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Chapter 34: Into The Jaws Of Death
Dreadnought posted a City Journal entry in IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN
Dreadnought battleship SMS Markgraf, III Battle Squadron, Hochseeflotte. Ahead of her in the battle line can be seen Grosser Kurfurst, with Konig (flag) leading the van of the battle fleet. Off their port beam they are engaging the four super-dreadnoughts of the 5th Battle Squadron as they steer north to join Jellicoe’s battle line. (Claus Bergen) IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 34: INTO THE JAWS OF DEATH As the smoke settled over HMS Invincible’s last resting place, Vizeadmiral Reinhard Scheer -- some 16,000 yards to the SW -- remained completely oblivious to it. As he steered the Hochseeflotte ENE at 17 knots, the van of his line -- the III Battle Squadron -- was warmly engaged with the British 5th Battle Squadron -- about 13,000 yards off the port beam. The rolling banks of smoke from the big rifles and hundreds of funnels effectively blocked his line of sight to the north and east. His mind was sharply focused on closing-up with Hipper’s Panzerkreuzer and completing the destruction of Beatty’s battlecruisers. Scheer had not the slightest idea of what awaited him on the other side of the impenetrable mass of smoke. And while intent on catching Beatty, he was for the moment, distracted by Evan-Thomas’ fast battleships. Evan-Thomas’ four Queen Elizabeth Class battleships were overloading their boilers as they steamed north at 24 knots to take station at the tail of the Grand Fleet deployment. This position would place them at the rear of HMS Marlborough’s battleship division, and nearly abeam of Scheer’s battle line. Unfortunately for Evan-Thomas, the smoke chose this moment to lift clear of the water and provide the Hochseeflotte with the first truly clear target they had seen. SMS Konig, flagship of III Battle Squadron, leading the van of the German battle fleet. She is exchanging salvos with the super-dreadnoughts of Evan-Thomas’ 5th Battle Squadron. Notice the thick funnel smoke trailing away to leeward as the battleships maintain a 17 knot speed. You will also notice how the masses of smoke being churned out by nearly 260 warships has, quite literally, darkened the sky – further lowering visibility. (Claus Bergen) SMS Friedrich der Grosse loosed her first broadside at 18:20 – quickly followed by the seven battleships of Konteradmiral Paul Behncke’s III Battle Squadron. The big 12-inch guns crashed out and mountains of smoke billowed skyward as the shells arched away toward the enemy. With clockwork precision, salvo after salvo was fired every twenty seconds, and forests of water columns sprouted around HMS Barham, Valiant, Warspite, and Malaya. The range to target varied depending upon the positions of the opposing ships, but averaged 10,000-15,000 yards. Within seconds of opening fire with the main battery guns, the German 5.9-inch secondary batteries opened as well. Evan-Thomas had been “splitting” his fire as he steamed north – Barham and Valiant fired on Hipper’s battlecruisers (when they could be seen) – while Warspite and Malaya engaged Scheer’s battle fleet. Hits were scored on both sides, but the only serious damage occurred when Warspite’s steering gear was temporarily jammed and she suffered 13 large caliber hits. (See chapter 32 for details.) This reduced Warspite’s speed and Evan-Thomas eventually detached her with orders to make for the Rosyth dockyards. SMS Kaiser, III Battle Squadron, “tactical #5” in the battle line. She is seen firing on HMS Warspite, which is circling to starboard with her steering gear jammed. The super-dreadnought took ten minutes to make two complete circles before her steering gear was freed-up, and very nearly every dreadnought in the Hochseeflotte took a crack at her. As the action raged on, more German dreadnoughts came within range and opened fire on the British fast battleships. Eventually, twelve of the battleships in III and I Battle Squadrons were engaged. After some twenty minutes of furious firing, SMS Ostfriesland fired the last salvo as visibility deteriorated in the failing light of early evening. A few minutes after 5th Battle Squadron disappeared in the smoke and haze to port (around 18:43), Beatty’s battlecruisers were still hotly engaged with the four remaining Panzerkreuzer. Beatty, having the advantage of knowing (more or less) where Jellicoe would deploy the battle fleet, began to close the range and maneuver against the van of the German battlecruiser line. Beatty now had the upper hand -- six battlecruisers (two of them relatively fresh) against the four heavily damaged ships under Kapitan Hartog’s command. By applying pressure to the head of the German line, Beatty would force them to give way to the south – thereby preventing them from interfering with the head of Jellicoe’s battle line. As the British Battlecruiser Fleet steered east, then SE at high speed, the tail-end of his line finally cleared the front of the Grand Fleet battle line. Now their massed guns would not be masked by Beatty’s ships, and the Grand Fleet gunners would no longer have to stare into his thick clouds of funnel smoke. Scheer continued to steam NE, following the Panzerkreuzer, and hoping to catch Beatty’s battlecruisers. Only aware of the presence of Beatty’s force, Scheer was on the verge of attaining the tactical goal of this sortie – the ambush and destruction of a formidable contingent of the Grand Fleet. As the admiral peered through his glasses, he could see (periodically) Von der Tann bringing up the tail of the German battlecruisers, with the rest of them shrouded in smoke and only “visible” through their gun flashes. As he swung the glasses to the north, the funnel smoke from Beatty’s unseen ships began to dissipate, and dim, shadowy shapes started to emerge. Scheer was momentarily puzzled. Hipper had earlier reported contact with British heavy ships approaching from the east (that would have been Hood’s 3rd Battlecruiser Squadron) – and that was followed by a wireless from Seydlitz reporting a vague appearance of ships to the north. (By this time, the wireless antenna on most of the Panzerkreuzer had been shot away and reports were less frequent and often garbled.) Finally, around 18:30, advanced elements of the II Torpedo Boat Flotilla had reported battleships to the north -- on a SE course. Scheer used the muffler tucked into his collar to clean the binocular lenses and looked again. The haze and smoke seemed to fade away to the east -- and NW of Von der Tann, he could see HMS New Zealand trailing Beatty’s line, and beyond that – just 19,000 yards from his own battle line – were King George V Class battleships. Scheer swung his glasses to the west, and through intermittent banks of smoke and haze, more British dreadnoughts were visible. Scheer later reported… “It was now quite obvious we were confronted by a large portion of the English Fleet, and a few minutes later their presence on the horizon directly in front of us was made known by the firing of numerous heavy caliber guns. An entire arc stretching from due north around to due east was a sea of fire. Even in places where smoke and mist still hung between the battle lines, the muzzle flashes were clearly seen.” The Hochseeflotte had stumbled into the Grand Fleet while Hartog’s battlecruisers had been lured off to the east -- and Scheer was clearly at a disadvantage. The rear of the British battle line was steering NE, with a bend in the middle – an 8 point turn in succession to starboard -- where Jellicoe had altered course SE to close on his enemy. The battle line formed a sort of “elbow pocket”, and Scheer was steering straight for it – right into the center of an inverted “V” formation. His “T” had been crossed and his lead elements would soon be in a crossfire from both ends of the English line. Both sides having opened fire, the battle line of the Hochseeflotte is steering NE. Left to right are – SMS Kaiserin, Prinzregent Luitpold, Kaiser, Kronprinz, Markgraf, Grosser Kurfurst – and SMS Konig, just barely visible as two funnels and a gun flash, at the head of the line. A German torpedo boat steams parallel to the fleet, on the disengaged side of the battle line. Notice the confusing elements of the scene: huge, random, shell splashes raising giant water columns – thick funnel smoke drifting to leeward – clouds of gun smoke large enough to obscure an entire battleship – and most important of all, the indistinct British targets in the distant smoke and haze. (Claus Bergen) Few