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Forward gun turret of SMS Goeben, at anchor in the Bosporus -- circa 1914. IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 20: PURSUIT OF THE GOEBEN SMS Goeben – circa 1914: 22,979 tons – 27.5 knots – 10x11-inch guns – 12x5.9-inch guns – 4x19.7-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 11 inches. The early afternoon of 28 June 1914, found SMS Goeben and her consort, the light cruiser Breslau, riding at anchor on the placid Mediterranean waters off Haifa. Normal shipboard routine prevailed, with fresh provisions scheduled to be brought aboard, while the battlecruiser’s officers prepared to go ashore to dinner invitations extended by the rich and important among Haifa’s citizenry. And then a steam launch from shore pulled alongside. The German Naval Attache from the consulate came aboard to deliver word that Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austrian throne, had been assassinated. The attache also informed Konteradmiral Wilhelm Souchon that Austria, having lost the “heir-presumptive”, was likely to take extreme measures. Souchon instantly realized the political gravity of the situation, as well as the strategic and tactical dangers of the Mediterranean. All neutral ports could soon be closed to his tiny squadron or – at best – very strict about the rules of neutrality. A large French Fleet controlled the western half of the Mediterranean – but it was mostly pre-dreadnought battleships (only one dreadnought) – and their chief concern would be to protect the North African troop convoys destined for France. The Italians, with a powerful fleet astride the central Mediterranean, might – or might not – abide by their treaty with Germany and Austria. And the British Mediterranean Fleet (3 battlecruisers and 4 fairly modern armored cruisers) were on the loose – whereabouts unknown. French dreadnought battleship Courbet: 23,100 tons – length 541 feet – 20 knots – coal with oil firing – 12x12-inch guns – 22x5.5-inch guns – 4x18-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 10.75 inches. Courbet was flagship of the main French fleet, concentrated in the Mediterranean and based out of Toulon. She was also the ONLY dreadnought in French service when war broke out. Her design was reminiscent of HMS Dreadnought, but was much closer in pattern to the Brazilian Minas Geraes Class battleships with wing turrets abreast the funnels. However, Courbet’s pair of main battery turrets fore and aft were superimposed at a time when the British and Germans were only just beginning to contemplate such arrangements. The armor belt was respectable, though hardly impregnable to German 11-inch rifles, while her slow speed would have made her incapable of catching Goeben. The French did have about 15 or 20 pre-dreadnought battleships in the Toulon fleet -- depending upon how you rated them -- but they were old and obsolete. Some ships only mounted two main battery guns in single turrets. Model Courtesy of "Barroco Hispano". Souchon only knew two things for certain – Goeben was in dire need of boiler repairs – and the Austrian ports in the Adriatic Sea were his only safe haven. Some 9,500 water-tubes had already been shipped to Pola, so Souchon cabled Berlin to arrange for a work gang from Blohm & Voss to be sent as well. By 15:00, the German cruisers had weighed and were disappearing toward the western horizon. The journey was uneventful, and unusual, in that no foreign warships were sighted. SMS Breslau was detached to Durazzo, to coal ship and take on provisions, and Goeben proceeded to Pola, arriving on 10 July. The battlecruiser moved into a repair basin within hours, and the Blohm & Voss mechanics went to work. After replacing 4,460 boiler tubes, Goeben moved to the Austrian gunnery ranges at nearby Pirano on 23 July. For four days, she practiced gunnery in the morning and continued boiler repairs in the afternoon and evening. SMS Goeben took on coal from 27-30 July in Trieste, then steamed south to rendezvous with SMS Breslau off Brindisi on 1 August. The two cruisers set course for the Sicilian port of Messina where they were to meet the steamer General. While transiting the Ionian Sea, at 00:52 on 2 August, Goeben received a wireless message declaring war mobilization. By 14:40 that afternoon, Goeben and Breslau anchored in Messina Roads and began to coal ship. Later that evening, General came alongside both warships to transfer stores and provisions, while the peacetime paraphernalia (wooden furniture, wooden paneling, etc.) was removed from both cruisers. Around 01:00 on 3 August, the German squadron cleared Messina and steamed north around Sicily on a westerly course. It was Souchon’s intention to position his ships for a strike against the French North African ports of Bone and Philippeville -- in the event war was declared. SMS Breslau – Magdeburg Class light cruiser: 4,564 tons – 27.5 knots – 12x4.1-inch guns – 120 mines – 2x19.7-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 2.5 inches. In not-so-far-away Malta, the battlecruiser HMS Indefatigable (flagship of the Mediterranean Fleet) rode at anchor in Valetta harbor. Flying from her foremast peak was the flag of Admiral Sir Archibald Berkeley Milne – “C.