-
Announcement
-
Simtropolis Returns! 05/26/2026
See here for details about our site recovery efforts.
-
Search the Community
Showing results for tags 'light cryuisers'.
Found 1 result
-
Chapter 08: The Italian, The First Lord, Dreadnought, & The Unexpected
Dreadnought posted a City Journal entry in IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN
Italian pre-dreadnought battleship Regina Elena – a 4 ship class -- 13,807 tons – 22 knots – 2x12-inch guns – 12x8-inch guns – belt armor 9.8 inches. They were the fastest battleships in the world when launched, and are sometimes referred to as the precursor of the battlecruiser concept. IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 08: THE ITALIAN, THE FIRST LORD, DREADNOUGHT, & THE UNEXPECTED. Vittorio Cuniberti – 1854 - 1913. A Naval Engineer in the Regina Marina (Italian Navy). Despite the poor quality of the photo, you get the idea. Typical “handlebar” mustache of the period, hair parted in the middle – and enough medals to choke a horse! Cuniberti was born in Turin and joined the “Genio Navale” in 1878. This department of the Italian Navy specialized in ship design and construction. He rose through the ranks and was promoted Major General in 1910. His best work was the design and building of the Regina Elena Class pre-dreadnought battleships of 1901. At 22 knots, they were the fastest battleships of their day. But he would come down to us in history as the author of an article in the 1903 edition of “Jane’s Fighting Ships”. His article put forth the case for building “all-big-gun” fighting ships. Up to this time, the various navies of the World had been building slow, thickly armored battleships (pre-dreadnoughts) with as many as four different calibers of guns aboard. The ships were lumbering, short and tubby, and overloaded with armor and guns. The idea was to waddle your way alongside the enemy and let fly with everything you had. Gunnery was a low priority – “What...?? Gunnery practice? Good God, Man!! That leaves powder stains on the paintwork!!” It was questionable as to how many of those shells would actually find their way to the target. Not to mention the fact that there was so much experimentation with ships, guns, and armor, that it was nearly impossible to form any sort of scientific theories or achieve any concrete results. But Cuniberti proposed a simple and streamlined ship – his “Colossus of the Seas”. She would be long, and low, with only guns and funnels above decks, with a minimal command bridge. This would produce a smaller target silhouette and remove all deck clutter that might be shredded or set on fire. And his theoretical ship would be fast. With a speed advantage, she could choose to attack or withdraw, or to select an engagement range that was to her advantage. She would carry a single caliber of gun – the biggest in existence at the time – the 12-inch gun. And his “Colossus” would be armored thickly enough to be impenetrable against anything up to the 12-inch guns of an enemy. Cuniberti envisioned a battery of twelve big guns – giving him a significant edge over the competition’s usual four. Cuniberti painted a vivid picture for his readers. His ship would quickly close with the enemy and unleash such a powerful broadside she would devastate first one enemy ship, then the next one in line, and the next – eventually chasing down and destroying an entire enemy fleet! He even theorized a squadron of six such “Colossi” would be so overwhelming as to deter any opponent. Among all this “theoretical” rapture, he mentioned one down-side – the cost. He said this sort of ship would only be available to a “...navy at the same time most potent, and very rich”. So your nation had to be strong at sea – with lots of money to spend. That does kind of narrow the field a bit. Cuniberti did, in fact, propose a design for the Italian Navy, but the government declined on the grounds of projected costs. They did, however, give him a consolation prize – permission to publish his thesis in “Jane’s Fighting Ships”. And there is one final item of significant interest. Cuniberti’s article was published well before the 1905 Battle of Tsushima – but the battle would endorse his theory. Once the smoke had settled and all the foreign observers filed their “After Action” reports, four things stood out. (1) Having too many gun calibers on a ship made it difficult to “spot the fall of shot”. Simply put – with so many shells of nearly the same caliber falling around a target, it was impossible to tell if yours had hit or missed. (2) The Russian ships had tall hull silhouettes and “piled-up” superstructures – making easy targets for Japanese gunners, and providing lots of material that caused showers of deadly splinters and thick, voluminous clouds of smoke when it caught fire. (3) The faster Japanese ships were able to control the range, while the slower Russians had no hope of escape. And – most importantly – (4) the real damage to the Russian ships had been caused by the 12-inch guns of the Japanese fleet. All the smaller guns were not much more than “smoke and noise” makers. Until