. The designers, in a rather bold move, took it upon themselves to alter the gunhouses for an elevation of -5 to +16 degrees, bringing them into line with foreign navies and providing a maximum range of 20,000 yards. (The US Army has an old saying...”It is easier to ask forgiveness than it is to get permission.”) Instead of the old manual traverse back-up system, an auxiliary electric motor was provided. The major difference between the gunhouses on Derfflinger and Lutzow, and those on “Hertha” was the new ammunition hoist system. Two shell hoists, one for each gun barrel, ran up the center of the barbette trunk from the shell rooms and handling spaces located on the lower platform deck. The top end of the “express” hoist came out between the guns near the trunnions. An auto-loader pushed the shell back onto a loading tray which swung the shell behind the breech. The hydraulic rammer then pushed the shell into the breech. Each hoist could service either gun. The shell hoists could only be accessed at the top or the bottom – and there were flash-proof automatic doors at either end. The powder hoists ran up from the powder magazines on the upper platform deck to the transfer room three levels below the guns. Here the powder charges were switched from the lower hoist to the upper hoist, and then up to the guns. The upper and lower hoists had flash-proof automatic doors fitted. The powder hoists were always designed with two stages so flash explosions could not shoot straight down into the powder magazines. This new arrangement gave shells their own dedicated, “express” hoist, eliminating the need to handle them twice on the way to the guns, and clearing the powder hoists of the extra work. Even with the new arrangement, shells and powder could be delivered to the guns at the rate of three rounds per minute. SECONDARY BATTERY The 5.9-inch batteries remained the same as Lutzow – fourteen SK-L/45 guns in shielded casemates on the battery deck amidships. The only difference in the guns were the mounts. A new mounting pedestal had been designed for the Bayern Class – an MPL-C/1913 – and it was taken for use on “Hertha” as well. There were minor modifications to the location of the elevation and traverse controls, but the mount was shorter, and sat closer to the deck. This made the casemate compartment somewhat smaller and allowed a few extra degrees of elevation (slightly increased range). TERTIARY BATTERY Originally, twelve 3.4-inch SK-L/45 (QF) high-velocity guns were intended for torpedo boat defense. But war experience proved these light guns useless against modern destroyers. (See Chapter 36 for specifics on gun performance.) In the end, four 3.4-inch “Flak” L/45 cannon mounted in MPL-C/1913 mounts were positioned around the forward funnel – two on either beam. As anti-aircraft weapons, they also proved of little use. British aircraft were generally carried by primitive “aircraft tenders” and proved awkward to operate, difficult to handle, unreliable, and generally incapable of seriously damaging a capital ship. TORPEDO ARMAMENT As was customary, “Ersatz Hertha” was fitted with four submerged torpedo tubes arranged in the standard pattern -- one fore and aft, and one on each beam. Sixteen of the new 24-inch “Type H” torpedoes were carried. They had a speed of 30 knots and a range of 12,000 yards, with a warhead containing 463 lbs of TNT. The Kaiserliche Marine favored a modified version of “TNT” as the bursting charge in all their shells, torpedoes, and mines because of its stable composition. Foreign navies, the British in particular, tended toward acid-based explosive compounds like Cordite and Lyddite – which often crystallized over time – and either became volatile or went inert and failed to explode on impact. A newly designed quick-loading device was installed in the broadside torpedo flat (the bow and stern torpedo flats were too small for the device). The propulsion plant – boilers, turbines, shafts, propellers, and rudders – were identical to Lutzow. The fine tuning of the underwater hull lines and the slightly lengthened stern allowed “Hertha” to achieve a speed of 27.5 knots in shallow water, even with the slightly heavier displacement. All other details of the design and construction – anchors, ship’s boats, electrical plant, searchlights, wireless transmitters and receivers – were the same as Lutzow. The “ring drainage system” was similar to Lutzow’s “improved” capacity, but the pumps were located in different positions in the hull. “Ersatz Hertha” would ship a crew of 45 officers and 1,118 men. “Grosse Kreuzer Esatz Hertha” was built to be just as fast, rugged, and powerful as her sister ships. And – if at all possible – her towering tripod mast made her even more handsome and warlike than her predecessors. Unfortunately, all the efforts of the planners and architects were unable to defeat the accountants – she came in at a “wartime inflation” cost of 59 million Marks – 3 million Marks over budget. The unadorned hull of “Ersatz Hertha” slides down the slipway at the Imperial Dockyard Wilhelmshaven with much rumbling and clanking of drag chains. Though it was a simple ceremony, it was a moment of great pride for the workmen and extreme interest for the naval officers. (Note the file of officers on the stairs right of center, bottom.) On 1 August 1915, after twenty-three long months on the builder’s slip, “Grosse Kreuzer Ersatz Hertha” was launched. After war broke out her construction was delayed, mainly due to workforce shortages. But the Admiralstab also assigned a higher priority to building U-Boats and repairing battle damage. Repairing torpedo and mine damage tied down a large part of Germany’s shipyard capacity. The new battlecruiser was christened SMS Hindenburg – in honor of Feldmarschall Paul von Hindenburg. Warships were not usually named after “living” military figures, but Hindenburg was, perhaps, the only nationally recognized “war hero” – and he was born to the Prussian aristocracy. Hindenburg had retired as a General der Infanterie in 1903, but was recalled in 1914 and won many victories on the Eastern Front. He became chief of the Supreme Army Command (OHL) in 1916 and remained as such until his second retirement on 30 June 1919 as a Generalfeldmarschall. As the most respected man in Germany, he was elected President of the Weimar Republic in 1925 and held the post until his death at age 86 on 2 August 1934. Though SMS Hindenburg was moved directly from the slipway to the fitting-out basin, work proceeded slowly, and she would remain there for another twenty-one months. In June 1916, an unusual delay occurred when specialized building materials and fabricated sections were “borrowed” to repair Derfflinger after Jutland. Judging by previous warship construction, they could have shaved a year off her time on the slipway, and another year off the fitting-out process. The delay was intolerable, and was responsible for Hindenburg’s absence at Jutland. This is an overhead shot – quite possibly taken from a Zeppelin. SMS Hindenburg has slid down the ways of the large construction slip visible in the left of the picture. The construction slips and dry docks of the Kaiserliche Werft construction yard are laid out along the west and north sides of what is the Inner Basin area of Wilhelmshaven. Hindenburg’s repair or maintenance will be carried out in the large dry dock basins to the right, or in one of several large floating docks built to accommodate the larger dreadnought capital ships. Tugs will push Hindenburg down to the “fitting-out” quay at lower left. Due to the somewhat limited facilities at Wilhelmshaven, it was only possible to have one capital ship building, and one fitting-out, at any given time. In this shot, Hindenburg has been moved from the fitting-out quay to one of the larger repair basins for the final stages of her completion. You can see the heavy work – gun turrets, superstructure, masts, and funnels have been completed. There are numerous small, but essential jobs – mostly interior finishing to be done – but there is no large work force, nor any sign of urgency. This is a 3-D artist’s view of SMS Hindenburg as she would have appeared at the time of commissioning. You can see the long, low, profile of the Derfflinger Class has been dramatically altered with the addition of the heavy and unusually tall tripod foremast. Note the large foretop fire control and spotting position. The overall design concentrates the above deck structures in a compact grouping between the gun turrets, while the long, low, hull gives her the look of a greyhound – lean and fast. The addition of the tripod mast only adds to her majestic proportions and elegant lines. SEA TRIALS Commissioned into the Kaiserliche Marine on 10 May 1917, Hindenburg was given to the battle-tested Kapitan zur See von Karpf, the commanding officer of SMS Moltke at Jutland. The new cruiser lay alongside the coaling and munitions piers from 10-21 May, while stores and fresh provisions were taken aboard from lighters. As the goods were stored below, preparations were made to begin sea trials. Unfortunately, Hindenburg’s official trials report did not survive WW II, but Kapitan von Karpf wrote several progress reports for the Admiralstab which are still extant. With the morning tide on 22 May, Hindenburg weighed and passed through the III lock to Wilhelmshaven Roads where compass deviation was determined, followed by engine and steering maneuver tests. Satisfied with her maneuverability, three torpedo boats from the 14th Flotilla assumed escort duties, and von Karpf set course for the mouth of the Elbe River at 18 knots. She anchored overnight in Altenbruch Roads and on the following day made the transit of the Kaiser Wilhelm I Canal, arriving in the Kieler Hafen by late evening. Hindenburg spent 24-29 May in the hands of the Imperial Dockyard Kiel while her machinery was checked and adjustments made. Newly commissioned, SMS Hindenburg is moored at the Munitions Quay”, working quickly to take aboard her “full combat load” so her sea trials can begin. The turret crews are loading shells and powder charges over the port side, while a work detail is preparing to take aboard ship’s stores and fresh provisions over the starboard rail. All of the lighters and tugboats in this picture are the work of “AP”, while his props are – quite literally – all over the munitions complex. Below is another view of the same scene. The staggeringly detailed model of the battlecruiser SMS Hindenburg is the