Search the Community

The Run To The South – HMS Lion, Princess Royal, Queen Mary, and Tiger return fire – 15:48 -- 31 May 1916. IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 29: RUN TO THE SOUTH SMS Von der Tann, bringing up the rear of Hipper’s battle line. She is traveling at high speed and battle has not yet been joined. You can also see the torpedo boat screen on her port beam. If a Dane had been walking along a Jutland beach on the afternoon of 31 May 1916, he might easily have looked out to sea – just a bit bewildered. The sky was misty, with some haze, and no sign of a storm brewing. But if he listened carefully, he might have heard the rumble of distant thunder – long and rolling – continuous. He could not possibly have known that many miles out in the North Sea, the advance units of two great battle fleets had stumbled into one another, and the greatest clash of dreadnoughts in all of history had begun. The Imperial German battlecruisers of Vizeadmiral Franz von Hipper’s 1st Scouting Group were steaming SE at 22 knots, exchanging fire with Beatty’s British Battlecruiser Fleet on their starboard beam. Great billowing clouds of funnel smoke poured into the sky and mixed with huge blotches of flame and smoke as the German guns crashed out. Hipper’s light cruisers and torpedo boats were tearing ahead, straining to take up station on his disengaged port side. The Panzerkreuzer had opened fire at 15:48, and quickly settled into a steady and accurate fire, with Lutzow (flag) leading the column. Korvettenkapitan Paschen, Lutzow’s Chief Fire Control Officer, described the first few critical minutes…… “HMS Lion was taken under fire. We fired the first salvo from all four turrets and found it unsatisfactory. They fell predominantly short and concealed the entire target with water columns. For the remainder of the battle, Lutzow fired alternating salvo fire – both forward turrets, followed by both aft turrets. We fired again – flight time 22 seconds. Impact -- left ahead of bow. Deflection 12 right. Salvo! The ship trembles as ‘C’ and ‘D’ turrets fire. Impact – over amidships! Eight down – salvo! Over! Eight down – Salvo! Straddle – hit near bridge!” Two and a half minutes into the engagement, Lutzow had found the enemy’s range and scored the first hit. SMS Lutzow opens fire – 15:48. She is traveling at high speed and the British battlecruisers can just be see in the distance off her starboard beam. Following her are Derfflinger, Seydlitz, Moltke, and Von der Tann. Note the huge smoke cloud from the forward turrets. (Claus Bergen) Astern of the flagship, Korvettenkapitan von Hase, in Derfflinger’s conning tower fire control, was not quite as quick…… “Like thunder our first salvo crashes out. The splashes are well together, but over and right of Princess Royal. Deflection left 2 – down 400 – Salvo! Over! Down 400 – Salvo! Over! Down 800 – Salvo! This, too, went over and I realized my last correction had not been heard or not executed. Down 800! Execute! Salvo! Over! The sixth salvo fired at 15:52 straddled the target – three splashes over and one short at 13,000 yards. At 15:58 a salvo struck the British battlecruiser with two of our 12 inch shells!” The first armor-piercing shell penetrated Princess Royal’s 6-inch belt armor and detonated in a coal bunker. The second shell burst against the armor belt and drove it inboard to a depth of four inches. The impact shock of the two shells temporarily disabled the battlecruiser’s fore-top fire control instruments and control had to be switched to the “B” turret rangefinder. Later, about 16:00, another 12-inch shell struck just below the upper deck at “B” turret, went through the Ward Room bulkhead, an adjacent coaling trunk, and detonated on the turret barbette armor. The explosion pushed the thick plate in about an inch, severely damaged the adjacent compartments, and started several fires – killing 8 and wounding 38. But for some reason unknown to the Germans, though the British had finally begun to return fire, no one was shooting at Derfflinger. As “tactical #3” in the line, SMS Seydlitz was firing on her opposite number, HMS Queen Mary. Her Fire Control Officer, Korvettenkapitan Foerster, received the flagship’s signal and opened fire at 16,400 yards. It is not known if Queen Mary was struck during the opening phase of the battle – her ship’s log did not survive – and Seydlitz was suddenly enveloped in her own emergency. Ten minutes after fire was opened, Foerster’s attention was diverted… “Habler, in Artillery Central, reported by telephone...’Turret Caesar does not give any answer – smoke is pouring out of their speaking tube’. This was the exact same report I had received at the beginning of the Dogger Bank action. I instantly knew we had been hit and the powder cartridges in Caesar turret’s trunk were on fire – the turret was out of action. I mechanically ordered the ‘C’ turret magazine flooded. With the chamber under water, there would be no further danger to the ship.” SMS Seydlitz was hotly engaged with HMS Queen Mary to starboard, steaming at 22 knots, on a SSE course. Her gunnery was good and she continued to straddle the British battlecruiser with rapid salvos. Around 16:58, Queen Mary straddled the Panzerkreuzer and she took a hit in “C” turret. As a point of interest, the Kaiserliche Marine lettered their turrets as follows: “A” turret, “B” turret (starboard wing), “C” turret (superfiring aft), “D” turret (extreme aft), and “E” turret (port wing). Below is a close-up view of “C” and “D” turret. The British 13.5-inch armor-piercing shell apparently penetrated the barbette of “C” turret (superfiring over “D” turret) and exploded in the munitions working chamber, setting off a flash fire among the powder charges. Seydlitz had lost both “C” and “D” turrets in a similar incident at Dogger Bank when the fire passed into the adjoining working chamber and burned out both turrets. Precautions put in place at that time prevented a repeat disaster and “D” turret continued to engage the enemy. Seydlitz by "AP". Fourth in Hipper’s battle line was SMS Moltke, and her Fire Control Officer, Kapitanleutnant Schirmacher, rained down a deadly accurate fire on HMS Tiger in the early part of the engagement. Moltke scored nine hits between 15:48 and 16:00 (twelve minutes). The first shell hit Tiger’s belt armor amidships, pushing it in about three inches. Another shell penetrated the hull and wrecked the C.P.O.’s mess, blowing a hole in the upper deck. The belt was penetrated abreast “A” turret and the shell struck the barbette armor, pushing it in six inches and filling the handling trunk with toxic gases. The port side belt armor was penetrated by yet another shell, destroying the Stoker’s mess and leaving a 10x4-foot hole in the main deck. At 15:54 “Q” turret was struck on the roof, the shell entering the turret and doing considerable damage to the gun controls. Though later repaired, the turret only fired 32 rounds during the entire battle. At 15:58, an 11-inch shell penetrated the hull at the upper deck level, traveled through intervening bulkheads, and blasted a 2x1-foot hole in the “X” turret barbette armor. The turret was only temporarily disabled, but when it came back on line, the director control instruments had also been damaged (probably concussive vibration) and it fired 19 degrees off target. Around 16:58 an 11-inch shell penetrated the armor belt in the machinery spaces just above the protective armored deck. The projectile passed through an ammunition handling passageway starting a fire, and carried on into the turbine spaces – narrowly missing the main steam pipe to the turbines. Had the shell struck that pipe, the battlecruiser would have gone “dead in the water”. The remaining shells caused considerable damage to light structures and non-essential compartments – starting several fires above and below decks. During all this damage to HMS Tiger -- Moltke remained unscathed – despite being under fire from both Tiger and New Zealand. Some time around 16:20, a near miss did fall close off Moltke’s starboard bow, resulting in minor flooding forward. At the end of the battlecruiser line was SMS Von der Tann – the oldest and smallest of them. Nevertheless, she was delivering a fast and accurate fire onto HMS Indefatigable – one of the very ships she had been designed to destroy. Within a minute and a half, she straddled and hit her target with the third salvo. For her part, Indefatigable was firing high and wide. British shells were landing among the light cruisers and torpedo boats on Von der Tann’s disengaged port side, forcing them to take evasive action. The German fire was so accurate, the shell splashes frequently obscured Indefatigable from sight. Captain Sowerby “yawed” the battlecruiser to port and starboard to evade the shells and throw off the German’s aim, but Von der Tann’s gunnery officer, Korvettenkapitan Mahrholz, quickly made corrections and continued to “straddle” his target with rapid salvo fire. This is a close-up of HMS Indefatigable’s deck detail. Note the areas around “A” turret and “X” turret. This will help “visualize” some of the action as it unfolds. (Model by "Barroco Hispano".) When the signal to open fire was finally run up Lion’s halyards, her massive guns roared to life – quickly followed by her squadron mates. But the British battlecruisers fired more out of a sense of urgency than with any degree of certainty. Like the opening German salvos, the shells fell over the target – but WELL over the target. The majority of Hipper’s ships found the range by the third salvo (a minute and a half to two minutes). The British were nowhere near that good. With poor rangefinders, a haze shrouding the eastern horizon, and their own funnel smoke obscuring the German ships, the British might as well have been firing “blind”. Boedicker’s 2nd Scouting Group had fallen back and taken up station about a mile off Hipper’s disengaged port beam. Suddenly, the light cruiser SMS Regensburg and her torpedo boats found themselves passing through mountainous columns of erupting water as British shells splashed down. The disengaged German light forces were in far greater danger than the Panzerkreuzer line. Even worse – Boedicker’s little ships continued to suffer under this punishing bombardment until they could sheer out of range – because the British were unbelievably slow to realize their error. HMS Tiger actually fired on Regensburg for a full ten minutes! Poor shooting by HMS Indefatigable and New Zealand was not an exception to the rule. Both the 1st and 2nd Battlecruiser squadrons fired off a great deal of large caliber ammunition during the “run to the south” – most of which, fell far beyond the target. Beatty’s relaxed attitude toward gunnery practice has already been noted, and more practice would undoubtedly have been to their benefit. But historians have more often excused inferior shooting by citing poor visibility. It is quite true the sun was to the west in the afternoon, and sharply silhouetted the British warships, while a gradually darkening eastern sky benefited the Germans. Throw in a thickening mist, a low-hanging haze along the coast, some patchy fog -- and the low-profile, light gray German warships would blend right in. A Barr & Stroud, 9-foot, coincidence rangefinder with electrical computing and repeating transmission unit. It is a relatively compact unit that can be installed almost anywhere. Rule of thumb: the greater the distance between the periscope apertures at either end – the more accurate the range estimate. The British were further handicapped by their optical rangefinders. The majority of British dreadnoughts at Jutland used a 9-foot, Barr & Stroud, coincidence rangefinder. (Some ships – HMS Orion and the ships of the 5th Battle Squadron – were equipped with an improved 15-foot model.) This device worked well in clear weather, but required visible, sharp edges so the two images could be merged into a single target image. Finding clear, sharp lines on a target during hazy weather proved problematic, to say the least. One British naval officer once remarked...”Naval gunnery was like taking a rifle and shooting at running rabbits from the back seat of a car moving at 30 miles per hour. The wonder is we ever hit anything…” The Kaiserliche Marine used 9-foot Zeiss stereoscopic rangefinders (replaced by 1918 with 12 and 15-foot models) which were high-magnification and well-suited to the hazy conditions in the North Sea. They were even more excellent at shorter ranges, which coincided with the somewhat limited battle ranges of their main battery gun turrets. This aspect allowed German ships to find the range much more quickly, therefore inflicting damage before the British. The German gunnery officers also went into battle knowing their guns, though smaller in caliber, were in many ways superior to British ordnance. German guns were “built-up” and preformed uniformly over long periods of firing. The British guns were