Cuniberti published his article in the prestigious “Janes” annual, there had been talk of “all-big-gun” ships, but it had been just that – talk. A naval architect over here – a constructor over there – and an admiral dining with a friend in his London “club”. They all “talked” over luncheon or speculated over their after dinner brandy and cigars. But the article opened their eyes. This Italian naval architect was seriously advocating the idea. Which meant the neighboring Austrians must be considering it. And the French! And worst of all – “Kaiser Bill’s” navy as well!! And this was not idle speculation. “Jane’s Fighting Ships” (Fred T. Jane – editor) was published, annually, in a bound volume organized into sections by nation – Great Britain, Germany, United States, Romania, Greece, etc, etc. It listed every nation with naval assets – no matter how small. If Monaco had a tugboat with a machine gun – it got a mention. The “national” sections listed ships by type and class and told you how many, how big, how many guns, how much armor, how fast – etc, etc. Granted – this intelligence was not always perfectly accurate – and it may have been obtained by less than “sporting” means. But “Jane’s” was, pretty much, a “who’s who” and “what’s what” of your potential enemy’s fleet. Everyone was known to read “Jane’s” (or Brassey’s Naval Annual) like a “Bible”. Everyone -- from junior officers to cabinet ministers. And that’s where “The First Sea Lord” takes center stage. Sir John Arbuthnot Fisher – 1841 - 1920 -- 1st Baron Fisher of Kilverstone. Known to his friends as “Jackie” – and to his enemies by less polite names. And – he obviously wins the competition for wearing the most medals! By 1903, the political atmosphere in Britain was growing increasingly suspicious. Between 1890 and 1903, Germany had launched twelve pre-dreadnought battleships and had six more on the builders slips. The Royal Navy certainly had more battleships, but she also had to maintain the strength of the Mediterranean Fleet, the Channel Fleet, The Atlantic Fleet, and the Home Fleet -- in addition to a handful of battleships operating as support for colonial stations. The German Navy had no such commitments and was able to concentrate her battleship strength in home waters – the North Sea. The British saw the German fleet as a direct threat to their naval supremacy – the first threat since Trafalgar, a century before. What’s more the naval threat was backed by the overwhelming power of the German army. All too clearly, the British understood that if the Hochseeflotte could control the North Sea for only a few days, the German army could land in England and easily defeat their much smaller army. The only plausible answer seemed to be building more and more battleships – and faster. But they say...”As the challenge arises, so rises the man to the challenge”. John Fisher entered the Royal Navy as a cadet in 1854, at age thirteen. From his first days in training, he was eager to learn, and quick to apply what he had learned. He was energetic, enthusiastic, and clever. He did, however, have a disconcerting habit of questioning his instructors until he had exhausted the block of instruction, as well as the instructor. As he grew older, and quickly rose through the ranks, he became known as a...”man who demanded to be heard, and one who didn’t suffer fools gladly”. When Fisher argued a point, he often became quite agitated. On one occasion, King Edward VII, an admirer and staunch supporter, finally had to ask him to quit shaking his fist in the Royal face! It should also be noted that Fisher was capable of being quite charming and persuasive when it suited his purpose. His easy charm, turned on and off like a light switch, often covered his taciturn nature and frequently made up for blunt or tactless comments. Fisher was a bit eccentric, and around 1877 he became interested in dancing. So much so, that he insisted all his ship’s officers should dance on deck in the evenings when the ship’s band played for the senior officer’s wardroom. In the Victorian navy, influence was often more important than being proficient, and Fisher used his charm and skill on the dance floor to sway politically important ladies. (Because they knew just how and who to influence.) The really odd thing about the man, is that he suffered from sea sickness his entire life. Putting all the “quirks” aside, Fisher believed the fleet should be efficient, proficient, and instantly ready for war. All his reforms and innovations were aimed at modernizing the fleet and making it “battle-ready”. And anything standing in the way should be swept away. “Anyone who opposes me, I crush”...was a frequent comment, and this autocratic streak grew worse as Fisher grew older. So did his unshakable belief in himself and his ideas. Whatever he believed to be correct -- MUST be correct. Along with “efficient and proficient” was his belief promotion should be based upon merit. And “merit” included officers skilled and knowledgeable in the modern weapons of war – torpedoes, gunnery science, submarines, and fast ships. (Fisher had a