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Chapter 12: Pulling The Lion's Tail
Dreadnought posted a City Journal entry in IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN
British light cruisers and destroyers putting to sea. IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 12: PULLING THE LION’S TAIL The staff of “Room 40” in the early days of the Great War. Hard to believe they could cause the Imperial Navy so much trouble, isn’t it? On 13 December 1914, the British code-breakers in “Room 40” of the Admiralty began to notice an increase in German wireless traffic in Wilhelmshaven. Unbeknownst to the Germans, the British Naval Intelligence Services had been provided with German Naval code books. They were taken from the cruiser SMS Magdeburg in August 1914, when she ran aground and was captured by the Russians off the Estonian coast. The Admiralty code-breakers could now read German wireless traffic within a few hours of receiving them. Their understanding of the codes and “call signs” (and how they were used) was not complete, but sufficient information had been assembled by the evening of 14 December to know a German squadron made up from the 1st Scouting Group would be leaving port shortly. Crucially, they could find nothing suggesting the Hochseeflotte would be involved. HMS Lion circa 1913 – 26,270 tons – 28 knots – 8x13.5-inch guns – 16x4-inch guns – 2x21-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 9 inches. Lion as she might have appeared moored at her buoy in the Firth of Forth. She served for most of the war as the flagship of the Battle Cruiser Squadron and then of the Battlecruiser Fleet. Despite being “high-sided” and a bit ungainly, she is a good-looking ship – much more business-like than the previous Invincible and Indefatigable Classes. Model provided by @Barroco Hispano. In an effort to get away from the troublesome “wing turrets” of the previous two battlecruiser classes, Lion’s designers managed to get all four main battery turrets on the centreline. But the new arrangement had its own problems (note the separation of the third funnel). Putting “Q” turret amidships forced them to arrange the boiler rooms and machinery spaces around them. The “up-side” of the layout allowed all four turrets to fire broadside with generous firing arcs. HMS Orion circa 1912 – 21,922 tons – 21 knots – 10x13.5 inch guns – 16x4 inch guns –3x21 inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 12 inches. This is the battleship design upon which Lion’s design was based. Below is a close-up of this wonderful model for you to enjoy. Even the weathering on the hull is exquisitely done. Courtesy of Barroco Hispano. The Admiralty immediately realized there was going to be another coastal raid -- and the Royal Navy’s reputation was on the line. They telegraphed Scapa Flow and ordered Admiral Jellicoe to send the 1st Battlecruiser Squadron (Vice Admiral David Beatty) composed of HMS Lion, Queen Mary, Tiger, and New Zealand, together with the Grand Fleet’s 2nd Battle Squadron (Vice Admiral Sir George Warrender) comprising the dreadnoughts HMS King George V, Ajax, Centurion, Orion, Monarch, and Conqueror, accompanied by the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron (Commodore William Goodenough) with HMS Southampton, Birmingham, Falmouth, and Nottingham. All to put to sea as soon as they raised steam. The “Harwich Force” (Commodore Reginald Tyrwhitt) was ordered to sea with the light cruisers HMS Aurora, Undaunted, and 42 destroyers – to join Beatty. Commodore Roger Keyes (Submarines – Dover) was to dispatch eight submarines and his two destroyer leaders – HMS Firedrake and Lurcher – to take station off the Dutch island of Terschelling, just in case the German squadron made for the English Channel. Jellicoe protested that, although Beatty and Warrender should be able to deal with Hipper, they would be outmatched if the Hochseeflotte turned up – unannounced. He added the 3rd Cruiser Squadron out of Rosyth (Rear-Admiral William Pankenham) with HMS Devonshire, Antrim, Argyll, and Roxburgh. They were to rendezvous with Beatty’s force 25 miles south-east of the Dogger Bank. Since they did not know what target the Germans had chosen, the plan was to ambush them on their way back to the Jade. HMS Tiger at anchor in Scapa Flow – 28,500 tons – 28 knots – 8x13.5-inch guns – 12x6-inch guns – 4x21-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 9 inches. Sometimes referred to as “the most beautiful warship ever