wire-wound and cased, and tended to “droop” when they got hot – seriously impairing accuracy. The intense exchange of gunfire between Von der Tann and Indefatigable continued for about fourteen minutes, until approximately 16:02, when the British battlecruiser was struck by three shells around her aft gun turret. Korvettenkapitan Mahrholz observed an explosion and Indefatigable immediately swung out of line to starboard, settling by the stern. (The German armor-piercing shells likely punched through the 1 inch deck plates and exploded deep in the ship – igniting the aft magazine and blowing the bottom out of her.) Within mere seconds, Von der Tann’s next salvo (fired at the extreme range of 17,700 yards) came in and two projectiles struck the British ship up forward. One shell slammed through the forecastle deck while the other penetrated the roof of “A” turret. Mahrholz’ after action report describes what he saw…… “I saw a giant explosion in the aft gun turret, a bright flame flashed up and ship debris was thrown into the air in a wide arc. As what appeared to be the turret roof landed on their aft deck, our next salvo arrived and two hits were obtained forward – one through “A” turret. A gigantic black smoke cloud rose above the ship and she lay over to port, as if to capsize. Less than 30 seconds later, there was a tremendous explosion, with a massive black smoke cloud reaching double the mast height and settling over the water. Pieces of the ship were seen to go in all directions – with a 50-foot steam launch rising two hundred feet before falling into the sea. When the smoke cleared, the enemy was gone.” HMS Indefatigable, mortally stricken, heels over to port the moment before she explodes and goes to the bottom. Her stern has gone under and her bow has lifted out of the water. It is possible this photo was taken from the deck of SMS Von der Tann as she passes to port. As near as analysts can figure, Indefatigable’s aft turret trunk had been hit and “ready” powder charges set on fire. The flames must have reached the aft magazine about the time the shell penetrated “A” turret, causing an explosive flash that reached down into the forward magazine. Apparently both magazines exploded almost simultaneously – shattering the thin-skinned cruiser and sending her to the bottom. (This was only 15 minutes into the battle.) A crew of 57 officers and 960 men went down with her. When the German lookouts aboard Lutzow reported Indefatigable’s loss, Hipper was – to say the least – skeptical. He calmly strode out on the starboard bridge wing and trained his glasses aft – to the massive column of smoke rising into the sky. He counted only five British battlecruisers remaining in line, grunted his approval, and lit a fresh cigar before turning his attention back to Lion. No one present that day had ever witnessed a modern capital ship disappear in a “puff of smoke”. Throughout the exchange, Von der Tann fired 52-11 inch and 38-5.9 inch shells, opening at 17,700 yards and closing to 13,500 yards. We do not know how many shells actually struck Indefatigable, because her ship’s log went down with her. But Von der Tann claimed the first victim of the Battle Of Jutland – while she, herself, remained undamaged. Admiral Hipper had deliberately closed the range, withholding the fire of his lead ships until his last ship, Von der Tann, was within gun range – and the gamble had paid-off handsomely. HMS Barham, 5th Battle Squadron, leading Malaya, Warspite, and Valiant – trailing Beatty’s line by 10 miles. Around 15:30, before the guns had opened, the German and British squadrons settled onto a gradually converging southeasterly course. The opposing Vice-Admirals had clearly demonstrated their intention to give battle – here, and now. And the next eighteen minutes have, for over a century, given naval analysts and historians cause to level severe criticism at Beatty for the confused and inept handling of his three squadrons (only ten capital ships). Ernle Chatfield (Beatty’s flag-captain) was on HMS Lion’s compass platform with his navigator and the chief gunnery officer and his staff. He was studying the German battlecruisers as the range closed and already knew Beatty had lost his first great advantage. The mist and haze to the east (about 12 miles) made ranging on the target difficult – and the British funnel smoke was blowing down-range -- further obscuring the German ships. At the same time, several destroyers of the 9th and 10th Flotillas passed between the opposing squadrons, struggling to reach their station ahead of the Battlecruiser Fleet – and their funnel smoke was making the situation intolerable. Beatty’s capital ships could have opened fire at 23,000 yards (5th Battle Squadron at 30,000 yards) – which, at the lower figure, exceeded Hipper’s maximum gun range of approximately 18,000 yards. That, and Beatty’s slight speed advantage, would have allowed him to stand off and pound the German battlecruisers to rubble. The poor visibility in the east and the roiling clouds of funnel smoke effectively dashed those hopes. Chatfield dutifully passed a message to Beatty that the squadron should open fire at once – but no response was forthcoming. Below Chatfield, on the Admiral’s bridge, were Beatty, his secretary, other staff, and the hapless “flag-lieutenant” Ralph Seymour. As HMS Lion charged along at 24 knots, Beatty was dictating a sighting report to his secretary, to be sent off to Jellicoe (never mind it contained insufficient data). At the same time, he was rattling off a string of flag signals to Seymour in an attempt to get his squadrons into battle formation. Each ship had slightly different speed capabilities, and while the four “cats” were keeping up – New Zealand and Indefatigable were overloading their boilers and gradually losing ground. The line was also staggered (some to port, some to starboard) and seemed to be having difficulty falling into “line ahead” formation. The scouting light cruisers were off somewhere – either skirmishing or chasing the German light cruisers as they disengaged to take station on Hipper. And the British destroyer flotillas, “on their own initiative”, were careening around, hard pressed to follow the big ships. As mentioned before, two flotillas even cut across the engaged front of the British battlecruisers to reach their station at the head of the line. (Jellicoe would have had heart failure!) Worst of all – little thought had been given to maneuvering the powerful fast-battleships of the 5th Battle Squadron. As Beatty’s “Splendid Cats” (battlecruisers) accelerated, Chatfield was keenly aware 5th Battle Squadron (Queen Elizabeth’s) was at least ten miles astern – out of gun range -- and falling farther behind with each passing minute. Beatty’s first turn to the SE to engage the Germans, and his first signaling error, had put them 10 miles astern. When Beatty increased to 24 knots, that put them even farther behind. HMS Tiger had, at the time, been relaying signals from the flagship to the 5th Battle Squadron by signal lamp (they were already too far behind to see flags). As Tiger sped up and closed-up into battle formation – that link was broken. Even if Beatty had given any specific thought to the 5th Battle Squadron – there was no communication channel. Beatty had, in effect, thrown away his second great advantage over the enemy. Small wonder history has judged Beatty harshly. This is a depiction of what Hipper’s battle line would have looked like before opening fire at 15:48. In the left hand column, facing the enemy, you have the battlecruisers Lutzow (flag) followed by Derfflinger, Seydlitz, Moltke, and Von der Tann. The middle column is composed of torpedo boats – on the disengaged port beam of the battlecruisers. On the far right, you have the light cruiser SMS Regensburg, assigned as a flotilla leader. (Again, I have greatly reduced the distance between ships in order to fit them into the picture.) Seydlitz model by "AP" -- all other models by "Barroco Hispano". This is a little more detail. The torpedo boats that later went into the attack were largely from the 6th Flotilla, composed of “V”, “G”, and “S” Class boats. Just for simplicity’s sake, I have used the model of G-101. When the signal to attack was hoisted, some of the torpedo boats would have increased speed, gotten ahead of Lutzow, and cut across her bows to get at the enemy. Others would have simply used their speed and agility to cut through the gaps between the big ships. (No doubt risky – but probably quite a “rush”!) The model of Seydlitz (center) is a work of art by @AP. The remainder of the wonderful models are graciously provided by @Barroco Hispano. In the foreground you see SMS Regensburg, the torpedo boat Flotilla Leader. The Flotilla Leader is, basically, an “overall commander” for one or more flotillas. When an attack is ordered, the light cruiser goes in with its flotillas and provides as much tactical control as possible during a skirmish (very little, really). If The torpedo boats get into trouble, the Leader provides a “rally point” for them to regroup under cover of his 6 inch guns. If the boats needed a little extra muscle to get through to their targets – the cruiser throws its weight into the battle. If the opportunity presents itself, the cruiser will also close to launch torpedoes. All-in-all – a job for younger men with steady nerves. At this point, it is worth remembering – when Admiral Hipper swung to the SE to give battle, he reduced the squadron’s speed, temporarily, to 18 knots so he could; (1) form line of battle; (2) close-up his Panzerkreuzer; (3) assign “fire distribution” (4) get his light forces shifted to the disengaged port beam; (5) clear his own funnel smoke – and then resume his converging course at 22 knots -- a speed ALL his ships could easily maintain. (Those steps fulfilled one of the essential rules of warfare – “concentration of force”. If there was a Naval Tactics textbook in the Kaiserliche Marine, those steps would have been listed.) Only then, with plenty of time remaining, did Hipper concentrate on closing the range. His battlecruisers had been out-ranged at Dogger Bank, and he feared Beatty would again use his superior gun range to stand off. Hipper knew he must close the range until his guns could reach Beatty’s battle line. So while Chatfield was sweating bullets on Lion’s compass platform, Beatty was on the bridge below, his attention diverted as he feverishly tried to get his squadrons sorted out. Why? Because he had failed to do so early on -- when there was available time. The British battlecruisers were still maneuvering into position – but worst of all – none of them could obtain a reasonably accurate range to target. According to long established Royal Navy protocol, the squadron was waiting for Beatty to make the signal to open fire – but Lion’s rangefinders were still getting obscured and mixed readings of up to 25,000 yards from their coincidence rangefinders – well beyond the range of his 13.5-inch weapons. Meanwhile, Hipper succeeded in closing the range and decided the issue by opening fire first. Chatfield, as “flag-captain”, knew he could wait no longer for Beatty -- and gave the order to open fire. Lion’s big 13.5-inch guns thundered, soon followed by the rest of the battle line, but every shot fired went “over” (only Princess Royal came close). The German ships, even at 15,000 yards, were still diffuse gray shapes against the mist and haze, and it took the British much longer to adjust the range. Beatty suddenly realized he was much closer to the German line than he thought, and opened the range by changing to a SSE course. Between 15:48 and 15:53, HMS Lion was hit twice by Lutzow. Hipper, getting the best of the fight, followed onto a southerly course, and a steady, thunderous, gunnery duel developed on a converging course at about 16,000 yards. It proved to be the most destructive gunfight in modern history. Beatty had, at 15:46 (just before Hipper opened fire), finally hoisted a flag signal ordering “distribution of fire”. Lion and Princess Royal were to take on Lutzow (in an attempt to take out the German flagship) – Queen Mary was to target Derfflinger – Tiger was to shoot at Seydlitz – New Zealand at Moltke, and Indefatigable to fire on Von der Tann. But in the confusion and rush to prepare for battle, two of the British ships missed the signal flags. As a consequence, Queen Mary fired at her opposite number – Seydlitz – leaving Derfflinger unhindered for a full ten minutes. HMS Tiger also missed the flag hoist, with the result that both she and New Zealand fired on Moltke – with little success. This is the left 12-inch rifle inside one of Lutzow’s main battery turrets. You see the big 12-inch projectile on the loading tray ready to be pushed into the gun chamber. The rating standing against the front wall of the turret is operating the controls of the new mechanical ramming mechanism designed for the Derfflinger Class battlecruisers. Two ratings