exquisite work of @AP – and is, without doubt, the finest work he has yet produced!! SMS Hindenburg running the “measured mile” in the Kleinen Belt. She is putting out a great deal of smoke and raising a huge bow wave – as well as a turbulent wake (due to shallow water). At 07:00 on 30 May 1917, the Panzerkreuzer put to sea to begin trials in the western Baltic. Two separate forced-draft trials were run to test the operation of the supplemental oil-firing for the boilers. The ship reached 64,862shp and achieved a sustained speed of 25.49 knots. The morning of 4 June, the cruiser ran out for a “measured mile” speed trial in the Kleinen Belt, during which it was noted the condensers were running “warm” – indicating a retarded flow of steam to the turbines. From 1-5 June she was in dockyard hands to correct the problem, while the traversing works of “C” and “D” turrets were tested. On 11 June, Hindenburg returned to the Kleinen Belt for a re-test on the “measured mile”. This time, her engines developed 95,777shp and attained a speed of 26.7 knots. Since the Kleinen Belt is fairly shallow, it was estimated Hindenburg could easily make 28.5 knots in deep water -- without resorting to boiler overloading. During the high speed test, Hindenburg “dug-in”, taking considerable water across the fantail. From 17-20 June, Hindenburg was moored quayside while aircraft handling equipment was installed. The idea had been added during construction, and the plan called for two twin-engine floatplanes to be shipped on either beam, abaft the second funnel. Hindenburg has been moored at the Cuxhaven repair docks while mechanics work on the overheated steam condensers. The steam pipes could be blocked by construction debris, or the pipes may need to be rerouted to improve the flow pattern and steam dispersal. The repair ship Vestal has moored alongside to support any heavy work, while a machinist’s barge has been brought over to help with the precision fitting needs. This angle shows the new tripod foremast with its spacious fire control top. This second view clearly shows the additional length at the stern and the streamlined hull form. The Steam tug Goliath, standing by the machinists barge, is courtesy of @Barroco Hispano. The building on the barge is by “Nob”, while the barges, dockside cranes, small boats, tugboats, and lighters are all by “AP”. The wonderful repair ship Vestal is also by “AP”. And the absolutely fantastic battlecruiser is the handsomely crafted, scratch-built, work of @AP. SMS Hindenburg on the gunnery range. Kapitan von Karpf has worked up to full speed and has opened fire with the main battery on his second run. On 21 June, the wind was from the WSW, force 3, with light cloud as Hindenburg weighed and put to sea for gunnery trials. The main batteries opened fire at 09:45 and continued at a slow and deliberate pace until 14:15 that afternoon. The following day the 5.9-inch secondary batteries were tested between 08:45 and 13:00. On 27 June, His Highness the Grossherzog (Grand Duke) Friedrich-Franz von Mecklenburg-Schwerin was received on board for a tour of the ship and luncheon with the officers. Beginning 18 July, 1st Scouting Group arrived in Kiel and Hindenburg joined them for unit maneuver training. This was followed by torpedo firing practice and main and secondary gunnery practice on the ranges. SMS Hindenburg was officially detached from trials on 20 August 1917, and the squadron shifted to the Mecklenburg Bight to carry out more maneuvers and towed-target gunnery. The Panzerkreuzer remained there until 11 October, when they returned to the Kieler Hafen. SMS Seydlitz (foreground) followed by SMS Hindenburg during squadron maneuvers with the 1st Scouting Group in Mecklenburg Bight. On 15 October, 1st Scouting Group again ran out for training with torpedo boat flotillas. It gave the torpedo boats station-keeping practice cruising with the big ships, while each of the two flotillas took turns making mock-attacks on them. The squadron anchored in the Kieler Hafen that afternoon, and Vizeadmiral Hipper was received on board Hindenburg. He toured the ship and dined with the officers, discussing their opinions of the new warship. During his inspection, he gave special attention to the new ammunition hoist system – climbing around “B” turret like a young naval cadet. At 22:43 on 25 October, SMS Hindenburg entered the south lock at Holtenau and made the transit of the Kaiser Wilhelm I canal, arriving in Brunsbuttel around 11:20 the following morning. There was a bit of fog, so von Karpf secured the services of a pilot boat and continued to the mouth of the Elbe. Once clear of the river, speed was increased to 18 knots and Hindenburg arrived in the Jade at 16:35. Later that evening, Hindenburg received orders assigning her to 1st Scouting Group, and ran into the dockyard for more minor adjustments and some “finish work” that needed to be done. OPERATIONAL HISTORY SMS Hindenburg was the last battlecruiser, and the last dreadnought, commissioned into the Kaiserliche Marine. She was fully operational by 20 August 1917, but the war had only fifteen months to run before the guns went silent. There would be no more major action at sea, and Hindenburg’s career would be both mundane and short. With trials out of the way, the big cruiser settled into the tedious routine of pulling picket duty in the Jade, being on short notice for raising steam (back-up for picket ships), or being in dockyard hands for periodic maintenance. There were no peacetime cruises as in days past – though the new battleship SMS Baden, escorted by Derfflinger, did carry the Kaiser on a Royal visit to Heligoland Island in August 1917. Training exercises were frequent, but were held in the western Baltic or confined to areas of the German Bight protected by minefields. And there was, of course, the occasional enemy intrusion on this tiresome monotony. In the wee hours of the morning on 17 November, SMS Hindenburg was on picket duty in Schillig Roads when a message was received to assume a state of “increased readiness”. There was a reconnaissance by minesweepers (light cruisers in support) in progress in the Bight – scouting out some recently laid British minefields. The Germans were eager to clear the mines, but the British had been particularly active in the area, and they were unsure what they might run into. As a precaution, Kapitan von Karpf ordered all boilers to be lit-off and steam raised for sailing as soon as possible. At 08:51 a wireless came in from the light cruiser SMS Konigsberg...”Enemy light forces in grid square 058 Alpha.” This was followed four minutes later with...”Enemy heavy units in support – 3 battlecruisers – cruisers and destroyers.” Orders went out to Hindenburg and Moltke to standby, and at 09:40 they were ordered to weigh and put to sea in support of the German light forces. Five boats of the XII Torpedo Boat Flotilla tore down the Jade’s deep water channel to get out ahead and form a screen for the big ships. Within minutes, Hindenburg, followed by Moltke, swept down the channel at 15 knots – visibility was just 5 miles. SMS Hindenburg moving to support German light forces operating in the Heligoland Bight. As seen from SMS Moltke. By 10:45, the Panzerkreuzer were passing War Light Vessel “A” off the Jade, making 23 knots. Around 11:16 the wind shifted slightly and a haze began to settle-in to the north and west. With visibility down to 2 miles, Hindenburg increased to 26 knots and gradually pulled ahead of Moltke, who’s best speed was only 23 knots (dirty bottom – bad coal). At 12:10, ships came in sight ahead on both bows and lookouts identified SMS Kaiser and Kaiserin. German torpedo boats could be seen ahead with light cruisers off the starboard bow. Konteradmiral von Reuter signaled Hindenburg and Moltke to fall-in astern and von Karpf took station off the battleship’s starboard quarter. They maintained course NW until 12:40 when a wireless from the Flottenchef (Scheer) ordered the battleships back to the Jade. Vizeadmiral Souchon (returned from Turkey) ordered the battlecruisers to continue scouting to the NW, and they did, until recalled around 15:00. Hindenburg and Moltke dropped anchor in Schillig Roads at 19:45 without sighting a single enemy. It is just as well. The British had been laying minefields close around the German Bight in an attempt to hinder German surface units, and especially U-Boats, from getting into the North Sea. The raid was supposed to discourage German mine-sweeping activity. HMS Renown, Courageous, Glorious, and a light cruiser squadron were to carry out the attack -- supported at a distance by the 1st Battle Squadron of the Grand Fleet. The British charged out of the haze just after sun-up and opened fire. The German minesweepers instantly scattered and laid a very effective smoke screen as they withdrew. Repulse landed one 15-inch shell on the light cruiser Konigsberg and raced ahead at 31 knots to close on her prey – when a great cloud of black smoke was seen rising to the SE. That could only mean one thing – battleships. Repulse quickly put about, recalled her light cruisers and destroyers, and withdrew into the NW haze. On 23 November, Vizeadmiral von Hipper transferred from SMS Seydlitz to SMS Hindenburg, and in a brief ceremony, his flag was hoisted to her forepeak. Hindenburg would remain flagship of the 1st Scouting Group until 21 June 1919. Beyond that bit of naval protocol, Hindenburg’s existence continued in the mundane and tiresome duties of a fleet in harbor: picket duty – escorting minesweepers – squadron evolutions – visits to the dockyard – and, the occasional “war patrol.” SMS Hindenburg on a visit to the dockyard. She is seen here, cradled in one of the large floating docks. Typically, one or two Panzerkreuzer, accompanied by light cruisers and torpedo boats, might sail westward and scout the “Hoofden” area off the Dutch coast in hopes of surprising some British shipping or light forces. Or – they might even run out to the Dogger Bank and scatter British light forces interfering with German minesweeping operations. Even if nothing momentous was achieved, it allowed the battlecruisers some time at sea and gave them practice operating in the wartime environment. In the later part of 1917, Admiral Scheer began harassing the Norwegian convoys to and from Britain. The Royal Navy had begun providing convoy escorts at least a year earlier to keep U-Boats away from the vital cargoes bound for Britain. After Jutland, Scheer was desperate to find some way to hit back at the British while proving the Hochseeflotte was still relevant to the German war effort. On 17 October, the fast minelaying light cruisers SMS Brummer and Bremse intercepted an east-bound convoy of twelve freighters and two destroyers – HMS Mary Rose and Strongbow. The convoy scattered while the German cruisers were distracted by the escorts, but they managed to sink both destroyers and hunt down nine of the freighters before withdrawing at high speed. On 12 December, four German torpedo boats ambushed another convoy of five freighters, again with two escorting destroyers. All five freighters were lost along with one destroyer. Admiral Sir David Beatty, new C.