built, then and now”. Also frequently included in the sobriquet “The Splendid Cats” – referring to the much admired battlecruisers HMS Lion, Princess Royal, and Queen Mary. HMS Tiger tied-up quayside. Though more or less equal to the Lion Class in her particulars, Tiger is a decided improvement. The designers created a much better deck layout, concentrating the superstructure and three funnels between “B” turret and “Q” turret. They did, however, continue to separate “Q” and “X” turret with the machinery spaces below decks. The handsome battlecruiser model is courtesy of Barroco Hispano. In the lower center of the picture you can see old three-masted sailing ships tied up to mooring dolphins – much like pictures of Hamburg Harbor just after the turn of the century. Ahead of Tiger a Sophia Class paddle tug is nudging a lumber lighter against the dock. The long row warehouses were re-lotted from @mattb325 “Austral-Asian Shipping Company”. The beautiful sailing ships, tugs, lighters, and mooring dolphins are by the talented @AP. This is a close-up shot of HMS Tiger’s central superstructure detail. The forward bridge elements have taken on a more modern and utilitarian appearance with a heavy tripod mast and a spacious spotting top for the gunnery control systems. One may debate whether or not she was “the most beautiful capital ship ever built”. But she was a tough old girl. At Jutland she was hit 18 times (16 hits scored by Moltke) and suffered a good bit of damage. But one thing is NOT a subject of debate – her gunnery was abysmal. Out of 303 main gun rounds fired, she is credited with one hit on Moltke and two on Von der Tann – a mere 1% hit ratio. Just imagine the damage her 1,400 pound shells could have done if she had managed even a 5% hit ratio. THE SCARBOROUGH, WHITBY & HARTLEPOOL RAID North Sea -- a modern map, but most of the features mentioned are still called by their 1914 names. After the ease with which the Yarmouth raid had been carried out, the Imperial Naval High Command had, indeed, planned another raid -- again with the intention of luring part of the Grand Fleet out where it could be isolated and destroyed. Konteradmiral Franz von Hipper would command the raiding force – the “Panzerkreuzer” of the 1st Scouting Group -- SMS Seydlitz (flagship), Von der Tann, Moltke, and Derfflinger – reinforced by the “grosse kreuzer” SMS Blucher – and accompanied by the light cruisers SMS Strassburg, Graudenz, Kolberg, and Stralsund, with 18 destroyers. The squadron steamed out of the Jade at 03:20 on 15 December and steered north until they reached the Horn’s Reef lightship, where they altered course to the west – and Scarborough. It was Hipper’s intention to arrive off the English coast just after daylight, the morning of the 16th. SMS Derfflinger – 26,600 tons – 26.5 knots – 8x12-inch guns – 12x5.9-inch guns – 4x3.5-inch guns – 4x19.7-inch torpedo tubes – armor belt 11.8 inches. The newest and most powerful of the “Panzerkreuzer”. Below is a close-up showing the wealth of detail in this model of a truly graceful warship. Model courtesy of Barroco Hispano. Later that night, approaching Dogger Bank from the northeast, the destroyer S-33 became separated from 1st Scouting Group and broke wireless silence to ask for directions. Hipper, fearing the transmissions might give away their position, ordered the destroyer to be silent. With no other choice, the lost destroyer set course for home. On the way, S-33 sighted four British destroyers and sent a sighting report by wireless. The incident with the sighting report bothered Hipper. His wireless operators were picking up increasing amounts of British traffic. And what were four destroyers doing east of Dogger Bank at this time of night – and in weather that was turning bad? With no further information, he concluded British fishing trawlers might have reported his squadron’s presence. Though Hipper could not know it, the “lost” German destroyer had, in all likelihood, sighted Beatty’s destroyer screen as his battlecruisers steered south-east for the rendezvous point off Dogger Bank. SMS Kaiser – 24,724 tons – 23.4 knots – 10x12-inch guns – 14x5.9-inch guns –12x3.5-inch guns – 5x19.7-inch torpedo tubes – armor belt 13.8 inches. One of the dreadnought battleships assigned to III Battle Squadron, Hochseeflotte. Magnificently detailed model courtesy of Barroco Hispano. Twelve hours after Hipper’s departure (15:00), Admiral Friedrich von Ingenohl put to sea with the main body of the Hochseeflotte – I and III