to the right are preparing to roll powder charges from the ammunition hoist, down a swinging tray, and into the rammer cradle. Two charges will be rammed into the gun chamber behind the shell. In testing, the projectile and charges of the new 12-inch guns were too heavy to sustain a rate of three rounds per minute manually, so mechanical ramming was used for the first time in a German capital ship. You will note two other ratings wearing slings and bandages. Even if a gun crew was not injured by direct enemy fire, a gun turret was a dangerous place to be, and concussion from outside the turret could be equally harmful. (The painting is by the renown German naval artist Claus Bergen.) As the British gradually acquired the range, and the various ship’s crews concentrated upon their individual tasks, the gunnery grew in noise and intensity. Aboard the Panzerkreuzer, memories of the Dogger Bank action may have flashed through their minds, but they faded quickly. That had been a wild, confused chase with comparatively little result. This was quickly developing into a grim, toe-to-toe slugging match, with neither side showing any interest in withdrawing. Nerves steadied and spotters and range-takers moved with precision and spoke quickly. The director chiefs manned their phone lines and flicked their repeater switches with robot-like calm. Inside the thick steel gunhouses, the turret crews worked amid thin wisps of cordite smoke drifting in the dim light – rolling the big shells from the hoists onto the loading trays -- pushing the rammer levers forward and back as they rammed them into the gun breech – repeating the process for the two powder charges with a mechanical rhythm – again and again. The gun layers attention would be focused on their control boards as they made regular corrections – looking neither left, nor right – no matter the noise or vibration. Commands were shouted over the din of the heavy machinery as the giant rifles were elevated yet again. A few more lateral adjustments – and the firing alarm rang out – “KA-BOOOM”. The over-pressure blast of the big guns wrenched at their ears and pushed against their eyes – even though they covered the one and closed the other tightly. For just a moment, there would be a dizzy feeling – but the sight of the big rifles recoiling, the breech sliding open, and the sound as the empty powder casing clanged to the turret floor would bring them back to their senses. Instantly, the macabre dance would begin again. Hipper’s five battlecruisers quickly registered hits on three of the six British battlecruisers. But it was fully seven minutes before the British obtained their first hit. Up on Lion’s bridge, it quickly became apparent no amount of training or sea duty could ever prepare a human being for battle…… “All around us huge columns of water, higher than the funnels, were thrown up as the enemy shells plunged into the sea. Some of the gigantic splashes curled over and, with the force of a hammer, deluged us with water. Occasionally, above the roar of the big guns, we heard the ominous buzz of a shell splinter and caught a fleeting glimpse of polished steel as it flashed past the bridge.” -- Lieutenant Chalmers The first near-disaster of the day had occurred at 15:58 when Seydlitz was struck on “C” turret and narrowly avoided destruction. As the gunnery duel heated up at the head of the column, Lion obtained a hit on Lutzow at 15:57. But the second near-disaster of the day occurred around 16:02, when one of Lutzow’s 12-inch shells struck Lion’s “Q” turret at 16,500 yards. The projectile penetrated the joint between the face-plate and the roof plate – blowing both plates into the air. The shell entered the gunhouse, detonated over the left gun, killed or wounded everyone in the turret, and started a smoldering fire among the powder charges. A mortally wounded Royal Marines Major, Francis Harvey, the Turret Captain, feared an explosion in the turret trunk – and he lived long enough to order the magazine doors closed and flooded. Seconds later, eight full powder charges in the lower handling chamber ignited and burned violently – flames rising to the masthead. The fire killed all but one of the munitions crew still in the chamber. But Major Harvey’s heroic action saved the battlecruiser from certain destruction, earning him a posthumous Victoria Cross. Around 16:00, Hipper turned away one point to port. In the heat of battle, he had allowed the range to close to about 12,000 yards – and that was simply too close. Though his secondary batteries were in range, and scoring hits on the British, the wily Bavarian had taken note of his enemy’s poor marksmanship. He reasoned that getting too close to the English might improve their gunnery. As the range gradually and imperceptibly opened, the British salvos began to go ”...wild and wide of the mark” – while the German salvos continued to fall on or among the British in those uncannily tight groupings. Four minutes later, the range had opened to just under 17,000 yards and Hipper steadied-up on course. Across the shell-torn stretch of water, still under an intense fire, Beatty turned away three points to starboard and ran up a flag signal informing HMS Princess Royal the flagship’s wireless antennas had been shot away. Apparently the fire control system for the German secondary batteries was wreaking havoc aboard HMS Lion. Thousands of British officers and men were below decks tending to their vital tasks, or were sealed inside the steel gun turrets above deck. Those that could actually see the battle, were shocked and stunned by the loss of Indefatigable. Moments after she went down, Lieutenant Chalmers left his post on Lion’s bridge for a quick look around…… “I stepped out onto the flagship’s bridge wing and looked aft down the line of firing ships. How magnificent they looked with their huge bow waves and the flashing broadsides with mountains of smoke. But astern of them, I saw only an enormous pall of gray smoke. I gazed at this in amazement, and at the same time tumbled to the fact there were now only five battlecruisers in our line...I glanced quickly towards the enemy. How many of them were still afloat? Still five.” The British had been blazing away, with their bigger guns and more numerous ships, and while they were certainly scoring hits, it did not seem to matter. The German battlecruisers steamed on at full speed with their rate of fire and capacity to deal out damage seemingly undiminished. Hipper and his battlecruisers were turning out to be a tougher lot than Beatty had allowed for. With all that had gone on since August 1914, this was really the first time Beatty had managed to come to grips with the Imperial German battlecruisers. At Dogger Bank, Hipper had sensed a trap, and the whole affair turned into a muddled stern chase. The German Admiral had wisely refused to give battle under unfavorable circumstances and all Beatty managed was to sink SMS Blucher – a ship that was hardly a match for his battlecruisers. But on this day, Beatty got his wish. Hipper had willingly offered battle on his own terms and Beatty was getting a proper crack at them. And he was only just beginning to learn how hard it was to sink a German battlecruiser. SMS Lutzow leading Derfflinger on the “Run To The South”. On the left of the picture, you can see the British shells largely falling far “over” their targets. The British battlecruisers can be dimly seen off their starboard bows. A destroyer skirmish appears to be in progress ahead of the advancing battle lines (upper left of picture). Note the huge smoke clouds from Lutzow’s guns and the heavy smoke column issuing from her funnels as she steams at high speed. The whole arena of battle is smothered in a mixture of gun smoke, funnel smoke, and mist, that literally blots out the sky. (Claus Bergen) HMS Lion’s log may show us part of the reason for Admiral Beatty’s revelation. Despite being fired upon by Lion and Princess Royal – Lutzow’s gunnery was outstanding. The German flagship had obtained nine hits on Beatty’s flagship between 15:51 and 16:24. (Roughly one shell every four minutes.) And though they all caused some sort of cumulative damage, the only serious event was the loss of “Q” turret at 16:02. Quite frankly, Beatty, Chatfield, and the other bridge staff only learned of the near-disaster when a lone Sergeant of Marines stumbled onto the bridge – wounded and severely burned – to report the turret out of action and the magazines flooded. (He was the only survivor.) There is little doubt this startling and shocking drama on Lion’s bridge, combined with the frequent jolting hits, had an effect. Beatty had been singularly focused on closing his enemy. Hipper, equally intent, monitored his range while the Panzerkreuzer dropped tight, accurate salvos on the British line and his secondary batteries blazed away at maximum range. Lutzow’s starboard 5.9-inch guns could fire a total of 42 rounds per minute and would cause considerable damage to the lightly armored English cruisers. At 12,000 yards, the sudden loss of Lion’s “Q” turret – followed by a blizzard of medium shells – had alerted Beatty to the fact he’d gotten in too close. At 16:10, Lion suddenly sheered out of line, fired two torpedoes at Derfflinger, and disappeared into the smoke by 16:24. Dodging into the smoke would give Lion a brief respite while her gunners caught their breath and damage control crews fought the out-of-control blaze amidships. This macabre minuet – in and out – back and forth – was played out numerous times as the two aggressive admirals jockeyed for advantage. Though hard-pressed, in all truth, HMS Lion must have been a “cat” with nine lives -- four of Lutzow’s 12-inch shells had failed to detonate. At 16:15, Princess Royal, also firing on Lutzow, landed two 13.5-inch shells on target. One projectile struck Lutzow’s waterline belt abreast the aft conning tower, delivered a violent punch, but failed to penetrate. The other shell penetrated the deck between the “A” and “B” turret barbettes and exploded, wiping out the forward battle dressing station. When Lion sheered off, Lutzow immediately took Princess Royal under fire and straddled her with the first salvo. Derfflinger was already firing on the British ship and, in quick succession, Princess Royal had the right gun of “Q” turret put out of action, her second funnel was shot through, a shell struck her armor belt abreast the fore funnel, and a projectile struck “A” turret. The shell failed to penetrate, but caused the breech of the left gun to jam shut. The shell also bent the retractor lever of the right gun, causing it to misfire frequently. Princess Royal’s “A” turret continued to fire – occasionally -- but could not be relied upon. The gun duel between SMS Seydlitz and HMS Queen Mary had been carrying on at a fast and furious pace, with each ship landing regular, well-timed salvos. Queen Mary was continually “straddled”, with Seydlitz’ shell splashes often obscuring the battlecruiser from view. As the German ship continued to close the range, the sweating and straining men inside the squat steel gunhouses fired-off salvos at 20-second intervals, while her 5.9-inch casemate batteries fired a blizzard of shells at Queen Mary’s upper works – blasting holes in the superstructure and starting numerous small fires. Around 16:20, with the range down to 12,900 yards, Queen Mary miraculously landed two 13.5-inch shells on Seydlitz’ forward gun turret. The first shell struck the turret’s side armor, failed to penetrate, but jammed the turret fast before ricocheting over the side and exploding in mid-air. The second shell struck the turret faceplate squarely, penetrated, and left a neat, round hole the size of the shell. The projectile did a great deal of damage to the turret’s interior machinery, but failed to detonate. Kapitan von Egidy heard the sharp crack of the impact on the turret, but focused his glasses back on Queen Mary and carried on the running gun battle with his three remaining turrets. Just thirty-five minutes into the engagement, Beatty was learning that a “proper crack” at Hipper’s battlecruisers was proving to be a hot and brutal affair. HMS Lion had been repeatedly hit and lost one turret. Princess Royal had been roughly handled with two turrets damaged and numerous fires blazing. Queen Mary had one turret damaged and her upper works “peppered” and set afire. And -- HMS Indefatigable had gone down in a massive explosion. Beatty started the battle with Hipper outnumbered six ships to five. Half an hour later, Hipper had managed to inflict serious damage on the British and evened the odds into the bargain. Hipper, for his part, was pressing the issue and using his well-armored battlecruisers to good advantage. His Krupp armor was keeping his battlecruisers intact and afloat while his 11-inch and 12-inch guns slowly dismantled the thinly armored British warships. What’s more, the “Run To The South” had only just begun. For those of you