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Chapter 17: The Second Generation
Dreadnought posted a City Journal entry in IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN
Here we see the crew of SMS Von der Tann taking aboard provisions in preparation for sailing. In the early 1900’s this was a common sight in Imperial naval bases. Shore-based bakeries would provide fresh bread daily to the naval barracks where the crews were billeted when in port, and were also tasked with sending ships to sea with a fresh-baked supply. Admittedly, the delivery and handling systems were a bit primitive in those days, but German “Brown Bread” (sometimes called “Black Bread”) was – and still is -- quite tasty, nonetheless. IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN BY: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 17: THE SECOND GENERATION HMS Indefatigable lying at anchor – circa 1912. Almost all British battlecruisers had a big, ungainly, look to them – mostly because they had such a high freeboard. This kept them “dry” in rough weather, but made them a bigger target. The superstructure on the first two battlecruiser classes were tall and “blocky”. Here, you can see quite clearly where the new ships were “stretched” amidships, made obvious by the distance between the first and third funnels. Before SMS Von der Tann’s design particulars had even been finalized, the British were moving ahead with their building plans. First Sea Lord Jackie Fisher had blind-sided the naval world with the Invincible Class “large cruisers” (not officially battlecruisers until 1911). And though they were among the most powerful warships afloat, Fisher was not quite satisfied. “Battlecruiser mania” had not yet taken hold of the Admiral’s thought processes and he was still flirting with the concept of the “fast battleship”. As far back as 1905, Fisher had started an inter-navy discussion with the purpose of developing a single capital ship that would incorporate the features of both HMS Dreadnought and HMS Invincible. Based on the discussions, the Department of Naval Construction (DNC) had prepared a design study featuring a faster version of HMS Dreadnought with a displacement of 22,500 tons. While the study was being prepared, Fisher established a “Fusion Committee” from members of the Admiralty -- with the notion he could better “control” the decision-making process. But – to Fisher’s utter dismay – the Admiralty Committee was determined to work within the budgeted Naval Estimates. They took one look at the design sketches and decided a heavy battleship with a cruiser’s speed would be too costly for a single ship. To build such an expensive ship would reduce the number of ships that could be built. Considering the increasing naval arms race with Germany, and Britain’s naval commitments to the Empire – the committee chose quantity over quality. Fisher’s “fusion battleship” would have to wait. In early 1906, the Liberal government under H.H. Asquith came to power and implemented a more stringent economic policy, so the Admiralty postponed discussion of future battlecruisers. Fisher found the delay unbearable. By surprising everyone with the Invincible, he had gotten ahead of the foreign navies – now he saw that advantage slipping away. In November, Fisher came back with a new proposal for a less expensive battlecruiser, which met with some favor in the Admiralty Committee. However, Parliamentary pressure deferred any decision to build a new class of battlecruisers until the navy estimates of 1908-1909 – but they did agree to a compromise. Since Fisher was in a hurry to add more battlecruisers to the fleet before other nations could catch-up – he agreed to a single new ship -- an “improved” Invincible design – to be called HMS Indefatigable. HMS Indefatigable: 18,800 tons – 25 knots – 8x12-inch guns – 16x4-inch guns – 2x17.7-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 4-6 inches – deck armor 1.5-2.5 inches – turret armor 7 inches. It can be seen the Indefatigable Class were not graceful ships. Mostly flush-decked, with a small fantail deck, they resembled nothing so much as a great, floating, “flatiron”. The forward and aft superstructures were tall and ungainly, and the heavy tripod masts towering over all would make excellent aiming points for German rangefinders. This superbly detailed model is courtesy of @Barroco Hispano. This expedient would keep Britain’s lead in battlecruisers secure, and worked well, as a reluctant Parliament was coaxed into agreement. A further “policy drive” encouraged the Dominions of Australia and New Zealand to pay for two more ships. (They were supposed to be stationed in Australian waters for protection – but would be under Royal Navy orders in time of war. A bit of “slight-of-hand” on the part of the Admiralty.) HMS Indefatigable wound up being the cheapest capital ship built in the 20th Century, which reassured the British and Dominion taxpayers their money had been well spent. But perception is not always reality. Claiming Indefatigable’s design was “improved” was a considerable overstatement – if not an outright lie. The low cost was achieved by “stretching” the design of Invincible to allow wider cross-deck firing arcs – thus providing more effective fire on either beam of the new ship. The new design was justified by the speed with which it was prepared and its low cost – but repeating all the original mistakes in a “second generation” was inexcusable. In this image, you see HMS Invincible in the foreground and HMS Indefatigable behind her. Indefatigable was designed as a “stretched” version of Invincible. The most easily noticed difference is in the midships area. Invincible’s “P” and “Q” turrets (port and starboard “wing turrets”) are extremely “crowded”, with poor firing arcs, and no room for cross-deck firing. This design fault was corrected in the Indefatigable Class by “stretching” the hull and making improvements to reduce the deck clutter. This view, and the one below, will allow you to better compare the shape and positioning of the various deck components – superstructure elements, funnels, and gun turrets. Lord Fisher’s poor judgment was apparent as early as 1908, when it became known the Germans were building their own battlecruisers – thus exposing the faulty logic in the “battlecruiser concept”. Now British battlecruisers would face opponents of equal speed and firepower and it became a matter of withstanding the destructive power of German 11-inch and 12-inch rifles. And Fisher had lobbied the British Press so effectively to obtain his battlecruisers, that he could not now admit they were anything less than superior to their opponents. In all truth, Von der Tann was equal in firepower and far superior in her armor, sub-division, and protective arrangements. But Fisher’s own propaganda had trapped him. Flawed though they might be, they were commissioned into the Royal Navy – HMS Indefatigable 1911 – HMS New Zealand 1912 – and HMAS Australia in 1913. This is a close-up of HMS Indefatigable showing the intricate detailing of this model. Every visible detail has been faithfully recreated. One example is the large metal square visible below “P” turret. The gun house sits atop the armored barbette which extends down into the hull of the ship to the handling rooms and their adjacent shell room and powder magazines. The battlecruiser’s 6-inch belt armor only reached two or three feet above the waterline – which would leave the actual barbette armor dangerously close to the thin, exterior hull plating. The “square” is, in fact, additional armor plating added to the design to protect the barbette beneath the wing turret. The Kaiserliche Marine also provided their wing turrets additional protection, but theirs was designed into the hull and not visible. THE MOLTKE CLASS BATTLECRUISERS SMS Moltke – a “second generation” Imperial battlecruiser at sea – circa 1912 or 1913 – in a very accurate artist’s rendering. You can see the low and graceful appearance of the German battlecruiser compared to her British contemporaries. Even the raised forecastle deck forward is considerably lower. The superstructure follows the German “minimalist” pattern, and the artist even captured the vast clouds of smoke issuing from the funnels. The design of “Grosse Kreuzer G – 1908” started in April of 1907, and thanks to the excellent design parameters developed for Von der Tann, things moved along smoothly. Unlike British naval constructors, German architects stuck to their pattern of making significant improvements to previous designs. The Reichstag granted a budget of 44.1 million Marks – a generous increase on Von der Tann’s 36.7 million Mark price tag. The new cruisers would be bigger, better armed, and better protected. There