Battle Squadrons with 14 dreadnought battleships, II Battle Squadron with 8 pre-dreadnought battleships, and the 2nd Scouting Group of 2 armored cruisers and 7 light cruisers, attended by 54 torpedo boats and destroyers. Von Ingenohl planned to provide distant support for the raid, while laying an ambush should a British force pursue Hipper’s squadron. Unfortunately, the Kaiser’s orders to avoid a fleet engagement still stood, and though he had approved the raid – he had not approved von Ingenohl’s use of the battle fleet in support. Accordingly, von Ingenohl advanced the main body with caution. He planned to stay close enough to Wilhelmshaven to be able to fall back if faced with a superior British force. Von Ingenohl would lay his ambush just southeast of Dogger Bank – provided Beatty did not get there first. Panzerkreuzer SMS Seydlitz – 24,988 tons – 26.5 knots – 10x11-inch guns – 12x5.9-inch guns – 12x3.5-inch guns – 4x19.7-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 11.8 inches. Below is a close-up of this beautifully detailed and textured model by @AP. Aboard the flagship (Seydlitz), Admiral Hipper paced the bridge as the squadron neared the English coast. The eastern sky had lightened somewhat, but the weather had worsened, and waves began to roll over the ship’s bow. At 06:35 on 16 December, Hipper signaled the destroyers and three light cruisers to make their best speed back to Wilhelmshaven. Rough seas or not, the light cruiser Kolberg would have to stay – she had 100 mines to lay off Flamborough Head. Fifteen minutes later, he signaled the squadron to break off into their assigned attack groups. Kolburg set off to carry our her part of the raid. SMS Seydlitz, Moltke, and Blucher turned north to shell Hartlepool, while Von der Tann and Derfflinger steered south to shell Scarborough, and then Whitby. Hipper was completely unaware the German ambush plan had already unraveled. Panzerkreuzer SMS Moltke – 22,979 tons – 25.5 knots – 10x11-inch guns – 12x5.9-inch guns –12x3.5-inch guns – armor belt 11 inches. The beautiful model is courtesy of “AP”. ENCOUNTER AT DOGGER BANK Sir George Warrender’s 2nd Battle Squadron steamed out of Scapa Flow at 05:30 on 15 December, but the weather was already so bad around the Orkney’s he left his destroyer escort behind. Fortunately, when he rendezvoused with Beatty’s battlecruisers at 11:00, near Moray Firth, he found they had brought seven destroyers. Warrender (senior) took command of the joint force and set course for the appointed ambush east of Dogger Bank. All went smoothly until 05:15 in the morning darkness of 16 December. The destroyer HMS Lynx sighted the enemy torpedo boat SMS V-155. The German ship was part of the 2nd Scouting Group in advance of the Hochseeflotte, and duly sent von Ingenohl a wireless sighting report. The British destroyer flotilla promptly hauled out of position to go investigate. A fire fight immediately brewed up with an indeterminate number of German cruisers and torpedo boats. HMS Lynx was hit, damaging a propeller, and HMS Ambuscade was hit several times, began taking on water, and turned away. HMS Hardy took several shells from the cruiser SMS Hamburg, causing severe damage and starting a fire – though she managed to get off a torpedo. Hamburg sent off another wireless report to von Ingenohl – this one about the torpedo attack. After fumbling around in the dark for about fifteen minutes, and shooting at anything that looked like a ship, the action was broken off. It was, as skirmishes go, nothing unusual – but in the darkness it looked much more sinister, with gun flashes lighting up the horizon in several directions. Around 05:40, one of the four remaining battle-worthy British destroyers, HMS Shark, again made contact – this time with five German destroyers. The British immediately opened fire and went into the attack. The Germans fired a few rounds, then prudently withdrew into the hazy morning darkness – immediately reporting the renewed enemy contact to von Ingenohl. German wireless communications were functioning perfectly, and German commanders understood that all information was valuable to the fleet C.