mania for speed – conducted all his fleet maneuvers at “flank speed”.) This belief in merit automatically divided the Royal Navy into two groups. The younger officers, learning new weapons systems and striving for promotion – and -- the “Old Salts”. The “Old Salts” were battleship captains waiting patiently for promotion to rear admiral -- and admirals commanding squadrons or fleets, “putting in their time”, waiting for promotion, an honorific title, and a job at the Admiralty. Fisher, quite reasonably, believed nations only fought wars for material gain. If Britain had a strong fleet, it would deter others from engaging her in a war. If they attacked her colonial possessions, the Royal Navy could choke off the sea lanes. If an enemy attempted to invade the Island Kingdom, the Royal Navy would destroy them before they came within sight of land. The might, and much vaunted reputation, of the Royal Navy was the best possible deterrence against war. “On the British fleet rests the British Empire”...as Fisher pointedly remarked in crucial negotiations with the Chancellor Of the Exchequer. Fisher also believed defeated armies could be rebuilt quickly, while a catastrophic defeat at sea could lose a war in a single battle, in a single day. The notion of losing the war in a single day became something of a “bogey-man” for British admirals and politicians. Everyone expected great things from the Royal Navy – but were afraid to take the risks needed to achieve them. In the end, prudent caution would win out over Nelsonian heroics. The possibilities of the “single-day-battle” was wholly based on the theory of “The Climactic Battle”. This idea, while plausible, was -- in reality -- very nearly impossible to achieve. Since Hannibal crushed the Romans at Cannae in 216BC, every admiral or general has sought the “Climactic Battle” – or battle of annihilation. For three years during the American Civil War, Robert E. Lee sought to out-maneuver and crush his opponents. Though brilliantly done, Lee never understood the first armies of the “Modern Era” were too large and complex to be overwhelmed and shredded. Nelson actually achieved the battle of annihilation at Trafalgar in 1805, through his genius, audacity, and the substandard performance of the French and Spanish fleets. Togo achieved a similar victory a century later at Tsushima, through sound tactical execution and the utter ineptitude of his Russian opponents. However, sinking an entire fleet of heavily armored, smoke belching, fire-breathing, 20th Century pre-dreadnoughts in a single engagement, was a completely different problem. Unfortunately, Jutland did not provide a conclusive fleet engagement. Which brings us back to where Cuniberti came in. Admiral Togo on the bridge of his flagship Mikasa as the Japanese battleships steam in line ahead formation -- closing on the approaching Russian ships. Note the early version of a rangefinder in use directly behind Togo. By early 1902, Fisher had been promoted to full admiral and was finishing up a three-year tour as Commander, Mediterranean Fleet – the preeminent posting in the Edwardian Era Royal Navy. He had made great progress in training his officers to function in the “modern” navy, rather than the “Victorian” navy – but he had begun to realize training ships and crews to be superior to all others might not be enough. He was looking for an “edge” and thought faster ships might be the answer. He had made the acquaintance of a naval constructor while in Malta, and they began working on rough sketches and design ideas for new ships that might better utilize his trained crews and modern methods. The year 1903 found Fisher taking up his new post as Commander-In-Chief, Portsmouth, when the Cuniberti article was published. While he never gave any inspirational credit to Cuniberti, it is certain he was familiar with the article and his other theories. Fisher could not have avoided them. Since the “big gun” proposal had now been published, it was more imperative than ever to act. This just might be the “edge” he was looking for. Fisher gathered an unofficial group of advisors (mostly naval architects and shipbuilders) in early 1904 and went to work on his earlier sketches and concept designs to formulate the ideal characteristics for a battleship. The time was fast approaching when he could make these theories a reality. On 20 October 1904, Admiral John Fisher was appointed First Sea Lord of the Admiralty, and was further promoted “Admiral Of The Fleet” in December. The decision was made by the government, and approved by King Edward VII, to bring Fisher into the Admiralty to reduce the naval budgets, and reform the navy along modern lines – efficient and proficient. The feeling was the Royal Navy had become too large, too expensive, and too hide-bound to measure up against the growing naval arms race with Germany. And Fisher was seen as the relentless, driving Juggernaut to correct the problem. One of his first acts was to push through the Board Of Admiralty a decision to arm the next battleship with 12-inch guns, with a speed of no less than 21 knots. (In