battleships on either side could see more than a portion of the enemy line, largely due to the ever-present mist and rolling banks of smoke generated by hundreds of guns and funnels. Even worse for Scheer, only a handful of his ships could clearly make out a target. In the failing light of early evening, Admiral Jellicoe had been able to get to the north and east of his enemy and the British ships were hidden in the darkening haze to the east – much as the Germans had been earlier in the afternoon. Jellicoe’s battleships were a dark and fuzzy image in the German rangefinders, while the sun dropping behind the western horizon now clearly silhouetted the German dreadnoughts. The Hochseeflotte, stunned and surprised by the sudden appearance of the enemy’s battle fleet, found itself, literally, steering into the jaws of death. Far from trapping Beatty, Scheer’s own fleet had been trapped by an overwhelming force and caught at a significant tactical disadvantage – largely due to Jellicoe’s excellent deployment of the Grand Fleet. What’s more – Jellicoe had neatly boxed Scheer in on three sides – and was quickly cutting him off from his escape route via Horn’s Reef. These cold, hard, facts came home swiftly to Scheer – and with uncomfortable force. The 2nd Battle Squadron of the Grand Fleet – King George V (flag) leading the line – had a clear view of the leading German dreadnoughts, as did most of the 4th Battle Squadron. The remainder of the British line, for the most part, had something of a view – though mostly fleeting and a matter of luck. The rear half of the Hochseeflotte battle line was still hidden by voluminous funnel smoke – guaranteeing III Battle Squadron would come in for the lion’s share of punishment. Vice-Admiral Jellicoe’s battleships were in the last stages of organizing their formation. Some had to reduce speed as they bunched-up, getting into line-ahead, and several even had their guns masked by their squadron mates. But various parts of the British battle line had a variety of targets to choose from – the disabled light cruiser Wiesbaden, still afloat – the Imperial battlecruisers to the SE – and, of course, the leading elements of the Hochseeflotte. The British dreadnoughts had an excellent view of SMS Konig, Grosser Kurfurst, Markgraf, Kronprinz, Prinzregent Luitpold, Kaiser, Kaiserin, and even the flagship, Friedrich der Grosse. HMS Benbow, 4th Battle Squadron – followed by Conqueror and Thunderer -- just seconds before opening fire on the Hochseeflotte. Notice the funnel smoke of the battleships is dangerously close to obscuring their own field of fire -- the smoke and haze has already obscured the following battleship divisions. HMS Marlborough reacted quickly, opening fire around 18:19 at 14,200 yards. Others followed within minutes, while some battleships delayed until they acquired a good “visual” on a target. Only four capital ships were unable to acquire a target and remained silent. Curiously enough, of the twenty battleships that opened fire, thirteen selected the unfortunate light cruiser Wiesbaden as a target. HMS Agincourt selected Kapitan Hartog’s battlecruisers, but later shifted to Wiesbaden. The remainder fired on various ships of the Hochseeflotte. Something nearing 200 British guns lit up the hazy, smoke-shrouded, horizon in a random and haphazard manner. Individual ships, or small groups of ships, briefly acquired a target -- fired one or two salvos in a minute -- then had to “check fire” when their target disappeared in the rolling smoke and haze. A lone British destroyer, intent on torpedoing the crippled Wiesbaden, approached as the large caliber shells screeched overhead, but the German battle line opened a fusillade from their 5.9-inch guns and drove it away. SMS Prinzregent Luitpold opened fire at 18:22, her guns trained on HMS King George V, leading the British battle line. The German battleship straddled her target with the second and third salvo, then had to “check fire” when funnel smoke obscured the field of fire. HMS Orion opened on SMS Markgraf at 18:32, firing four salvos of 13.5-inch APC shells (armor-piercing, capped) and managed a single hit with the last one. The shell exploded on impact against the port side casemate armor of the #6 5.9-inch gun. Though it failed to penetrate the casemate, the armor was holed, the crew killed, and the gun disabled. Shortly thereafter, a large caliber shell fell close alongside the stern and exploded. No damage was apparent, but around 18:44 a bent propeller shaft forced the engine room crew to shut down the port high pressure turbine. Markgraf’s speed momentarily dropped, but the engineers were able to gradually increase steam pressure to the starboard and center turbines, returning her to 18 knots and maintaining her place in line. Iron Duke (C.-in-C. Flag – ninth in line) opens fire on the van of the Hochseeflotte battle line. Note the failing light of late afternoon and the thick, smokey haze hanging over the British battle line. These two factors made it extremely difficult for the German dreadnoughts to return fire. (Claus Bergen) HMS Iron Duke opened the engagement targeting SMS Konig – as did several other ships. Within five minutes, Iron Duke fired nine salvos and continuously deluged the German dreadnought with straddling shell splashes. Numerous 6-inch shells slammed into the casemate armor on the port quarter, but the only effect was to destroy large segments of the torpedo nets and booms. Within that short space of time, Konig reeled under the repeated impact of large shells. Her decks were littered with debris and fittings blasted loose from the superstructure, she was on fire, and taking on water. A 13.5-inch shell (1,250 pounds) struck the top of Konig’s armored conning tower at an oblique angle and bored a groove across it before exploding 90 feet beyond the ship. The impact broke loose a roof mounting bracket which slightly wounded Konteradmiral Behncke. Another shell struck the face-plate of “A” turret, but glanced off without damage. The most dangerous hit was at 18:35 when a 13.5-inch struck just below the armor belt – below the waterline – aft of “C” turret. The protective coal bunker and torpedo bulkhead were penetrated, the port wing passages flooded, and several adjacent compartments wrecked. The flooding was brought under control, and three compartments on the starboard side were counter-flooded to maintain the ship’s stability as a gun platform. Though a bit sluggish in turns, Konig was able to maintain speed and remain in the line. Iron Duke’s gunnery may well have been the best in the Grand Fleet that day. She was credited with seven large caliber hits in just five minutes. (What else would you expect from the gun crews of the C.-in-C.’s flagship?) It should be noted, Iron Duke had the potential to fire as many as 100 shells in a five minute time frame, representing a 7% hit ratio – but no records confirm that supposition. On a lighter note, HMS Agincourt, just ahead of the 5th Battle Squadron, opened on Hartog’s battlecruisers with her 12-inch guns – all 14 of them – in one tremendous broadside. For a brief moment -- there was so much fire and smoke – observers were stunned, and thought the battleship had blown up. When the smoke cleared and Agincourt was still there, great relief took the form of humor…”...looked like bloody great bonfires on Guy Fawkes Night!...Bet there ain’t a lick ‘o paint still on ‘er!” Taken under fire during “The First Encounter” – left to right – SMS Markgraf, Grosser Kurfurst, and Konig, leading the van of the Hochseeflotte battle squadrons. The Imperial dreadnoughts are returning fire in the direction of the hazy gun flashes barely visible on the port beam. Notice the huge shell splashes and the funnel smoke trailing to the SE. (Claus Bergen) Official Dispatches, battle observations, and even notations in official ship’s logs can be grossly inaccurate. For example: if a four-gun salvo straddles the target ship, and the observer can only count three shell splashes – he will likely assume the fourth shell struck the target – a “hit”. But “battle” is not a normal condition for the human animal. Every sense, every movement, every thought – the entire body – is running in overdrive – fueled by human emotion, and fed with pure adrenaline. During the heat of battle the mind jumps to conclusions – sees things one way when they are, in fact, something altogether different. The brain regularly “fills in” gaps in sensory information the other senses have not supplied or confirmed. Don’t forget – both HMS Princess Royal and Agincourt were assumed to have