are varying opinions as to whether Moltke was a “second generation” battlecruiser – or merely the “second ship” of the “first generation” of Imperial battlecruisers. Some analysts consider Von der Tann, Moltke, Goeben, and Seydlitz to be of a single class. And there are, indeed, significant similarities between the four ships. But the four were laid down in successive years beginning in 1908 and ending with Seydlitz in 1911. Each ship was an altered design – a new turret here, a new hull form there, and a new deck arrangement on the other one. While three of the four ships looked nearly identical – Von der Tann did not. All four ships were deserving of their reputation for speed – but not all of them were equal to the fastest among them. Not all of them had the same number of big guns. I could go on and on with “what they were not” – but “what they were” is far more important. Each battlecruiser was an improvement upon the preceding design, so each new ship was a bit bigger, a bit faster, and a bit better armored than the last one. If you take Von der Tann and compare her to the fourth ship (Seydlitz) the difference is both visible and invisible. Seydlitz had been so far improved, she was no longer in a class with Von der Tann. And Seydlitz would prove in battle just how much those improvements mattered. So – my theory is that Moltke is “second generation”. The first question raised by the Naval High Command was whether or not to increase the gun caliber. All the British battlecruisers were armed with 12-inch guns, and the recent design of the Helgoland Class dreadnought battleships mounted 12-inch rifles. It only seemed logical to make the jump. However, with the British continuing to build more and more battlecruisers, Tirpitz reasoned – tactically -- it would be wiser to add more guns rather than increasing the caliber. More guns allowed for the possibility of splitting a ship’s fire between two targets. He countered with the suggestion of an additional twin main battery turret for the new cruiser, on the theory the Reichsmarineamt still considered the 11-inch rifle sufficient to engage even battleships. Eventually, a concept design for a cruiser of approximately 22,000 tons with five twin turrets and capable of 24.5 knots was decided on, and the Kaiser approved it on 28 May 1907. From that point, the design process began to bog down, largely due to other design work already in progress, and the many changes gradually worked into the new cruiser. In May 1908 – to reduce the work load in the design department and streamline the building time in the yards – Tirpitz decided “Grosse Kreuzer G-1908” and “Grosse Kreuzer H-1909” would have to be identical twins. Bids were solicited from the construction yards, and when Blohm & Voss submitted the lowest bid, they received contracts for both cruisers. This unusual move ensured both battlecruisers would be built to the same specifications. NOTE: In Chapter 15 – “Anatomy Of A Battlecruiser” – I went into great detail regarding the design and construction of the Imperial battlecruisers, and threw a truckload of numbers at you. For the most part, each succeeding battlecruiser class will have been constructed using the same methods – and largely the same materials. Rather than bore you with repetition, I will stick to the basics and only mention changes or modifications where significant. I hope that will be more enjoyable. Profile and deck plan of “Grosse Kreuzer G” – soon to be christened SMS Moltke. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS The contract for “Grosse Kreuzer G” was awarded to Blohm & Voss Dockyards, Hamburg, on 17 September 1908, and her keel was laid on 7 December. She would be launched sixteen months later, on 7 April 1910. The main design features of the new cruiser were significantly superior to the previous Von der Tann Class. At 22,979 tons, her displacement was considerably increased – almost 3,600 tons heavier than Von der Tann and HMS Indefatigable. The new cruiser’s hull was longer, at 612 feet, with finer hull lines at both ends, and somewhat broader in the beam. The hull was constructed of transverse and longitudinal framing, and plated with Siemens-Martin “mild steel” for flexibility and resilience. There were fifteen watertight compartments on six deck levels, with a double bottom running 78% of her length. The double bottom and extensive use of internal compartmentalization between the watertight transverse bulkheads contributed significantly to her underwater protection -- slowing flooding and confining it to a smaller area. Though not in the original plans, bilge keels were later fitted to improve stability. SMS Moltke (“Grosse Kreuzer G”) at anchor in Cuxhaven’s Inner Basin. Here you can see the longer hull form with the clean lines forward and the fine, tapered, hull form aft. This also shows the well balanced and careful layout of the decks. To starboard, a Sophia Class paddle tug is passing with a “double tow” of lighters filled with general ship’s stores. The beautiful model of SMS Moltke, the paddle tug Sophia, and the lighters are courtesy of the hard-working and talented @AP. All interior decks were steel plated and covered with linoleum, while exterior (“weather”) decks were steel plated and covered with 2.5 inches of teak planking. Forward of “A” turret, the forecastle had a gentle, sloping, rise of approximately 22 feet above the waterline at the stem. Aft of “A” turret, the deck leveled off and was flush all the way to the aft main gun turrets. The ship’s overall freeboard had been increased by three feet over that of Von der Tann in an effort to reduce the amount of water taken over the decks in heavy weather. The additional rise at the stem and an increased “flare” of the bow at deck level, was designed to throw water away from the bow. In an unusual move, the new cruiser’s stem was cut nearly vertical and the customary ram bow was all but eliminated. (This was an attempt to improve her sluggish helm response at low speed.) In order to accommodate the aft main gun turrets, the fantail was lowered by one deck level. The largely flush-deck configuration was quite appealing and gave her a long, sleek, appearance. The deck layout is pretty much the same pattern as Von der Tann. Behind “A” turret was the forward superstructure housing the Navigation Bridge, the forward armored Conning Tower, a Chart Room, a pair of searchlight platforms, the forward pole mast, and the Flag Bridge. The forward funnel was built into the rear of this structure. The funnels on this class were a bit larger in circumference, making them look squat and heavy. This was an easy identification feature not found on other cruisers. The fore funnel had a ten-foot “boot cap” installed soon after trials to keep smoke out of the bridge areas. Air intakes for the boiler rooms were found at the rear base of the funnel. Like Von der Tann another funnel housing with air intakes and boat derricks was located amidships between “B” and “E” wing turrets. This is an excellent view of the upper decks of SMS Moltke. The flush Superstructure Deck extends from the bow all the way aft to the “C” turret barbette mounting. This increased the freeboard over 75% of the ship, keeping the decks relatively “dry” in heavy weather. It was policy in the Kaiserliche Marine to assign letters to the main gun turrets in a clockwise fashion. On the bow is “A” turret – starboard wing turret is “B” – superfiring turret aft is “C” – aft turret is “D” – and the port wing turret is “E”. The aft superstructure block included the secondary conning tower, a pair of searchlight platforms (each with two searchlights) stepped against the after mast, and air intakes around the base. Beyond that were two main battery turrets – “C” turret superfiring over “D” turret. This was a significant improvement over Von der Tann – not only adding two more 11-inch guns, but using superfiring turrets in the Kaiserliche Marine for the first time. Elaborate firing tests were run to ensure the blast over-pressure of the top turret would not interfere with the operation of the lower guns. (This was a problem both the Royal Navy and the Kaiserliche Marine had feared for many years, but the Germans found an adequate solution first.) The same machinery layout below decks as Von der Tann, allowed the funnels and superstructure groups to be placed well clear of the main battery firing arcs. Interestingly enough, the new design had originally contemplated “lattice masts”, similar to those found aboard U.S. Navy ships, but they had never been tested on a German warship, and Tirpitz feared they might be too heavy and prone to battle damage. Close-up of the innovative aft superfiring main battery turrets. The Austrians were the first naval power to mount superfiring