-in-C. Grand Fleet, could not afford to keep losing destroyers, and was equally reluctant to risk light cruisers. He decided battleships would quickly put an end to the German nuisance raids and attached a Battle Squadron of eight ships to the escort force. This quickly became known to the Admiralstab, and just as quickly, it was seen as the opportunity for which they had been waiting all along. At long last, a manageable portion of the British battle fleet might be isolated and destroyed. This is a view of SMS Hindenburg moored at her berth along the breakwater in Cuxhaven’s roadsted. Built as one of three Derfflinger Class battlecruisers, she is nearly identical to SMS Lutzow. The only visible differences are the tripod foremast with fighting top, and the “cosmetic” appearance of her funnels. You will note, as flagship of Scouting Forces, she is flying a Vizeadmiral’s flag at the forepeak. And -- she is the largest, last, and finest, of all the Imperial battlecruisers. The breakwaters are by “Uki”, and the modified mooring points are by “Mattb325”. The gunboat USS Erie, patrolling off the breakwater, is courtesy of “Barroco Hispano”. The motor launch off the port beam, the boat boom and small boats, the harbor tug with provision lighter – and the superbly crafted model of the SMS Hindenburg is the meticulous work of “AP”. BELOW is a close-up of the detail work on SMS Hindenburg. The massive gun turrets are authentic in every detail, right down to the German version of the “Carley Floats” on their sides. The new tripod foremast and fire control fighting top are clearly visible, with a new black paint scheme for the upper portions. The “signature” boat booms (cranes) and “Kingston Posts” are intricately detailed constructions, and each of the ship’s boats is an individual “work of art” in itself. The soot-stained funnels, weathered decking, and weathered hull are details that are often overlooked. The level of detail is magnificent – and this model is his best work – with more to come. Vizeadmiral von Hipper was tasked with planning the operation and he fell back on the old reliable methods. With the light cruisers of 2nd Scouting Group screening ahead, the Panzerkreuzer of 1st Scouting Group would form the advance screen and convoy strike force. If there were no battleships in the escort, the battlecruisers would make short work of the convoy. If there were British battleships present, Hipper would signal the Hochseeflotte – waiting to the south – just below the horizon. Scheer would outnumber the British battle squadron by nearly 3 to 1. The only real difference in the operational planning was that Hipper imposed strict wireless restrictions on the fleet prior to and during the operation. There would be no gossip on the airwaves. On 23 April 1918, at 05:00, 2nd Scouting Group, followed by 1st Scouting Group cleared the Jade and steered north along the swept channels. But the weather was terrible, with patches of thick fog limiting visibility to as little as 200 meters, and only two and a half miles at best. Navigating minefield channels in such conditions was insanity. Both scouting groups anchored at 11:35, but resumed course and speed at 12:10. By midnight, the two scouting groups had cleared all the British-laid minefields and increased speed to 18 knots. Morning of 24 April dawned bright with a NE breeze and visibility of 34 to 46 miles. Around 09:00 Hipper swung Hindenburg about and led Derfflinger and Seydlitz back to Moltke, lying dead in the water – some fifty miles SW of Bergen, Norway. SMS Moltke had thrown her inboard, starboard propeller, and before the turbines could be shut down, the shaft ran away and caused the couplings to shatter – sending large chunks of metal slicing through the ship. Several boilers were disabled, the hull had been holed and was making water, and only one turbine could be operated. The crew plugged the leak, began sorting out the boilers, and made temporary repairs that would get the ship underway at 4 knots. Fortunately, the main body of the Hochseeflotte drew abreast around 10:25, and the battleship SMS Oldenburg was ordered to take the crippled battlecruiser under tow for the Jade. With Moltke in good hands, Hipper turned north once more in search of the British convoy. By 13:10, 1st Scouting Group was about 60 miles west of Bergen, Norway. Hipper steered a search pattern across the known course of the previous convoys three times. At the top leg of the third pass, he searched about 20 miles farther north, then swung 10 miles inshore and, steering SSE, passed within 40 miles of the fjord mouth. But to no avail – no merchant ships nor warships. It was now past the usual sailing time for the convoys – so they had either sailed early, or canceled the sailing. Hipper swung Hindenburg due south, recalled 2nd Scouting Group from their search pattern, and set course for the Jade. A brief, code-word signal was sent to Scheer, who promptly turned the battle fleet about and also made for Wilhelmshaven. About 01:00 on 25 April, SMS Oldenburg, with Moltke in tow, came into view under a bright moon in a cloudless sky. By this time, Moltke’s crew had made repairs to the engines and the towed battlecruiser was making 13 knots. Hipper reduced speed and 1st Scouting Group took station on the seaward flank of the tow to provide security for the journey home. The group made steady progress southward until about 12:10, when a minesweeper in advance of the group, M-67, struck a mine, broke in half, and sank. Later, around 19:37, Moltke (under tow) was approaching Amrum Bank Passage and the entrance to the German defensive minefields. She was struck in the port side engine room by a torpedo fired from the British submarine E-42. The battlecruiser took on nearly 1,800 tons of water and began listing to port. Kapitan zur See Gygas knew his pumps were holding the water in check, so he maneuvered Moltke into the Amrum Bank Passage and gained the safety of the defensive minefields. Eventually four salvage tugs arrived and helped pump out the flooded compartments, then two of them were lashed alongside, while a third took over the tow from Oldenburg. Around 03:20 on 26 April 1st Scouting Group dropped anchor in Wilhelmshaven Roads, and Moltke went into dry dock soon after daybreak. It was later determined the German agent in Bergen had gotten his information wrong. The convoy was actually scheduled to sail on 25 April – twenty-four hours after Hipper’s visit. But – Hipper’s ban on wireless traffic before and during the sortie proved quite effective. The canny Bavarian had pinpointed the weakness in German operational security. The Room 40 code-breakers in Whitehall never had the slightest notion the Hochseeflotte was loitering about off Norway. A great deal has been written by historians to prove Jutland put the “fear of God” into the Germans and they never again ventured to sea after the battle. The truth, however, is far less complimentary to the British, and a lot less provocative to the Germans. In fact, the entire nature of The Great War at sea changed after Jutland. Submarines and mines were considered far too dangerous in the confined waters of the North Sea. German submarines had become a positive menace to merchant shipping and warships alike. After the battle, Jellicoe arbitrarily decided the Grand Fleet could no longer be risked in the southern portions of the North Sea – it was too close to German submarine bases and too easily mined by German light forces. For his part, Scheer devoted much money and many man-hours to keeping lanes swept through the British-laid minefields, and his warships were constantly stalked by British submarines. The Norwegian sortie proved the German battle fleet could, and would, put to sea – but only when they thought an ambush was possible. The German heavy ships went to sea quite frequently, and sortied outside their own territory, but mostly kept in waters where they could not be easily surprised. So the two greatest battle fleets in the world kept to their own portion of the North Sea – or rode at anchor in “checkmate” of one another. But events in the land war continued to move forward, regardless of the stalemate at sea. And anyone in a position of command knew the war could not last much longer. The British naval blockade had strangled German trade and access to foodstuffs and raw materials – the nation would soon collapse. On 11 August 1918, Hipper was promoted to full Admiral and given command of the Hochseeflotte. Konteradmiral Ludwig von Reuter assumed command of 1st Scouting Group, hoisting his flag aboard SMS Hindenburg the following day. Scheer, having been promoted Chief of the Naval Staff, was determined to inflict as much damage as possible on the Royal Navy in order to obtain a better bargaining position in a negotiated peace. It was early October 1918, and at this point in the game, Scheer was no longer concerned about possible losses to the Hochseeflotte. Scheer’s plan involved two simultaneous raids. One, with torpedo boats and a light cruiser squadron, was to attack British warships operating off the Flanders coast. The other strike by more torpedo boats and light cruisers was to be supported by the Panzerkreuzer of 1st Scouting Group – and would be aimed at the massed shipping in the Thames estuary. No one had attacked the Thames estuary since the Dutch raided the Medway in 1667. This was a spectacularly bold move – guaranteed to bring Beatty and the Grand Fleet south. Once the raids had caused the maximum damage and confusion, the two strike forces would retire and rendezvous with the battle squadrons of the Hochseeflotte. Somewhere off the Texel or Terschelling, Hipper and the Hochseeflotte would offer battle to the Royal Navy. As the Hochseeflotte began to concentrate in the Jade, war-weary sailors became aware of