blown up – with somewhat comic results. But there is one central theme running through the various “after action” reports of the ships on both sides – visibility. Whole paragraphs in every record relate the continual problems involved in sighting a target, holding it in the sights long enough, and firing on it. Never mind hanging onto a target long enough to sink it. HMS Marlborough was among the British battleships closest to the Imperial battle fleet…... “We opened fire at her at a range of about 16,000 yards – by the time deflection was corrected, and about four salvos were fired, she disappeared in the mist. Shortly afterwards, another battleship came in sight, but before fire could be opened on her, she was obscured by smoke.” This one factor – visibility – accounts for why, virtually the entire Grand Fleet, chose to direct their fire on what remained of SMS Wiesbaden. The hapless light cruiser lay dead in the water, battered and on fire, as the British battle fleet passed to the north at short range. Clearly visible to every battleship, Wiesbaden received an unknown number of heavy and medium shells (estimated to be in excess of 300 rounds – hits unknown), but unlike larger and more heavily armored British battlecruisers, the German light cruiser never blew up. Wiesbaden remained afloat until approximately 01:00 (precise time unknown) when, full of water, she turned over – much like SMS Blucher at Dogger Bank – and took all 570 of her crew to the bottom. But not before she exacted a certain measure of revenge on her tormentors. The light cruiser SMS Wiesbaden as she would have looked at the Battle of Jutland. She is steaming at high speed, with volumes of smoke pouring from her funnels. With her speed increasing, you can look aft and see the propellers have “dug-in”, and her stern has settled. Commissioned in 1915, Wiesbaden was fast and agile, and well armed with 8x5.9-inch guns and 4x19.7-inch torpedo tubes. She was a fine example of the “standard” light cruiser adopted by the Kaiserliche Marine. SMS Wiesbaden, since being crippled by HMS Invincible earlier in the afternoon, had become a “shell magnate”. The little light cruiser received fire from any British warship that spotted her or even came close (don’t forget “Arbuthnot’s Charge”). She had been battered beyond all belief, but defiantly fired back until all her guns had been disabled – no doubt in the hope of staying afloat long enough to be rescued. And though various Imperial ships had come to her rescue in one form or another, the battle around her had been too fierce to take her under tow, or to rescue the crew. Around 17:45, as HMS Marlborough passed to the north and took Wiesbaden under fire, the German crew fired two torpedoes in her general direction. Perhaps they hoped to force the British battleships to turn away and leave them alone – or -- they thought they were going to sink and wanted to take a battleship down with them. The first torpedo ended up “God knows where” – but the second one struck Marlborough near the starboard diesel generator room. The resulting hole was 28 feet wide by 14 feet tall and resulted in immediate and significant flooding. As water poured into the hull and began to trickle into the forward boiler room, the fires were shut down and stokers evacuated to prevent an explosion. Marlborough’s speed promptly dropped to 16 knots. By 18:30, pumps had contained the flooding in the boiler rooms, but the battleship had taken on an eight degree list, and it caused water to leak into the forward dynamo room, knocking-out power to the main battery turrets. A thorough inspection showed the powerful torpedo blast had damaged just over 30 watertight compartments to varying degrees. The torpedo bulkhead had held, but the most seriously damaged compartments had to be shored-up with timber balks. Had Wiesbaden’s first torpedo also found the target, Marlborough would certainly have gone to the bottom then and there. (British underwater protection was woefully inadequate and the problem only came to light during the war. Even if bulkheads managed to survive the initial blast, their watertight integrity was invariably compromised – resulting in serious “leaks” and flooding adjacent compartments, which were not built as “watertight” as they should have been. British capital ships were much more likely to sink once hit by a mine or torpedo.) Marlborough, seriously damaged, managed to struggle along, barely keeping up with the battle fleet throughout the evening and into the night. SMS Wiesbaden’s torpedo struck HMS Marlborough – approximately – where you see the small boat hanging from the davits. It impacted the starboard side below the armor belt and blasted a large hole in the lower hull near the forward boiler room. HMS Marlborough was an Iron Duke Class dreadnought battleship of 25,820 tons. Model courtesy of Barroco Hispano. By 01:00 on 1 June, the 6th Battleship Division (Marlborough leading) had fallen astern of the battle fleet some 14 miles. The battleship’s damage control officer had found it necessary to reduce speed to 12 knots to take the strain off the shored-up forward bulkheads, but they were still in danger of giving way, and it was believed they would collapse from the vibration of firing a single turret. At first light, Vice-Admiral Cecil Burney lowered his flag and transferred to the 15-inch-gunned HMS Revenge, while ordering Marlborough to make for Rosyth dockyards. Later in the morning, Admiral Jellicoe signaled Marlborough, concerned about her condition. When fully informed of their situation, he instructed Captain Ross to steer for the Humber anchorage (much closer) where temporary repairs might be made. The journey was, to say the least, a “close run thing” (to borrow a quote from the Duke of Wellington). To make a long story much shorter, Wiesbaden got a bit of her own back, but HMS Marlborough was repaired, renovated, and returned to duty with the 1st Battle Squadron on 5 August 1916. By then, she had gone into the history books as the only dreadnought battleship torpedoed at the Battle of Jutland. Shortly after Marlborough was detached and ordered to Rosyth, Admiral Jellicoe, concerned about her condition, diverted the battleship to the mouth of the Humber River and the dockyards at Hull (much closer). He further directed four destroyers from the “Harwich Force” to rendezvous with her and provide an escort. I apologize for the WW I era Clemson Class US Navy destroyers – but they were as close as I could get to a British WW I destroyer. Both excellent models are courtesy of @Barroco Hispano. While the British were frustrated at their inability to get a clean shot at the German battle fleet, Admiral Scheer was beginning to feel the confines of the trap he’d steamed into. He continued to trail the 1st Scouting Group as Beatty’s battlecruisers forced them onto an easterly course, and as he did so, he closed the range toward the center of the Grand Fleet battle line. Poor visibility was relieving some pressure on his leading battleships, but each gap in the smoke and haze brought down a terrific fusillade of large caliber shells. The continuous rumble of British guns, no doubt unnerving, was inevitably followed by a dozen mountainous geysers of water obscuring one or more of his battleships. From the open bridge, Scheer held his glasses steady and searched toward the head of the line. Between the smoke and water columns, he caught glimpses of SMS Konig, leading the battle squadrons. She was firing sporadically, when visibility allowed, but listing to port and on fire. SMS Markgraf appeared to be listing to port as well, and she, too, was fighting a small fire. The flagship, Friedrich der Grosse, was farther down the line and more often covered by funnel smoke, but she drew the occasional British salvo, nonetheless. Scheer had noted, with some concern, several salvos landing close by with considerable impact. The water columns shot up much thicker and higher than the others, and the last one landed so close alongside, the whole ship trembled as though it had been hit. The vague thought crossed his mind they might have been fired by HMS Royal Oak or Revenge – the two 15-inch-gunned battleships with the Grand Fleet. The flagship of the Hochseeflotte, SMS Friedrich der Grosse, moored at buoys off the coaling docks. Moored at dolphins along the breakwater, is the collier SS Erlangen, with a small boat coming alongside and a motor launch already tied up. Astern of Erlangen is a Jupiter Class collier. Mooring dolphins, mooring buoys, small boats and colliers are by @AP. Friedrich der Grosse courtesy