-in-C.”, Mediterranean. With war looming, he must have had a somewhat sarcastic laugh at the idea of his “little fleet” – 3 battlecruisers and 4 armored cruisers. It was a far cry from the eight dreadnought battleships Churchill had promised when he was sent out to assume command. With a German battlecruiser on the loose in the Mediterranean, and three Austrian dreadnoughts in the Adriatic, eight dreadnought battleships might have been able to do the job – but Admiral Milne was hardly a creative thinker. Sir Archibald was what was known as a “social” officer – he owed his high rank and position to influential friends -- King Edward VII and Queen Alexandra. He had served a tour of duty as “Flag-Officer Royal Yachts” and had become quite close with their Majesties. (Edward took great pleasure in referring to the admiral as “Arky-Barky”.) Obviously, a pleasant enough drinking companion, it was unlikely a slightly dull, slack, and ultra-snobbish man would be suited to swiftly changing strategic and tactical situations. Two of the battlecruisers in the Mediterranean Fleet (HMS Inflexible and Indomitable) were of the Invincible Class: 17,408 tons -- 25.5 knots – 8x12-inch guns – 16x4-inch guns – 5x18-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 6 inches. HMS Indefatigable Milne’s third battlecruiser: 18,500 tons – 25 knots – 8x12-inch guns – 16x4-inch guns – 2x17.7-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 6 inches. Note the “stretched” area between the first and third funnels in this “second generation” battlecruiser. To go along with the old photographs, I offer two views of HMS Inflexible – Invincible Class. Here you see her lying just offshore, tied-up at “battleship buoys”. Note the two green (starboard) channel buoys marking the edge of the shallows. The below-water shallows have been textured with a Poseidon Mod terrain brush. Below is a detail shot of this beautiful model. The “ladder-like” objects on the deck are gangways -- they are rigged over the side when in port and resemble a “staircase”. The channel markers and Battleship buoys are by “AP”, and this finely detailed warship is courtesy of @Barroco Hispano. Admiral Milne’s second in command was Rear-Admiral Sir Ernest Troubridge, flying his flag in the armored cruiser Defence. He came from a long line of Royal Navy officers -- descended from Thomas Troubridge, one of Nelson’s “Band Of Brothers” at Trafalgar. He was well-thought-of, but reputedly did not have much “on the ball”. Troubridge’s “Flag-captain” was a gunnery officer named Fawcett Wray. (The rear-admiral did the “strategic thinking” while his “Flag-captain” handled the day-to-day business of administering the squadron and offering advice.) Wray was well-known as a supporter of Admiral Lord Charles Beresford, a man in opposition to all Jackie Fisher reforms. Those that knew Wray would also have said he had…” a titanic arrogance...and was much too pleased with himself”. These three men would figure prominently in the drama about to unfold in the Mediterranean – and they were pitted against a German admiral known to be efficient, logical, clever, and decisive. HMS Defence – Minotaur Class: 14,600 tons – 23 knots – 4x9.2-inch guns – 10x7.5-inch guns – 5x18-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 6 inches. Flagship of Rear Admiral Ernest Troubridge, commanding 1st Cruiser Squadron, Mediterranean Fleet. HMS Warrior: 12,590 tons – 23 knots – 6x9.2-inch guns – 4x7.5-inch guns – 3x18-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 6 inches. HMS Duke Of Edinburgh HMS Black Prince: 12,590 tons – 23 knots – 6x9.2-inch guns – 10x6-inch guns – 3x18-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 6 inches. On 30 July, Milne received an Admiralty telegram – the official “War Warning” communication. From the wording of the lengthy message it was clear the men sitting behind big desks in London were trying to cover every possibility – and their own back-sides…... “...first task to aid French in transportation of their African army to France by covering, and, if possible, bringing to action individual fast German ships, particularly Goeben, who may interfere with that transportation…...Do not at this stage be brought to action against superior forces, except in combination with the French as part of a general battle.” The one, crystal-clear, point was to assist the French in getting their troop convoys from North Africa to France. Presumably, Milne was to act in cooperation with the French Mediterranean Fleet (constituting a “superior force”) to engage the small German squadron – should they appear – or possibly, even the Austrians. The telegram then confuses the issue by telling him “if possible” to engage “individual fast German ships” – but NOT to engage “superior forces”. This begs the question – what “superior force” were they talking about? Did they mean the Austrian battle line – but forgot to clarify? Or did they consider one German battlecruiser a “superior force”? Was it acceptable for Milne to engage Goeben with two battlecruisers – but not one? You see the problem, here. To a man like Milne, this sort of communication would leave him riddled with doubt and indecision. To make matters worse, dithering at the British Foreign Office forbid Milne any sort of prior coordination with the French. The British diplomats were playing their cards close to the vest. By not having “military talks” with the French, the British had not implied any certain course of action – and they had not, in fact, decided on neutrality or war. (This was a classic example of Britain’s diplomatic policy of “splendid isolation” at work. It implied an “alliance”, while actually keeping Britain’s options open. Germany invaded Luxembourg and adjacent parts of Belgium at dawn on 2 August -- seizing vital railroad connections. Only then did Britain issue an ultimatum to Germany.) Even so, Milne was unable to raise the French C.