direct agreement with Cuniberti’s proposal.) In January 1905, he convened a formal “Committee On Designs” (including many of his former advisors) to evaluate design proposals and to assist in the detailed design process. At the same time, Fisher provoked massive public controversy and inter-service opposition as he ruthlessly laid-up 64 ships in reserve and scrapped 90 obsolete ships, characterizing them as...”too weak to fight and too slow to run away -- a miser’s hoard of useless junk”. This freed-up crews and operating funds to increase the numbers of large, modern ships in home waters. He trimmed 3.5 million Pounds from the 1905 naval estimates – and was still able to institute new building and training programs that greatly increased the fleet’s effectiveness. HMS Lord Nelson – 1908. The last class of British pre-dreadnought battleships – 17,820 tons – 18 knots – 4x12-inch guns – 6x9.2-inch guns – 5x18 inch torpedo tubes – sister ship HMS Agamemnon. HMS Dreadnought – 1906. The first all-big-gun battleship in the World – 18,120 tons – 21 knots – 10x12-inch guns. The Committee On Design produced their final design in record time and Fisher immediately pushed it through the Board of Admiralty. HMS Dreadnought was ordered in April 1905 -- laid down in October 1905 – launched in February 1906, and commissioned into the Royal Navy in December 1906. It still holds the world record for the fastest building time for a Capital ship. Considering the huge number of innovations in the design – it was a miracle – and a costly one at 1.8 million Pounds! HMS Dreadnought moored quayside for the installation of new gunnery equipment. This is an excellent overall view of the revolutionary new warship. The arrangement of the five main battery turrets is clearly visible, with excellent firing arcs for broadside fire. The forward superstructure is compact with two funnels. Just outboard of her, a Midgard Class tug is towing a barge crane to its’ next repair job. Tug, barge, and crane courtesy of "AP". Another view of Dreadnought. A real “bruiser” for her day, just eight years later she would be considered small compared to her larger and more modern cousins. The quay is a series of re-lotted PEG-SNM Series “battleship” docks with 1x1 custom lots used to fill-in between the dock and the rail line. In this view, you can see the forward bridge structure, with a funnel right behind it, and a heavy tripod mast with a “spotting top” right behind that. The only reason they could have arranged it in that order was to position the funnels at either end of the boiler rooms below decks. With the funnel between the bridge and foremast, thick clouds of black smoke would have made the upper bridge uninhabitable in a trailing wind. And with a head wind, the funnel gases and smoke would have blown right back into the spotting tops – blinding the spotters and making their perch unbearably hot. Believe it or not – that mistake would be made more than once. In the top right, a Midgard Class tug is passing with a “double tow” bound for the coaling docks. The beautiful little tug and coal lighters are by "AP". This view shows a problem common to warships of the pre-World-War period. Of Dreadnought’s ten big guns, only eight can fire in broadside – where battleships do most of their fighting. In effect – during battle – one of the “wing turrets” will always be unable to engage the target. The simple solution would have been to lengthen the bow and place two “superfiring” turrets up forward. But – British designers had no previous experience with “stacked” turrets, and the seagoing officers feared the blast over-pressure from the top turret would enter the open sighting hoods of the lower turret – disabling or killing the gun crew. In this close-up, you can clearly see the spotting top on the tripod foremast. This was one of Dreadnought’s revolutionary features. Before “gunnery science” came into being, battle ranges were around 2,000 to 3,000 yards – close enough for Turret Captains or bridge officers to see the fall of their own shells with high-powered binoculars. As guns grew larger, they could actually shoot farther than you could see to aim. When the range of torpedoes reached 2,000 yards, as well – it became imperative to open the range to avoid the torpedoes – and a method to shoot farther had to be invented. Thanks to Fisher’s relentless drive, and Capt. Percy Scott’s ingenuity, “Director Firing” was introduced beginning with HMS Dreadnought. “Director Control” equipment was installed below decks and communicated with wide angle rangefinders installed in the “spotting top” on the tripod mast. Now all main battery guns could be fired with the press of a button. “Spotters” in the tops would be able to see the shell splashes through the rangefinders, and corrections could be made quickly and easily. Gunnery scores at much longer ranges rose from the previous 40% to 80% hits. That made HMS Dreadnought not only heavily armed – but deadly dangerous. Here is a “detail shot” of the beautiful and highly accurate model provided by @Barroco Hispano. The “all-big-gun” battleship