of Barroco Hispano. Below is a detail shot of Friedrich der Grosse: Commissioned 1912 – 24,724 tons – 22.4 knots – 10x12-inch guns – 14x5.9-inch guns – 12x3.5-inch guns – 5x19.7 inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 13.8 inches. But for the moment, Scheer’s mind was preoccupied by a single, overwhelming thought: how to extricate his battle line from this tactical deathtrap. Whether he planned to continue the battle or not, was irrelevant. If he did not get his ships out of this concentration of enemy fire they would be destroyed. He quickly realized there was no alternative but to put about and withdraw from the “kill zone”. He ruled out executing a 16 point turn in succession. That would have exposed each ship in the battle line to a galling fire at the point of the turn – where Konig now suffered. It would also leave II Battle Squadron at the end of the line and expose the old pre-dreadnoughts to the massed guns of the Grand Fleet. Konteradmiral Mauve’s elderly battleships were, more or less, universally accepted as “cannon-fodder”. But Scheer, to his credit, would not throw them “...as red meat to the wolves…” while he made his escape. The Hochseeflotte had, for many years, practiced a tactical maneuver called the “Gefechtskehrtwendung” – or “battle turn-away”. In this maneuver, each ship turned 180 degrees – simultaneously – in this case, to starboard. The turn would instantly reverse both the order and the heading of the battle line. Instead of steaming NE, the Hochseeflotte would be headed SW. Whereas SMS Konig now led the battle line, she would then be bringing up the rear. Conversely, Mauve’s pre-dreadnoughts would then lead the battle line to the SW – thereby staying out of reach of the enemy’s guns. Admittedly, this solution was of little comfort to Konig -- but it was, by far, the better choice. Torpedo boat G-11 (Kapitanleutnant Adolf Muller) leads the eleven boats of the V Flotilla into the diversionary attack on the British battle line. G-11 is just beginning to make smoke, while you can see shell splashes already falling nearby. V-2’s deck (foreground) is already wet, and as she gathers speed and begins to twist and turn, the waves will literally wash across her deck. Life in a torpedo boat was rarely dry. Note the Maxim machine gun on a tripod mount and the torpedo tubes to the right. These were thoroughly vicious little boats in a close encounter. Scheer ordered his torpedo boats into the attack to cover his maneuver. As the little boats rang for full speed and lunged ahead, their crews readied the guns and checked the settings on their torpedoes. The slender boats sliced through the rolling waves with ease, twisting and turning to avoid the storm of shells that poured forth from the towering British battleships. The boats fanned out into attack formation, while the engineers in the boiler rooms opened the valves to spray fuel oil directly onto the fires. Thick, sooty clouds poured from their funnels and swiftly trailed away astern, hanging low over the water and cloaking Scheer’s battle fleet in an impenetrable smoke screen. The torpedo boat flotilla (some 11 boats and two stragglers from another flotilla) would swing broadside just inside maximum range and loose one torpedo each at the passing British. It was not a “death or glory” attack – merely a feint. Much like the cavalry of previous land wars, the torpedo boats would divert attention away from the main body of the Hochseeflotte. At 18:35, Scheer hoisted the signal for the “battle turn-away” and the lumbering dreadnoughts put their helms over in unison. The beginning of the turn was sighted, briefly, by lookouts on HMS Collingwood and the information was passed to the C.-in-C., but the British could not fathom what the Germans were up to. The “battle turn-away” was an extremely complicated and difficult maneuver to perform – even in peacetime – and required the highest standards of seamanship and ship-handling. Within four minutes, Scheer’s captains were putting their helms amidships and steadying-up on a SW course – no collisions, and hardly a “wobble” in the battle line. (SMS Konig did not receive the signal due to wireless problems, and started her turn late, along with the rest of the 5th battleship Division. Konig and her division did, however, increase speed and catch up to the battle fleet. Unfortunately, SMS Markgraf’s port turbine had been shut down and she struggled to maintain her place in line.) But Scheer’s gamble paid off handsomely. The Hochseeflotte disappeared into the smoke and haze and the British simply ceased fire. Scheer’s “first encounter” with the Grand Fleet had lasted all of seventeen minutes. The “battle-turn-away” has begun – as seen from the fantail of SMS Markgraf, She is preceded by Grosser Kurfurst and Konig – still firing, they are already well into their starboard helm. Note the empty powder casings littering Markgraf’s deck in rear of the aft turrets. Smoke has shrouded the sky as forests of huge shell splashes leap into the air. (Claus Bergen) Scheer’s “battle turn-away” and withdrawal from the “first encounter” started another of the many controversies still swirling around the Battle Of Jutland. It deserves mention, but I will try to keep it as short and simple as possible. Many historians, especially the British historians, contend that when Scheer broke off the engagement, it was because he had been neatly ambushed, trapped at a serious disadvantage, and soundly beaten – and his only thoughts thereafter were to elude the British until nightfall, then make a run for the swept minefield channels into the Jade Estuary. It is only natural the British would adopt this opinion of the battle. And when the later stages of the battle were played out, they seemed to support this theory. The theory also becomes necessary to British morale when the losses in men and ships were tallied over the two days after the battle. The British “take” on Jutland paints them as big, lion-hearted chaps, while the Germans come off as scared little rabbits. Understandably, the officers and men of the Hochseeflotte did not see it that way. The long-standing objective of the Kaiserliche Marine was to ambush a portion – a manageable portion – of the Grand Fleet and destroy it utterly. The strategy was to repeat that process until the Grand Fleet numbers had been reduced sufficiently to allow the Hochseeflotte to engage at something close to parity. NO ONE in the Kaiserliche Marine advocated taking on the Grand Fleet in a stand-up fight. The odds were simply too great for any chance of success. At full strength, the Grand Fleet could muster 30 battleships and 10 battlecruisers (two battleships and one battlecruiser missed Jutland). The Hochseeflotte could only field 17 battleships and 5 battlecruisers (one battleship missed Jutland, and pre-dreadnought battleships don’t count.) No amount of skill, courage, or audacity could overcome those odds – especially in the age of the 15-inch gun. Admiral Scheer was most certainly ambushed, and though they could hardly be said to be working together closely, Jellicoe and Beatty made a superb job of it. Due to the miserably poor visibility, Scheer remained oblivious to the presence of the Grand Fleet -- only realizing the extent of his danger when SMS Konig came under the concentrated fire of heavy caliber guns. At that moment, Scheer realized he had been trapped, and by the entire Grand Fleet. The “Jutland Sortie” only envisioned destroying Beatty’s battlecruisers – and Hipper had accepted the challenge of adding the 5th Battle Squadron to the “hit list”. Even so, Scheer was relatively certain that objective could be achieved. When the Grand Fleet so rudely appeared – all bets were off. If Reinhard Scheer was anything – he was a pragmatist. He knew the loss of even a single battleship or battlecruiser, would be irreparable, and would weaken him even further against the enemy. His tactical position was untenable. To remain and fight would, with certainty, incur heavy losses in men and ships – an unthinkable result on many levels. And to do so was, simply, NEVER part of the strategic plan. Vizeadmiral Scheer did what any commander would do when faced with a superior and overwhelming enemy holding a strong tactical position – he withdrew in an organized manner as quickly as possible. Even Napoleon resorted to maneuver when confronted by a more numerous enemy in an unassailable position. Simply put – Scheer’s ambush had failed, and he saw no advantage in continuing a battle he could not win. NEXT TIME…… THE SECOND ENCOUNTER MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful warship models. SPECIAL THANKS to my friend and partner, @AP, for his talents, meticulous models, colorful imagination, and extreme dedication. If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496- 4 Comments