having trouble keeping all this straight – don’t feel bad. The times of incidents often overlap -- others need more explanation, etc, etc. The “Run To The South” was a brutal slugging-match with a great deal of action to include. And it should be pointed out -- nearly two thirds of all the serious battle action at Jutland occurred at this time. I found a simple, but concise map to help. If you have questions – feel free to ask. BATTLECRUISER ACTION – “RUN TO THE SOUTH” (1) 15:22 - Hipper sights Beatty. (2) 15:48 - First shots fired by Hipper's squadron. (3) 16:00 -16:05 - Indefatigable explodes, leaving two survivors. (4) 16:25 - Queen Mary explodes, eighteen survive. (5) 16:45 - Beatty's battlecruisers move out of range – “Run To The North”. (6) 16:54 - Evan-Thomas's battleships turn north behind Beatty. NEXT TIME…… “...SOMETHING WRONG WITH OUR BLOODY SHIPS...” But before we leave you…… How about a tour of the munitions handling complex. In Cuxhaven, the munitions complex is set up with a connection to the main rail line and to the munitions distribution docks – munitions can be brought to the storage bunkers either by rail or by sea. This is an overview of the distributions quays. Left to right you have the Italian heavy cruiser Zara, the US destroyer Clemson, and the battlecruiser KM Scharnhorst. You will note the rail line behind the quays has been arranged so that all three replenishment points can be accessed at the same time without traffic jams. This very fine model of Scharnhorst is provided courtesy of @Barroco Hispano and shows her as she would have appeared upon commissioning in January 1939: 32,100 tons – 31 knots – 9x11-inch guns – 12x5.9-inch guns – 14x4.1-inch AA guns – 16x1.5-inch AA guns – 6x21-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 13.8 inches – 1 catapult and 3 Arado, Ar-196A-3 float planes. There has long been a debate as to whether Scharnhorst was a battlecruiser or a battleship – but her design was based on the final plans of the Imperial battlecruiser Ersatz Yorck, which was never completed. The pedigree seems clear enough to me – so I absolutely had to work her into the CJ somewhere! In essence – she was the last battlecruiser ever commissioned by the German Navy. She was armed with an “improved” 11-inch gun – for political reasons. In the mid-1930’s, it was feared 15-inch guns might cause the British to “get the wind up”. In this close-up of the dock activity, you can see the working parties unloading main gun ammunition from the shuttle locomotives to the quay for delivery to the warship. There are masses of people bustling about – unloading shells, checking them for imperfections, cleaning the rounds, and hauling them about with hand-trucks or loading them into cargo racks to be hoisted aboard the battlecruiser. In real life, docks are seldom quiet places, and we have tried hard to recreate the hundreds of crew and working parties involved in servicing a capital ship. This is a rear view of the quayside. The docks were modified from the “PEG SNM Series” (battleship docks) with “WMP Seawalls” added as timber bumpers on the outer edges. The large dockside cranes were borrowed from the “PEG Trash Removal” lots and resized to better fit the surrounding models. The 100 ton cranes trackside are by “AP”. The ammunition shuttle locomotives and “rolling stock” were modeled by “AP” from old pictures of equipment on German WW I period military railroads. The Great War would not have been possible without railroads. Artillery battery commanders, in particular, were shocked to find they could fire off a year’s worth of peacetime artillery shells in just a matter of hours. The British thought they had enough reserve artillery ammunition to last through a “short war” – perhaps a year. More than half of it was expended in the first two weeks of actual combat. Various props have been used to “dress-out” the scene, but the many “specialized” props were created by “AP” – sailors, shells, etc, etc. At the end of the quay, there are two Esmeralda Class paddle tugs moored to “barrel buoys”, while an Odin Class (diagonal) tug is visible at the top preparing to take two loaded lighters under tow. Barrel buoys, mooring dolphins, paddle tugs, and the Odin are the meticulous work of “AP”. Here you see a Clemson Class destroyer preparing to take aboard a full load of torpedoes. The Clemson’s were a large class of destroyers built by the US Navy over a number of years. The early versions of the extended class served during WW I, while others were completed between the wars. Under the “Lend Lease” agreement, 50 of them did yeoman service with the Royal Navy in WW II. Characteristics: 1,215 tons – 35.5 knots – 4x4-inch guns – 1x3-inch AA gun -- 12x21-inch torpedo tubes – no armor. USS Clemson is by “Barroco Hispano”. The 100 ton cranes quayside and the 20 ton cranes trackside are by “AP”, as are the shuttle locomotives, rail cars, and torpedoes. This is the Italian heavy cruiser Zara: Commissioned 1931 – 11,326 tons – 32 knots_8x8-inch guns – 16x3.9-inch guns – 34 AA guns – 2 seaplanes – belt armor 5.9 inches. As with all Italian warships built or modernized between the wars, they were quite handsome, with sleek lines and high speed. She is preparing to top-off her magazines with 8-inch shells and powder charges. In this shot, you can see the powder charges in brass cases stacked in rows on the quayside. Next to them are the 8-inch shells – ready to be hoisted aboard and stowed in the magazines. Again, the shuttle engines and ammunition cars are by “AP”, along with the shell and powder stacks – and, of course – the sailors and 20 ton cranes. This rear view of the quay gives a good view of the ammunition handling parties and the ammunition trains. We’ll continue this tour in Chapter 31. MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful warship models. SPECIAL THANKS to my friend and partner, @AP, for his talents, meticulous models, colorful imagination, and extreme dedication. If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-176649600000

Palmer’s Shipbuilding & Iron Company, Ltd. -- Jarrow, Scotland – circa 1905. It is difficult to see much through the smoke, and steam, and early morning gloom. But this would have been a common sight along the River Tyne (“Tyneside”) in the early decades of the 20th Century. Highly visible are the unmistakable funnels and tripod masts of a pre-dreadnought battleship. Note the “spotting tops” on both masts. Just one of many British shipyards. IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 14: BIRTH OF THE IMPERIAL GERMAN BATTLECRUISER First -- let me clarify the “terms” used in previous chapters when referring to various warships. In the Royal Navy, the last armored cruisers were the Warrior Class of 1908-1909. These ships were followed in the evolutionary process by the revolutionary Invincible Class of 1908-1909. The Invincible’s were variously referred to as “dreadnought cruisers” or “large cruisers” until 1911, when they were officially reclassified as “battlecruisers”. In the Kaiserliche Marine, the last armored cruiser built was, arguably, SMS Blucher, and I have referred to her as an “armored cruiser” or a “Grosse Kreuzer” (large cruiser). Blucher was, in realty, evolved from the Scharnhorst Class armored cruisers, but she was such a significant advance on armored cruisers that it could be said she no longer belonged to that classification. I have tried to avoid attaching the term “battlecruiser” to German warships prior to the appearance of SMS Von der Tann in the narrative, because she was the first of this unique ship type built for the Imperial Navy. Not only was she “first”, but she was the beginning of an entirely new evolutionary track decades ahead of other navies. In the previous chapter, Von der Tann, Moltke, and Derfflinger, were referred to as “Panzerkreuzer”, (literally, armored cruiser) – but they were developed far beyond the armored cruiser concept. They were, in fact, battlecruisers – but in Germany, that term was not used until after World War I. Official documents of the Imperial Era called them “Grosse Kreuzer” (large cruiser). But the men who sailed and fought them, used the term “Panzerkreuzer”. And official reports of Admiral Hipper’s 1st Scouting Group used that term as well. Beginning with this chapter, you will see “Panzerkreuzer” and “battlecruiser” used interchangeably. THE ORIGINS OF “GROSSE KREUZER F - 1907” It should come as no surprise that the origin of the next new cruiser – “Grosse Kreuzer-F-1907” – though complicated and convoluted, would begin with Kaiser Wilhelm II. Wilhelm remained obstinate in his belief Germany should build “fast battleships” – thereby eliminating the need to build both costly large cruisers and battleships. A few weeks before the information about HMS Invincible came to light, in May 1906 – in a surprise move – the Kaiser announced a competition among German shipyards for a “fast battleship” type. Wilhelm stipulated the ships should form a “special purpose” squadron and be capable of both reconnaissance work and battle line duty. His Imperial Majesty further specified the ships should be 3 knots faster than foreign contemporaries and mount a main battery of no less than four 11-inch guns. He suggested the new Nassau Class dreadnoughts (already in blueprint stage) should be used as the basis for the new type. State Secretary von Tirpitz was, of course, opposed to the competition – on several different levels. First and foremost, he feared the cost of another new ship type would anger the Reichstag. And a new ship could strain an overworked design department, and over burden the Imperial Dockyards. Though the competition might have been an embarrassing surprise to Tirpitz, it showed Wilhelm clearly understood the trend in ship type development. Unlike Jackie Fisher, the Kaiser had taken the “dreadnought theory” to its’ logical conclusion. History would show the Kaiser had, for once, been remarkably farsighted. In Britain, Fisher had forced the revolutionary design of the Invincible Class through the Admiralty by sheer force of will – his will. And he had become fixated on a big-gun cruiser of remarkable speed. Being determined, but practical, when the designers told him he could not have guns, armor, and speed – Fisher sacrificed the armor. In theory, the 12-inch guns would overwhelm an enemy – and if they could not, then speed would carry his cruiser out of harm’s way. No need for anything more than minimal armor. In Germany, the Reichsmarineamt was constantly forced to impose limitations on ship designs due to financial constraints. The Kaiserliche Marine was not free to build numbers of “experimental” ships – nor could they take risks with new technologies. If Tirpitz went to the Reichstag for millions of Marks to build a ship, he had to be sure it was going to be a solid addition to the strength of the Hochseeflotte. Consequently, the Naval High Command and the Design Bureau always sought the safer, more reliable balance between guns, armor, and speed. Around the end of June 1906, the General Navy Department sent a memorandum to Tirpitz regarding the “Grosse Kreuzer 1907” and follow-on ships. In their opinion, Germany was only building “large cruisers” because they were outnumbered by the British large cruisers – and the British would only continue to out-build them. After the true proportions of the Invincible’s became public knowledge, those 12-inch guns, and news the Japanese were building a similar Tsukuba Class meant “...we must build our “Grossen Kreuzer” as “fast battleships”. The memorandum theorized the armored cruisers of the Kaiserliche Marine had been, for years, inferior to the British and could not have performed their reconnaissance function, trade protection, or cruiser warfare functions. For the same reasons, the armored cruisers (including the new Blucher) could not act as a “fast wing’ of the battle fleet because they did not have the displacement, gun power, or armor protection for that type of work. And – the Naval High Command was certain confrontation between enemy battleships and their armored cruisers was inevitable. Attached to the General Navy Department memorandum was a “specification sheet” calling for a ship with six to eight 11-inch high velocity guns in various configurations, with eight 5.9-inch secondary guns in casemates or twin turrets, twenty 3.5-inch anti-torpedo-boat guns, 4 torpedo tubes, armor just 20% less than the Ersatz Bayern Class battleships (in early planning stage), and a speed of not less than 23 knots. Tirpitz, for his part, stubbornly insisted the proper operational employment of “large cruisers” was against other cruisers. Tirpitz did not seem to understand that sea battles are like knife fights – there are no rules. The Naval High Command had expressed singular insight – which would be proven correct. Still in the early stages, the discussion continued. An article appeared in the July 1906 issue of “Marine Rundschau” – in opposition