turrets on a capital ship – but the Germans jumped ahead of the Royal Navy in their use. Note – the superfiring “C” turret is mounted on the superstructure deck, while the fantail was lowered by one deck level to accommodate “D” turret. The ship’s electrical needs were handled by six turbo-generators totaling 1,500kw output at 225 volts. As a precaution against battle damage, the generators were divided between four dynamo rooms – one each to port and starboard of the forward engine room, and two more on the centreline, all on the upper platform deck. The new ship retained Von der Tann’s extensive drainage and pumping system, with three high-capacity centrifugal pumps (two steam driven – one electrical) and several portable, electric “leak” pumps. In an emergency, the condenser pumps could also be connected to the drainage system. The cruiser was to be equipped with two wireless transmitters, three receivers, and as many antennas, and prior to 1914, an additional transmitter/receiver was installed in the forward conning tower. “Grosse Kreuzer G” would ship a crew of 43 officers and 1,010 men. PROPULSION PLANT ”Grosse Kreuzer G”, with nearly 4,000 tons extra weight, was designed with a more powerful propulsion system to compensate. She was equipped with twenty-four Schulz-Thornycroft, water-tube boilers built to a modified design in the Blohm & Voss Boiler Works. Specially developed for the Kaiserliche Marine, the double-ended, coal-fired boilers were built larger, out of weight-saving materials, with four water drums and two steam drums -- delivering high-pressure steam with lower coal consumption. They were arranged in eight separate boiler rooms – four ahead of the “B” turret barbettes – and four aft -- divided by longitudinal bulkheads. Due to problems with low quality coal, “tar oil” sprayers were installed in all boilers beginning in 1916. Maximum bunker capacity was 3,100 tons of coal, providing an operating radius of 4,120 miles at 14 knots. “Grosse Kreuzer G” was designed for 52,000shp, providing 25.5 knots. The boilers fed four sets of Parsons Steam Turbines manufactured by the Blohm & Voss Engine Works and arranged in the same manner as Von der Tann’s. The forward and aft engine rooms were divided along the centreline by a longitudinal bulkhead. In a radical departure from Von der Tann, two rudders were fitted, “in tandem”, along the centreline – a feature that would become standard on battlecruisers. This novel arrangement worked well enough at moderate to high speeds. She was quick to answer the helm, with a tight turning radius. But at low speeds or in shallow water, she was extremely difficult to steer. Each rudder was driven by an auxiliary steam steering engine. In the event of damage, both rudders could be coupled to a single engine, or manually operated. SHIP’S ARMAMENT MAIN BATTERY The chosen main battery armament of “Grosse Kreuzer G” was the Krupp 11-inch SK-L/50 (QF) high-velocity gun. The gun came into service in 1911 with an increased barrel length of 50 calibers – specifically designed to increase the velocity and accuracy of the previous SK-L/45 gun. The gun houses (turrets) only allowed a +13.5 degree elevation, which limited the range to approximately 17,800 yards – somewhat shorter than Von der Tann’s gun range. (In a 1916 refit the turrets were modified and the range increased to 20,900 yards.) In reality, the prevailing visibility conditions in the North Sea meant battle ranges varied between six to eight miles (on a good day) – usually within the maximum range of the guns. The unusually large -8.0 degree depression meant German ships could continue accurate fire on the “up-roll”. (It also made swabbing out the barrels much easier.) Mounted in twin turrets, the guns were well placed: “A” turret (Albert) forward on the forecastle deck – “B” turret (Berta) in the starboard “forward wing” position – the aft superfiring turret “C” (Caesar), and “D” turret (David), aft on the fantail deck, with “E” turret (Emil) in the port “aft wing” position. By carefully positioning the turrets and superstructure, and keeping the “deck clutter” to an absolute minimum, the architects enabled her to “cross-deck fire” with the midships “wing turrets” on an impressive arc of about 75 degrees. This shot provides an excellent view of the midships wing turret arrangements. Each wing turret has a wide arc of fire on the broadside beam, with a reasonable firing arc in the cross-deck mode. A new gun house (turret) design was developed for the new gun tube – the Drh-L-C/1908 – which had several advantages over previous designs. The open “spotting hood” in the roof was discontinued – thus preventing blast over-pressure effects inside the turret, and allowing the use of superfiring turrets. An apparatus was also installed coupling the gun barrels together for elevation and aiming. The gun houses were electrically trained, with an electrohydraulic elevating system for the gun tubes. The SK-L/50 gun could fire a 666-lb armor-piercing shell at the rate of 3 rounds per minute. The shell was propelled by a “fore charge” of 58 lbs in a double silk bag – and a main charge of 175 lbs in a brass case. The brass case had two advantages; the Krupp guns used a horizontal “sliding wedge breech” sealed by the rear rim of the shell casing (obturator seal) – and “cased” charges were far less likely to burn or explode in an accident. The magazines stored a total of 840 rounds -- 150 rounds per wing turret and 170 rounds for the others. Fire Control “ranging and spotting” was handled from the fore or aft conning towers, whose upper floors housed the Fire Control Party operating Zeiss 9-foot stereoscopic rangefinders mounted on the roof. Additional rangefinders were installed in various locations, and after 1914, a crow’s nest Fire Control position and rangefinder was added to the foremast. The control stations were connected to a Central Gunnery Control situated beneath the protective armored deck. Here, the ship’s Fire Control Team received data from the remote stations, calculated target information, and issued gun-laying orders to the “Turret Captains” via voice pipes, telephones, or electro-mechanical “repeaters”. The Chief Gunnery Officer handled range corrections and controlled the actual firing of the turrets from the forward conning tower. (See Chapter 14 for full fire control details.) SECONDARY BATTERY ”Grosse Kreuzer G” continued the pattern of carrying a strong secondary battery. The British had mixed opinions about carrying a secondary battery on capital ships, but the Germans had no such qualms. The Reichsmarineamt had settled on the 5.9-inch gun after the Battle Of Tsushima – and they never looked back. The medium caliber gun was an excellent complimentary weapon to the 11-inch main gun, and at the closer battle ranges in the North Sea, it could be a very effective weapon. Like Von der Tann, twelve 5.9-inch SK-L/45 (QF) high velocity, guns were mounted in MPL-C/06 casemates, six amidships on either beam. Unlike Von der Tann, the flush-decked arrangement of the new cruiser placed the Battery Deck one level higher than normal, and the guns could be worked quite well in heavy seas. As originally installed, they had a range of 13,500 yards, but after the action at Dogger Bank they were altered to allow a range of 16,800 yards. The gun crew of eight men could fire a 100-lb shell in a brass cartridge case, at a sustained rate of 5 to 7 shells per minute. To speed up the rate of fire, each casemate gun had its’ own electric ammunition hoist. Magazine capacity allowed for 50 armor-piercing shells, and 100 head-fused high explosive rounds per gun. TERTIARY BATTERY For torpedo boat defense, twelve 3.5-inch SK-L/45 (QF) high-velocity guns were provided in the original design. But after the Battle Of Dogger Bank in 1915, it was realized these light guns were virtually useless against modern destroyers, and they were gradually removed. It was of no consequence because the 5.9-inch guns were more than adequate for the job. TORPEDO ARMAMENT As was customary for the time period, all German capital ships carried a strong torpedo armament. “Grosse Kreuzer G” was fitted with four submerged 20-inch torpedo tubes. They were arranged in the standard pattern -- one fore and aft, and one on each beam. Eleven torpedoes were carried. ARMOR To say German capital ships of the period were comprehensively armored would be quite correct – but grossly understated. The Imperial Construction Department spent more time designing the armor layout than they did for the ship as a whole. The very first step was the consideration of what you were armoring against – in this case, the British 12-inch Mark X/45 gun. “Grosse Kreuzer G” would have to be sufficiently armored to withstand battle damage