the suicidal nature of the coming operation, and began to jump-ship in large numbers. As Derfflinger and Von der Tann passed through the III Lock into the roadsted, over 300 men from the two ships climbed over the side and disappeared ashore. By 29 October the capital ship crews were in full mutiny and the planned operation was abandoned. Events moved quickly as news of the mutiny spread. Demonstrations and outright riots broke out across Germany, and on 9 November, Kaiser Wilhelm II abdicated both the Imperial and Prussian thrones. On 10 November Wilhelm took a train across the Dutch border and went into exile – where he remained, rather well-off, until his death at age 82, in June 1941. On 11 November 1918, the Armistice was signed and the blood-letting stopped. In less than two weeks, 500 years of Hohenzollern rule over Prussia ceased, and the Imperial German Empire became the Wiemar Republic. Under the terms of the Armistice, the bulk of the Imperial Fleet was to be interned at Scapa Flow pending further disposition by a formal treaty. On 21 November 1918, fifteen capital ships (to include all of the battlecruisers), seven light cruisers, and 50 modern torpedo boats, departed German waters for an unknown fate. Prior to departure, Admiral Adolf von Trotha (Admiralstab) made it clear to Konteradmiral von Reuter (commanding), that the interned ships were not to be seized by anyone – under any circumstances. The German fleet remained in an uneasy captivity during the Versailles peace negotiations -- until a copy of the London “Times” informed Reuter the Armistice was to expire at noon on 21 June 1919. This was, of course, the deadline by which Germany was to have signed the peace treaty. But Reuter decided the British intended to seize the German fleet once the Armistice expired. With no ammunition, he could not defend the ships, and they had insufficient coal to reach Germany. The only means to prevent seizure was to scuttle the ships when an opportunity presented itself. Early on the morning of 21 June, the Grand Fleet steamed out of Scapa Flow to conduct training maneuvers. (Yet another blunder by Beatty.) Around 10:00, Reuter made a flag signal ordering the German ships to stand by – and at 11:20 the order to scuttle was sent by semaphore and searchlight. Actions were taken immediately. Seacocks and flood valves were opened, water pipes smashed, porthole scuttles and watertight doors opened, and even condenser covers were removed to facilitate flooding. Without going into the sad details, 15 capital ships, 5 light cruisers, and 32 torpedo boats settled to the bottom of Scapa Flow. SMS Hindenburg was the last to go down around 17:00. Among the capital ships, only the battleship Baden failed to sink – boarded by the British before it was too late. Within the space of a few hours, the second largest Navy in the world all but ceased to exist. Rightly or wrongly – the Imperial Navy officers had performed the only act of defiance within their power. Defeated in war – but not in battle – they could only preserve their honor through destroying the Hochseeflotte by their own hand. By 17:00 on 21 June 1919, this is all of SMS Hindenburg that remained above water. Her Kapitan scuttled the vessel on an even keel – making it easier for the crew to escape. She was raised 11 years later and scrapped at Rosyth. Her ship’s bell was returned to the Bundesmarine in 1959. NEXT TIME…… THE LAST DREAMS OF EMPIRE MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful warship models. SPECIAL THANKS to my friend and partner, @AP, for his talents, meticulous models, colorful imagination, and extreme dedication. If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496

SMS Seydlitz as she would have appeared -- circa 1913. She rides at anchor in the Kieler Hafen during sea trials. A Norddeutscher packet steamer lies alongside with tourists brought out to see Germany’s newest battlecruiser. (Note the Norddeutscher “house flag” on the mainmast.) IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 22: THE FLAGSHIP THE NAVAL ARMS RACE: UPDATE HMS Queen Mary – Queen Mary Class -- commissioned 1913: 26,770 tons – 28 knots – 8x13.5-inch guns – 16x4-inch guns – 2x21-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 9 inches. Queen Mary was very similar to the preceding two ships of the Lion Class. The British had recognized the threat represented by the new German battlecruisers and increased the speed and belt armor, as well as stepping-up to the 13.5-inch main gun. Unfortunately, the British were still focused on speed and big guns. They did not fully realize the extent of the advantage bestowed on the Panzerkreuzer by their “armor suite”. In March 1908, State Secretary von Tirpitz managed to get a fourth Naval Law passed through the Reichstag. This second “supplementary bill” increased the rate of new battleship construction from three hulls to four per year – over the course of the next four years. In the fifth year, construction would revert to three ships per year and stabilize at that rate. The projected numbers would give the Kaiserliche Marine 21 dreadnoughts by 1914. Amazingly, Tirpitz believed – and assured the Kaiser – the British would not be alarmed by such a naval buildup. But there were ministers in his own government that had their doubts. The recent Austrian annexation of the Ottoman provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina heightened political tensions and drew mass protests from virtually every sovereign nation in Europe. Allied to Austria, Germany came in for her share of diplomatic protests, as well. Realizing how volatile and delicate the political situation had become, the German Chancellor, Bernhard von Bulow, looked about Europe and could see no friendly faces. His continued efforts to reach some sort of understanding with Britain were coldly rebuffed. Von Bulow, once a strong supporter of Tirpitz, began to question the value of a costly navy. Not only did it seem to be alienating British diplomats, but Germany’s national debt had doubled between 1900 and 1908 – with most of the money going to fund the military. The move from pre-dreadnoughts to the vastly more expensive dreadnoughts had considerably exacerbated the issue – and Tirpitz’ wish to further increase construction made the situation intolerable. As the man responsible for finding all this money, von Bulow was coming to the conclusion that Germany could not afford both the largest army and second largest navy in Europe. When questioned, Tirpitz insisted the rivalry with Britain was not naval – but economic – a rivalry in overseas trade. He further argued Germany had invested too much money in the naval program to stop now – and the domestic/political coalition created to support the navy might react unpredictably if the government withdrew from the arms race. The Kaiser, overly fond of his warships and loath to think this thing through, sided with Tirpitz. Poor von Bulow was faced with Reichstag opposition to increased taxes and an ever-expanding budget deficit. Lacking Imperial support – the Chancellor resigned in July 1909. Until the passage of the 1908 Supplemental Naval Law, Britain had largely ignored the German buildup, though some in the military and government were keenly aware of the potential threat. After the bill’s passage, the Admiralty abandoned plans to reduce construction and proposed building a minimum of six dreadnoughts. Though opposed by the Liberals -- the Conservative MP’s, the Navy League, the British armaments industry, and even the King-Emperor, Edward VII, supported the plan. Prime Minister H.H. Asquith managed a compromise to start four dreadnoughts in the next fiscal year, with four more by Spring 1910 – if needed. This was a significant escalation in naval building and resulted in the battlecruisers New Zealand, Australia, Lion, and Princess Royal joining the fleet in 1912 – and HMS Queen Mary in 1913. Laid down a month apart in early 1911, HMS Queen Mary and SMS Seydlitz were the last battlecruisers built for either navy prior to The Great War. It is also a matter of some irony that they both joined their respective fleets for duty just eighteen days apart. When that lazy, hot, summer of 1914 was unexpectedly interrupted, Germany would go to war with four battlecruisers (one in the Mediterranean) – while Great Britain would deploy nine. Had the Admiralty known the German battlecruisers were, in reality, “fast battleships” – they would have reacted with a good deal less “sangfroid”. HMS Queen Mary is officially listed as a “single-ship class”, though she is often considered part of the preceding Lion Class battlecruisers. She was just a little longer, a few tons heavier, and the placement of her secondary battery guns was different – but in all other respects – she could have been a sister-ship. She was frequently referenced as one of “The Splendid Cats”. This is HMS Queen Mary taking on coal at the Rosyth naval coaling docks. The beautifully detailed battlecruiser is from @Barroco Hispano. The docks are re-lotted from the PEG “SNM Series” battleship docks. The wooden caissons added to the front are borrowed from the “WMP Sea Walls”. The coaling cranes are repurposed from the “PEG Trash Removal” lots, while the dockside small offices were re-lotted from SFBT railroad signal stations. Both the steam locomotive (the “Nevada 97”) and the coal cars were provided by @Barroco Hispano. Many small props and sailors seen on the quay were crafted by @AP. All of this Anglo-German animosity might not have been necessary – had the relationship been handled better. But a bit of “background history” is needed to show what could have been. In 1861, Frederick Wilhelm IV died, and Wilhelm I came to the Prussian throne in his own right. Wilhelm I quickly appointed Albrecht von Roon as Minister of War, and Helmuth von Moltke (the Elder) as Chief Of Staff of the Prussian Army. The two military reformers set out to reequip, reorganize, and modernize the Prussian Army. When funding for the reforms was submitted to the Landtag (Prussian Parliament), in 1862, they refused to pass the budget. Arguments went back and forth, threats were made, and Wilhelm even threatened to abdicate in favor of his son – Kronprinz Frederick William. But the Kronprinz adamantly refused the idea, thinking he had just the man to resolve the stand-off – Otto von Bismarck. Bismarck had already served as Prussian ambassador to the Romanov Court, and in both houses of the Prussian parliament. Though not