was now a reality – and Cuniberti’s thesis had become fact. HMS Dreadnought brought down the curtain on the “Pre-Dreadnought Era” and gave her name to the new type of “dreadnought” battleships, and a new era. And that brings us to the “unexpected” part of the tale. When the Committee On Designs finished their work on Dreadnought, they immediately set to work on another of Fisher’s concept sketches. The new battleship had been designed to ensure the Royal Navy’s superiority in battle fleet engagements, and was more amenable to the conservative big-gun admirals. The new project would ensure that Britain’s sea lanes and colonial possessions would be safe from marauding enemies – a massive new armored cruiser. Fisher seems to have had conflicting trains of thought at this point. Having built Dreadnought with a speed of 21 knots, she was quite capable of operating with the existing armored cruisers. But their speed averaged 23 knots – barely sufficient to scout ahead of the battle fleet. And though faster and more powerful than their German counterparts (mostly), they did not possess either of these qualities to any overwhelming degree. Fisher thought the armored cruisers could be put to better use if they were faster. He had always been overly fascinated by fast ships, and saw them as tactically decisive – which appealed to his nature. W.H. Gard, Chief Constructor at HM Dockyard Portsmouth, had been on Fisher’s earlier “advisory board” and was now a member of the Committee On Designs. While with Fisher, in Malta, he had proposed a 25.5 knot armored cruiser armed with sixteen 9.2 inch guns, and that became the focus of discussion. But Dreadnought had whetted Fisher’s appetite and he now saw the possibilities of marrying the “all-big-gun” theory to a very fast armored cruiser. It was quickly decided the new cruiser would be armed with the same main battery gun as Dreadnought – the 12-inch gun. Using this gun would effectively counter ships being built for the Italian and Japanese navies. This would also simplify the process of gun manufacturing and ammunition procurement – thereby lowering costs and giving the new cruiser a massive offensive capability. Coupled with a 25.5 knot speed, the ship would be able to catch and sink any existing enemy cruisers with her overwhelming gun power. At the same time, she would be heavily armed enough to defend herself against almost any warship – while still having the option to disengage at high speed. As the design began to take shape, it was agreed the new cruiser might be a suitable candidate to fulfill the role of the “fast wing” of the battle fleet. And Fisher may well have thought the new cruiser might eventually evolve into a potentially cheaper alternative to the much more expensive battleship. (Fisher’s quick mind operated simultaneously on several different levels – not all of which came together in the end.) But the thought of completely eliminating battleships was never seriously considered, largely due to the storm of opposition this would elicit from every corner – including the Board of Admiralty, seagoing officer ranks – and the public. Due to the system of alliances Europe had twisted itself into, and the obvious naval challenge from Germany, the committee quickly concluded the Royal Navy would potentially have to meet challenges in the Baltic Sea, North Sea, English Channel, and the Mediterranean. With the Kaiserliche Marine mostly concentrated in the North Sea, the possible threat to trade routes was not considered serious. And, from a purely tactical point of view, the Home Fleet needed a replacement for the existing, slow armored cruisers if they were going to operate effectively against the Hochseeflotte. Consequently, the primary duty of the new cruisers would be scouting for the fleet. Their high speed and powerful guns would enable them to destroy or brush aside enemy cruiser or destroyer screens, report the location and composition of the enemy fleet, and then retire without engaging heavy units. Since their firepower and speed would prevail against their enemies, and ensure their escape from enemy battleships, it was further decided they did not need to be armored against anything larger than an 8.3-inch gun (standard armament on German armored cruisers). Another possible task for the new armored cruisers was the aforementioned “Fast Wing” of the battle fleet. They could deploy ahead or astern of the battle fleet as protection against sudden cruiser or destroyer attacks. They might maneuver to present a threat to enemy battleships – only engaging if circumstances were favorable. As mentioned before, the new armored cruisers could be used to pressure the vanguard of an enemy fleet and force them onto a course advantageous to the British. Their speed advantage would allow them to successfully pursue a retreating enemy force and damage or destroy slow or “wounded” ships. And, of course, they were ideally suited to destroying commerce raiding cruisers and armed merchant cruisers. Fisher’s fertile brain even conceived the bizarre notion they might maneuver against the rear of the German