from these guns and emerge victorious (or at least afloat and under her own power). Taking that as a starting point, they were then able to decide which areas of the ship were essential to survival of the vessel as a fighting unit. The battlecruiser was, in the end, a floating, self-propelled, gun platform – designed solely to bring the guns into action against the enemy. (Over simplified – but true.) German designers, in their quest to build a combat-effective battlecruiser (in essence, a “fast battleship”), had to strike a delicate balance between guns, armor, and speed. They managed this balancing act by fine-tuning the armor suite through a very tedious design process of placing armor – then calculating the weight and calculating the potential speed. Depending upon the results, they added armor, or removed armor, or thinned an inch here or a half-inch there. Eventually, they arrived at a very complicated and comprehensive layout compatible with the gun and speed requirements. Imperial German capital ships were consistently built with extensive and thick armor suites when compared to other navies. The improvement of “Grosse Kreuzer G’s” armor suite over Von der Tann’s was simple – there was more of it – and thicker! (I’m not going to go into the intricate details – take off a half-inch here, add an inch there – I did all that in Chapter 15.) The new battlecruiser was armored throughout with Krupp Cemented Armor, face hardened with nickel steel, and backed with 2 inches of Teak to prevent spalling. The “protective armored deck”, unlike most warships, extended from stem to stern. The horizontal parts varied between 1.5 inches and 3.5 inches -- the sloping sides were 2 inches, connected to the lower end of the main belt armor. The Main Belt Armor amidships was 11 inches, with 4 inches extending to the bow and stern. The Citadel armor (the next level up) ran from barbette to barbette with 8 inches of armor – increasing to 9 inches to give added protection in the area of the “wing turrets”. The Casemate armor (the final layer reaching the deck level) ran from barbette to barbette and was 5.9 inches thick. The main battery turrets were also protected with Krupp Cemented Nickel Steel armor – turret faces 9.2 inches – sides and back 7.3 inches – roof 3.9 inches. The forward conning tower was protected by 14-inch armor -- the aft conning tower had 8 inches. The armor scheme was thicker and better arranged and was, by itself, a masterful achievement – but there was more. The underwater protection of “Grosse Kreuzer G” was the most extensive yet designed into a battlecruiser. Fourteen transverse bulkheads divided the ship into fifteen vertical watertight compartments. The protective armored deck (at the waterline) further divided each compartment horizontally – effectively creating thirty watertight compartments – half above the waterline, and half below. Between the transverse bulkheads -- within each of those “armored, watertight boxes” -- were numerous subdivisions. These were lighter steel bulkheads (in a house, you would call them “walls”) forming individual compartments (rooms) throughout the hull – Damage Control Center, Boatswain’s Store, Sail Locker, Capstan Engine Room, etc, etc. Each compartment could be sealed against flooding with watertight doors. In effect – the interior of the hull was a labyrinth of passageways, small compartments, and watertight doors – a “honeycomb” designed to keep the ship afloat in the event of damage. There were exceptions to the system, usually in the machinery spaces – boiler rooms and engine rooms – where the compartments were large, and often two or three decks in height. But “Grosse Kreuzer G” had well over 80 watertight compartments in her design – considerably more than most foreign warships – and she would be able to withstand a great deal of damage before sinking. (See Chapter 13 for difficulty sinking Blucher.) Following Von der Tann’s example, the new cruiser was given a built-in, armored torpedo bulkhead. (See Chapter 15 for details.) This was still considered a new design innovation and was not at all common in foreign navies. But German designers knew it was much easier to repair a damaged ship than to build a replacement. “Survivability” was a key factor in all their decisions. Another protective measure in all Imperial warships was the common coal bunker. Like Von der Tann, the new battlecruiser used outboard hull spaces as coal bunkers – running the length of the hull between the fore and aft turret barbettes. But the few extra feet designed into her beam made it a much-improved scheme. The upper bunkers began in the “Zwischendeck” (between decks) and formed a horizontal protective layer about eight feet deep. They began about fifteen feet from the centreline and extended outboard to the “citadel” armor belt of the hull – almost covering the spaces over the boiler and engine rooms. The upper bunkers then slanted down one more deck level, with a depth of ten feet, to the top of the sloping protective armored deck. Below the armored deck the lower coal bunkers extended down to the double bottom, just outboard of the torpedo bulkhead, with a width of six feet. In this way, enemy shells plunging into the decks and superstructure would have to penetrate both the battery deck and the coal-filled “Zwischendeck” before they could reach the boiler or engine spaces. The coal in the lower bunkers would be burned first, since they were underwater and less likely to be hit – leaving the upper coal bunkers to protect the overhead and outboard areas of the machinery spaces. Taken at face value, coal was far cheaper than Krupp steel, and could absorb more destructive energy than a thick armor plate. Though other navies used coal bunkers as added protection, none were as extensive or comprehensive as those found on German capital ships. “Grosse Kreuzer G” was, indeed, an improvement over Von der Tann, but it was not just more armor and thicker armor jotted down in a long list of numbers – she was so much more than that. She was a carefully conceived, homogeneous and interwoven machine designed to quickly bring her guns into battle and, above all, survive the fight. Guns were, obviously, important – but they were of little use if the ship could not survive long enough to put them to good use. During the First World War, German capital ships earned a reputation for being lethal in combat and almost impossible to sink – a feature that remained with them until the end of the Dreadnought Era, some thirty years later. On 7 April 1910, “Grosse Kreuzer G” was christened SMS Moltke – in honor of Generalfeldmarschall Helmuth Graf von Moltke. (Often referred to as “Moltke The Elder”.) He entered the Prussian Army at age 22 and served the Kingdom for fifty years, and the German Empire for another seventeen years, before retiring in 1888. He served briefly with the Danish Army and the Ottoman Army in Egypt, and commanded during the Second Schleswig War, the Austro-Prussian War, and the Franco-Prussian War. He served with distinction as the Chief of the Great General Staff for the Prussian and Imperial armies for thirty years and pioneered the military use of railways in Europe. He has been described as...”the embodiment of Prussian military organization and tactical genius.” As a “side-note” of some interest – “Moltke The Elder” retired the same year Wilhelm II ascended the throne, and his organizational skills delivered to Wilhelm the finest army in all of Europe – not a small achievement. In 1906, his nephew, Graf Helmuth Johannes Ludwig von Moltke (“Moltke The Younger”), succeeded Graf Alfred Von Schlieffen as Chief of the Great General Staff and was in command of the Imperial armies in August 1914. As SMS Moltke slid down the Blohm & Voss slipway and into the waters of the Elbe, she had an illustrious namesake to live up to – but history would prove her equal to the challenge. NEXT TIME…… MOLTKE AT WAR MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his generosity in providing the beautiful warship models. SPECIAL THANKS to my collaborating partner, @AP, for volunteering his considerable talents, time, and vivid imagination. I am eternally indebted to him. If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496- 2 Comments
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Chapter 08: The Italian, The First Lord, Dreadnought, & The Unexpected
Dreadnought posted a City Journal entry in IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN
Italian pre-dreadnought battleship Regina Elena – a 4 ship class -- 13,807 tons – 22 knots – 2x12-inch guns – 12x8-inch guns – belt armor 9.8 inches. They were the fastest battleships in the world when launched, and are sometimes referred to as the precursor of the battlecruiser concept. IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 08: THE ITALIAN, THE FIRST LORD, DREADNOUGHT, & THE UNEXPECTED. Vittorio Cuniberti – 1854 - 1913. A Naval Engineer in the Regina Marina (Italian Navy). Despite the poor quality of the photo, you get the idea. Typical “handlebar” mustache of the period, hair parted in the middle – and enough medals to choke a horse! Cuniberti was born in Turin and joined the “Genio Navale” in 1878. This department of the Italian Navy specialized in ship design and construction. He rose through the ranks and was promoted Major General in 1910. His best work was the design and building of the Regina Elena Class pre-dreadnought battleships of 1901. At 22 knots, they were the fastest battleships of their day. But he would come down to us in history as the author of an article in the 1903 edition of “Jane’s Fighting Ships”. His article put forth the case for building “all-big-gun” fighting ships. Up to this time, the various navies of the World had been building slow, thickly armored battleships (pre-dreadnoughts) with as many as four different calibers of guns aboard. The ships were lumbering, short and tubby, and overloaded with armor and guns. The idea was to waddle your way alongside the enemy and let fly with everything you had. Gunnery was a low priority – “What...?? Gunnery practice? Good God, Man!! That leaves powder stains on the paintwork!!” It was questionable as to how many of those shells would actually find their way to the target. Not to mention the fact that there was so much experimentation with ships, guns, and armor, that it was nearly impossible to form any sort of scientific theories or achieve any concrete results. But Cuniberti proposed a simple and streamlined ship – his “Colossus of the Seas”. She would be long, and low, with only guns and funnels above decks, with a minimal command bridge. This would produce a smaller target silhouette and remove all deck clutter that might be shredded or set on fire. And his theoretical ship would be fast. With a speed advantage, she could choose to attack or withdraw, or to select an engagement range that was to her advantage. She would carry a single caliber of gun – the biggest in existence at the time – the 12-inch gun. And his “Colossus” would be armored thickly enough to be impenetrable against anything up to the 12-inch guns of an enemy. Cuniberti envisioned a battery of twelve big guns – giving him a significant edge over the competition’s usual four. Cuniberti painted a vivid picture for his readers. His ship would quickly close with the enemy and unleash such a powerful broadside she would devastate first one enemy ship, then the next one in line, and the next – eventually chasing down and destroying an entire enemy fleet! He even theorized a squadron of six such “Colossi” would be so overwhelming as to deter any opponent. Among all this “theoretical” rapture, he mentioned one down-side – the cost. He said this sort of ship would only be available to a “...navy at the same time most potent, and very rich”. So your nation had to be strong at sea – with lots of money to spend. That does kind of narrow the field a bit. Cuniberti did, in fact, propose a design for the Italian Navy, but the government declined on the grounds of projected costs. They did, however, give him a consolation prize – permission to publish his thesis in “Jane’s Fighting Ships”. And there is one final item of significant interest. Cuniberti’s article was published well before the 1905 Battle of Tsushima – but the battle would endorse his theory. Once the smoke had settled and all the foreign observers filed their “After Action” reports, four things stood out. (1) Having too many gun calibers on a ship made it difficult to “spot the fall of shot”. Simply put – with so many shells of nearly the same caliber falling around a target, it was impossible to tell if yours had hit or missed. (2) The Russian ships had tall hull silhouettes and “piled-up” superstructures – making easy targets for Japanese gunners, and providing lots of material that caused showers of deadly splinters and thick, voluminous clouds of smoke when it caught fire. (3) The faster Japanese ships were able to control the range, while the slower Russians had no hope of escape. And – most importantly – (4) the real damage to the Russian ships had been caused by the 12-inch guns of the Japanese fleet. All the smaller guns were not much more than “smoke and noise” makers. Until Cuniberti published his article in the prestigious “Janes” annual, there had been talk of “all-big-gun” ships, but it had been just that – talk. A naval architect over here – a constructor over there – and an admiral dining with a friend in his London “club”. They all “talked” over luncheon or speculated over their after dinner brandy and cigars. But the article opened their eyes. This Italian naval architect was seriously advocating the idea. Which meant the neighboring Austrians must be considering it. And the French! And worst of all – “Kaiser Bill’s” navy as well!! And this was not idle speculation. “Jane’s Fighting Ships” (Fred T. Jane – editor) was published, annually, in a bound volume organized into sections by nation – Great Britain, Germany, United States, Romania, Greece, etc, etc. It listed every nation with naval assets – no matter how small. If Monaco had a tugboat with a machine gun – it got a mention. The “national” sections listed ships by type and class and told you how many, how big, how many guns, how much armor, how fast – etc, etc. Granted – this intelligence was not always perfectly accurate – and it may have been obtained by less than “sporting” means. But “Jane’s” was, pretty much, a “who’s who” and “what’s what” of your potential enemy’s fleet. Everyone was known to read “Jane’s” (or Brassey’s Naval Annual) like a “Bible”. Everyone -- from junior officers to cabinet ministers. And that’s where “The First Sea Lord” takes center stage. Sir John Arbuthnot Fisher – 1841 - 1920 -- 1st Baron Fisher of Kilverstone. Known to his friends as “Jackie” – and to his enemies by less polite names. And – he obviously wins the competition for wearing the most medals! By 1903, the political atmosphere in Britain was growing increasingly suspicious. Between 1890 and 1903, Germany had launched twelve pre-dreadnought battleships and had six more on the builders slips. The Royal Navy certainly had more battleships, but she also had to maintain the strength of the Mediterranean Fleet, the Channel Fleet, The Atlantic Fleet, and the Home Fleet -- in addition to a handful of battleships operating as support for colonial stations. The German Navy had no such commitments and was able to concentrate her battleship strength in home waters – the North Sea. The British saw the German fleet as a direct threat to their naval supremacy – the first threat since Trafalgar, a century before. What’s more the naval threat was backed by the overwhelming power of the German army. All too clearly, the British understood that if the Hochseeflotte could control the North Sea for only a few days, the German army could land in England and easily defeat their much smaller army. The only plausible answer seemed to be building more and more battleships – and faster. But they say...”As the challenge arises, so rises the man to the challenge”. John Fisher entered the Royal Navy as a cadet in 1854, at age thirteen. From his first days in training, he was eager to learn, and quick to apply what he had learned. He was energetic, enthusiastic, and clever. He did, however, have a disconcerting habit of questioning his instructors until he had exhausted the block of instruction, as well as the instructor. As he grew older, and quickly rose through the ranks, he became known as a...”man who demanded to be heard, and one who didn’t suffer fools gladly”. When Fisher argued a point, he often became quite agitated. On one occasion, King Edward VII, an admirer and staunch supporter, finally had to ask him to quit shaking his fist in the Royal face! It should also be noted that Fisher was capable of being quite charming and persuasive when it suited his purpose. His easy charm, turned on and off like a light switch, often covered his taciturn nature and frequently made up for blunt or tactless comments. Fisher was a bit eccentric, and around 1877 he became interested in dancing. So much so, that he insisted all his ship’s officers should dance on deck in the evenings when the ship’s band played for the senior officer’s wardroom. In the Victorian navy, influence was often more important than being proficient, and Fisher used his charm and skill on the dance floor to sway politically important ladies. (Because they knew just how and who to influence.) The really odd thing about the man, is