well-liked, the haughty Pomeranian Junker moved in the highest circles of European politics – even Prime Minister Disraeli had marked him as...”a man to be watched carefully”. A double-edged compliment if there ever was one. At the insistence of the Kronprinz, Konig Wilhelm I summoned Bismarck to Berlin in 1862, and promptly appointed him both “Minister President” and “Foreign Minister” of Prussia. Bismarck accepted the appointment – fully intent on making Prussia the dominant power broker in Continental Europe. For the next 28 years Bismarck, second only to the King, ruled with an iron fist – side-stepping and outflanking opposition where possible – destroying the opposition when necessary. He engineered three shockingly swift wars; seizing two provinces from Denmark (1864), eliminating Austrian influence over the small states of the North German Plain (Battle of Koniggratz - 1866), and using the utterly humiliating defeat of France (1871) to unify all Germany under the Prussian House of Hohenzollern. On the strength of that resounding victory, on 18 January 1871, in the Hall Of Mirrors at the Palace of Versailles, Konig Wilhelm I of Prussia was proclaimed Emperor of a united Germany and became Kaiser Wilhelm I. Graff (count) Otto von Bismarck was raised to the rank of Prince (Furst) and appointed by the new Emperor to the post of Imperial Reichskanzler, while retaining his previous political posts in Prussia. Historian Jonathan Steinberg wrote… “The genius-statesman transformed European politics and unified Germany in just eight and a half years...by sheer force of personality, brilliance, and determination. He achieved the impossible. When he returned to Berlin in March 1871, he had become immortal…” For the next nineteen and a half years, Bismarck’s genius allowed him to play one nation off against the other. The only real mistake he ever made was allowing the Army’s demands and public opinion to force him to take the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine from France. This created a permanent and implacable enemy. Bismarck did not fear war, but it was always expensive to wage, and the results could not always be guaranteed. Instead, he created alliances in Europe that kept the French virtually isolated. The French – alone -- would not wage war, and by keeping Austria, Italy, and Russia politically tied to Germany, he left the French no great power with which to ally. As the years passed, even the British came to view Bismarck as an honest broker of Peace. In the meantime, German trade, industry, and prosperity grew by leaps and bounds. The Imperial Chancellor handled the Reichstag with a deft touch – sometimes the gloved hand – sometimes the back of his hand. But he was always careful to ensure the Army budget was passed. Bismarck knew von Moltke’s expanding, well equipped, and efficient army was the power base that gave his diplomacy weight. And so it went. Bismarck served Kaiser Wilhelm I loyally and well. And then his son, Frederick III, who came to the throne doomed by throat cancer, and reigned but 99 days. And so it came to pass that Prince Bismarck was to serve his third Emperor, Wilhelm II, who came to the throne on 15 June 1888. Bismarck had built a strong and modern Germany – prosperous, gaining in science and technology daily, and protected by the finest and most capable army in all of Europe. And he watched its’ crown bestowed on a petty and embittered young man – who had never known battle or war – and would never know what it meant to be an emperor. Wilhelm II only understood that he was “The All-Highest” (his words) and whatever his wishes, they were to be obeyed. And that’s where the trouble started. Bismarck knew Germany had the technological means and the military strength to be the “first” nation in Europe – both in trade and in politics -- and he had never seen much use in overseas colonies. He had bowed to public opinion and acquired one colony, but saw nothing of value in spending money on colonies that were supposed to generate it. When Wilhelm came to the throne, his Grandmother, Queen Victoria, possessed the mightiest empire on earth. Violently envious, he was determined to have his own empire. And the same envy drove him to the conclusion he needed a modern navy to defend his dreams of overseas empire. Bismarck, who had usually done as he pleased, quickly realized Wilhelm II (at least partially a creature of his own making) would not be pliable. The confrontations between the “Iron Chancellor” and the “boy Emperor” became more frequent and more dramatic over the next year and a half. The old chancellor had run Germany as a well-oiled machine while performing a magnificent balancing act in Europe’s political arena – because he had been given a free hand to do so. He could not abide Wilhelm II’s insistent meddling in his ministerial duties in both Prussia and the Empire, while making ill-considered foreign policy statements to anyone who cared to listen. The final break came when Bismarck refused to jointly sign a worker protection proclamation along with Wilhelm. Bismarck resigned at Wilhelm’s insistence on 18 March 1890. With Bismarck gone – there were no restraints on Wilhelm’s sudden whims. Bismarck had kept the Peace in Europe, whereas Wilhelm constantly rattled his saber and made wild public statements. His bullying extended over Europe and into the Middle East. His public disgust extended to China and Japan. And his disdain even extended to America. He had neither the skill, the inclination, nor the temperament to maintain Bismarck’s complex system of alliances, and Germany soon found herself politically isolated, while France found new friends. Even the British acquired a quick distrust of the new German Emperor. His dreams of a navy to match Britain’s began to take material shape when the politically ambitious von Tirpitz was brought to Berlin. Germany’s new warship building programs provoked instant suspicion and thinly-veiled hostility from Britain. Bismarck died in 1898, and there is no proof eight more years as Chancellor would have changed anything. But it is worth considering how von Tirpitz would have gotten his Naval Laws past the Iron Chancellor. Bismarck clearly understood a massive battle fleet was of little use to Germany – and he was certain it would antagonize the British. Worst of all, it would drain money away from the army, which was absolutely vital to Germany’s position in Europe. In the end, the animosity between Britain and Germany was brought on by the ambition of von Tirpitz to head a mighty battle fleet – and Wilhelm’s childhood dreams of being bigger and better than his English cousins. THE SEYDLITZ CLASS SMS Seydlitz – May 1914 – lying at anchor in Schillig Roads. This shot captures the personality of the new battlecruiser – long and low – with her big guns prominent and menacing on her sleek lines. She looks every bit the fast and deadly cruiser she would prove to be. SMS Seydlitz was known among the sailors of the Hochseeflotte as a “lucky” ship and that reputation started when the first keel plate was laid. After 13 months on the slipway, her finished hull was christened and launched into the waters of the Elbe River to begin her life afloat. The Blohm & Voss tugs wrestled her into the fitting-out basin and the complicated process of installing the machinery, building the superstructure, and mounting her guns was undertaken. Just 13 months later, the tugs eased her out of the basin and moved Seydlitz to a coaling dock where a shipyard crew took possession and began taking on coal and stores. In a matter of days, she had set sail for the Imperial Dockyards Kiel, where sea trials would be conducted -- arriving on 12 April 1913. From keel-laying to delivery, Blohm & Voss had built Seydlitz in just 26 months. This was a record for the Kaiserliche Marine and a brilliant achievement for Blohm & Voss – unmatched by any German shipyard. And it had all been possible because the Blohm & Voss yards had built the previous three battlecruisers as well. They knew what materials would be needed and had accumulated them ahead of construction. They knew how many workmen would be needed – and they were already staffed with experienced men skilled in the necessary craftsmanship. And the Blohm & Voss executives were eager to burnish their reputation as “builders of battlecruisers for His Majesty, The Kaiser.” In all, they built the first five battlecruisers – out of seven – and were contracted for two more that were never finished. You might say they held the “Royal Warrant” for battlecruisers. (It should be noted that the only battlecruiser lost in combat – SMS Lutzow – was NOT built by Blohm & Voss.) Upon arrival in Kiel, the navy took possession of the ship for trials and her new crew came aboard. Drawn from the recently laid-up armored cruiser SMS Yorck, roughly 600 men and 30 officers made up the bulk of the crew, with the remainder rounded up from a variety of sources. (The Kaiserliche Marine was chronically short of crews.) The ship’s log shows there were, at first, some disruptive elements among the mixed crew – but the “Yorck-men” quickly weeded these out and Seydlitz was soon considered not only a “lucky” ship – but a “happy” one, as well. On 22 May, Kapitan zur See Moritz von Egidy assembled the ship’s company and read his orders assuming command. (The Kapitan would become a trusted member of the command structure of the 1st Scouting Group and would retain his position until October 1917.) At the end of the “reading-in” ceremony, the ship’s pennant was hoisted to the fore-peak and Seydlitz was commissioned for sea trials. SEA TRIALS SMS Seydlitz on her sea trials in mid-1913. She has not yet worked up to full speed. The ship and machinery met all contract specifications during trials, with the round trip on the measured mile at Neukrug logging 27.87 knots. The maximum effort speed trial developed 89,738shp – well above the designed performance -- and achieved 28.1 knots. During the 6-hour forced draft test, the Panzerkreuzer averaged 26.75 knots. Like Goeben – Seydlitz was a fast ship and attained speeds well in excess of the required 25.5 knots. The new cruiser burned 13 tons of coal per hour at a cruising speed of 14 knots – far below the presumed fuel consumption. It was estimated a slower speed of 12 knots would give Seydlitz an operational radius of 5,807 miles. There was some machinery vibration around 21 knots, but this smoothed out as speed increased and was never severe enough to interfere with the