battle-line and engage the smaller battleships, such as the Wittelsbach Class. SMS Zahringen – Wittelsbach Class pre-dreadnought battleship 11,774 tons – 18 knots – 4x9.4-inch guns – 18x5.9-inch guns – 12x3.5-inch guns – 6x17.7-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 8.9 inches. Admiral Fisher planned to use his new 12-inch-gunned “dreadnought cruisers” to attack the elderly, lightly armed and armored pre-dreadnoughts bringing up the rear of the German battle line. The Committee On Design finalized the “particulars” of the new armored cruisers, Gard’s architects and draftsmen finished the plan drawings, and they met for the last time on 22 February 1905. The Board Of Admiralty approved Dreadnought’s design on 17 March, and the new armored cruiser design on 7 July 1905. Dreadnought was laid down on 2 October, 1905 at HM Dockyard, Portsmouth – reputed to be the fastest shipyard in the World. The new battleship was to be built under conditions of strict secrecy, with the building slip completely screened-off from outside observation, and the area kept off-limits to all but the work force. Fisher fully intended Dreadnought’s particulars to be kept secret in order to delay other nations from building competing battleships. He also intended Dreadnought’s secret to be a “decoy”. Even though the new armored cruiser would be laid down at Armstrong, Whitworth & Co., Ltd, on Tyneside, in the north of England, Fisher hoped to divert attention from her by giving “foreign interests” a high-profile “secret” in the most likely place – Portsmouth. The deception was a success. The appearance of HMS Dreadnought in December, 1906, was akin to a bomb going off in the Reichsmarineamt, as well as the Palace in Berlin. Admiral Tirpitz instantly realized he had just commissioned a new Deutschland Class pre-dreadnought battleship – and had four more fitting out. And Dreadnought had made them all obsolete! Meanwhile, up on Tyneside, the new armored cruiser was laid down just a few weeks after Dreadnought was commissioned. Again, the ship was built in strict secrecy, and it was even arranged for false information to be leaked -- leading people to believe the new ships were merely improved versions of the recent Minotaur Class armored cruisers. A year later, she was christened HMS Invincible at her launching, and eleven months on she was commissioned into the 1st Cruiser Squadron, Home Fleet -- 20 March 1909. (Her two sister ships, Indomitable and Inflexible, had been commissioned in the last half of 1908, but they were either in the dockyards for “working-up” adjustments, or sent on voyages to North America – more or less out of European sight.) In April and June Invincible participated in fleet maneuvers. On 9 June, with the rest of the Home Fleet, she steamed up the Solent and dropped anchor at Spithead, where the Atlantic Fleet would soon arrive for the Spithead Naval Review of 1909. Naval reviews were, in those days, more like social events than military affairs. And this one, in particular, because it kicked-off the festivities for “Cowes Week”, the annual yachting regatta hosted by King Edward VII. Ships of various nations were invited to attend, as were diplomats, naval attaches, industrialists, and military officers of all branches and nationality. And this is where the world got its’ first good look at HMS Invincible and her sisters. HMS Invincible lies at anchor during the Spithead Naval Review of 1909. Note the steamer alongside. She would steam up and down the six lines of anchored warships providing sightseers a close look at the might of the Royal Navy. Information about the new armored cruiser had been trickling into the Reichsmarineamt for well over a year, but it all turned out to be erroneous. Once the 1st Cruiser Squadron (Invincible – Inflexible -- Indomitable) dropped anchor in the Solent, it was painfully obvious none of the information had been reliable. German officers, diplomats, and dignitaries were welcomed aboard the new armored cruisers as quests, and they knew, without doubt, that it was “game over”. These cruisers were obviously bigger, surely faster, and certainly more heavily gunned than anything in the Kaiserliche Marine. And that included the battleships! Neither Tirpitz, nor the Imperial Navy High Command had suspected the new British cruisers could be this innovative and powerful. And three of them already in service! But there is always the – “unexpected” – isn’t there? The 1st Cruiser Squadron of the Home Fleet lies moored at buoys just outside the Cuxhaven roadsted breakwater. They are returning a courtesy port call circa 1911. (Left to right – HMS Invincible, Inflexible, Indomitable.) These port calls by foreign navies were always festive occasions, with much “show and ceremony”. A large number of civilian small craft have gathered to see the big British cruisers up close. The tourists are immensely entertained by such simple things as “morning and evening color” ceremonies – when the ship’s bands play the national anthem while the flag is raised in the morning and lowered in the evening, while a detachment of