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Chapter 30: "Something Wrong With Our Bloody Ships"
Dreadnought posted a City Journal entry in IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN
The fast battleships of 5th Battle Squadron, overloading their boilers to exceed their 24-knot design speed. Note the heavy seas taken over the bows as they plunge ahead, trying to catch-up to Beatty’s battle line. HMS Valiant, Warspite, and Malaya as seen from the flagship, HMS Barham. IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 30: "...SOMETHING WRONG WITH OUR BLOODY SHIPS...” Hipper’s 1st Scouting Group was holding a SE course at 22 knots, and maintaining a rapid and accurate fire on the British battlecruisers off their starboard beam. The British had already lost one battlecruiser to the extremely accurate German gunnery, and Hipper was gradually closing the range to inflict even more damage. With each salvo, great masses of gun smoke billowed high into the sky, then blew back across the Panzerkreuzer before trailing away to the ESE. The Gunnery officers waited impatiently until the “fall of shot” clocks sounded the alarm and they watched eagerly as great water columns shot into the air, straddling Beatty’s battlecruisers with a forest of tightly grouped shell splashes. HMS Queen Mary: 26,770 tons – 28 knots – 8x13.5-inch guns – 16x4-inch guns – 2x21-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 9 inches. Queen Mary was the last battlecruiser to join the fleet before World War I, and the last iteration of the Lion Class ships (“The Splendid Cats”). HMS Tiger would soon follow, but her designed appearance was completely different. For the record – the gun turrets are lettered, bow to stern, as “A”, “B”, “Q”, and “X”. Queen Mary has the same basic deck plan as the Lion Class, allowing for a full 8-gun broadside and wide firing arcs for “Q” turret. (Model courtesy of Barroco Hispano.) HMS Queen Mary, third in line, engaged Seydlitz until 16:17, and had been hit several times by the German battlecruiser. One shell landed in the aft 4 inch gun casemates and started an ammunition fire. At 14,800 yards, Seydlitz hit her a second time, on the right side of “Q” turret. The shell failed to penetrate, but the impact was so severe it put the right hand gun out of action. When Lion sheered out of line, Derfflinger took Queen Mary under fire at 14,400 yards and Queen Mary returned Derfflinger’s fire around 16:17. Some nine minutes later, three shells out of a four-gun salvo fired by Seydlitz were seen to strike Queen Mary (an amazingly tight grouping), raising a small smoke cloud amidships, near “Q” turret. Only seconds later, Derfflinger’s salvo landed two 12-inch shells near Queen Mary’s “A” turret -- and a tremendous yellow flame instantly shot into the air. Derfflinger’s Korvettenkapitan Hase wrote…… “Queen Mary and Derfflinger settled into a regular gunnery duel carried out overhead of the torpedo boat and destroyer action raging between the battle lines. The enemy was shooting superbly. Twice Derfflinger came under their fire – and twice she was hit. Queen Mary was also under fire from Seydlitz, who’s Gunnery Control Officer was Korvettenkapitan Foerster – our crack gunnery expert. Since 16:22 every one of our salvos had straddled the enemy, and around 16:25 a salvo (presumably from Seydlitz) was seen to crash into the area of Queen Mary’s “Q” turret, followed by a huge sheet of flame and smoke shooting high into the air. Seconds later, our own salvo landed near her forward turrets. A red flame shot up through her fore-deck, abreast the gun turrets, followed by a visible explosion, and then – a huge explosion amidships. Black smoke began to shoot skyward, filled with debris and parts of the ship. Amid a monstrous black cloud, the enemy ship seemed to lift itself from the water, shuddering, with the middle blown out. A massive cloud towered a thousand feet in the air. The battlecruiser’s masts collapsed inwards into the smoke and nothing more could be seen.” (This was approximately thirty-seven minutes into the battle.) This detail shot of Queen Mary shows her steering SE under fire from Seydlitz and Derfflinger. Seydlitz landed a lethal salvo that penetrated the deck abreast “Q” turret and most likely went on to penetrate the turret’s lower barbette armor. The shells touched off her midships powder magazine. Mere seconds later, Derfflinger landed a salvo abreast of the forward turrets which most likely touched off those magazines as well. The nearly simultaneous explosion of both magazines was more than enough to destroy the battlecruiser. HMS Princess Royal (left of picture) comes under heavy fire as the smoke continues to rise over HMS Queen Mary’s grave. The original of this photo can be found on file in the Imperial War Museum, London. If you think it has been re-touched, you are correct. The original image was faded, grainy, and somewhat over-exposed. Photo experts worked with the light and dark contrasts, and eventually had to “artistically” alter the picture to bring out the details. None of the basic information contained in the original was lost, but this re-touched original makes a stunning and far more dramatic presentation of the cataclysmic event. It was 16:26 when Queen Mary blew up. Beatty and Ernle Chatfield, his Flag-Captain, were standing on Lion’s port bridge wing when the force of the tremendous explosion washed over them. Both men spun round in time to witness the unpleasant spectacle unfolding before their eyes. They remained in stony silence until the gigantic smoke cloud began to dissipate, then Beatty turned to Chatfield...”There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today…”. Chatfield, stunned by the depth of understatement, made no comment. Such prudence would see him promoted Admiral Of The Fleet in 1935. And most historians applaud the cool and collected manner in which Beatty took the catastrophic loss of two capital ships – but few of them point out the obvious – it didn’t have to happen that way. Had Beatty kept the 5th Battle Squadron on a tight leash, it’s entirely possible Hipper might have suffered the losses. But Beatty had charged off after the German battlecruisers in fine “fox-hunting” style and high hubris – ignoring the First Rule Of War – “Never underestimate your enemy”. HMS Queen Mary had broken in two, and the aft portion was still afloat as New Zealand passed by. Only eighteen survivors were plucked out of the water by the destroyers HMS Laurel and Petard, and the German torpedo boat V-28. A total of 1,266 men went down with her. (Every year, on 31 May, at 16:26 – the exact time of her sinking -- a Royal Navy warship is privileged to perform a wreath-laying ceremony over her wreckage.) During the brief exchange, only Seydlitz was hit, with a 13.5 inch shell penetrating the starboard #6 5.9-inch casemate in the secondary battery – putting the gun out of action. Amid all this chaos, SMS Moltke continued to fire on HMS Tiger – though Tiger was engaged with Von der Tann at the time. The German battlecruiser scored a total of five 11-inch hits between 16:05 and 16:35, two of which hit the 6-inch upper belt and the 9-inch lower belt just aft of the forward engine room. The armor was not penetrated, but it was pushed in about four inches, causing several leaks. Tiger, though still full of fight, had been suffering terribly under Moltke’s accurate salvos. There was a great deal of “superficial” damage – gaping holes in superstructure compartments – funnels shot through – a fair number of wounded and dead -- and numerous hits on the armor belt that displaced plates and started leaks. But – so far – there had been nothing critical. Around the same time, Moltke launched four torpedoes toward the British line, three of which were sighted by them, but there were no hits. Aboard SMS Lutzow, amid the swirling smoke and thunderous gunfire, Hipper had already been informed Indefatigable had gone down, and he watched Lion sheer out of line, followed at 16:26 by the signal that Queen Mary had been sunk. Hipper now outnumbered Beatty’s battlecruisers by five-to-four. He was also informed the 5th Battle Squadron had opened fire on the light cruisers of 2nd Scouting Group. The small cruisers were screening the tail of his battle line, but they would have to give way in the face of such a force. Though