gunnery optical instruments. The performance of the boiler room fans, feed pumps, and condensers proved satisfactory. All electrical system functioned well, with no failures or overheated terminals. SMS Seydlitz was a good “sea boat” – with a light pitching motion and a slow and gentle roll in a “beam sea”. At high speeds her secondary battery was largely dry and fully functional – and some water was taken over the bow – but only at extreme speed or in heavy weather. The four shaft arrangement and her high ship horsepower gave Seydlitz’s propellers a marked tendency to “dig-in” her stern – causing some water over the fantail. Due to the somewhat unsatisfactory “tandem rudder” arrangement, Seydlitz suffered from poor handling in shallow waters and especially at low speeds. With the completion of the widening of the Kaiser Wilhelm I Canal in 1914, this would become more than a simple inconvenience. As the newest battlecruiser, Seydlitz was also the longest, and the narrow confines and turns of the canal would become problematic to a long ship with low-speed handling difficulties. Even when underway at speed, Seydlitz responded to helm commands only after a considerable amount of “helm” was applied. The admiral’s and kapitan’s accommodations were placed in the traditional location, beneath the fantail deck – the admiral to starboard and the kapitan to port – divided by a companionway. Though the admiral’s “stern-walk” had gone out of fashion, his quarters were more spacious than usual and all the officers cabins were designed to be more comfortable and convenient. Crew accommodations beneath the forecastle deck were well ventilated and generally good – though many hammocks were double-slung due to lack of space. By contrast, the accommodations for the medical staff were hot and lacked any natural ventilation. Three weeks into trials, the main and secondary batteries were exercised. The fire control optics and communication links proved reliable. The 5.9-inch guns were found quite satisfactory – elevation and training smooth – excellent firing arcs – and each gun’s ammunition hoist functioning well. The big 11-inch rifles performed well, but there were some problems with the hydraulic elevation pumps in the lower gun houses. A short stretch in dockyard hands would see the problem rectified by installing more powerful pumps. The close proximity of the superfiring turrets aft resulted in a shared “switch room/munition handling room” which proved a bit crowded, and turned out to be a liability. SMS Seydlitz lying at anchor in the Kieler Hafen during “Kiel Week 1913”. Note the crew manning the rails during the review of the fleet. This is a beautiful picture displaying her long, low profile. With her “minimalist” superstructure, the big gun turrets naturally draw attention. Trials progressed well, but were interrupted in late June, when Kaiser Wilhelm II ordered Seydlitz to return to port to participate in the “Kiel Week Yachting Regatta” of 1913. On 29 June, His Majesty visited the ship at anchor in the Kieler Hafen and expressed his pleasure with her appearance. On 3 July, King Victor Emmanuel III, of Italy, also paid a courtesy visit and was given a brief tour followed by light refreshments beneath the awnings on the fantail. When the festivities concluded, Seydlitz resumed her trials, but was interrupted yet again on 26 July, when she grounded briefly near Friedrichsort Light in a heavy fog. Fortunately, no serious damage was done and trials were officially concluded on 17 August. OPERATIONAL HISTORY After coaling ship and taking on stores in Kiel, SMS Seydlitz weighed and proceeded via the Skagen, rendezvousing with the assembled Hochseeflotte near Heligoland on 31 August. The new battlecruiser joined 1st Scouting Group and the fleet conducted maneuvers until 9 September. For the remainder of 1913, Seydlitz completed “working-up her crew” and practicing “evolutions” with the reconnaissance squadron. After a brief “holiday” for Christmas and New Year’s celebrations, training resumed in January 1914 as Admiral Hipper exercised his ships together as a “maneuver unit”. At the end of March, Spring Maneuvers were held with the fleet in the North Sea, followed by fleet maneuvers in the Baltic and North Sea in April and May. In June, “Kiel Week 1914” followed – with Seydlitz making an impressive presence for the many foreign warships attending. The British were especially interested, and two small tours were given – but they were not allowed in certain “sensitive” areas of the ship. On 23 June, Konteradmiral Franz von Hipper transferred his flag from SMS Moltke and raised it aboard SMS Seydlitz. With a few, brief, interruptions (usually lengthy dockyard visits during the war), Seydlitz would serve as Flagship Scouting Forces until 26 October 1917. Around this time it was suggested she might be sent as part of a squadron representing Imperial Germany at the opening ceremonies of the Panama Canal, with a side-trip to San Francisco – but nothing came of the idea. In mid-July 1914, the North Sea and Baltic forces of the Hochseeflotte rendezvoused off Skagen and the combined fleet began their last peacetime exercises. On 25 July, Seydlitz dropped anchor in Sognefjord, Norway, to coal ship – but the next day she was ordered to rejoin the fleet without delay. Coming up with the fleet off Cape Skadenes, the ships received orders from Naval High Command to return to their home ports and await further instructions. Word was passed the heir to the Austrian throne had been assassinated – and there was imminent danger of war. Even the Kaiser had cut short his Norwegian Summer cruise. In the evening of 1 August, Seydlitz was moored to a buoy in Wilhelmshaven Roads when the “war mobilization” order came through – to be executed the following day. A “war watch” was posted and the torpedo nets rigged-out. The following day, Admiral Hipper issued organizational orders dividing the reconnaissance forces into various groups, with the battlecruisers confirmed as the 1st Scouting Group. By 4 August 1914, Germany was at war with France, Russia, and Great Britain. On 17 August, the Panzerkreuzer put to sea for “evolutions” in the morning and “dry fire” gunnery exercises in the afternoon, before returning to the Jade that evening. On 28 August 1914, Seydlitz sortied with Moltke and Von der Tann in support of German light reconnaissance forces involved in the First Battle Of Heligoland Bight – but saw no action. (See Chapter 16 for full details.) September was spent in training maneuvers with the fleet, and a false “action alert” which put the fleet on immediate stand-by with all boilers lit-off. On 17 September, Seydlitz was back on picket duty in Schillig Roads when an interesting phenomenon occurred. At anchor, with the torpedo nets deployed, the added underwater resistance to tidal action actually caused the ship to drag her anchor. Needless to say, the nets were recovered. SMS Seydlitz during one of her numerous stays in the floating docks at Wilhelmshaven. This one is probably for a bottom cleaning and painting. During the pre-war years of the “Kiel Week Yachting Regattas”, Admiral Jellicoe had occasion to visit both Kiel and Hamburg and was much impressed by the numbers of large floating dry docks in service. By 1914, six of them had been built to lavishly equip Wilhelmshaven. Keeping capital ships properly maintained and fit for service was a crucial element of the naval establishment (and the budget). At 08:00 on 16 October, Seydlitz steamed out of Wilhelmshaven Roads to preform picket duty when odd noises were detected coming from the starboard low-pressure turbine housing. The Engineer Officer suggested the noise indicated turbine damage, and a short trial trip to Schillig Roads and back was taken. Considerable and persistent noise demanded the turbine be opened for inspection, so Seydlitz made fast at a repair dock in the harbor basin around 01:00 0n 18 August. By 23:00 that night, it could be seen that seventeen blades in one series were bent, but there was nothing more serious. On 21 October, work was begun repairing the blades and re-closing the turbine housing, which was finally finished on 27 October. At 16:40 on 2 November, Seydlitz weighed anchor and led the battlecruiser squadron down the Jade channel on the Great Yarmouth Raid. (See Chapter 11 for full details.) SMS Seydlitz is made fast to a repair dock in Cuxhaven’s Inner basin. Work is underway to remove the left barrel of “C” turret (damaged during the Yarmouth Raid) and replace it with a new rifle. The work could have been preformed in a dry dock, but none were available, so this was the alternative. It was imperative to get the job done quickly -- in a wartime situation, the battlecruiser had to be combat-ready at all times. The repair ship Vestal has been moored alongside Seydlitz to provide machine-tool support and mechanics to get the job done. A special work team has been sent down from Blohm & Voss Shipyard to assist and oversee the work, and are temporarily billeted aboard Vestal. Two Thor Class harbor tugs standby to move Vestal if necessary. The old steam tug Goliath has towed a barge crane into position to do the work, while the paddle tug Helena stands by with a “gun lighter” in tow. “Spoiler Alert !!” -- We were unable to show the entire step-by-step procedure – it would have required too many individual models, and though @AP is a wonderfully generous man – he is only a “small Army of one”. I did my best to “piece-it-together” with the models on hand -- so you will have to use a bit of imagination from time to time. The old steam tug Goliath was a powerful tug in her day and has provided the tow for the crane barge – she is courtesy of Barroco Hispano. ALL the other ships, tugs, barge, and lighter, are by “AP”. A few of the crates and barrels on the barge are by “Historic Harbors” – everything else on the barge is by “AP”. Especially nice are the workmen preparing the new gun tube for installation. The 150-ton crane is shown lifting a new rifle weighing 41 tons. This is another view of the scene. This gives you a better look at the dockside facilities – cluttered and “busy” with sailors and dock workers. On the left of the picture is a Jupiter Class collier moored to “dolphins” out in the stream – very similar to pictures from turn-of-the-Century Hamburg harbor. On 6 November, Seydlitz made fast to berth B7 at the repair docks. During the Great Yarmouth bombardment, the left barrel of “C” turret had been damaged when an 