sailors is assembled to “salute the colors”. The steamer SS Lorena (foreground) has come down from Hamburg with a boatload of sightseers on a “day trip”. In the evenings, the British captains might even have the ship’s band serenade the small craft anchored nearby. These ostentatious shows of courtesy were quite common in the Edwardian Age. Here we have two views of the SS Lorena. She was, in reality, a British packet steamer out of the Humber, sometime in the late 1930’s and early 1940’s. But for our purposes, she’s a packet steamer down from Hamburg. When I came across the photo of Invincible and the steamer, it seemed too good an opportunity to pass up. The model is provided by Barroco Hispano, and is a prefect little gem of detail. The sailing ketch in the upper right is by @mattb325, while the remaining small craft are from NBVC’s marina sets. Here you have an excellent view of Invincible. She has a long and sleek appearance, with a rather tall and compact superstructure, and funnels grouped forward and aft, separated by the midships main battery turrets. There are large open areas of deck, with a minimum of clutter. The ship’s boat boom has been extended, with a motor launch tied on. The Port Admiral has placed the motor launch and crew at the disposal of the squadron commander (Rear Admiral Sir Horace Hood) for the duration of the visit. The very fine armored cruiser models are courtesy of Barroco Hispano. (It should be noted the British did not officially adopt the term “battlecruiser” until late in 1911.) The boat boom, motor launch, and small cutter are the finely detailed work of "AP". This is a detail shot. Amidships you see a problem common to many capital ships prior to WW I. In their desperation to maximize the number of guns on a warship, designers often used “wing turrets” placed amidships. In this instance, the two center turrets have been placed in such a manner that they might, possibly, be able to fire cross-deck on either beam. Theoretically, this would allow an eight gun broadside. In reality, the port side turret, firing cross-deck to starboard, would have a very narrow arc of fire (unless you were willing to fire over the top of the starboard wing turret – not recommended.) And – the blast over-pressure of a 12-inch gun would rip the planking right off the deck, buckle the steel deck plates beneath it, buckle any superstructure plates within 40 feet, and make toothpicks out of nearby ship’s boats. The fact was, though Invincible carried eight main battery guns, she only had a six-gun broadside. This is the chief reason broadside fire was so important and why battle formations were “single-line-ahead” – to maximize broadside firing arcs. (Note: If you examine the cutter hooking onto the boat boom, you will see the boat crew has their oars raised to the “oars up” position for docking. “AP” likes everything done “ship-shape” and proper.) SMS Scharnhorst had been assigned to the East Asiatic Squadron in March 1909, as a matter of course. She was to relieve the aging Furst Bismarck. As squadron flagship, she was one of the most powerful armored cruisers in the Far East. Four months after Scharnhorst’s departure, the Naval High Command scrutinized the new information on the British armored cruisers displayed at Spithead, and found the situation grim. These British “dreadnought style” cruisers clearly out-classed all of Germany’s armored cruisers – and sending German cruisers against them would be something akin to murdering one’s own ships and crews. (Early on, the Invincible’s were actually referred to as “dreadnought cruisers”.) And yet – Gneisenau was a new and powerful ship. So they arrived at the decision to send her to the Far East where her power and presence might still be of use. And that’s why both of Germany’s finest armored cruisers wound up on the other side of the World. Plans had been made, keels hand been laid, and ships had been built. But Fisher’s deception and HMS Invincible had upset all the careful planning of the Reichsmarineamt. Tirpitz had spent large amounts of money on two very fine cruisers that were, in the end, almost worthless to him. Though valuable assets in the Far East, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau would be of little use in the North Sea – where Tirpitz knew the issue would ultimately be decided. But it is difficult to plan for -- the unexpected. HMS Inflexible – Invincible Class battlecruiser – circa 1911. NEXT TIME…… CORONEL AND THE FALKLANDS MANY, MANY, MANY, THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful and highly detailed warships. VERY SPECIAL THANKS to my partner -- @AP -- for the immense amount of time and effort he has so generously put into this project. Without him “Cuxhaven” would not exist. If you enjoyed anything you saw – please punch the “like” button so I will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of my ability. THANK YOU for your visit and the COMMENTS many of you have been kind enough to make! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496- 7 Comments
-
- 9
-
-
-
- battleships
- battlecruisers
- (and 10 more)