the battle seemed to be going his way at the moment, the powerful British battleships would soon come in range of Von der Tann – and all Hell would break lose. Hipper signaled the squadron to increase to 23 knots – hoping he could hold the enemy battleships at a distance. He could run away from them – but his job was to lead them to destruction under Scheer’s guns. Still, the old buccaneer sensed an opportunity, and he chose to press his momentary advantage. He signaled a course change -- one point to starboard – to close the range on Beatty. Beatty, fully aware he had lost two battlecruisers, was under a good deal of pressure. Even he realized the damage to his ships continued to mount while the German battlecruisers were still delivering rapid and accurate salvos. HMS Lion (having resumed her position in line) was down to a six-gun broadside with fires raging on the forecastle and amidships, while Princess Royal could only present a four-gun broadside. (Though Beatty was probably unaware of it at the time, the British seemed to be having particularly bad luck with their “Q” turret installations. The designers appear to have thought “amidships” was a good place to locate a main battery turret. It also happened to be where German fire control officers were most likely to place the cross-hairs of their gun-pointers.) In an effort to relieve the pressure, Beatty sent in the 9th Destroyer Flotilla, from the head of his line. HMS Nestor, commanded by Captain Barry Bingham, led the attack. As the British destroyers increased speed and swung about, Kommodore Heinrich (commander torpedo boat flotillas) in the light cruiser SMS Regensburg, spotted them and exercised his own initiative. The Kommodore quickly signaled his torpedo boats and went in to break up the approaching attack. German torpedo boats race toward the British battle line to disrupt an approaching destroyer attack. (Illustration by noted marine artist Willy Stower.) Thick, billowing smoke spewed from the funnels of fifteen German torpedo boats as they lunged forward at full revolutions. Some boats followed their Leader (SMS Regensburg) and cut across Lutzow’s bows to get at the British battlecruisers. Other boats, their captains eager to get at the enemy (and a bit more daring), used their high speed to “cut the line” – slipping through the three hundred yard gaps between the massive battlecruisers. Once on the other side of Hipper’s battle line, the boats rallied briefly, then tore off toward the fast-approaching swarm of British destroyers led by the light cruiser HMS Champion. The tiny German boats plunged headlong into the waves, some managing 33 knots, with their slender hulls bucking and rolling, and masses of funnel smoke trailing away astern. German torpedo boats were just that – torpedo boats. They had a minimal gun armament of two or three 3.4-inch deck guns, but usually carried six torpedo tubes. British destroyers were designed to defend against enemy torpedo boats and usually mounted four 4-inch guns, but only two torpedo tubes. Consequently, as the range between the two swarms closed, the British opened fire first. German captains twisted and turned the hurtling little boats, dodging shellfire while their smaller guns returned fire. Onward, into the midst of the enemy -- commands shouted along decks running knee-deep with seawater – guns blazing away to port and starboard. A fleeting target appears and a torpedo is loosed at an enemy. The helm goes hard over to avoid a collision – more gunfire – a shell passes through the funnel – the little craft slews round and charges toward another enemy. The confused, swirling melee went on for what seemed hours, but was only about fifteen minutes. So many destroyers and torpedo boats were milling about between the lines, it become impossible to tell friend from foe as the thickening smoke clouds hung low on the water. Inevitably, like the terriers they were, a few ships managed to break loose and close on the big ships. Many torpedoes were fired in the melee, both British and German, but Hipper and Beatty turned away from the torpedo attacks (a standard defensive maneuver adopted by both navies). The capital ships escaped unharmed – with the exception of Seydlitz (she was having her share of bad luck). Seydlitz was hit at 16:37 by a torpedo fired from HMS Petard. The torpedo struck the starboard side forward, below the armor belt, and ripped a hole 40 feet long by 13 feet high. Though taking on water, the inner torpedo bulkhead held, and the battlecruiser maintained her speed and place in the battle line. The small craft would continue their vicious dogfight until Beatty recalled his destroyers around 16:40. The ruthless little skirmish had entailed a good deal of sound and fury, resulting in quite a bit of damage and a few “kills”. HMS Petard torpedoed and sank V-29, her second kill of the day. The German V-27 was hit several times and disabled, and battle conditions prohibited towing, so they scuttled her. HMS Nestor and Nomad were dead-in-the-water from gunfire and were eventually sunk by the battleships of the Hochseeflotte as they passed by headed north. Commander Bingham (HMS Nestor) spent the rest of the war as a guest of the German Empire -- but lived to receive the Victoria Cross. The fast battleships of the 5th Battle Squadron closing on 2nd Scouting Group at the rear of Hipper’s battle line. HMS Barham leading and Valiant following – as seen from HMS Warspite. With the opposing battlecruiser squadrons holding course to the SE at high speed, locked in mortal combat, and the destroyer melee between the battle lines in full hue and cry -- things began to go badly at the rear of the German battle line. The light cruisers of 2nd Scouting Group (SMS Frankfurt, Pillau, Elbing, and Wiesbaden) were dutifully screening the tail of Hipper’s column, and Admiral Boedicker had been watching somewhat grimly as Rear-Admiral Sir Hugh Evan-Thomas bore down on him with the powerful 5th Battle Squadron. HMS Barham (flag) was leading the squadron and from the way she plunged into the rolling waves, throwing spray up to the bridge, she was doing every bit of the 24 knots she was designed for. HMS Malaya opening fire with her powerful 15-inch guns. Note the large volume of thick smoke issuing from the gun tubes. A lot of Cordite is required to launch a 1,900-pound shell – and that means voluminous smoke clouds. At 15:58 the first 15-inch shells splashed down 300 meters from SMS Frankfurt. As the salvos began to fall at regular intervals, Boedicker deployed a new device – “smoke floats”. These were ignited and dropped overboard, quickly creating a very effective smokescreen. Barham temporarily ceased fire when her target was obscured, but resumed fire after a short interval, firing into the smoke to no effect. Boedicker sent a contact report to Hipper, then wisely withdrew at high speed to the NE, later altering SE to rejoin Hipper. By 16:06, Barham had closed the tail of the German battlecruiser line and opened on Von der Tann at 20,000 yards. Within minutes the remaining battleships joined in – Barham and Valiant concentrating on Moltke -- with Warspite and Malaya firing on Von der Tann. Whatever temporary advantage Hipper may have had, evaporated like a desert mirage. The German battlecruisers, with 11-inch and 12-inch guns, were now fighting battlecruisers and battleships armed with 13.5-inch and 15-inch guns. Still out of range of Von der Tann’s guns, it was much like target practice for Evan-Thomas’ ships – and all Jellicoe’s training would pay off. It would soon become apparent -- no matter how good the Panzerkreuzer were, or how well they were led – Tirpitz should have given them bigger guns. The strength of the Imperial German battlecruisers, the skill of their Admiral, and the courage of their crews would surely be tested to the limit this day. SMS Moltke, prior to the sortie, taking on provisions and stores while moored in Schillig Roads on picket duty. Alongside, a Thor Class tug is preparing to unload a lighter filled with fresh fruit and vegetables. A Sophia Class paddle tug stands by with two lighters containing various ship’s stores and dry goods. In the picture below, you can see the intricate detail on the battlecruiser, tug, and lighter. The mooring buoys, battlecruiser, tugs, and lighters are all the wonderful work of @AP. SMS Moltke now came under a sustained fire from HMS Barham and Valiant. At 16:16, she was hit by a 15-inch round from Barham. The projectile penetrated the armor below #5 casemate, knocking out the 5.9-inch gun, killing the crew, and penetrating an upper