-in-C. by wireless on 31 July, and eventually sent a cruiser to Bizerte on 3 August to communicate with Admiral de Lapeyrere. Only then did he learn France and Germany were already at war, and that Britain had delivered an ultimatum. By now, British Naval Intelligence had learned Goeben and Breslau were coaling at Messina. (Being a fairly common port-of-call, Messina would have had a British Consulate in residence. A very useful source of information.) The Admiralty War Staff concluded, for no apparent reason, the German ships would sail west. Not to attack the French troop ships -- but to break out of the Mediterranean through the Straits of Gibraltar to prey on unprotected British shipping! A patrol was immediately set up from Gibraltar to cover the straits. Milne (to his credit) had previously positioned the battlecruisers HMS Indomitable and Inflexible in the Strait of Otranto (at the mouth of the Adriatic Sea) to ensure Goeben could not return to Pola, or link up with a sortie by the Austrian dreadnoughts. But the Admiralty ordered the two ships (at 20:30 on 3 August) to proceed to Gibraltar at high speed to intercept the German squadron when it approached the straits. SMS Goeben opens fire on Philippevile, while Breslau alters course to proceed to Bone for the same purpose. In clear weather and late summer sunshine, SMS Goeben and Breslau steered west across the Tyrrhenian Sea before altering course to the southwest. Admiral Souchon adjusted his speed to arrive off Philippeville and Bone just after sunrise. Around 18:30 a coded wireless message brought word that Germany and France were, in fact, at war – while the British ultimatum would expire at midnight 4 August, and a state of war between Britain and Germany would then exist. Around 20:00, a further coded wireless came through – this one instructing Souchon to take his squadron to Constantinople. Apparently, there had been some sort of political arrangement -- but Admiral Souchon was determined to carry out his strike against the French before making for Turkey. (Souchon was not about to deprive himself of what might be his only opportunity to strike the enemy.) As the two warships steamed through the soft Mediterranean night a “war watch” was set – and for the first time – it was not a drill. At 05:00 on 4 August, the German crews were shaken out of their bunks and hammocks by the alarm klaxon and ordered to “clear ship for battle”. A few minutes later, SMS Breslau was detached to make a high-speed run to Bone, where she would turn her 4.1-inch guns on the port. At 06:08 SMS Goeben opened fire on the Philippevile docks, warehouses, and cranes with her 5.9-inch guns and lobbed 36 rounds into the harbor area. At 06:18 Souchon ceased fire, put the helm hard-a-port, and rang for full speed – pulling out of range before the French could sort themselves out and return fire. Around 06:20 an 8.2-inch howitzer in the old Citadel north of town opened fire for about ten minutes, but all of the rounds fell short. The shellfire had, no doubt, rudely awakened the sleepy little port, but beyond that, it caused little damage. About an hour later, SMS Breslau fell into line astern of Goeben, and Souchon set a north-easterly course – straight into the path of the British battlecruisers sent round from the Strait of Otranto. HMS Indomitable and Inflexible, commanded by Captain Francis Kennedy, sighted smoke one point off the port bow about 10:20 – some 50 miles west of Galita Island. Goeben’s lookouts had sighted and identified the British warships at 10:15 – thanks to their Zeiss optical instruments. By 10:30 Captain Kennedy had a clear view as the big German battlecruiser swept toward them. Technically speaking, neither side was at war with the other, but neither Kennedy nor Souchon knew if their opposite number would respect that point of honor. Closing at a combined speed of roughly 40 knots, they had little time to consider other options and were soon passing each other at high speed, in opposite directions, about 9,000 yards apart. The main batteries were trained fore and aft, but the turret crews were closed-up at “gunnery stations” and ready to fire at a moment’s notice. As might be expected, the courtesy of the “yachting regatta days” was forgotten and no signals or salutes were exchanged. Once past each other, Indomitable and Inflexible made a wide turn and fell in behind the German ships to maintain a shadowing position, while a “sighting report” went to Admiral Milne in Malta – with a request for permission to open fire. It was the beginning of a long, hot, day that turned into a five-hour ordeal as the two squadrons maintained their cruising speeds, and their distance from one another. Captain Kennedy kept station astern of Goeben, with some speed in reserve, in case he was given permission to engage – but it seemed unlikely permission would be granted. The light cruiser HMS Dublin had picked up the first sighting report and soon arrived to join the shadowing mission. She pushed ahead of the British battlecruisers and took station on the port side, about midway between the opposing forces. SMS Breslau immediately crossed Goeben’s wake and took up station on the port side to prevent any surprise torpedo attacks. Around 14:00, Kennedy received a curiously un-coded reply from Milne simply stating that the British ultimatum to Germany did not expire until midnight. It is entirely possible Goeben intercepted the message as well, and Souchon decided to take the initiative. He ordered the entire “war watch” personnel into the stoke holds and bunkers to ensure sufficient coal was moved to the boilers, then rang for “full ahead”. Vast clouds of smoke shot from the battlecruiser’s funnels and trailed for miles astern as she worked up to speed. The shadowing exercise had suddenly transformed into a stern chase to the east. As days go, 4 August was very warm, indeed, and the stokers in the boiler rooms had been hard at work since 06:00 that morning. As Goeben’s speed climbed to 23 knots, then 24 knots, and finally 25 knots – some of them began to pass-out, and had to be carried up on the weather deck for fresh air. But as men fell-out, others stepped in to carry on, while men in the bunkers shifted coal to the stoke-hold chutes to keep them supplied. As Goeben miraculously reached 26 knots, several of the older boiler tubes ruptured and four men were badly scalded, later dying from their burns. SMS Goeben at top speed would have looked