-in-C. The seas had continued to rise during the night, worrying von Ingenohl as to how much longer he could keep his light forces at sea. Having the night suddenly erupt in gun flashes was not helping. The Admiral knew he had already exceeded his orders by taking the battle fleet beyond the safe haven of the Heligoland Bight. When the report of the second skirmish came in – that was enough for him. There was no particular reason why the fleet should encounter enemy light forces off Dogger Bank in such foul weather. AND – why were they acting so aggressively – unless they were the advance screen of the Grand Fleet? At 05:45, von Ingenohl came about and the Hochseeflotte set course for the southern entrance to the minefields along the East Frisian Islands. Around 06:50, HMS Shark and the remaining destroyers sighted the armored cruiser SMS Roon and it’s destroyer escort. (Roon was the rear guard of the withdrawing Hochseeflotte.) Captain Loftus Jones (Shark) signaled the sighting at 07:25. and it was picked up by Warrender and the battlecruiser HMS New Zealand – but the information was not relayed to Beatty. (British captains were notoriously reluctant to signal the flagship with relayed messages – or even “sighting reports”. A situation that plagued the Royal Navy throughout the war.) At 07:40, Shark closed Roon to fire torpedoes, but two other cruisers appeared out of the morning mist and he had to withdraw at high speed. Warrender brought his battle squadron around, steering toward Shark’s position, and expected Beatty to do the same. At 07:36, he signaled Beatty to make sure, but got no reply. Warrender finally got through to Beatty at 07:55, and Beatty sent New Zealand and three light cruisers to search for the Germans. Beatty followed with the rest of the battlecruisers. Around 08:42, the battleships and battlecruisers were barreling along at flank speed when both Warrender and Beatty received a wireless report from HMS Patrol that she and Scarborough were under attack from two German battlecruisers. The chase of Roon was abandoned, and the British squadron put about yet again, to intercept Hipper. (Beatty had been recklessly charging about “like a bull in a china shop” -- desperate to find something German to shoot at. His decision to allow Roon to escape may have been most fortunate. Roon would certainly have led him right under the guns of the Hochseeflotte – and Beatty might well have lived long enough to regret that.) SHELLING OF SCARBOROUGH, HARTLEPOOL, AND WHITBY German Panzerkreuzer shelling Scarborough. (Willy Stower) Around 04:30 on 16 December, the men of the Durham Royal Garrison Artillery were turned out of their warm bunks and told to “stand to” in “battle-dress”. A telegram from the Admiralty had arrived warning there might be an offshore raid in progress and Hartlepool could be a target. Of the three towns targeted that day, Hartlepool was the most significant, with war industry factories and extensive dock facilities. The port was defended by three 6 inch naval guns – two in Heugh Battery on a point north-east of the harbor, and one at the harbor mouth on Lighthouse Causeway. The “Durham Royals” immediately began preparations to go into action, while ammunition parties moved shells and powder charges from the magazine bunkers to the “ready lockers” in the gun pits. At 07:46, three large warships appeared over the horizon, approaching at high speed. Shells began to fall on the town at 08:10, but no warning had been given to the naval patrols in the area. With the bad weather overnight, only the destroyers HMS Doon, Test, Waveney, and Moy were at sea – and they were taken under fire by the German ships within minutes. Considerably outgunned, the destroyers turned away – with the exception of HMS Doon – which closed to 5,000 yards, fired a single torpedo (it missed), then turned away as well. There were two scout cruisers in the harbor, HMS Patrol and Forward. Forward remained at anchor with no steam up, while Patrol at least made an attempt to get to sea. Not far out of the harbor mouth, she was hit by two 8.3 inch shells from Blucher and Captain Bruce was forced to beach the ship. The submarine HMS C-9 followed Patrol to sea, but had to dive when a forest of shell splashes erupted around her. (Commodore Keyes – Commander Submarines, Dover – later commented...”three large, nearly stationary, German capital ships spent fifty minutes lobbing shells into a town – yet, C-9 returned to harbor after the raid with a full load of torpedoes!”) Seydlitz, Moltke, and Blucher steamed in line ahead offshore, their big guns leisurely firing on the town while the secondary batteries engaged the British warships. When the squadron neared the limit of their firing arcs, Hipper reversed course to starboard and made a return pass – repeating the “loop” several times. In all, 1,150 shells were