coal bunker before detonating. At 16:23 another 15-inch shell detonated against the waterline belt abreast the forward funnel. It did not penetrate, but displaced the armor plate, rupturing the hull skin and causing flooding in the wing passage and a protective coal bunker. At 16:26 (about the same time Queen Mary was going down), a shell struck aft, underwater, and crossed to the port side before detonating and caused additional flooding in the stern. Again, at 16:27, a 15-inch shell detonated on the armor belt abreast the aft superstructure and caused more flooding in the wing passage and another protective coal bunker. The hardened Krupp armor proved equal to the task and prevented the shells from penetrating the ship, but the massive concussive force of the 1,900-pound shells was pushing in plates, sheering bolts and rivets, and starting leaks. These four hits, alone, caused Moltke to take on 1,000 tons of water and a three degree starboard list. In order to maintain a level and steady gun platform, Kapitan von Karpf evened the keel by counter-flooding. The 5th battle Squadron continued to fire regular salvos with frequent hits. It should be remembered the battleships had received the benefit of gunnery practice with the Grand Fleet and were also equipped with the new fifteen-foot rangefinders. The heavy shells from HMS Warspite and Malaya raised tall water columns all about Von der Tann -- frequently obscuring her from sight. At 16:09, a 15-inch shell struck to starboard aft, on the joint of two armor plates, and detonated during penetration. Large pieces of shrapnel entered the ship and caused two compartments to take on more water -- some 600 tons. The concussive force of the big shells shook the ship violently and briefly caused a steering engine to malfunction. The engineering staff worked furiously in the stifling heat of the cramped and dimly lit steering engine compartment. They were all aware what the loss of a steering engine could mean at this critical moment – and they quickly brought it back on line. But worse was yet to come. At 16:20, a 15-inch shell penetrated “A” turret barbette. There was little fire damage and no danger of explosion, but the massive blast of the 1,900-pound shell jammed the turret fast – taking it out of action. SMS Von der Tann -- the main battery turrets are lettered from bow to stern: “A” turret, “B” turret (starboard wing), “C” turret (aft), and “D” turret (port wing). Model courtesy of @Barroco Hispano. Below is a close-up of the forecastle and “A” turret. The shell would have struck the starboard side of the barbette where the gunhouse joins to the circular barbette – damaging the turret “race” (the revolving bearings of the training mechanism). At 16:32 another 15-inch shell crashed through Von der Tann’s fantail deck, penetrated to the battery deck, and detonated against the “C” turret barbette. The shock of the massive blast caused the turret to jam, the turning mechanism fouled by bent and distorted steel. The damage outside the barbette was devastating. Surrounding compartments were blown apart and transformed into twisted and shredded steel plates. This shell also caused a more pressing problem. The anti-torpedo nets were blasted loose and left dangling over the side – threatening to foul the propellers – until a crew of brave men went on deck under heavy fire to secure them. The 15-inch shell would have punched a large hole in the fantail deck (or quarter deck) on the starboard side, close to the deck edge -- approximately where the mooring bollards are. The turret would have been trained over the starboard side when the blast jammed it. You can just make out the anti-torpedo netting along the edge of the lower battery deck. The force of the blast and the severe jolt of the explosion would have wrenched the net restraints loose and bent or broken the net booms – leaving the steel mesh nets trailing in the water. When the range fell to 17,000 yards, Von der Tann began hitting back, and at 16:23 landed a shell on Barham’s armor belt forward. The shell did not penetrate, but pushed the armor in three inches and started leaks. At 16:26 she scored a hit on New Zealand which penetrated her deck and punched out a large piece of armor from “X” turret barbette, jamming the turret for some time. By 16:30, Von der Tann was down to only “B” and “D” turrets left in operation (the midships wing turrets) and she was having difficulty acquiring a target due to the restricted firing arcs, but she continued to fire whenever her guns would bear. (This is where it paid off to reinforce the midships deck armor for cross-deck firing.) SMS Von der Tann – midships area. This is a close-up of “B” turret – the starboard “wing” turret, and “D” turret – the “port” wing turret. (Model courtesy of Barroco Hispano.) Shortly thereafter, Von der Tann’s “B” turret (starboard wing) broke down. On the last salvo, the two big 11-inch rifles went “out of battery” and jammed in the recoil position. (The reason is not clear, but it’s possible there was a leak in the hydraulic system, or the prolonged rapid firing caused extreme over-heating.) Von der Tann had suffered a severe pounding at the hands of two Queen Elizabeth Class battleships, and she was down to just two operable gun tubes – but Blohm & Voss had done their work well – she was still afloat and able to maintain her place in the battle line. From Lutzow’s bridge, Hipper could see the forest of shell splashes enveloping the rear of his line and decided, at 16:27, it was time to break off this unequal contest. He signaled his ships to turn away together (a simultaneous turn by all five ships), 122 degrees, to the southeast. At the head of the line, around 16:28, another little drama played out on Lion’s bridge. A well-placed salvo landed around Princess Royal (astern of Lion) and the tightly grouped water columns completely obscured the battlecruiser. An over-excited signalman promptly ran onto the Admiral’s bridge and announced...”Sir! Princess Royal’s blown up!” Beatty and Chatfield dashed out onto the bridge wing and stared aft in disbelief. A moment later, the shell splashes subsided and Princess Royal was still steaming along with guns blazing. Needless to say, Lion’s bridge contained one very angry Admiral, and a signalman about to receive the sharp edge of his tongue. HMS Southampton, flagship 2nd Cruiser Squadron, as she would have appeared on 31 May 1916. Displacement – 5,400 tons – 25.5 knots – 8x6-inch guns – 2x21-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 2 inches. Some two and a half miles to the southeast of all the chaos, the British 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron was fanned out on a wide search pattern ahead of Beatty’s Battlecruiser Fleet. Commodore William Goodenough, his flag in HMS Southampton, was the farthest to the east, with HMS Birmingham, Nottingham, and Dublin stretching toward the west. Goodenough was a “cruiser man”. He relished being out on his own, his cruisers racing along, poking their noses into every little thing to see what was what. Much like the free-wheeling frigate captains of Nelson’s day. He simply didn’t have the restrained and prudent temperament of a “battleship captain”. He had resisted the urge to throw his squadron into the destroyer melee going on astern – which was more to his taste than a docile scouting mission. But the Commodore had acted rashly in the past and was not one of Beatty’s “favorites” – so he thought it better to stick to the rules and “be a good lad”. As he stood on the bridge, possibly regretting his decision, the lookout rang down from the foremast and the Commodore’s ears perked up. Flag-lieutenant Arthur Peters answered the hand-set, then turned slightly...”Smoke, sir – two points off the port bow.” Goodenough snatched up his glasses and focused on the horizon...”Helm – two points to port – make revolutions for 22 knots”. The agile cruiser swung gently, gathering speed as the staff clustered on the small bridge. Moments later, wisps of smoke were seen – gradually building and growing as Southampton approached. Within minutes there was a great pall of smoke trailing to the east. And then suddenly, as if by magic, there were the masts, funnels, and upper-works of battleships rising over the horizon. Peters, a little awed by the sight, spoke as the cruiser raced on...”Look, Sir -- this is a light cruiser’s day of a lifetime! The whole of the High Seas Fleet is before you.” This was their mission – what they had trained for – what they were paid to do. The handset from the fore-top rang again, and the lookout filled in