that he suffered from sea sickness his entire life. Putting all the “quirks” aside, Fisher believed the fleet should be efficient, proficient, and instantly ready for war. All his reforms and innovations were aimed at modernizing the fleet and making it “battle-ready”. And anything standing in the way should be swept away. “Anyone who opposes me, I crush”...was a frequent comment, and this autocratic streak grew worse as Fisher grew older. So did his unshakable belief in himself and his ideas. Whatever he believed to be correct -- MUST be correct. Along with “efficient and proficient” was his belief promotion should be based upon merit. And “merit” included officers skilled and knowledgeable in the modern weapons of war – torpedoes, gunnery science, submarines, and fast ships. (Fisher had a mania for speed – conducted all his fleet maneuvers at “flank speed”.) This belief in merit automatically divided the Royal Navy into two groups. The younger officers, learning new weapons systems and striving for promotion – and -- the “Old Salts”. The “Old Salts” were battleship captains waiting patiently for promotion to rear admiral -- and admirals commanding squadrons or fleets, “putting in their time”, waiting for promotion, an honorific title, and a job at the Admiralty. Fisher, quite reasonably, believed nations only fought wars for material gain. If Britain had a strong fleet, it would deter others from engaging her in a war. If they attacked her colonial possessions, the Royal Navy could choke off the sea lanes. If an enemy attempted to invade the Island Kingdom, the Royal Navy would destroy them before they came within sight of land. The might, and much vaunted reputation, of the Royal Navy was the best possible deterrence against war. “On the British fleet rests the British Empire”...as Fisher pointedly remarked in crucial negotiations with the Chancellor Of the Exchequer. Fisher also believed defeated armies could be rebuilt quickly, while a catastrophic defeat at sea could lose a war in a single battle, in a single day. The notion of losing the war in a single day became something of a “bogey-man” for British admirals and politicians. Everyone expected great things from the Royal Navy – but were afraid to take the risks needed to achieve them. In the end, prudent caution would win out over Nelsonian heroics. The possibilities of the “single-day-battle” was wholly based on the theory of “The Climactic Battle”. This idea, while plausible, was -- in reality -- very nearly impossible to achieve. Since Hannibal crushed the Romans at Cannae in 216BC, every admiral or general has sought the “Climactic Battle” – or battle of annihilation. For three years during the American Civil War, Robert E. Lee sought to out-maneuver and crush his opponents. Though brilliantly done, Lee never understood the first armies of the “Modern Era” were too large and complex to be overwhelmed and shredded. Nelson actually achieved the battle of annihilation at Trafalgar in 1805, through his genius, audacity, and the substandard performance of the French and Spanish fleets. Togo achieved a similar victory a century later at Tsushima, through sound tactical execution and the utter ineptitude of his Russian opponents. However, sinking an entire fleet of heavily armored, smoke belching, fire-breathing, 20th Century pre-dreadnoughts in a single engagement, was a completely different problem. Unfortunately, Jutland did not provide a conclusive fleet engagement. Which brings us back to where Cuniberti came in. Admiral Togo on the bridge of his flagship Mikasa as the Japanese battleships steam in line ahead formation -- closing on the approaching Russian ships. Note the early version of a rangefinder in use directly behind Togo. By early 1902, Fisher had been promoted to full admiral and was finishing up a three-year tour as Commander, Mediterranean Fleet – the preeminent posting in the Edwardian Era Royal Navy. He had made great progress in training his officers to function in the “modern” navy, rather than the “Victorian” navy – but he had begun to realize training ships and crews to be superior to all others might not be enough. He was looking for an “edge” and thought faster ships might be the answer. He had made the acquaintance of a naval constructor while in Malta, and they began working on rough sketches and design ideas for new ships that might better utilize his trained crews and modern methods. The year 1903 found Fisher taking up his new post as Commander-In-Chief, Portsmouth, when the Cuniberti article was published. While he never gave any inspirational credit to Cuniberti, it is certain he was familiar with the article and his other theories. Fisher could not have avoided them. Since the “big gun” proposal had now been published, it was more imperative than ever to act. This just might be the “edge” he was looking for. Fisher gathered an unofficial group of advisors (mostly naval architects and shipbuilders) in early 1904 and went to work on his earlier sketches and concept designs to formulate the ideal characteristics for a battleship. The time was fast approaching when he could make these theories a reality. On 20 October 1904, Admiral John Fisher was appointed First Sea Lord of the Admiralty, and was further promoted “Admiral Of The Fleet” in December. The decision was made by the government, and approved by King Edward VII, to bring Fisher into the Admiralty to reduce the naval budgets, and reform the navy along modern lines – efficient and proficient. The feeling was the Royal Navy had become too large, too expensive, and too hide-bound to measure up against the growing naval arms race with Germany. And Fisher was seen as the relentless, driving Juggernaut to correct the problem. One of his first acts was to push through the Board Of Admiralty a decision to arm the next battleship with 12-inch guns, with a speed of no less than 21 knots. (In direct agreement with Cuniberti’s proposal.) In January 1905, he convened a formal “Committee On Designs” (including many of his former advisors) to evaluate design proposals and to assist in the detailed design process. At the same time, Fisher provoked massive public controversy and inter-service opposition as he ruthlessly laid-up 64 ships in reserve and scrapped 90 obsolete ships, characterizing them as...”too weak to fight and too slow to run away -- a miser’s hoard of useless junk”. This freed-up crews and operating funds to increase the numbers of large, modern ships in home waters. He trimmed 3.5 million Pounds from the 1905 naval estimates – and was still able to institute new building and training programs that greatly increased the fleet’s effectiveness. HMS Lord Nelson – 1908. The last class of British pre-dreadnought battleships – 17,820 tons – 18 knots – 4x12-inch guns – 6x9.2-inch guns – 5x18 inch torpedo tubes – sister ship HMS Agamemnon. HMS Dreadnought – 1906. The first all-big-gun battleship in the World – 18,120 tons – 21 knots – 10x12-inch guns. The Committee On Design produced their final design in record time and Fisher immediately pushed it through the Board of Admiralty. HMS Dreadnought was ordered in April 1905 -- laid down in October 1905 – launched in February 1906, and commissioned into the Royal Navy in December 1906. It still holds the world record for the fastest building time for a Capital ship. Considering the huge number of innovations in the design – it was a miracle – and a costly one at 1.8 million Pounds! HMS Dreadnought moored quayside for the installation of new gunnery equipment. This is an excellent overall view of the revolutionary new warship. The arrangement of the five main battery turrets is clearly visible, with excellent firing arcs for broadside fire. The forward superstructure is compact with two funnels. Just outboard of her, a Midgard Class tug is towing a barge crane to its’ next repair job. Tug, barge, and crane courtesy of "AP". Another view of Dreadnought. A real “bruiser” for her day, just eight years later she would be considered small compared to her larger and more modern cousins. The quay is a series of re-lotted PEG-SNM Series “battleship” docks with 1x1 custom lots used to fill-in between the dock and the rail line. In this view, you can see the forward bridge structure, with a funnel right behind it, and a heavy tripod mast with a “spotting top” right behind that. The only reason they could have arranged it in that order was to position the funnels at either end of the boiler rooms below decks. With the funnel between the bridge and foremast, thick clouds of black smoke would have made the upper bridge uninhabitable in a trailing wind. And with a head wind, the funnel gases and smoke would have blown right back into the spotting tops – blinding the spotters and making