to the “fast battleship”. The author pointed out Invincible was a very powerful cruiser – but had no armor to defend against a battleship – and it was an illusion to think speed AND armor could coexist in a fast battleship. He also made it clear battleships should fight battleships – cruisers should fight cruisers – and the armored cruiser should never be placed in the battle line. In conclusion, he stated – unequivocally – “...the cruiser type was incapable of developing it’s armor capacity – and the battleship incapable of increasing its’ speed – to the point where the two types could merge”. Having been written by a Naval officer in the Reichsmarineamt, one must either accept the article as “official policy” – or – Tirpitz was turning the tables on Jackie Fisher and spreading a bit of disinformation of his own. No one will ever know. It is worth remembering Admiral Fisher had once considered “fast battleships”, but was distracted by his mania for speed. This “fetish” for speed produced heavily armed and extremely fast cruisers. But they had so little armor, the Royal Navy captains considered them little more than “deathtraps”. (That particular opinion would change as British battlecruisers grew in size and gun-power.) Fisher’s “speed equals armor” theory would eventually be carried to such ridiculous extremes that he fell from grace and was removed from the Admiralty. (Some of his last battlecruiser designs were so combat-ineffective they would be converted to high-speed aircraft carriers under the terms of the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty.) HMS Courageous as completed in 1916, moored at Scapa Flow. At 19,180 tons she had a low displacement, but at 786 feet she was very long (lots of boilers). Equipped with 4x15-inch guns in two turrets – her guns had longer range – but packed only half the firepower of other warships. With only four guns, it would have been more difficult to hit her target with one of those big shells – while her target might be able to close the range and wreak havoc on her flimsy 3 inch armor belt. Fisher believed her 32 knot speed would prevent such a disaster. (Her hull was so thin parts of the bow plating and decks buckled when she steamed at high speed into heavy seas!) Superb model courtesy of @Barroco Hispano. HMS Glorious as she might have looked in 1919, when she was taken out of service and “laid-up in ordinary”. Extremely long at nearly 800 feet, with an 81-foot beam -- almost the entire midships third of her hull was devoted to boiler rooms generating her impressive speed of 32 knots. Her unacceptably thin armor protection was the end result of taking Fisher’s battlecruiser concept to its ultimate limits. Her 15-inch guns were lethal, but her lack of protection made her unfit for combat with anything larger than a light cruiser. Even a 5.9-inch shell could cause serious damage to her thin-skinned hull. Here you see her moored to buoys just off an old pier in the “mothball anchorage”. This is where the old and obsolete ships go to wait for their trip to the breaker’s yard. (More on the “mothball anchorage” in later chapters.) HMS Furious as completed in 1917. Courageous, Glorious, and Furious were of the same class, but Furious was redesigned at the last minute to accommodate two gigantic 18 inch guns in two single turrets. The three ships were meant to spearhead one of Fishers favorite hair-brained ideas. In his mind, World War I could be ended in a fortnight by sending a large Royal Navy squadron into the Baltic Sea, landing a British expeditionary force on the Pomeranian coast, and marching on Berlin. The Baltic is notoriously shallow in coastal waters, so these battlecruisers were specially designed with a shallow draft to work close inshore and provide bombardment support for the troop landings. Stern 18-inch gun turret of Furious. This is the biggest gun ever mounted in a Royal Navy warship. It was capable of firing a 3,320 lb shell out to a maximum of 40,500 yards (effective range was only 31,400 yards). The shells were so huge and hard to handle, the rate of fire was only one round per minute. Royal Navy captains declared it useless against other ships because it took so long to load – fall of shot corrections would be worthless with the target ship moving far beyond the last shell splash. It might have been useful bombarding the Pomeranian beaches. However, it’s more likely rooted in a comment by Fisher – “We must have the biggest gun on the fastest ship!” All three ships were “laid up in ordinary” in 1919, and converted into aircraft carriers in the 1920’s. As if in support of the “disinformation” notion, Tirpitz appears to have realized something must be done to catch-up to the British. In July 1906, from his summer home in St. Blasien, he sent a memorandum ordering an increase in size and gun caliber on the 1907 ships – the new battleship and “Grosse Kreuzer F”. He also wanted designs prepared as soon as possible – the battleship with twelve 12-inch guns and the cruiser with eight 12-inch. Considering the British ships, it was logical, but von Tirpitz was compromising between the Reichstag’s financial considerations, public opinion, and naval requirements. As fate would have it, the cruiser proposal was soon abandoned – while the battleship project produced the four ships of the Helgoland Class (1910-1911). SMS Helgoland. Laid down at the Howaldtswerke, Kiel, in November 1908 – launched September 1909 – commissioned August 1911. She was the name ship of a class of four – the second generation of dreadnoughts built for the Kaiserliche Marine. She is moored, fore and aft, to “battleship buoys” laying offshore of a boat landing. The “rickety” pier is from the “PEG Cannery” lot. The landing office/tower and the large warehouse are by “Historic Harbors”, while the small warehouse is from “Nob’s 1905 Japanese Naval Series”. The sea walls are by NBVC and the pavement is Paeng’s Grunge Concrete set. Some of the small props on the landing are randomly selected from the “prop box”, but the vast majority are by "AP" -- as are the “battleship buoys”. The excellent battleship model is courtesy of Barroco Hispano. This shot shows the layout of the main battery armament. Though Helgoland is longer than the Nassau Class, they have retained the turret pattern, with twin turrets fore and aft, and two “wing turrets” on either beam amidships. An interesting point -- unlike other battleships of the period, Helgoland has her three funnels concentrated in a single group between the wing turrets. Another point of interest -- this class made the jump to 12-inch guns, rather than the standard 11-inch gun. Helgoland was 22,808 tons – 20.5 knots – 12x12-inch guns – 14x5.9-inch guns – 14x3.5-inch guns – 6x20-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 11.8 inches. From this view, you can see the large areas of uncluttered deck space, providing wide firing arcs on either broadside. The superstructure, spartan though it is, has been concentrated along the centreline of the ship – out of the way of the big guns. This bow view demonstrates how “minimalist” the bridge structure was on the early German dreadnoughts – a tiny navigation bridge, the oval-shaped armored conning tower with rangefinder, and two banks of searchlights stepped against the foremast. The three forward turrets were grouped in this configuration with the intention of providing “ahead fire” by six guns. In reality, firing the two turrets abaft the bridge would have caused severe blast damage to the forward superstructure as well as ripping up the teak deck planking. Firing a battleship’s main armament anywhere but on the broadside was not recommended. This shot gives a better view of the small navigation bridge between the forward turret and the conning tower. It was small and cramped, but adequate for habitation during rough weather. You can also see the torpedo nets and booms collapsed against the hull. Just above them are the 5.9-inch secondary guns in turreted casemates at main deck level – seven on each beam. During rough seas, they would be awash. Amidships, around the funnels, the sloped sides at the base of the funnels cover the “armored funnel uptakes” (exhaust ducts for the boilers). Damage to the funnel uptakes could effect the operating pressure of the boilers – reducing speed – even though the boilers are usually operated under “forced-air draft”. Toward the stern, right behind the aft conning tower (with rangefinder on top), you can see a raised, tower-like, platform – a compass platform. A dreadnought is one gigantic mass of steel, and it tends to interfere with magnetic fields. The wooden platform raised above the deck lessens the compass distortion and can be used if the main compass on the bridge is destroyed or fails. A view of Helgoland’s stern. The stern anchor is tucked-in between two anti-torpedo-boat guns in hull casemates, with the shields open. On the starboard side, to the right of the main gun turret, you can see two of the 5.9-inch turreted casemate guns. The row of objects down the center of the fantail are skylights allowing sunlight into the officer’s accommodations below decks, and can be propped open to circulate air as well. Again, the three turrets grouped aft are intended to fire “dead astern” – not recommended. In all, she could present an eight-gun broadside. September 1906 saw Tirpitz opting for a new cruiser design of 19,000 tons, 8x11-inch, 8x5.9-inch, less expensive than Helgoland, speed 24 knots, stronger armor layout, and best of all -- steam turbines. The Admiral had stepped down from the larger gun, which could be considered unwise. But with turbines producing an acceptable speed, and a lighter propulsion plant, the weight saved by fewer turrets and guns could be converted into armor. Tirpitz had begun to think “outside the box”, and this was a clear indication the “Grosse Kreuzer” was moving toward the displacement, cost, and offensive/defensive capabilities of a battleship. A new “departmental” meeting was held the same month, and Tirpitz indicated the political climate favored the Kaiserliche Marine at the moment, and “the public” was of the opinion the British Invincible’s should be countered – the “Grosse Kreuzer-1907” must be equal, or better. The 11-inch, high velocity, rifle was agreed upon as being suitable to engage the enemy battle line – while saving weight. There was further discussion on underwater protection against large caliber shells, mines, and torpedoes – and the Design Department presented five studies. Three of the designs were rejected immediately because the 5.9-inch secondary guns were mounted in four twin turrets. Of the remaining two designs, Project I was rated at 23 knots with twin turrets fore and aft, and two single turrets on each beam. Project II reached 24 knots with twin turrets fore and aft and one on each beam. From that point the decision making process degenerated into a somewhat confused exercise in moving turrets around, changing from single to double turrets, placing the midships turrets in various locations, calculating costs and weight with each new configuration, and making endless numbers of sketch plans. A “base plan” was arrived at in October 1906, with twin turrets fore and aft and two twin “wing turrets” amidships, arranged in a diagonal echelon (“lozenge”) pattern – starboard wing turret forward. A November Construction Department memorandum outlined new developments. Parsons steam turbines had been added on four shafts, positioned, and the weights calculated. The bow armor was increased in coverage, and after initial towing tests, the length and beam were altered to obtain the best speed. The displacement had climbed to 19,200 tons. More changes occurred in February 1907, with the torpedo bulkhead and wing turrets moved inboard for better placement of the ammunition hoists and a faster rate of fire. Magazine space was increased as well. Finally, on 22 June 1907, Kaiser Wilhelm II signed off on the building order and tenders were invited for “Grosse Kreuzer-F”. Since the first memorandum from the General Navy Department, von Tirpitz had gradually – if grudgingly – come around to the prevailing opinions of the staff. It would be a gross over-simplification to say “Grosse Kreuzer-F” was merely a speedy version of the Helgoland Class battleships. The only thing they really had in common was a shared armor suite – though the cruiser’s armor belt was an inch thinner than the battleships – but she was 4 knots faster. “Grosse Cruiser-F 1907” was a sleek and striking design, and she would prove to be an excellent fighting ship. And, just in case you were wondering, the winner of the “Royal Fast Battleship Competition” was announced on 27 March 1907 – A.G. Weser Dockyards, Bremen. Their entry was “Polemos” – and her particulars were amazingly similar to the Design Department’s F2c plan. Within a percentage point here and there, the only real difference was “Polemos” had triple expansion engines and the armor