like this during the chase. Notice the mass of funnel smoke. HMS Indomitable had attained 26.1 knots on trials, and Inflexible a tad more – but that was six years ago. Both ship’s had engines in need of overhaul, their bottoms had grown foul, and they were short of stokers. The battlecruisers logged close to 24 knots as they charged across the smooth waters of the Mediterranean – with white waves reaching high up their bows – but conditions were no better in the British boiler rooms. At least the German stokers regularly received word from the Admiral that their Herculean efforts were out-stripping their pursuers. Souchon and Kapitan Ackermann pushed the stokers to greater and greater efforts, the steam pressure rising higher and higher, and the boilers reaching dangerous overloads. But Souchon knew he must lose his pursuers if he was to save his ship and take her safely to Constantinople. He could fight the two British battlecruisers – probably sink one – and possibly both of them. But that was a last, desperate, option. If he could out-run his enemies, it would impress his antagonists that his were the fastest ships in the Mediterranean – and that would give him a great morale and tactical advantage. And this he accomplished – thoroughly. Around 15:40 Goeben’s lookouts could no longer see the smoke from the British battlecruisers – they had fallen too far astern. Though the light cruiser HMS Dublin held on stubbornly, she was slowly but surely being outdistanced. At 19:37 she signaled – “Goeben out of sight – following smoke trail – still daylight”. By 21:00 a thick haze had begun to settle in the east and even the smoke trail disappeared. At last, the Germans were lost in the haze and darkness of the vast ocean. Dublin finally put about and went in search of HMS Inflexible and Indomitable. Souchon held his course to the east for another half an hour, reduced speed to 15 knots, then swung north for Messina. At 18:00, while HMS Dublin was doggedly trailing Goeben, yet another Admiralty cable reached Admiral Milne in Malta……”Italian Government declared neutrality. You are to respect neutrality rigidly...should not allow any HM ships to come within six miles of Italian coast”. It is to be understood that in the first few days of the greatest war the world had ever seen – a few mistakes would be made. But the British Foreign Office appears to have been so narrowly focused on Britain’s interests – they overlooked the fact that other nations might have agendas of their own. Italy was allied to Germany and Austria by treaty – but was covetous of Austrian territory around Trieste, and deeply suspicious of Austrian intentions. They were especially wary of the three new Austrian dreadnought battleships (soon to be four). By the terms of the alliance, Italy was not required to go to war. Declaring neutrality on 4 August was a clear signal to the British that the Italians were keeping their options open. But the British Foreign Office did not pick-up on the clue. By strictly respecting a 6-mile limit to Italian territorial waters, the diplomats were trying to avoid provoking Italy into joining Germany -- playing it safe. However, the 6-mile limit meant the Royal Navy could not blockade, or even enter, the Straits of Messina (too narrow). It also gave the German cruisers a “safe haven” – of sorts. Goeben could stay within the “neutral zone” (ignoring Italian neutrality) and eventually out-run any pursuers. In truth, the Italians would rather have seen the British sink Goeben, than let her escape to join the Austrian dreadnoughts. Austrian dreadnoughts Viribus Unitis Class Viribus Unitis (1912) Tegetthoff (1913) Prinz Eugen (1914) Szent Istvan (1915) SMS Tegetthoff – circa 1913: 20,000 tons – 20.5 knots – 12x12-inch guns – 12x5.9-inch guns – 4x21-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 11 inches. Three ships were in commission at the outbreak of war, another to follow in 1915. SMS Tegetthoff anchored off the Old Basin Mole as she would have appeared in 1914. The Tegetthoff’s were a bit small by comparison, but they were efficient ships – well built and innovative. The triple turrets were designed by the Skoda Armaments Works and were the first such gun houses installed on a warship. Though they would have packed a punch in battle, their small size was indicative of their low speed. Below is a close-up showing the deck layout and the excellent detail on the model provided by Barroco Hispano. The V-25 Class torpedo boats are also his. Meanwhile, very little attention was being paid to the Ottoman Empire – and all of it bad. Turkey had just purchased a Brazilian dreadnought from the Armstrong-Whitworth Shipyards (the Brazilians couldn’t pay for it). Renamed Sultan Osman I, the warship was finishing her sea trials when war broke out. Churchill, acting within British National Defense Law, ordered the vessel seized for the Royal Navy. A Turkish Captain and 500 crewmen were waiting to board the vessel when she was seized right under their noses. (The ship would become HMS Agincourt – with 14x12 inch guns -- the most powerful vessel afloat, at the time.) The British also seized the Turkish dreadnought Resadiye (a modified King George V Class) that was still fitting-out. Needless to say – the Turks were outraged – and “out” close to 30 million Sterling. But the Foreign Office failed to take note of their justifiable wrath – and also overlooked the Ottoman Empire’s close ties with Imperial Germany. The fact that Goeben might enter into this equation does not appear to have crossed their minds. The super-dreadnought Sultan Osman I in the fitting out basin at the Armstrong-Whitworth Shipyards in early 1914. Seized by the British Government under wartime emergency laws, she became HMS Agincourt: 27,850 tons – 22 knots – 14x12-inch guns – 20x6-inch guns – 3x21-inch torpedo tubes – belt armor 9 inches. She holds the