their perch unbearably hot. Believe it or not – that mistake would be made more than once. In the top right, a Midgard Class tug is passing with a “double tow” bound for the coaling docks. The beautiful little tug and coal lighters are by "AP". This view shows a problem common to warships of the pre-World-War period. Of Dreadnought’s ten big guns, only eight can fire in broadside – where battleships do most of their fighting. In effect – during battle – one of the “wing turrets” will always be unable to engage the target. The simple solution would have been to lengthen the bow and place two “superfiring” turrets up forward. But – British designers had no previous experience with “stacked” turrets, and the seagoing officers feared the blast over-pressure from the top turret would enter the open sighting hoods of the lower turret – disabling or killing the gun crew. In this close-up, you can clearly see the spotting top on the tripod foremast. This was one of Dreadnought’s revolutionary features. Before “gunnery science” came into being, battle ranges were around 2,000 to 3,000 yards – close enough for Turret Captains or bridge officers to see the fall of their own shells with high-powered binoculars. As guns grew larger, they could actually shoot farther than you could see to aim. When the range of torpedoes reached 2,000 yards, as well – it became imperative to open the range to avoid the torpedoes – and a method to shoot farther had to be invented. Thanks to Fisher’s relentless drive, and Capt. Percy Scott’s ingenuity, “Director Firing” was introduced beginning with HMS Dreadnought. “Director Control” equipment was installed below decks and communicated with wide angle rangefinders installed in the “spotting top” on the tripod mast. Now all main battery guns could be fired with the press of a button. “Spotters” in the tops would be able to see the shell splashes through the rangefinders, and corrections could be made quickly and easily. Gunnery scores at much longer ranges rose from the previous 40% to 80% hits. That made HMS Dreadnought not only heavily armed – but deadly dangerous. Here is a “detail shot” of the beautiful and highly accurate model provided by @Barroco Hispano. The “all-big-gun” battleship was now a reality – and Cuniberti’s thesis had become fact. HMS Dreadnought brought down the curtain on the “Pre-Dreadnought Era” and gave her name to the new type of “dreadnought” battleships, and a new era. And that brings us to the “unexpected” part of the tale. When the Committee On Designs finished their work on Dreadnought, they immediately set to work on another of Fisher’s concept sketches. The new battleship had been designed to ensure the Royal Navy’s superiority in battle fleet engagements, and was more amenable to the conservative big-gun admirals. The new project would ensure that Britain’s sea lanes and colonial possessions would be safe from marauding enemies – a massive new armored cruiser. Fisher seems to have had conflicting trains of thought at this point. Having built Dreadnought with a speed of 21 knots, she was quite capable of operating with the existing armored cruisers. But their speed averaged 23 knots – barely sufficient to scout ahead of the battle fleet. And though faster and more powerful than their German counterparts (mostly), they did not possess either of these qualities to any overwhelming degree. Fisher thought the armored cruisers could be put to better use if they were faster. He had always been overly fascinated by fast ships, and saw them as tactically decisive – which appealed to his nature. W.H. Gard, Chief Constructor at HM Dockyard Portsmouth, had been on Fisher’s earlier “advisory board” and was now a member of the Committee On Designs. While with Fisher, in Malta, he had proposed a 25.5 knot armored cruiser armed with sixteen 9.2 inch guns, and that became the focus of discussion. But Dreadnought had whetted Fisher’s appetite and he now saw the possibilities of marrying the “all-big-gun” theory to a very fast armored cruiser. It was quickly decided the new cruiser would be armed with the same main battery gun as Dreadnought – the 12-inch gun. Using this gun would effectively counter ships being built for the Italian and Japanese navies. This would also simplify the process of gun manufacturing and ammunition procurement – thereby lowering costs and giving the new cruiser a massive offensive capability. Coupled with a 25.5 knot speed, the ship would be able to catch and sink any existing enemy cruisers with her overwhelming gun power. At the same time, she would be heavily armed enough to defend herself against almost any warship – while still having the option to disengage at high speed. As the design began to take shape, it was agreed the new cruiser might be a suitable candidate to fulfill the role of the “fast wing” of the battle fleet. And Fisher may well have thought the new cruiser might eventually evolve into a potentially cheaper alternative to the much more expensive battleship. (Fisher’s quick mind operated simultaneously on several different levels – not all of which came together in the end.) But the thought of completely eliminating battleships was never seriously considered, largely due to the storm of opposition this would elicit from every corner – including the Board of Admiralty, seagoing officer ranks – and the public. Due to the system of alliances Europe had twisted itself into, and the obvious naval challenge from Germany, the committee quickly concluded the Royal Navy would potentially have to meet challenges in the Baltic Sea, North Sea, English Channel, and the Mediterranean. With the Kaiserliche Marine mostly concentrated in the North Sea, the possible threat to trade routes was not considered serious. And, from a purely tactical point of view, the Home Fleet needed a replacement for the existing, slow armored cruisers if they were going to operate effectively against the Hochseeflotte. Consequently, the primary duty of the new cruisers would be scouting for the fleet. Their high speed and powerful guns would enable them to destroy or brush aside enemy cruiser or destroyer screens, report the location and composition of the enemy fleet, and then retire without engaging heavy units. Since their firepower and speed would prevail against their enemies, and ensure their escape from enemy battleships, it was further decided they did not need to be armored against anything larger than an 8.3-inch gun (standard armament on German armored cruisers). Another possible task for the new armored cruisers was the aforementioned “Fast Wing” of the battle fleet. They could deploy ahead or astern of the battle fleet as protection against sudden cruiser or destroyer attacks. They might maneuver to present a threat to enemy battleships – only engaging if circumstances were favorable. As mentioned before, the new armored cruisers could be used to pressure the vanguard of an enemy fleet and force them onto a course advantageous to the British. Their speed advantage would allow them to successfully pursue a retreating enemy force and damage or destroy slow or “wounded” ships. And, of course, they were ideally suited to destroying commerce raiding cruisers and armed merchant cruisers. Fisher’s fertile brain even conceived the bizarre notion they might maneuver against the rear of the German battle-line and engage the smaller battleships, such as the Wittelsbach Class. SMS Zahringen – Wittelsbach Class pre-dreadnought battleship 11,774 tons – 18 knots – 4x9.4-inch guns – 18x5.9-inch guns – 12x3.5-inch guns – 6x17.7-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 8.9 inches. Admiral Fisher planned to use his new 12-inch-gunned “dreadnought cruisers” to attack the elderly, lightly armed and armored pre-dreadnoughts bringing up the rear of the German battle line. The Committee On Design finalized the “particulars” of the new armored cruisers, Gard’s architects and draftsmen finished the plan drawings, and they met for the last time on 22 February 1905. The Board Of Admiralty approved Dreadnought’s design on 17 March, and the new armored cruiser design on 7 July 1905. Dreadnought was laid down on 2 October, 1905 at HM Dockyard, Portsmouth – reputed to be the fastest shipyard in the World. The new battleship was to be built under conditions of strict secrecy, with the building slip completely screened-off from outside observation, and the area kept off-limits to all but the work force. Fisher fully intended Dreadnought’s particulars to be kept secret in order to delay other nations from building competing battleships. He also intended Dreadnought’s secret to be a “decoy”. Even though the new armored cruiser would be laid down at Armstrong, Whitworth & Co., Ltd, on Tyneside, in the north of England, Fisher