on “Polemos” was less comprehensive. The Kaiser had wanted a “fast battleship” design – and A.G. Weser had designed one for him. And His Majesty was delighted – because Admiral von Tirpitz had designed a better one. (Tirpitz, however, would have preferred to be shot at dawn, rather than admit to designing a fast-battleship.) At this point the whole situation becomes a bit blurred. The Germans were obviously in a competitive ship building race with the British. But they were also in a developmental race. The Kaiserliche Marine privately acknowledged they could not out-build the British, but in order to remain competitive they had to build a warship superior to the British. Invincible’s high speed and monstrous 12-inch guns could be deadly to any existing cruiser. The Naval High Command had understood the dilemma perfectly well when they recommended...”we must build our Grossen Kreuzer as fast battleships.” Jackie Fisher had envisioned the Invincible Class as the ultimate “big cruiser” – fast, so she could scout in advance of the fleet and catch any enemy cruiser – and heavily gunned so she could destroy them. And that was fine – as far as it went. While Fisher’s battlecruisers might be able to avoid heavily gunned and armored battleships – with a bit of luck – what were they to do if confronted with an enemy battlecruiser equal in speed and comparable in firepower? Fisher had given them only a 6-inch armor belt, and that was totally inadequate to resist 11-inch and 12-inch gunfire. The German Naval High Command had found the flaw in Fisher’s logic. The British battlecruisers were awesome and terrible giants on offense, but they had an “Achilles’ Heel” on defense – little or no armor. The High Command further reasoned, if you could not build more ships than your enemy – build better ships. The process of designing a ship to counter the British was complicated -- with many twists and turns -- and would eventually have many fine technical details built into her. Nonetheless – the concept was reasonably straightforward. They took from Fisher’s battlecruiser concept the speed and guns – and added a full suite of carefully planned and arranged armor. Combine this with weight-saving technical advances in the propulsion plant, and the technologically advanced Krupp armor, and you had a single “Grosse Kreuzer” that was roughly equal to two Invincible’s. And in the process – either unwittingly, or intentionally – the Kaiserliche Marine had turned the mythical “fast battleship” into a reality. German designers were fully thirty years ahead of their time. Curiously enough, the Kaiserliche Marine preferred to call them “Grosse Kreuzer”, and the British do not seem to have caught-on to the difference. SIDEBAR ONE: “Langer Heinrich” under tow through the “swing bridge” at Wilhelmshaven dockyard – circa 1916. THE GROSSER SCHWIMMKRAN "LANGER HEINRICH” In the years leading up to the outbreak of war in 1914, the Kaiserliche Marine found itself building increasing numbers of large capital ships. They were also faced with rising political tensions in Europe and looking for ways to speed-up the building process. While the Imperial dockyards had built expensive cantilever cranes to handle the heavy lifting and fitting-out tasks, many of the private shipyards could not. The Reichsmarineamt decided the solution to the problem was a “Grosser Schwimmkran” -- a large floating crane capable of performing the heaviest work, while self-propelled and able to move around inside a dockyard – or from one dockyard to another on demand. Thus was born the concept of “Langer Heinrich” (loosely translated – “Long Henry”). Langer Heinrich from a side profile – circa 1917. Ordered in 1913, the crane structure was designed and built by Demag Fabrik in Duisburg and the hull, or “pontoon”, was constructed by AG Weser in Bremen. When completed in 1915, she was the largest floating crane in the world – even larger than the “Ajax” crane built to install the lock gates on the Panama Canal. The rectangular pontoon hull was 165 feet in length, 101 feet across, and drew 10 feet of water. The massive steel girder crane structure had a deadweight of 2,400 tons and rose 267 feet above the deck. Displacing 3,900 tons, Langer Heinrich was equipped with dual rudders behind twin propellers driven by two triple-expansion engines rated at 1,000shp each. The engines were fed steam by two large boilers housed in an aft deck house with a single funnel. Not built for any sort of speed, she was capable of only 4 knots. The hull pontoon was composed of 41 compartments – four containing pumping stations designed to flood other compartments to counterbalance the lift load. Certain compartments could also be “flooded-down” to steady the crane during sea movements. The crane structure could be rotated through a full circle and the jib boom had three smaller hoists of 10, 20, and 50 tons -- while the main hoist had two 125 ton lifting units that could be coupled together for a maximum capacity lift of 250 tons. (One of the main hoists would be sufficient to lift a 12-inch gun tube – about 110 tons – while both coupled units could lift an assembled gun house and it’s upper working chamber -- or “basket”.) Langer Heinrich was delivered to the Imperial Dockyards Wilhelmshaven in 1915 and saw extensive service in the fitting-out basin as well as repairing heavy war damage to the battleships and battlecruisers of the Hochseeflotte. As wartime demands rose, she was occasionally moved to Hamburg, Bremen, Kiel, and even the Schichau Yards in Danzig. After the Armistice in 1918, Great Britain claimed Langer Heinrich as “war reparations” – but Royal Navy officers deemed it impractical to move her across the North Sea. Instead, it was demanded similar cranes be built in Portsmouth (1920) and Brest (1935) at German expense. In 1928, when the German ocean liner SS Bremen was under construction, Langer Heinrich lifted the boiler plant into the hull. In 1933, the massive crane was used in the construction of the KM Admiral Graf Spee, and again in 1940 for the KM Tirpitz. By 1944, Langer Heinrich had been moved to Bremen to work in U-Boat construction. Her enormous lifting capacity allowed her to lift and place large prefabricated sections of submarine hulls -- and even completed smaller craft. Langer Heinrich raising a scuttled Type XVII-B submarine from Bremerhaven harbor – circa 1945. From 1945 to 1985, the crane was commandeered by the US Army and US Navy to clear wrecks out of German harbors and even unloaded complete steam locomotives to replace destroyed German rolling stock. In 1956 she was overhauled and modernized – mostly replacing her triple-expansion engines with new M.A.N. diesels. In 1985, Langer Heinrich was returned to the Federal Republic Of Germany and was sold later that year to an Italian company. In 2002 she was declared a “Monument To Industrial Archaeology” and work was undertaken to return her to her 1915 appearance. The crane passed her 100th birthday in 2015 and can still be seen on display in Genoa, Italy. In her day, Langer Heinrich was as famous as any of the Imperial warships and was featured on both German bank notes and collector cards. Here we have a selection of in-game pictures of “Langer Heinrich” in action…... Moored at her permanent berth in the dockyard. The model is, of course, the intricate work of our resident genius -- @AP – MANY THANKS. Though self-propelled, her engines were very low horsepower and she was usually towed from one job to another. The steam tug Goliath (Courtesy Barroco Hispano) is towing the giant crane, while a harbor tug (Thor) follows with a “brake” hawser attached. In this picture, Heinrich is hoisting a gun tube into SMS Seydlitz’ forward turret, while the steam paddle tug Esmeralda stands by the work barge. All models by “AP”. Always busy, the floating crane is assisting with some work on SMS Moltke’s turbines. Goliath stands by a machinist’s barge lashed alongside, while Nordwind and a harbor tug mind the turbine transport barge. Below is a detailed shot. All models courtesy of “AP”. Here we have two views of “Langer Heinrich” handling two sets of massive triple expansion engines for SMS Furst Bismarck. Her heavy lift capacity made Heinrich an invaluable dockyard asset and not only the largest crane in the world, but the most versatile. (Models by “AP”.) The amazingly detailed model of “Langer Heinrich” can be found in @AP “HISTORIC HARBORS 1900 Series – Volume 15”. SIDEBAR TWO: This short article is in reply to a question asked in the comments section of the last chapter. Being familiar with the fire control systems used during the 1905 Battle of Tsushima, the reader was curious about what systems came into use between 1905 and 1918. I gave him the short answer at the time, but promised a more informative answer here. This one’s for you @TheMurderousCricket. I hope it answers your questions – and I hope the lengthy and, sometimes complicated, details will not bore you. Again, I am happy to field any questions you may have. If there is an interest in a subject – as much information as possible should be made available. “Curiosity is the mark of intelligence – through it, knowledge is acquired.” DIRECTOR FIRE CONTROL SYSTEMS Throughout the 16th, 17th, and 18th Centuries, most naval combat took place between wooden sailing ships mounting the bulk of their guns in broadside. And, once the maneuvering for position was over, the fight usually degenerated into a slugging match at considerably less than 300 yards. Nelson’s triumph at Trafalgar was won with opposing ships-of-the-line grinding their hulls against one another. At that range – it was impossible to miss the target – and very little shooting skill was required. Some 66 years later, in 1871, HMS Devastation was launched – the first ironclad turret ship – and the ancestor of the modern battleship. Their main battery armament typically consisted of four 12-inch rifled, muzzle-loading, 38-ton guns in two revolving turrets. Produced in the Royal Arsenal, at Woolwich, in southeast London, the gun fired a 706-lb “Palliser” shell to a maximum range of 6,500 yards. Muzzle loaders proved problematic, and slow to load in combat (causing gunnery problems) – and were eventually phased-out in favor of breech-loaders. These guns were absolute monsters by comparison to the 32-pounder smoothbores aboard HMS Victory. And their 6,500-yard range was an enormous leap in gun range – resulting in an immense number of problems for capital ship gunnery, in general. In those days, gun turrets were operated under “Local Control”. A Turret Captain (with his gun crew) supervised the overall operation of the turret. “Loaders” handled the ponderous shells and rammed them into the breech, while a “spotter” in the forward part of the turret operated a sighting telescope with a crude aiming and ranging sight (not much different than the sights on an infantryman’s carbine). Following instructions from the “spotter”, the “gun-layer” trained the turret for “azimuth” and “laid it for elevation”. When all was ready, the Turret Captain gave the order to fire. “Local Control” meant each turret aimed and fired independent of the other turrets on the ship. This led to erratic and wildly differing results – meaning -- gunnery was still pretty much a “By guess and by God” proposition. It was clear the continual advancement of bigger guns with longer ranges could not be fully exploited without better technology for ranging and firing them. And that’s where Captain Percy Scott, Royal Navy, comes onto the scene. Percy Scott had a brilliant analytical mind, backed by boundless nervous energy – but found himself trapped in the waning years of a sedentary Victorian Navy. For over a decade, he had been working on improving the Royal Navy’s gunnery through the use of modern science. Scott realized the average gun-layer was incapable of accurately estimating the range to target, nor could he calculate the relative movement of his own ship and that of the target. He also knew turrets firing independently were not fully applying the power of the guns against the target. His fertile brain devised a series of hand-cranked mechanical computers that could take the estimated range, speed, and course of the target – and project an aiming point ahead of the target. He then linked these primitive computer systems to the gun turrets so they could be controlled and fired together. This was the crude beginnings of “Director Control”. Refined versions of his inventions eventually became the basis of Royal Navy fire control systems. But having invented it – he had to “sell” it to the Admiralty – and they weren’t buying. While Captain Scott was doing all this “secret” improvisation (meaning he did not have permission), he was in command of the cruiser HMS Scylla in the Mediterranean Fleet. He put his system to the test in the 1897 Fleet gunnery trials and raised his old score of 32% hits to 80%! Some envious brother officers (most of them senior to