record with 7 main battery turrets – all on the centreline. Here you see Sultan Osman I / HMS Agincourt at anchor off a tug station. This gives you a good idea of the power of this dreadnought, and shows the unique arrangement of her main battery turrets. Unlike the Royal Navy, the Armstrong-Whitworth designers had no qualms about using superfiring gun turrets. She served for the duration of the great war and was one of the Grand Fleet’s most powerful capital ships. Below you have a close-up of this beautiful model with all its’ intricate detail – courtesy of @Barroco Hispano. The tugs are by “AP” and the tugboat docks were modified from the “Somy Tug Docks”. At 06:00 on 5 August, Goeben’s lookouts raised Messina off the starboard bow -- with five Italian torpedo boats approaching. The torpedo boats escorted the battlecruiser to an anchorage in Messina Roads and the Deutscher-Afrika Steamship Line SS General came alongside at 07:45 to begin coaling. SMS Goeben had been maneuvering at high speed for the last two days and only had an estimated 600 tons of coal remaining in the bunkers. General was followed by two more steamers that had been rerouted to Messina by the Admiralstab at Souchon’s request. An Italian Naval officer came aboard and very politely, but firmly, informed Kapitan Ackermann he would be allowed the “legal” twenty-four hours under neutrality laws – but no more. He also passed the word that Britain had officially declared war at five minutes past midnight – just six hours ago. SMS Goeben lies at anchor just inside the Messina breakwater. Alongside to starboard is the SS General, preparing to transfer coal to both Goeben and the light cruiser Breslau. But this is not an ordinary coaling operation. As “Neutrals”, the Italians allowed the German warships to remain in port for twenty-four hours – but they would not provide coal, now that the Germans were at war with France, Great Britain, and Russia. As soon as the German ambassador determined the Italians were declaring their neutrality, he wired Berlin, and the Admiralstab placed all German merchant shipping in the Mediterranean under their orders. At Souchon’s request, several vessels were ordered to Messina to assist his squadron. Unfortunately, none of the vessels were colliers – but Souchon would empty the steamer’s coal bunkers to get his warships to sea. The steamers would have had to make for a neutral port anyway – there was little hope of them getting back to Germany. At least this way, they were sacrificed to good purpose. On the SS General’s starboard side is Breslau. Since the ships are in the lee of a breakwater -- and their time was limited -- it was decided to coal from both sides of the steamer. The coal would have to be loaded out of General’s bunkers in large canvas sacks, hoisted across to the warships decks, then dumped down the coal scuttles. The process was much slower than working with bulk coal, but crewmen from the warships were sent aboard General to speed up the work. This shot gives you a close-up view of the detail on the models. SMS Breslau is courtesy of @Barroco Hispano. SMS Goeben and the steamer are by @AP. I’m afraid I had to use “AP’s” model of a Prometheus Class collier with closed hatches – I don’t have a suitable model of an old, worn-out cargo ship. Just in case you’re wondering why the Italians did not go to war beside their treaty allies (Germany and Austria) – they were not obligated by the terms of the treaty. It was a “mutual defense” arrangement – only valid if one of the signatories was attacked by an outside party. When Austria declared war on Serbia, she became the aggressor – thereby nullifying the treaty obligations. Around 09:00, A German Consular official arrived with a coded message from the Naval High Command in Berlin. Souchon’s instructions to proceed to Constantinople had been changed. In accordance with the wishes of His Imperial Majesty, the Mediterranean Squadron was to break out into the Atlantic and try to reach Germany – or -- to proceed to Pola. Admiral von Pohl (commander Hochseeflotte) favored Pola – but after a heated discussion with Admiral von Tirpitz – von Pohl sent a new cable rescinding his orders, ignored the Kaiser’s wishes, and ordered Souchon to Constantinople once again. Within an hour of Goeben’s arrival in Messina, Admiral Milne had been notified, and he began adjusting the deployment of his warships. Milne, assessing the situation, determined Souchon would either head west to the Atlantic, or east to Pola. Milne continued to view the protection of the French troop convoys as his primary task, which meant he had to control the sea lanes between the islands of the central Mediterranean. But in the afternoon of 5 August, London ordered him to blockade the Straits of Otranto so the Austrians couldn’t get out, and the Germans couldn’t get in. It seemed straightforward enough, but the Italian 6-mile neutrality zone left Souchon with a loophole for escape. Needing to guard the French convoys -- and the mouth of the Adriatic -- Milne sent Troubridge’s armored cruisers to the Straits of Otranto. Milne, with two battlecruisers, patrolled north of Messina on the theory Goeben would steam west to attack the troop convoys, or to reach the Atlantic. HMS Indomitable was detached to coal at Bizerte. In an ironic twist, no one thought to inform Milne the French Toulon Squadron was at sea in overwhelming strength, and well placed to protect their own convoys. The Battlecruiser SMS Goeben, with the light cruiser Breslau astern, slips out of Messina harbor to begin a dangerous “cat & mouse” game with the Royal Navy. Having taken aboard 2,100 tons of coal, SMS Goeben and Breslau weighed and slipped out of Messina Roads around 17:00 on 6 August. The cruisers steered east, then swung south through the Straits of Messina (ignoring Italian territorial waters). As they exited the southern