the details: sixteen battleships with a torpedo boat screen on either bow, in single-line-ahead, with six smaller battleships bringing up the rear. For the first time in two years of war, the Royal Navy was witness to the full deployment of the Hochseeflotte battle line. The range, rapidly closing, was about 7 miles – 13,000 yards. Peters was filling out a signal pad, ready to send a wireless to Beatty – the primary reason the cruiser squadron existed. As the range continued to close, Commander Edward Rushton remarked...”If you’re going to make that signal, you’d better do it now, Sir – you may never make another”. Peters had already sent the signal, and Goodenough smiled, but did not lower his glasses. Rushton, getting a bit tense, said, as if to himself...”This is madness.” The Commodore lowered the glasses and laughed...”No, no, Commander. Clearly I can do no wrong this day – whatever stupidities I may have committed on other days.” SMS Konig – Konig Class dreadnought battleship – 4 ships commissioned in 1912 and 1913: 25,796 tons – 21 knots – 10x12-inch guns – 14x5.9-inch guns – 5x19.7-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 13.8 inches. Designed in 1910-1911, these were the most modern and most powerful battleships in the Kaiserliche Marine when war broke out in 1914. They were also the first and only German capital ships to have five main battery turrets on the centreline. On 31 May 1916, Konig was flying the flag of Konteradmiral Paul Behncke, leading the III Battle Squadron, in the vanguard of the Hochseeflotte. Her image would have loomed large and menacing as Commodore Goodenough closed the range from the NW. Unfortunately, I do not have a model of Konig as she would have appeared during the war. This one represents a 1932 design study done by the Reichsmarine in the Wiemar Republic period. However, the Reichsmarine was working within a tight budget, with reduced staff, and fewer design facilities at their disposal. Consequently, they largely kept to the original design parameters and only updated them to reflect technological advances. The changes to the original plan are, for the most part, in their machinery – or are largely visual. In short – they would have been a few knots faster, and looked more modern – but the guns, hull form, and armor would have remained the same as in 1913. This is a comparison between SMS Konig and Derfflinger. The obvious difference in length is entirely due to the difference in speed. At 28 knots, Derfflinger’s considerably longer hull was designed to accommodate the more numerous boilers required to generate that power. The battleship was only designed for 21 knots, so she did not require the elongated hull – but she did pack a more powerful punch into the shorter hull. You will note the similarity in basic design: superfiring 12-inch turrets fore and aft (but with a fifth turret amidships) – twin funnels – and the secondary battery of 5.9-inch guns arrayed in casemates on the Battery Deck. In this detailed comparison, you can pick out the differences and, perhaps, imagine what the battleship might have looked like in 1913. First: there would have been a pole mast forward on the battleship instead of the cumbersome 1932 “military mast”. Second: the funnels would have been larger, and without the “raked” funnel caps. Third: there would be no aircraft catapult on the midships turret. And fourth: the forward and aft superstructure elements would not be as heavy, tall, and built-up as they are in the 1932 version. The bridge and superstructure elements of the 1913 Konig would have looked very similar to what you see on Derfflinger – visually simple, utilitarian, and not more than one deck higher than the armored conning tower. In my opinion, the Konig of 1913 would have been just as powerful, but far more pleasing to the eye than the 1932 design study. (Models courtesy of Barroco Hispano.) Southampton closed to within 12,000 yards – close enough to identify the flag of Konteradmiral Paul Behncke flying above SMS Konig. Any one of fifty 12-inch guns could have blown the little cruiser to oblivion – but the German gunnery officers were having trouble identifying the hazy bow-on view. When they did open fire, Southampton’s helm instantly went hard over and she increased speed to 25 knots. The narrow-hulled cruiser leaned so far into the turn her railings nearly brushed the water. She signaled her consorts (Birmingham, Nottingham, and Dublin) and made off on a zig-zag course as huge fountains of water erupted all about her. Goodenough was determined to maintain contact with the German battle fleet so he could send regular sighting reports to Beatty. But with the mist and haze being what it was, he could only do that if he remained within gun range of the German battleships. Well over forty large shells had already fallen within 75 yards of Southampton, so this was going to be sticky business. Lieutenant Ralph Ireland, the navigation officer, put into action a plan he had worked out some time before – “salvo chasing”. He directed the helmsman to steer the ship toward the last splash of an enemy salvo. The German gunnery officers would make corrections when shells fell “over” or “short” – so by steering toward the splashes, Ireland ensured the ship would never be where they thought. (This was a brilliant idea – but only if the Germans didn’t catch-on to the trick.) SMS Konig, leading the Imperial battle fleet, takes Goodenough’s cruisers under fire as they close the range and signal the position of the German warships to Admiral Jellicoe. HMS Lion picked up Southampton’s sighting report (as did Admiral Jellicoe) and Beatty altered course toward her position. Lion was still in line, but she was in bad shape. One of her four turrets was knocked out and the fires on her forecastle and midships were still raging. She’d been hit in the aft superstructure, leaving a gaping hole in the deck, and two demolished steam launches. Two shells had plunged through the weather deck only feet apart and exploded on the Mess Deck, starting yet another raging fire. Her unreliable dynamos were still functioning, but not at full power, and the mains had been hit in several places so parts of the below-decks were in darkness. The lack of electrical strength had reduced Beatty to using Princess Royal as a “relay” signaling ship for long-range WT traffic. Within minutes, Beatty had visual confirmation the Hochseeflotte was NOT at anchor in the Jade. It was just 12 miles away in line-ahead battle formation and already firing hotly on his scouting cruisers. Beatty had very nearly fallen into the trap set by Scheer. In a matter of moments, he would signal the remaining ships of the Battlecruiser Fleet to turn 16 points to starboard “in succession” – reversing his course. His duty now – was to lure Scheer’s fleet into Jellicoe’s trap. At this point, the “run to the south” is over – but it is worth taking stock. Between 15:48, when the engagement began, to 16:54 (one hour and six minutes), when Beatty reversed course to the NW – the 1st Scouting Group (Imperial battlecruisers) obtained an estimated forty-four 11-inch and 12-inch hits on the British battlecruisers; 9 on Lion – 6 on Princess Royal – 7 on Queen Mary – 14 on Tiger – 1 on New Zealand – 5 on Indefatigable – and 2 on the battleship Barham. By comparison, The Battlecruiser Fleet obtained only eleven 13.5-inch and six 15-inch hits on the German Panzerkreuzer: 4 on Lutzow – 4 on Seydlitz – 2 on Moltke – 1 on Von der Tann, and with 15-inch shells: 1 on Seydlitz – 4 on Moltke – and 1 on Von der Tann. By the end of the “run to the south”, the British had lost 2 battlecruisers and 2 destroyers – while the Germans lost 2 torpedo boats. Again, I have provided a concise map to help you keep track of the confused action. If you have questions – feel free to ask – and I will do my best to answer. BATTLECRUISER ACTION – “RUN TO THE SOUTH” (1) 15:22 - Hipper sights Beatty. (2) 15:48 - First shots fired by Hipper's squadron. (3) 16:00 -16:05 - Indefatigable explodes, leaving two survivors. (4) 16:25 - Queen Mary explodes, eighteen survive. (5) 16:45 - Beatty's battlecruisers move out of range – “Run To The North”. (6) 16:54 - Evan-Thomas's battleships turn north behind Beatty. NEXT TIME…… THE RUN TO THE NORTH MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful warship models. SPECIAL THANKS to my friend and partner, @AP, for his talents, meticulous models, colorful imagination, and extreme dedication. If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496- 3 Comments
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