Scott) accused him of cheating. When the gossip got back to the Lords of Admiralty in London, they promptly relieved him of his command and landed him on the beach at half-pay! This was the sort of “hide-bound”, reactionary attitude he struggled against. In the Mediterranean Fleet, the ship’s Captains spent a goodly portion of their pay buying extra paint to keep their ships “sparkling” at all times, while gunnery training was ignored – firing practice left powder stains on the paint work. But modern technology inexorably moved forward whether their Lordships at the Admiralty liked it or not. (Fortunately, when Jackie Fisher became First Sea Lord, in 1904, he rescued Scott and officially backed his crusade to modernize gunnery in the Royal Navy.) In 1899, optical rangefinders began to appear in the major fleets, which solved the problem of getting an accurate range to the target. The Royal Navy adopted the Barr & Stroud, FQ2-type, 9-foot, coincidence rangefinder – which produced two images of the target that had to be cranked together until a single, sharp picture emerged – then you could read the range from a digital dial. The B&S worked quite well at shorter ranges, proved somewhat unreliable at long range, and was virtually useless in conditions of haze or mist. The Kaiserliche Marine chose the Zeiss, 9-foot, stereoscopic rangefinder – widely accepted as the finest optical instrument on the market. It was simple, but elegant, with a target marker that was centered amidships on the target, and the view adjusted for a sharp image. The Zeiss units required operators with excellent eyesight, but were remarkably good at finding the initial range, and were less effected by ship vibration or smoke. Their ease of operation allowed the Chief Gunnery Officer to keep track of the often rapid changes in course and speed of the target – thereby delivering a sustained fire on the enemy. With the range problem solved, it remained to calculate the speed of the opposing ship, adjust the aim ahead of the target (deflection), allow for the time of flight of the shells, and the pitch and roll of the firing ship. In 1902 a new device came into use – the Dumaresq – a manually-operated computing device. Information was fed into the device (own ship’s speed and course and speed of enemy) and the range to the target was updated, while a firing point ahead of the target (deflection) was provided. The Dumaresq was linked to a second new computing device – the Vicker’s Range Clock – which was a wind-up, clockwork, analogue computer for tracking continuous range to target. (The Vicker’s Range Clock was Scott’s brainchild, but was developed in conjunction with Vickers, Ltd. and manufactured by them.) Then, in 1911, Captain F.C. Dreyer (later Fleet Flag Captain to Jellicoe) devised the “Dreyer Table”, which maintained a continual plotted range to target and rate of change. The Dreyer Table also incorporated a primitive gyroscope to allow for the “yaw” of the firing ship. A system similar to the Dreyer Table was under development by Arthur Pollen about the same time, and competitive tests were run by two battleships equipped with the different systems. After extensive testing in 1905 and 1906, the Royal Navy found the Dreyer System to be more reliable. Finally, the necessary mechanical computers had been invented that would make “Director Fire Control” a reality, and modern gunnery came into its’ own. At least – that’s what one would think. But the Admiralty had other ideas. In the past, authors and analysts have mercilessly criticized the Admiralty as being stubborn, tyrannically dictatorial, and thoroughly resistant to modern change -- in an age that was characterized by the shocking swiftness of changes in guns, armor, and engines – and capital ship design, in general. Quite literally, today’s newly commissioned battleship could be tomorrow’s obsolete beast. And, curiously enough, recent authors have tried to revise history by portraying their Lordships as progressive and fully open to change – which, they were NOT. At the turn of the 20th Century, Britain possessed the largest battle fleet on Earth, and they stubbornly refused any technological advance that threatened their primacy. Their Lordships knew the Royal Navy was “superior”, and there was no need to make changes to the system – hence, battleship admirals that preferred sparkling paint work to gunnery practice. For thirty years, the Lords of Admiralty flatly refused to see the need for changes in the science of gunnery. They fought Percy Scott’s reforms “tooth and nail” and toe-to-toe. Even when Scott and his fellow officers managed to invent the necessary systems and prove them in testing, the Admiralty would not embrace the much needed innovations. By the end of 1911, only HMS Thunderer and Neptune had been fitted with the full system. When war broke out in 1914, only eight ships had been equipped with the, then current, system. By the Battle of Jutland, in 1916, only six capital ships were fully fitted for both main battery and secondary battery systems – and NONE of the cruisers. In essence, Britain went to war with the largest fleet of modern dreadnoughts the world would ever know – of which, very few could hit “a bull in the butt with a base fiddle”. (Thank you, Admiral Halsey, for the colorful quote.) The Kaiserliche Marine used a similar operational form of Director Fire Control, but it differed somewhat in that the German devices were streamlined and more adaptable to quick changes in the target’s course and speed. Almost the same, there was a German version of the Dumaresq, a range clock, and the E-U Anzeiger unit – basically, a German evolution of the Dreyer Table. The system was, according to the British, inferior to their Dreyer Table arrangement – but the superior German gunnery at Jutland belied that opinion. When the Hochseeflotte went to war in 1914, ALL of their capital ships, and nearly all of their cruisers, were fitted with the latest in fire control equipment. This is “Gunnery Central” (transmitting station) aboard HMS Belfast. The light cruiser was commissioned in 1939, and her chief claim to fame is having played a significant part in the 1943 Battle of North Cape, and the sinking of the battlecruiser KM Scharnhorst. She is currently anchored in “The Pool” of London, on the Thames, below Tower Bridge and across from The Tower of London. (Where I last saw her.) The “Director Control” equipment in the picture is a more modern version developed by the Admiralty in 1927 – but it is essentially the same “basic concept” in use during WW I. This is the analogue computer table used to generate firing solutions for the main guns. The disc-shaped device on the wall in the corner of the compartment is a Dumaresq. Adjacent to it, with the long silver bar, is a refined version of the Dreyer Table. The surface of the 8-foot long computer box has numerous “clock-type” displays as well as digital repeaters, while you can see some of the numerous hand-cranks used to enter information. When all the gears stop turning, the computer displays a firing solution and sends it to the turrets. This model was advanced enough in 1927 to control the simultaneous training and elevation of the turret guns. (I was unable to find this sort of illustration for the WW I era – but – you get the picture.) The actual “Director Fire Control” aboard a Royal Navy warship started in the “spotting top”. Typically, the spotting top was perched high above the forward bridge on a tripod foremast. Some warships used “pole masts” rather than tripods, and spotting tops were often fitted to the mainmast, as well. The position evolved from a simple “crow’s nest” to a spacious housing with as many as two or three levels. The ship’s Chief Gunnery Officer and his “topside team” were stationed here, along with the rangefinder, range clock, and Dumaresq. The spotting top team was charged with ranging to the target, observing and estimating the enemy’s course and speed and, most important -- reporting the “fall of shot” (where the shells landed on or around the target). There was a constant stream of visual information entered into these devices and sent through communication cables to the “transmitting station” (or – Gunnery Central). The “fall of shot” and resulting aiming corrections were called directly to the turret gunlayers by the Chief Gunnery Officer via handset telephone. His primary job was to directly supervise and coordinate the firing of the main battery guns. His skill and training could make a critical difference in battle. (In the Kaiserliche Marine, a Chief Gunnery Officer could only be appointed after completing a lengthy “Master Gunner’s” course and qualifying on a ship’s gunnery range. Only then could he be promoted to the coveted assignment of “Schutze Meister”.) The communication cables from the spotting top led down into the bowels of the ship to a “transmitting station” – or “Gunnery Central” (“Artillerie Zentral” if you sprechienzie.) There may be more than one transmitting station aboard, and their exact location differed from ship to ship and navy to navy. Usually, they were placed in the safest possible location – amidships beneath the Protective Armored Deck. Inside “Gunnery Central”, a “fire-solution” team receives the information from the spotting top and feeds it into the Dreyer Table – a crank-operated analogue computer. As information is fed into the machine (by using hand cranks to adjust various digital displays), it continually updates and displays a “firing solution” for the guns – which is then sent to the gun turrets via more communication cables. Inside the gun house, the information is flashed-up on the gunlayer’s electro-mechanical, digital display and he proceeds to train the turret for azimuth (lateral position) and lays the gun for elevation (range). When the gun is properly positioned he informs the Turret Captain, who then pushes a green button – which signals the turret guns are loaded, aimed, and ready to fire. Back in the spotting top, the Chief Gunnery Officer’s position has a series of lights and buttons on an electrical panel. Each gun turret is represented by a red light, green light, and the red firing button. Once the gun is loaded and properly aimed, the Turret Captain activates the green light on the Gunnery Officer’s panel. The Chief Gunnery Officer can then fire a single turret or any combination of turrets he deems appropriate. He sets a selector switch to those he intends to fire, presses a “firing alarm” button that sounds a klaxon in the turret – then hits the firing button. The operator of the “shot clock” activates the timer and the “spotter” waits for the shell splashes. If the course and speed of the target remains relative, corrections for the next salvo may be called directly to the gunlayer in the turret. Some gunnery officers wait for corrections to be applied by the gunlayer, then shoot again, while others wait for a new firing solution from “Gunnery Central”. (For the record: A later form of “Director Control” actually allowed the Chief Gunnery Officer to control the training and elevation of the guns from his position -- but that system did not come into common use until the late 1920’s.) In the Kaiserliche Marine, the equipment and layout was pretty much the same, with the exception of the spotting top. The Germans initially started with a spotting top on the fore and aft pole masts. But beginning with SMS Von der Tann’s design, spotting tops were restricted to ranging and spotting the fall of shot, while the Chief Gunnery Officer and his control panels were moved into the top two floors of the heavily armored forward and aft conning towers – allowing “Director Control” from two locations. All four positions were equipped with the Zeiss 9-foot rangefinder, in addition to two more mounted in the upper works of the superstructure (the location varied from ship to ship). During combat, all rangefinders that would bear on the target sent data to “Artillerie Zentral”, thus ensuring the most accurate range estimates possible. During the conflict in the North Sea, the Imperial warships proved uncommonly adept at quickly acquiring the initial range – usually “straddling” or hitting the target on the third salvo (one and a half minutes) -- a fact frequently noted in British battle reports. On the other hand, Royal Navy warships often took up to eight full minutes to land their first “straddle”. Over years of intensive gunnery training and practice, the Hochseeflotte developed a “salvo-fire” system that produced excellent results. The Chief Gunnery Officers were trained to fire “two-turret-salvos” – four forward guns, followed at an interval by four aft guns. This saved ammunition that would have been wasted in an eight-gun-salvo, reduced the amount of powder smoke fouling their aim, and gave a tighter and more visible grouping of shells around the target – thereby improving the “spotting” information. Another, most effective, means of quickly