end of the straits, the light cruiser HMS Gloucester was sighted. The British cruiser immediately sent a sighting report to Milne, which produced an immediate response – the wrong one. Milne, convinced Goeben would circle round southern Sicily and head west, took his two battlecruisers west around Sicily. The plan was to coal at Malta, then be in position to intercept the Germans off Tunisia if they turned west to threaten the French troop convoys. Unwittingly, Milne’s decision effectively removed the British battlecruisers from the chase. Meanwhile, with HMS Gloucester shadowing, the German squadron altered course to the east, and then northeast. It was Souchon’s intention to deceive the shadowing British warship into believing he was headed for the Adriatic. Gloucester duly reported the new course and speed. The message was intercepted by Troubridge and his cruisers patrolling off the island of Cephalonia, south of Corfu. He immediately altered course to the southwest and spread out in search formation with the intention of intercepting Goeben. Around 22:45, the German ships turned back to the south east and shaped course for Cape Matapan. Admiral Souchon had no way of knowing the confusion he was sowing within the British Fleet, but it would have been a great relief to know the enemy battlecruisers were far to the west and the enemy armored cruisers were steering in the wrong direction. But he was not that lucky. His enemy numbered seven ships big enough to cause trouble. He could not risk engaging more than one British battlecruiser at a time – and did not want to fight even a single ship that could damage Goeben in a part of the world where proper repairs would be nearly impossible. For the same reason, he did not wish to tangle with the enemy armored cruisers – though he held a significant advantage. The Admiral had already pushed his ailing boilers to extreme overload pressures when earlier shaking-off the British battlecruisers – he dared not do that again. And -- Goeben’s coal bunkers were not full – he would have to find a safe place to coal before reaching the Bosporus. But, perhaps worst of all – he was not alone on the dark waters of the Ionian Sea. The light cruiser HMS Gloucester displaced 4,800 tons, carried 6-inch and 4-inch guns, and could make 26 knots if pushed. And Captain Howard Kelly had her well astern of Goeben and Breslau, trailing them through the moonlit night like a bloodhound. He knew his brother, John Kelly, commanding HMS Dublin, was racing to join Troubridge. Based on signal bearings, he figured Dublin would soon cross Goeben’s path, and at 01:30 Dublin did send out a sighting report...”Breslau dead-ahead – am following…” and gave his position. But Breslau was running flat-out – making 27 knots to come up alongside her bigger consort – and Kelly soon lost her in the dark. Brother Howard Kelly was having better luck and shadowed the German ships with skill and dogged tenacity. Earlier in the evening, closer to the Italian coast, Gloucester had been forced to steer straight for the big battlecruiser in order to get between her and the shore so he could keep her in sight in the failing light. Breslau moved in and made threatening passes, and at any moment Goeben could have turned her big guns on the little cruiser and blown her out of the water. The bright moonlight helped Kelly trail the Germans from a greater distance, but it also meant there was nowhere to hide from the long reach of 11-inch guns. All night long, in spite of Goeben’s attempts to jam his transmissions, Kelly regularly reported the speed, course, and position of the battlecruiser. On the other side of the coin was Admiral Troubridge and his armored cruiser squadron. With Milne more or less sidelined -- the 1st Cruiser Squadron was now the only force still in position to take action against the German warships. The Rear-Admiral had been taken in by Goeben’s earlier feint toward the Adriatic, and that had cost him precious hours steaming in the wrong direction. But one of Gloucester’s regular sighting reports was taken in around 23:05, exposing the error, and the British cruisers had swung back to the southeast. A few minutes after midnight (24:11, 7 August), Troubridge swung his cruisers onto a southerly course, hoping to intercept the Germans before they rounded Cape Matapan. For the next four hours, the big armored cruisers sliced through the moonlit waters at nearly top speed – the stokers shoveling and sweating in the dim light of the stokeholds, while their shipmates prepared themselves – each in his on way – for what they expected would be action at dawn. Around 02:30, Troubridge signaled Gloucester and Dublin...”1st Cruiser Squadron position 38-25’N, 20-0’E, course south 20 knots – endeavoring to cross Goeben’s bows 06:00.” Resolute words, indeed -- with no hint of hesitation in challenging Souchon’s cruisers – just as he had been prepared to intercept Goeben in the Adriatic. Surely over the past five days, every possible calculation had been run assessing the relative strengths of the four armored cruisers versus the single battlecruiser. Meetings with the various captains must have worked out plans of attack to cover every possible contingency. And there could not have been a single man aboard those cruisers who did not understand what would happen at dawn – and where his duty lay. Later – Troubridge claimed his decision to attack was made out of sheer desperation, and completely ignored clear orders from Admiral Milne and the Admiralty...”not to engage a superior force”. Again we are confronted with the question of what constitutes a “superior force”? Was a single German battlecruiser accompanied by a light cruiser with 4.1-inch guns a “superior force”? And what of the Royal Navy’s long-standing tradition of attacking even when outnumbered? Apparently, the Rear-Admiral had given considerable thought