fired into Hartlepool, hitting the gasworks, railways, steelworks, seven churches, and 300 houses. Some 86 civilians died and 424 were injured, while 7 soldiers were killed and 14 wounded. It is worth noting that Private Theophilus Jones (Durham Light Infantry) was the first British soldier killed on British soil by enemy action in 200 years. The shore batteries were initially confused about the approaching ships – until shells began falling in town. Two guns engaged Seydlitz, while the third gun fired on Blucher. The German ships were at such close range many of their shell fuses did not activate, and since the shells were traveling nearly horizontal rather than plunging – often failed to explode, or simply ricocheted into town. The shore gunners found their shells to be ineffective against warship armor belts, so they aimed for the superstructures and wireless antennas. Seydlitz was hit three times with no casualties and minor damage. Moltke was hit once, between decks, with minor damage and no casualties. Blucher, however, was hit six times – two 5.9-inch guns were disabled, the bridge was hit, one 8.3-inch gun was disabled, and she suffered nine dead and three wounded. (Blucher’s thinner armor had paid a price.) One of the private dwellings in Hartlepool struck by a 5.9-inch shell during the bombardment. To the south, around 08:00, Derfflinger and Von der Tann opened fire on Scarborough with their main and secondary battery guns. More than 500 high explosive shells were fired in a slow and steady bombardment of twenty minutes -- chiefly aimed at the Coast Guard station, a naval wireless station, and two transmitting towers -- but also falling on Scarborough Castle, the Grand Hotel, three churches, and various other structures. Nineteen townspeople died. Kolberg finished her minelaying about 08:15 and rejoined the Panzerkreuzern. They then headed north and destroyed the Coast Guard station at Whitby, as well as its’ wireless transmitting station, before setting course to rejoin Hipper. By 09:45, the two forces had linked up, increased to “flank speed”, and laid-in a course to round Dogger Bank to the south – intent on keeping their appointed rendezvous with the Hochseeflotte. Panzerkreuzer Von der Tann – 19,370 tons – 24.8 knots – 8x11-inch guns – 10x5.9-inch guns –16x3.5-inch guns – 4x17.7-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 9.8 inches. This fabulously detailed model is courtesy of Barroco Hispano. THE TRAP THAT DIDN’T SPRING The weather was still wretched, and visibility was extremely limited, but Hipper’s Panzerkreuzer muscled their way through the heavy seas at 22 knots. In an hour or two, they would alter course to the east -- and away from English waters. The Admiral had gotten in undetected, carried out the raid, and was now about to rendezvous with the Hochseeflotte, where there would be safety in numbers. The ship’s Navigation Officer estimated Hipper’s detached cruisers and destroyers were about 50 miles ahead (slow going in heavy weather) and would soon join the battle fleet. They might take a bit longer because the British had mined the area to shield the Yorkshire coast, but U-Boats had charted the swept channel. So they should manage it. Around 11:25, HMS Southampton (scouting for Beatty’s battlecruisers) sighted German ships through the rain and haze. A few minutes later, she signaled...”engaging German light forces...”. HMS Birmingham was detached from the screen and sent to assist. Shortly thereafter, Commodore Goodenough sighted the cruisers SMS Strassburg and Graudenz – but failed to report them. (Another failure to pass information to the squadron commander.) The two remaining light cruisers in Beatty’s screen took the initiative and moved to join the hunt. Beatty – uninformed of the action – ordered one of the cruisers to return to the screen. Unfortunately, the wording of the signal was botched by Beatty’s Flag Lieutenant, Ralph Seymour, who had never received full signals training (and this would not be the last botched signal). This resulted in all the cruisers returning to the screen -- allowing the German cruisers to escape. These were, in fact, Hipper’s detached cruisers and destroyers passing eastward through Beatty’s scouting screen as it advanced southeast. This signaling error was compounded by the fact that none of Beatty’s commanders had reported the various enemy contacts to the flagship. If Beatty had known a force of four light cruisers with destroyers was coming from the west, he would