11-inch shell exploded before clearing the gun tube. The turret roof was unbolted, then lifted off, and the damaged gun tube hoisted out of the turret so a new rifle could be installed. The work was completed on the 10th, and that afternoon Seydlitz returned to her mooring in Wilhelmshaven Roads. On 15 November, the new battlecruiser SMS Derfflinger joined 1st Scouting Group and the squadron put to sea on the 20th for a short cruise to the northwest of the Jade. Squadron evolutions were preformed, followed by torpedo-firing exercises, and more evolutions – before the ships anchored in Schillig Roads around 22:30. Two views of SMS Derfflinger moored to “battleship buoys” along the shallows of Schillig Roads. Note the blinking green channel markers to starboard: 26,600 tons – 26.5 knots – 8x12-inch guns – 12x5.9-inch guns – 4x19.7-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 11.8 inches. Though not the fastest of the Imperial battlecruisers, or the toughest, the Derfflinger Class was the most powerful with, perhaps, the most graceful profile of them all. The bottom view shows the low profile and compact central superstructure with the big 12-inch turrets on either end. This beautiful and detailed model is by @Barroco Hispano. The buoys and channel markers are by "AP". At 03:00 on 15 December, 1st Scouting Group with its attendant light forces weighed, steamed down the Jade, and into the North Sea. The wind was “force 2” from the south, with a slight swell and limited visibility. Speed was increased to 15 knots and course set for the English coast. Hipper’s battlecruisers were tasked with the Bombardment Of Scarborough, Whitby, and Hartlepool. (See Chapter 12 for details.) Between 19 - 23 December, Seydlitz moored at berth 4 of the Wilhelmshaven dockyard to make good the battle damage from the recent raid. The battlecruiser had suffered three hits at about 6,000 yards from the 6-inch guns of the Hartlepool shore batteries. The first high explosive shell struck the aft superstructure on the starboard side of the ventilation shaft – damaging the shaft and severing the power cables to the aft searchlight banks. The second high explosive shell struck the forward superstructure in the funnel mantle – causing some internal damage to the mantle housing and cutting the power leads to the starboard searchlight. The third high explosive shell struck the forecastle deck just forward of “A” turret near the deck edge. The shell exploded on contact, throwing splinters in all directions and causing a minor penetration of the thin deck plating. With repairs completed, Seydlitz shifted her berth to Wilhelmshaven Roads for coaling, then the first three weeks of January 1915 were spent lying at anchor in either Wilhelmshaven Roads or Schillig Roads. Around 18:00 on 23 January, Seydlitz weighed and followed the scouting cruisers down the Jade channel with the battlecruiser squadron trailing behind. The weather was cold, but clear as Hipper set out to spring a trap on the British light cruisers lurking about off Dogger Bank – and so started The Battle Of Dogger Bank. (Details in Chapter 13.) Around 19:28 on the evening of 24 January, the battlecruiser squadron returned from Dogger Bank and anchored in Schillig Roads – but Seydlitz, with her burnt-out aft turrets, was immediately taken through the III Lock entrance at Wilhelmshaven Dockyard. At 01:25 the next morning (25 January) the tugs maneuvered Seydlitz into berth G-1 of the Imperial Dockyard so repairs could commence immediately. A special shipyard crew was ordered down from Blohm & Voss to speed-up the repair process, while investigating the exact cause of the near disaster. They would arrive by special train around mid-morning. Though seriously damaged – the ship had been spared a catastrophic magazine explosion. “Lucky” Seydlitz had cheated “The Gods” of their sacrifice – and not for the last time. The facts, as far as could be determined, were fairly straightforward. The shell hit during the early part of the engagement – approximately 10:43 – and was most likely fired by HMS Lion. It was a 1,400-pound, 13.5-inch round, base-fused, with a black powder bursting charge. It struck the Battery Deck (fantail) and passed through into the “Zwischendeck” (“between deck”, or, “t’ween decks”) space before striking the face of the “D” turret barbette. The shell detonated against the 9 inch-thick Krupp Cemented Armor and most of the explosive effect was felt outside the barbette – but the barbette had been holed. The hole punched in the face of the barbette was, roughly, circular and 14 inches across. Due to the “spalling effect”, the saucer-shaped interior hole was about 24 inches across and irregularly shaped. Along with the “explosive flash” – red-hot fragments of displaced armor (spall) shot into the working chamber, igniting the bagged fore charges. The massive combustion shot flames up into the gun house and below into the munitions rooms, igniting the “ready” powder charges in both. It was determined -- with the first flash of flames -- men attempted to flee through the double connecting doors into the adjoining munitions room of “C” turret barbette. The “D” turret door had been manually opened, and it was obvious the “C” turret door had been blown open by the gas pressure of the burning powder. This allowed flames to carry into the “C” turret trunk and incinerate the interior of that barbette as well. The final report of the investigators recommended eight specific changes to prevent future damage of this sort. Some were in how munitions were stored and handled, but one crucial recommendation was that munition handling rooms should not be shared between turrets. The report went on to say flooding the magazines had saved the ship, but water leaked through ventilation ducts and caused additional flooding in adjacent compartments. Future designs should include separate ventilation shafts for each space between the watertight transverse bulkheads. (Thereby eliminating an “opening” in the watertight bulkhead.) Henceforth, the connecting doors aboard Seydlitz would be secured by special locking devices with access controlled by the bridge staff. Repairs to SMS Seydlitz took a little over three months to complete, and she was returned to duty on 1 April 1915. Four days later, she departed for Kiel, via the Kaiser Wilhelm I canal, arriving on 5 April after a twelve hour transit of the canal. A period of training and evolutions were carried out in the Kieler Hafen to bring the crew up to “battle standards” and to test new fire control equipment installed during the repair period. Seydlitz arrived back in Schillig Roads on 13 April. The next few months were spent supporting minelaying operations in the North Sea, fleet “advances” in the German Bight and around Dogger Bank, dockyard maintenance visits, picket duty in Schillig Roads, squadron and fleet level evolutions, escorting the auxiliary cruiser Meteor out to sea, and frequent exercises on the gunnery ranges. In June, there was another training stretch in Kiel focused on tactical deployment with torpedo boat flotillas. Back in Wilhelmshaven, noises were again detected in the low pressure turbines and 18 – 31 July was spent in the dockyard opening and inspecting the units. SMS Seydlitz is once again in for repairs – this time anchored alongside the dry dock mole. At the bottom of the picture is the munitions pier. Warships can be warped into the pier to take on shells and powder or they can be replenished out in the roadsted from lighters. Tied up to the pier is the Italian heavy cruiser Zara – a truly handsome example of WW II era heavy cruisers. Zara is courtesy of Barroco Hispano. Seydlitz’ engineering staff had detected noises coming from the low pressure turbines – which had given trouble before. The repair ship Vestal has again been brought alongside to provide a floating workshop and the mechanics needed to inspect the turbines. It has been decided to inspect both the high pressure and low pressure sets to make sure they are functioning properly. Two Thor Class tugs are moored alongside Vestal in case they are needed to move the ship. The tugs, Vestal, and Seydlitz are the superb work of “AP” If you examine the dry dock mole carefully, you will see many of “AP’s” props there as well. The battlecruiser’s turbine engine rooms are located, roughly, beneath the aft superstructure. Fortunately, steam turbines are generally constructed in several sections and assembled much like a jig-saw puzzle. The engine rooms are quite tall, with overhead steel beams, so the heavy turbine covers can be lifted off with a hydraulic chain winch. Once opened, the fan systems are composed of small, easily handled pieces – spindles, rotors, nozzles, and circular fan blades. If there is any imperfection in the machining processes of these parts, it could cause an imbalance in the swiftly turning circular blades, resulting in vibration, which can cause the fan blades to break or warp. If the damage is extensive enough – turbine failure will result. One by one the two low pressure and two high pressure turbines were inspected. Opening them up can be a lengthy process and, in the end, only the port low pressure turbine was found to be damaged – with several broken blades in the 3rd and 4th stages of the rotor fans. The fan blades were replaced, the turbine closed, and Seydlitz put to sea on a test cruise off the Jade. With engines performing properly, she was returned to duty on 31 July 1915. On 2 August 1915, Seydlitz led 1st Scouting Group north to the Elbe River to make the transit of the Kaiser Wilhelm I canal. Seydlitz, Moltke, and Von der Tann, along with the group’s light cruisers and torpedo boat flotillas, had been temporarily assigned to C.