hoped to divert attention from her by giving “foreign interests” a high-profile “secret” in the most likely place – Portsmouth. The deception was a success. The appearance of HMS Dreadnought in December, 1906, was akin to a bomb going off in the Reichsmarineamt, as well as the Palace in Berlin. Admiral Tirpitz instantly realized he had just commissioned a new Deutschland Class pre-dreadnought battleship – and had four more fitting out. And Dreadnought had made them all obsolete! Meanwhile, up on Tyneside, the new armored cruiser was laid down just a few weeks after Dreadnought was commissioned. Again, the ship was built in strict secrecy, and it was even arranged for false information to be leaked -- leading people to believe the new ships were merely improved versions of the recent Minotaur Class armored cruisers. A year later, she was christened HMS Invincible at her launching, and eleven months on she was commissioned into the 1st Cruiser Squadron, Home Fleet -- 20 March 1909. (Her two sister ships, Indomitable and Inflexible, had been commissioned in the last half of 1908, but they were either in the dockyards for “working-up” adjustments, or sent on voyages to North America – more or less out of European sight.) In April and June Invincible participated in fleet maneuvers. On 9 June, with the rest of the Home Fleet, she steamed up the Solent and dropped anchor at Spithead, where the Atlantic Fleet would soon arrive for the Spithead Naval Review of 1909. Naval reviews were, in those days, more like social events than military affairs. And this one, in particular, because it kicked-off the festivities for “Cowes Week”, the annual yachting regatta hosted by King Edward VII. Ships of various nations were invited to attend, as were diplomats, naval attaches, industrialists, and military officers of all branches and nationality. And this is where the world got its’ first good look at HMS Invincible and her sisters. HMS Invincible lies at anchor during the Spithead Naval Review of 1909. Note the steamer alongside. She would steam up and down the six lines of anchored warships providing sightseers a close look at the might of the Royal Navy. Information about the new armored cruiser had been trickling into the Reichsmarineamt for well over a year, but it all turned out to be erroneous. Once the 1st Cruiser Squadron (Invincible – Inflexible -- Indomitable) dropped anchor in the Solent, it was painfully obvious none of the information had been reliable. German officers, diplomats, and dignitaries were welcomed aboard the new armored cruisers as quests, and they knew, without doubt, that it was “game over”. These cruisers were obviously bigger, surely faster, and certainly more heavily gunned than anything in the Kaiserliche Marine. And that included the battleships! Neither Tirpitz, nor the Imperial Navy High Command had suspected the new British cruisers could be this innovative and powerful. And three of them already in service! But there is always the – “unexpected” – isn’t there? The 1st Cruiser Squadron of the Home Fleet lies moored at buoys just outside the Cuxhaven roadsted breakwater. They are returning a courtesy port call circa 1911. (Left to right – HMS Invincible, Inflexible, Indomitable.) These port calls by foreign navies were always festive occasions, with much “show and ceremony”. A large number of civilian small craft have gathered to see the big British cruisers up close. The tourists are immensely entertained by such simple things as “morning and evening color” ceremonies – when the ship’s bands play the national anthem while the flag is raised in the morning and lowered in the evening, while a detachment of sailors is assembled to “salute the colors”. The steamer SS Lorena (foreground) has come down from Hamburg with a boatload of sightseers on a “day trip”. In the evenings, the British captains might even have the ship’s band serenade the small craft anchored nearby. These ostentatious shows of courtesy were quite common in the Edwardian Age. Here we have two views of the SS Lorena. She was, in reality, a British packet steamer out of the Humber, sometime in the late 1930’s and early 1940’s. But for our purposes, she’s a packet steamer down from Hamburg. When I came across the photo of Invincible and the steamer, it seemed too good an opportunity to pass up. The model is provided by Barroco Hispano, and is a prefect little gem of detail. The sailing ketch in the upper right is by @mattb325, while the remaining small craft are from NBVC’s marina sets. Here you have an excellent view of Invincible. She has a long and sleek appearance, with a rather tall and compact superstructure, and funnels grouped forward and aft, separated by the midships main battery turrets. There are large open areas of deck, with a minimum of clutter. The ship’s boat boom has been extended, with a motor launch tied on. The Port Admiral has placed the motor launch and crew at the disposal of the squadron commander (Rear Admiral Sir Horace Hood) for the duration of the visit. The very fine armored cruiser models are courtesy of Barroco Hispano. (It should be noted the British did not officially adopt the term “battlecruiser” until late in 1911.) The boat boom, motor launch, and small cutter are the finely detailed work of "AP". This is a detail shot. Amidships you see a problem common to many capital ships prior to WW I. In their desperation to maximize the number of guns on a warship, designers often used “wing turrets” placed amidships. In this instance, the two center turrets have been placed in such a manner that they might, possibly, be able to fire cross-deck on either beam. Theoretically, this would allow an eight gun broadside. In reality, the port side turret, firing cross-deck to starboard, would have a very narrow arc of fire (unless you were willing to fire over the top of the starboard wing turret – not recommended.) And – the blast over-pressure of a 12-inch gun would rip the planking right off the deck, buckle the steel deck plates beneath it, buckle any superstructure plates within 40 feet, and make toothpicks out of nearby ship’s boats. The fact was, though Invincible carried eight main battery guns, she only had a six-gun broadside. This is the chief reason broadside fire was so important and why battle formations were “single-line-ahead” – to maximize broadside firing arcs. (Note: If you examine the cutter hooking onto the boat boom, you will see the boat crew has their oars raised to the “oars up” position for docking. “AP” likes everything done “ship-shape” and proper.) SMS Scharnhorst had been assigned to the East Asiatic Squadron in March 1909, as a matter of course. She was to relieve the aging Furst Bismarck. As squadron flagship, she was one of the most powerful armored cruisers in the Far East. Four months after Scharnhorst’s departure, the Naval High Command scrutinized the new information on the British armored cruisers displayed at Spithead, and found the situation grim. These British “dreadnought style” cruisers clearly out-classed all of Germany’s armored cruisers – and sending German cruisers against them would be something akin to murdering one’s own ships and crews. (Early on, the Invincible’s were actually referred to as “dreadnought cruisers”.) And yet – Gneisenau was a new and powerful ship. So they arrived at the decision to send her to the Far East where her power and presence might still be of use. And that’s why both of Germany’s finest armored cruisers wound up on the other side of the World. Plans had been made, keels hand been laid, and ships had been built. But Fisher’s deception and HMS Invincible had upset all the careful planning of the Reichsmarineamt. Tirpitz had spent large amounts of money on two very fine cruisers that were, in the end, almost worthless to him. Though valuable assets in the Far East, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau would be of little use in the North Sea – where Tirpitz knew the issue would ultimately be decided. But it is difficult to plan for -- the unexpected. HMS Inflexible – Invincible Class battlecruiser – circa 1911. NEXT TIME…… CORONEL AND THE FALKLANDS MANY, MANY, MANY, THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful and highly detailed warships. VERY SPECIAL THANKS to my partner -- @AP -- for the immense amount of time and effort he has so generously put into this project. Without him “Cuxhaven” would not exist. If you enjoyed anything you saw – please punch the “like” button so I will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of my ability. THANK YOU for your visit and the COMMENTS many of you have been kind enough to make! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496- 7 Comments
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