have reasoned they must be the advance screen for Hipper’s squadron. But there was no report, and the enemy force disappeared in the murk, headed down the swept channel of the minefield. At 12:15, the German cruisers and destroyers exited the southern end of the minefield channel and found Warrender’s battleships. SMS Stralsund bought the group a little time by flashing a recognition signal, which evidently confused the British. HMS Orion trained her guns on the little cruiser, but the division commander would not give permission to fire. Warrender also saw the German cruisers and ordered Packenham to give chase with his armored cruisers – but the faster German ships disappeared back into the rain and mist. The big difference is Stralsund immediately reported the position, course, speed, and composition of Warrender’s Battle Squadron to Hipper. Stralsund also reported there was no sign of the Hochseeflotte at the rendezvous point. Hipper’s wireless operators had been monitoring British traffic since they left the Jade, and the strength of the signal gave an idea of how far away they might be. So he knew they were out there. But now he knew there were battleships -- and they had moved to block his route of withdrawal. Worst of all -- the Hochseeflotte was not there to help. Not one to hesitate, Hipper glanced at the navigation chart and ordered a course change to the north-east. He had decided to skirt the north-west edge of Dogger Bank, then steer east for Horn’s Reef. He would be out of reach by the time the British realized “the bird had flown”. Hipper’s Panzerkreuzer dropped anchor in Schillig Roads at 09:00 on 17 December 1914. Once again, Hipper and his Panzerkreuzern had “pulled the British lion’s tail” and gotten away with it – though a strategic opportunity had gone awry. Ironically, if the Imperial Battle Fleet had maintained their position off the Dogger Bank, they would have brushed aside the thin screening forces and sighted the British capital ships just about first light. Von Ingenohl could have engaged Beatty’s four battlecruisers and Warrender’s six battleships with his 14 dreadnoughts, 8 pre-dreadnoughts, and a whopping 54 destroyers and torpedo boats. In that sort of confused situation, even the old pre-dreadnoughts could have made a good accounting of themselves. Von Ingenohl could have even sent Hipper a wireless message to close in behind the British ships. The raiding strategy was designed to lure a small portion of the British fleet into just this sort of trap. And it had worked perfectly. Ten British capital ships might have been lost that day – their numerical superiority wiped out in a single battle. But von Ingenohl didn’t even bother to use his cruisers to reconnoiter the enemy strength before putting about and heading for home. Simply put – he lost his nerve. As a result of the whole affair, the British Press made much of Beatty’s failure to bring the German raiders to battle, and it was decided to move the battlecruisers south, to a new base at Rosyth, on the Firth of Forth. This would considerably shorten any response time. For Admiral Jellicoe’s part, he decided any time a German operation was in the offing – the Grand Fleet would sail “en masse” in support. This would ensure Jellicoe was on hand to coordinate actions and make strategic and tactical decisions. (Reviewing the action reports – some fears were expressed at high levels regarding Beatty’s impetuosity – and the potential for catastrophe had he engaged von Ingenohl.) The Kaiser reprimanded his admirals (as a whole, rather than point out individuals) for their timidity, but von Ingenohl’s reputation suffered greatly. The Kaiser’s orders not to engage in fleet actions had unduly influenced Ingenohl – but they remained in force. NEXT TIME…… DEATH OF A HYBRID ONCE AGAIN -- MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his generosity in providing so many beautiful and highly detailed warships. VERY SPECIAL THANKS to my collaborating partner, @AP for volunteering his talent, time, vivid imagination, and advice -- while creating so many beautiful and wonderfully detailed models and props from the Great War Era. I could not do this without him. If you enjoyed anything you saw – please punch the “like” button so I will know. A comment would be even more informative (good or bad). Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of my ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496- 10 Comments
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