-in-C. Baltic Forces -- His Royal Highness, Prinz Heinrich von Preussen (the Kaiser’s brother). The Baltic Forces were ordered to break into the Russian-held Gulf of Riga, and 1st Scouting Group would act as “cover” for the operation. They were to deal with the Russian dreadnoughts – should they make an appearance. (See Chapter 16 for details.) It is interesting to note Germany largely fought WW I in the Baltic Sea with cruisers and torpedo boats. When “heavy units” were deemed necessary, the Hochseeflotte would temporarily detach a few squadrons of battleships or battlecruisers for temporary duty in the Baltic (usually for cooperation with Army operations ashore). The reason is astoundingly simple – the Russian Baltic Fleet, based at Kronstadt, near Helsinki, was anything but aggressive. After Imperial Russia’s catastrophic naval defeat in 1905 at the Battle of Tsushima, they had no “Baltic Fleet” to speak of, and it was taking an unbelievably long time to rebuild. By mid-1915, Russia had only managed to complete four battleships of the Gangut Class at the three shipyards along the Neva River in St. Petersburg. Understandably, they were reluctant to risk scarce and expensive battleships. Russian design technology was surprisingly good – and so it should have been. When they began rebuilding in 1909, Russian designers – much as Peter The Great had done – went all over Europe seeking assistance and inspiration from France, Germany, Italy, and Great Britain. Their battleship designs compared favorably with other European navies, but they were nearly obsolete by the time they were completed. Russian industry was, to say the least, primitive – and the Tsarist bureaucracy was much like a Russian “Matryoshka Doll” – no matter how many dolls you opened, there always seemed to be another one inside. This bureaucratic labyrinth, literally, strangled the Russian Navy in its cradle – it took five years to build a battleship. (Of course, the chief designer’s insistence on “high-tensile” steel for construction overly burdened the limited Russian production capacity, and may have delayed the ships by as much as three years.) IRN GANGUT CLASS: Gangut, Petropavlovsk, Poltava, Sevastopol – all commissioned between November 1914 to January 1915. Displacement: 23,400 tons – Length: 600 feet – Speed: 23 knots – Armament: 12x12-inch 52-caliber guns – 16x4.7-inch guns – 4x18-inch torpedo tubes – Armor: 11-inch armor belt. Anyone familiar with the design of the Italian battleship Dante Alighieri will immediately recognize a marked similarity with Gangut – but Chief Designer Krilov always denied any Italian influence. However, both ships made use of triple turrets at a time when few navies even thought of them. And their deck plans were, more or less, identical. Both ships had the bare minimum of superstructure above deck – though Gangut was nothing more than gun turrets, funnels, and a small bridge forward (her aft superstructure was little more than an armored conning tower tube). However, the Russians equipped their fire control systems with wide-base rangefinders – approximately 21 feet – which gave Admiral Souchon a run for his money when he took SMS Goeben raiding into the Black Sea. (Two improved Gangut’s – the Imperatritsa Maria Class – were added to the Black Sea Fleet in the last half of 1915.) I have provided a detail shot of Gangut below, with a detail shot of Dante Alighieri below that for comparison. The superb models of Gangut and Dante Alighieri are courtesy of Barroco Hispano. When the Riga operation was over, 1st Scouting Group arrived back in Schillig Roads on 28 August 1915, coming to anchor around 21:35 that evening. The remainder of the year was given over to a variety of somewhat mundane activity – covering minelaying missions, several routine “advances” into the North Sea, picket duty, gunnery practice, day-trips for “evolutions”, and – of course – maintenance spells in the dockyard. It should be noted almost every sortie into the German Bight or North Sea was either observed or stalked by a number of British submarines. It was not uncommon for several submarine sightings to be made during an operation. It was true many of the sighting reports were false – phantom periscopes and submarine conning towers spotted by jittery lookouts in poor visibility. But it was just as true there were an even dozen submarines lurking around the cleared lanes through the minefields – each captain eager to slam a torpedo into an unwary dreadnought. Returning from a training period in the Baltic (4 December), Seydlitz was exiting the south lock at Brunsbuttel and ran onto an anti-torpedo net which had not been opened for her to pass. The battlecruiser’s engines were immediately shut down, but her poor steering at low speeds ran her up, hard and fast, on Dalben Bank before she came to a stop. The four escort tugs quickly went to her assistance and managed to pull her free. Divers from a salvage tug went down to check her bottom, and found no damage, but a starboard propeller was entangled in the net, which had to be cut loose. Early 1916 was spent in pretty much the same fashion as late 1915. On 11 February, around 01:20, the 1st Scouting Group sortied in support of the 2nd Torpedo Boat Flotilla which had become engaged with British light cruisers and destroyers out in the Bight. On 3 March, Seydlitz led the 1st and 4th Scouting Groups and the 1st Battle Squadron to sea to link-up with the German auxiliary cruiser Mowe off Horn’s Reef – she was returning to Germany after an Atlantic commerce raid. On March 5th, Seydlitz led the 1st and 2nd Scouting Groups accompanied by the 4th and 9th Torpedo Boat Flotillas on a commerce raid into the “Hoofden” off northwest Holland. No enemy patrols were sighted, and the only shipping encountered proved to be neutral Dutch fishing trawlers. After three submarine alarms between Terschelling Bank and Texel Island, the force put about and anchored in Schillig Roads on the afternoon of the 7th. SMS Lutzow coaling at the Cuxhaven docks. She was completed as, virtually, an identical twin to her sister-ship SMS Derfflinger. Between 17 - 24 March SMS Lutzow joined the squadron for gunnery practice and squadron maneuvers conducted in the Baltic. On 25 March, Seydlitz broke off coaling at Wilhelmshaven and steamed north at high speed to intercept British destroyers reported off List Island. The battlecruiser steered into Amrum Bank passage, but a strong swell and approaching bad weather had probably caused the enemy ships to withdraw, and she put about after an hour’s search. On 24 April 1916, Seydlitz and the 1st Scouting Group, accompanied by the 2nd Scouting Group and the 9th Torpedo Boat Flotilla, weighed around 10:50 and put to sea on the Lowestoft Raid. (See Chapter 16 for details.) During the early part of the raid, Seydlitz struck a floating mine on the starboard bow below the armor belt. The blast tore a hole roughly 55 feet wide by 30 feet and penetrated the outer hull, the outer passageway bulkhead, and the inboard bulkhead (none of these armored). Some ships launched prior to 1914 had built-in underwater protection systems to deal with torpedoes and mines, but none of the designers had any practical knowledge of the power of these weapons. They simply had no idea of the destructive force of modern underwater weapons. But Seydlitz had extensive compartmental subdivision that saved her. With 1,400 tons of water taken aboard, she steamed back to Wilhelmshaven at a brisk 15 knots. Once again, her “luck” had held. SMS Seydlitz was in the floating dry dock at Wilhelmshaven from 25 April to 18 May, the repairs to the mine damage being quite extensive. On 18 May, the battlecruiser was towed out of the floating dock and shifted to berth A5 in the dockyard, where she remained until 23 May. The cruiser then exited the ship locks and anchored in Schillig Roads, where a flooding test was carried out to asses the repairs that had been done. Unfortunately, the Imperial Dockyard’s repair work was shoddy – to say the least – and extensive flooding through the transverse bulkheads and wing passage bulkheads was unacceptable. Seydlitz returned to the floating dock on the 24th, and additional repairs were carried out until the 29th. Admiral Hipper would have preferred to send Seydlitz back to Blohm & Voss for a thorough repair job, but Vizeadmiral Reinhard Scheer (Commander Hochseeflotte) would not approve the request. Scheer had been planning a raid against Sunderland on the English coast since early May, but could not manage to coordinate all the elements. The Vizeadmiral had decided on an elaborate plan to trap a significant portion of the Grand Fleet. German submarines were laid on to wait in ambush off the British naval bases at Cromarty and Scapa Flow, while Zeppelins of the Naval Airship Service would drop bombs on the enemy warships and preform aerial reconnaissance ahead of the fleet. But submarines, still in their infancy as a weapon of war, were small and cramped, and could not remain on station for an extended period. While the Zeppelins were completely at the mercy of the weather. Once the submarines had been dispatched to their patrol stations, Scheer found he could not get the Zeppelins airborne. In the end, Scheer, eager to get on with it, chose an alternative operation interdicting and sinking merchant convoys between the Scandinavian countries and Britain. Admiral Hipper was still unhappy with the condition of Seydlitz – especially with action imminent. Any cavalryman of his day would have told you never to ride a sick horse into battle. And so, at 03:00 on 31 May, Vizeadmiral Franz von Hipper stood on the navigation bridge of SMS Lutzow, his flag at the fore peak. Below, in the boiler rooms, the second relay of stokers had taken over and were rapidly feeding their furnaces to maintain steam for 20 knots, while others with long metal rakes “trimmed” the fires to keep them hot. Thick, black smoke poured from the funnels of the big cruisers and flattened out above them like a low hanging cloud. Amid the endless clang of shovels and the deep-throated roar of the ventilation fans, these sweating, grimy men gave life to the ship’s beating heart. A light rain was falling in the early morning darkness as Lutzow’s signal lamp flashed back along the line of anchored ships. Seydlitz acknowledged the message and the anchor party up forward slipped the mooring lines to the buoy. The big ship swung out into the channel behind Derfflinger and increased speed until the battlecruisers swept down the Jade channel at 18 knots. Seydlitz, without her admiral, followed along as “Tactical #3”. Hipper led the 1st Scouting Group out into the German Bight and steered north for the Amrum Bank passage through the minefields. They were bound for the convoy routes west of the Skaggerak. In an ironic twist of fate – Hipper would have done better to remain aboard Seydlitz – the “lucky” ship. But we must leave SMS Seydlitz, for the time being…... NEXT TIME…… THE IRON DOG COMETH MANY THANKS – as always -- to @Barroco Hispano for his many beautiful warship models. SPECIAL THANKS to my collaborating partner, @AP, for his wonderful, wonderful, models – and all the hard work that has gone into them. If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496