acquiring the range to target was what the Germans called “ladder fire”. The first two-turret-salvo was aimed and fired carefully, but if it went “over” the target, ALL turrets were given a “down 400” correction, then the aft two turrets were fired. If the second salvo still fell “over” – another “down 400” correction was made – and so on. By making small, identical, corrections – like climbing up or down a ladder – the target could be acquired quickly and “rapid salvo fire” ordered. If nothing else, this particular system plainly demonstrates the value of Director Fire Control. And it should be remembered – Kaiser Wilhelm II had always been a staunch advocate of superior gunnery skills – awarding medals to the crews, and his “Schutze Trophy” to the winning ship. He often threw in extra gifts of Schnapps and fine foods to the mess decks for a celebratory party. Despite his frequently feckless behavior, His Imperial Majesty – in his own way – understood just having a lot of guns wasn’t enough. You had to be able to hit something with them! NEXT TIME…… ANATOMY OF A BATTLECRUISER In the meantime, let’s talk about…... IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS Again, I have probably bored you with technical details – which I find fascinating – but you may not. So let us take a break from ship design and building, and take a look at the “Imperial Dockyard: Cuxhaven”. That way I can get some in-game pictures into this chapter. Strictly speaking, there were only three Imperial Dockyards (Kaiserwerft) within the Empire – Kaiserwerft Wilhelmshaven, Kaiserwerft Kiel, and Kaiserwerft Danzig. These establishments were not just naval anchorages. They provided docking facilities for large and small warships – piers, quays, and offshore mooring points. They had various coaling arrangements – from large coaling quays to smaller, and more primitive transfer systems. There was, usually, a small oil fuel pier since “oil-firing boilers” were coming into service. A complete facility for ammunition storage and replenishment was always present. There were, in some of them, “Fitting-Out Basins” (heavy work to complete the building process) and “Re-fit Basins” for not-so-heavy “modernization”. Dry docks were always available (anywhere from one to five each) for major repair work, simple bottom scraping and painting, or sometimes for ship construction. And both Wilhelmshaven and Kiel were equipped with a variety of floating docks, some capable of handling the largest warships. Nestled in among all of this was a variety of workshops, warehouses, foundries, and machine shops necessary to provide the mechanical support to keep the fleet battle-ready. And all Imperial Dockyards were equipped with building slips for large warships – usually four or five. It was Reichsmarineamt policy that at least one capital ship be under constructing at all times in each of the three dockyards. Technically speaking, “Cuxhaven” is not an “Imperial Dockyard” because there are no building slips. The thought has crossed our minds – and “AP” and I will undoubtedly throw one together – once we’ve worked out all the bugs. This, and the following two pictures, show the warehouses and workshops in the West Loch. Being older and smaller than Cuxhaven Roadsted, the West Loch industrial buildings are less numerous and were retained during the expansion at the turn of the century. The long warehouses are from the “PEG Seaports Series”, while other buildings were taken from the Maxis industrial props. The buildings in the center are the “Ropewalk”, where hawsers for the ships are stored. The two buildings are taken from “Nob’s 1905 Naval Series”. The following two pictures are of the workshops and foundries where repair parts are cast and machined and custom repair materials are made. In the early years of the 20th Century, repair parts were not ordered from a supply chain – they were often “made-to-order” on site – cast, hammered, and machined to fit individual requirements. Factory assembly lines (at least in Europe) were still a thing of the future. Since the repair facilities in the West Loch are smaller, less “specialized”, and less modern, the ships berthed here have to go around the headland to the Cuxhaven Roadsted for major work. The four central buildings of the West Loch complex are all re-purposed from various in-game industrial lots. The red brick is from Morgenkirk’s Organworks, and the other three are by “Simmer2”. In this view, you see the adjacent dock areas of the West Loch – the railhead, the warehouses, and the dockside. If you look closely, you will see the whole area is alive with activity and people. It has always been my personal opinion that SC4 needed more people engaged in some sort of activity. Just like any dockside in any harbor – there is cargo in motion and people milling about in all directions. This concept is part of our “busy harbor” philosophy and helps bring the setting to life. Below is a shot of the industrial area behind the Mooring Basins in the Cuxhaven main anchorage. The landscape is a combination of hills and sand dunes, with a mix of clear terrain and thickly forested areas. Along the roads and rail lines are a series of 1x1 custom “Tree Filler” lots, some with lighting – some without – specifically created as borders along transportation routes. The heavy forest is a combination of 1x1 custom “Forest Tree Filler” lots designed to blend in with MMP work. Again, I use landscape MMP’s to “paint” the scenery and recommend @Girafe highly. Along the top end of the mooring basins, you see a cluster of industrial lots. On the left are a mixed batch taken mostly from the Maxis industrial base lots – a foundry and a blast furnace. In the center is a 7x6 “Gun Tube Storage” lot. Cuxhaven does not have the industrial equipment to cast, turn, and line gun barrels, so new gun tubes are brought in by rail and stored here until needed. Old worn-out gun tubes (a bit rusty) are kept here waiting to be sent out to get the tube liners replaced. (Old gun tubes never die – they just get relined.) The warehouses on the lot are from “Nob’s 1905 Japanese Naval Series”. On the right are the boiler works. This is a close-up of the Gun Tube Storage lot. Note the two flatbed rail cars with gun tubes on them. You can find pictures from the period that look just like them. A small blue switch engine is being used to shuttle the tubes on the rail line, as well as in and out of the storage depot warehouse. Beside the switch engines, in front of the warehouse, are two gun tubes with work details cleaning them, servicing the breech mechanisms, and preparing them to be sent out. Notice the two “100 ton” cranes moving the gun tubes around. In case you’re wondering, the gun tubes have two wooden transportation cradles attached to them. At the bottom of the picture, “WolZe’s” steam tug is standing by as preparations are made to lift two gun tubes out of a lighter. The base texture of the lot is Paeng’s Grunge Concrete. The large workshop and old warehouse are from “Nob”. The sailors, gun tubes, “100 ton” cranes, rail cars, rope coils, and lighter are all by “AP’. This is, actually, the front view of the Boiler Works – but all the activity is in the back by the rail line. Here, boilers are built and shipped to the Dry Dock, repair docks, or even to other shipyards or naval bases, as needed. The work barge and crane tied-up in the basin are by “AP”. The dark brick workshop is borrowed from “SM2”. I cannot, for the life of me, remember where the large brick factory building comes from (it’s been in the game forever). I modified both lots to add more industrial smoke. Dockyard pictures from around 1910 always had a smokey haze. I have used various 1x1 custom-made lots to fill in around the buildings. This shot is an overview of all the activity at the rail siding behind the Boiler Works. In this close-up, a work detail prepares to load a third boiler onto a rail car and secure it. Another detail of sailors is preparing to hook up a hoist to the boiler on the left. On the right, another crew of workmen are making repairs to another pair of boilers. You will note there are two types of boilers visible – the standard, circular type – and a new type with angular sides. The boilers developed by Blohm & Voss, and installed in “Grosse Kreuzer F” closely resembled the angular type. The circular boilers were patterned after those aboard RMS Titanic. Sailors, rope coils, and boilers are by “AP”. This is the Cuxhaven “Machinen Werk” (Engine Works). The building on the right is where the engine parts are cast and forged before being moved to the building on the left. The building on the left is where the parts are machined, drilled, and punched before being hand fitted as they construct the engines from full size templates. A triple-expansion engine had hundreds of bolted or riveted pieces that had to be fitted with hundreds of other moving parts that were precision machined before fitting. The construction of battleship engines could take months of hard, intricate work, and even a bit of trial and error. Heavy industry had already come to Germany, and they excelled at it. But much of the advanced machine technology of the day was accompanied by a lot of manual labor. This is a rear view of the engine works. On the left is “Prairie Star Foods” with “Dead Forest Paper” on the right – repurposed for use as industrial buildings. I used a lot of in-game 1x1 lots to fill in around the buildings. Some filler lots are from the T-Wrecks “IRM Industrial Set”, while others are custom-made from random props found in the Maxis Editor. In this close-up, you see the finished product of the Machinen Werk – several three cylinder, triple-expansion steam engines. Two of the engines have been lifted onto flat cars and crews stand by to shackle them down. Some sailors have climbed on top of the big engines to help secure the retaining cables over the top. Another flat car has a cluster of men waiting for an engine to be swung aboard. The rail-side crane is preparing to lower the hook so it can be attached to the engine below. To the left of the loading pad, you can see heavy crankshafts in traveling cradles that will soon be loaded-out. The crane on the left has been lifting the heavy parts to test-assemble the large, three cylinder triple-expansion engine beneath it. Once all the parts have been properly fitted, and a manual operation test done, the engine will be disassembled and shipped out to its’ destination. At that time, interchangeable parts were a thing of the future, and each engine had to be hand assembled. The large engine on the left is a propulsion unit for a capital ship, while the smaller engines could be used in smaller ships, or as auxiliary engines aboard the big ships (steering engines, dynamo engines, pump engines, etc.). There are two different sized engines – but notice the size of the engines in relation to the sailors nearby. “AP’s” sailors, engines, and ships are all carefully crafted to be “in scale”. This gives you a really good idea how huge these old engines were. The sailors, rope coils, crankshafts, condensers, and beautifully detailed engines are by “AP”. (His engines are just one “first” among many unique creations.) At the head of the Mooring Basin behind the Engine Works, we find a small group of sailing vessels tied-up at mooring dolphins. The large one is a schooner. Known in Europe since the 16th Century, they were small, fast, boats used to carry passengers or perishable goods – such as fruits and vegetables. They were valued in European coastal waters for their speed and easy maneuverability in confined waters. Larger versions were bulk carriers – mostly coal and timber. With a small crew, they were more economical to operate and generated higher profits per voyage. The smaller boats are sloops – even faster than schooners, they were once prized by Buccaneers for the ease with which they ran down their treasure-laden victims. Sailing ships were common in early 20th Century harbors the world over. Sailing vessels were dependent upon the vagaries of the wind, but compared to a coal-burning steamer, they were usually faster, and vastly less expensive to operate. Shipping companies continued to use them until the end of WW II, when surplus “Liberty Ships” could be purchased for a pittance. “AP” enjoyed making these models. They are a part of the “Romance of the Sea” and they were a bit of an “exploration” for him. We hope you like them. AS ALWAYS -- MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his many beautiful and highly detailed warships. VERY SPECIAL THANKS to my collaborating partner @AP for volunteering his talent, time, and vivid imagination in creating so many beautiful and wonderfully detailed models. I am in awe of his talent and envy his skills. If you enjoyed anything you saw – please punch the “like” button so I will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of my ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496