to the situation, and even more thought to the vaunted Royal Navy traditions. He was standing in HMS Defence’s chart room, deep in thought, when the flag-captain came in around 02:45 and saw the worried expression. Wray, a man who had an authoritative answer for everything, had already decided the question of “superior force”, and was troubled by his commander’s obvious indecision. He came straight to the point...”Are you going to fight, Sir? If so – the squadron should know.” “Yes…” replied Troubridge. “I know it is wrong, but I cannot have the name of the whole Mediterranean Squadron disgraced.” Wray dutifully nodded and withdrew from the chart house, but he did not like the answer. He had been trained as a gunnery officer and knew the difference between the British 9.2-inch gun and the German 11-inch rifle. He was also aware the German warships had run away from battlecruisers doing 24 knots. Around 03:30, Wray returned to the chart room and casually mentioned to Troubridge he did not “...fancy the prospect of taking on Goeben”. “Neither do I – but what’s bothering you?”...asked the Admiral. Fawcett Wray had the dialogue well prepared, and (seemingly for the first time – and with only two and a half hours to contact) he explained how Goeben, with her superior speed, would be able to control the battle range. The enemy 11-inch guns could range out to nearly 18,100 yards – while Defence’s 9.2-inch guns could only manage 16,200 yards. Goeben’s speed advantage would ensure she stayed beyond British gun range while her big rifles shot them to pieces. And if they tried to break off the action – Goeben could chase them down, one by one, and sink them all. It was, Wray explained, entirely possible for the battlecruiser to sink the entire cruiser squadron while suffering only minor damage – if any at all. “It seems to me…” he concluded “...to engage Goeben would be suicidal.” Troubridge, his resolve wavering, said defensively – “I cannot turn away now – think of my pride”. But Wray was ready with the “closing argument”…...”Does England wish you to throw away thousands of lives and four armored cruisers – for the sake of your pride?” Troubridge sent for the navigator and asked if there was any chance of the squadron closing to the range of the 9.2-inch guns. He was told there was no chance whatsoever. A few minutes past 04:00, 7 August, off the southern tip of the Greek Island of Zante (modern Zakynthos) -- Rear-Admiral Sir Ernest Troubridge called off the chase. Wray told him...”Admiral, that is the bravest thing you have ever done in your life.” Needless to say – there would be differing opinions on that. The reason given in the official report was that 1st Cruiser Squadron would not have been able to reach the point of interception until long after the German squadron had passed. (Which, in all truth, was quite correct. So there was no need for all that drama and soul-searching. But not making the effort turned out to be “bad form”.) At sunrise on 7 August, Goeben’s lookouts sighted Gloucester’s smoke column still trailing astern. Like a “fox-hound”, Captain Kelly continued to shadow the German battlecruiser, even though Milne had signaled him to drop astern to avoid “capture” (odd choice of words). In mid-afternoon (13:00), near the Gulf of Kalamata, Breslau took steps to deal with the annoying British cruiser. Breslau dropped astern of Goeben and began crossing Gloucester’s bow – repeatedly --as if dropping mines in her path. Gloucester opened fire at 11,500 yards with her forward 6-inch gun and Breslau instantly replied with rapid salvos of extremely accurate fire. Kelly increased speed and turned Gloucester to present her broadside guns as he closed the range. Unfortunately for Kelly, this move provoked Souchon to bring Goeben into action. No more than a distant smudge in the heat haze, Kelly watched the big battlecruiser swing to open up her firing arcs – then the guns flashed. Twenty seconds later – the sea close ahead of Gloucester erupted in hundred-foot geysers. Kelly instantly put Gloucester’s helm hard-over and withdrew to a more respectful distance. He signaled Milne at 14:45...”Have engaged Breslau at long range – retreated when Goeben opened – am following.” Around 16:40, running low on coal, and with orders from Milne not to go beyond Cape Matapan, Kelly signaled...”Enemy ships in Cervi Channel steering east 15 knots – am off Cape Matapan – returning – N55W – 15 knots”. Captain Howard Kelly ordered his ship about and steamed off to the west – having preformed not only a “text book” shadowing mission, but preforming it with a steadiness and courage even Souchon would have found commendable. Sadly, it would prove to be the only creditable British performance in the whole affair. When Gloucester put about and disappeared over the western horizon – Goeben and Breslau found themselves alone – and they disappeared into the maze of islands in the Aegean Sea. Once the German squadron rounded Cape Maleas, in southeastern Greece, Souchon reduced speed to 12 knots and changed course to the northeast. Goeben and her consort lingered in mid-ocean northwest of the island of Ikaria throughout 8 August – keeping a watchful eye on the horizon while waiting for a contract steamer. On 9 August, Souchon steamed south and rendezvoused around 05:32 with a leased collier in Rusa Bay off Denusa Island. Coaling began immediately and continued around the clock at a furious pace. Goeben’s wireless flat monitored the constant stream of traffic passing between Royal Navy warships, and was able to estimate how far away they might be by the signal’s strength. Admiral Souchon was unaware the British had all but given up the pursuit of his ship, so at 05:45 on 10 August, the squadron weighed and steamed north at 15 knots for the Dardanelles. (At about the same time, Admiral Milne and his battlecruisers were just beginning a leisurely search of the western islands.) Berlin had warned Souchon he might not gain immediate entry from the Turks – diplomatic negotiations were still ongoing – but he approached the straits, nevertheless. At 17:00, Goeben and Breslau hove-to off Cape Hellas and signaled the station for a pilot. Within minutes a Turkish torpedo boat steamed out of the Dardanelles, signaled “Follow me”, and the German cruisers followed it through the protective minefields. By 19:17 Goeben and Breslau lay at anchor beneath the fortress guns at Chanak Roads. On 11 August, the German ships moved to Artaki Bay and began coaling ship – taking on 2,445 tons in Goeben alone. After a day of rest, both cruisers scrubbed down the decks and touched-up their paint work. On 16 August, Goeben and Breslau anchored in Haidar Pasha Roads, off Constantinople, their fresh white paint gleaming in the morning sun. The Turkish Naval Minster came aboard to inspect the ship, and in a formal ceremony, received both warships into the Ottoman Navy – whereupon, the German sailors removed their Imperial German caps and donned their new head gear – the crimson Turkish Fez. SMS Goeben was renamed Yavuz Sultan Selim, and Breslau became Midilli. On 23 September, Admiral Souchon officially accepted the offer to command the Ottoman fleet. The British had rudely seized two Turkish battleships in July 1914, and now the Germans had given them a superb battlecruiser and a modern cruiser in August. The old Sultan in Constantinople must have seen the “Hand of Allah” in it. No doubt he suppressed an outright laugh when the British ambassador filed a formal protest. The pursuit of SMS Goeben – and the battlecruiser’s career in the Imperial German Navy – had come to an end. SMS Goeben is accepted into the Ottoman Navy as the Turkish flag is hoisted. The German crew has not yet donned the “Fez”. AFTERMATH Though there was no formal declaration of war, The Turkish War Minster, Enver Pasha, ordered a pre-emptive strike against the Russian Black sea ports, and Yavuz Sultan Selim (Goeben) fired the first shells announcing Turkey’s entry into The Great War. As flagship of the Ottoman Navy, she served her new masters well during the remainder of the war. Goeben’s consort, Breslau, was lost in 1918 at the Battle of Imbros from mine damage. But the battlecruiser survived into old age and was assigned “NATO hull #70” in 1952. Yavuz Sultan Selim was finally stricken from the Turkish Navy on 14 November 1954. When she went to the breaker’s yard in 1973, she was the only existing dreadnought outside the United States, the last surviving warship built by the Imperial German Navy, and the longest serving dreadnought in the World. (The vessel had, in fact, been offered for sale to the German government as a museum ship, but the offer was declined.) Some historians have said the mere presence of Goeben in the Sea of Marmora led to the Dardanelles Campaign, and the failure to open the Turkish Straits prevented the British from supporting Russia with war materials – which, in turn, led to the Russian Revolution and the fall of the House of Romanov. This is, at best, wishful thinking – and at worst, pure nonsense. The Lords of Admiralty (mostly Winston Churchill) thought they could send a fleet charging up the Dardanelles and all but “scare” the poor, weak, decrepit Turks into surrendering – thereby establishing an ice-free supply route to bolster their Russian ally. Needless to say – it was not all that easy, and the British managed to lose the Dardanelles Campaign all on their own. Goeben’s existence never entered into it. The Admiralty triumphantly announced the Mediterranean had been “swept clean of German forces” – but the public mood soured when they realized Goeben had led the Royal Navy a “merry chase” – and gotten away to boot. Admiral Sir Archibald Berkeley Milne was recalled and faced a Court of Inquiry on 30 August. Though formally acquitted, Milne never received the promotion, or the job at the Admiralty he had expected. Instead he was left unemployed, on half-pay, until the end of the war – his name widely vilified in the service. A Court Martial was convened aboard HMS Bulwark at Portland from 5-9 November 1914, to determine the guilt or innocence of Rear-Admiral Sir Ernest Troubridge. Cowardice was not charged – but “...negligence to pursue...” was charged. In the end, the Admiralty orders had forbade engaging a “superior force” – and the only force present was Goeben. By implication – he had obeyed orders. The Court “fully and honorably” acquitted Troubridge. Having been acquitted, he was treated less harshly -- given various commands, all beneath his station and expectation, and never served at sea again. Fawcett Wray gave evidence at the court, but was not implicated in any charge. Nevertheless, he was treated like poison and remained unemployed for some time. Later he was able to redeem something of his reputation by winning a DSO at the Dardanelles. In effect, all three officers had been “broken”. Historians and “armchair strategists” have debated for over a century about what sort of chance Troubridge would have had in combat against Goeben. Some have said Troubridge could have sent Goeben to the bottom with a well-coordinated gun and torpedo attack. Others look at the size of the guns, the number of guns on each side, and they calculate the “weight of broadside”. None of these comparisons can provide a realistic measurement of combat power. The idea of a “coordinated gun and torpedo attack” would not work, because they simply couldn’t pull it off. Goeben was too fast for the armored cruisers. She could choose the gun range, and simply stand-off and shoot the British ships to pieces, while all their 9.2-inch shells fell short. And at that range and speed, it would be difficult to fire a torpedo at Goeben with any prospect of success. British officers, as a whole, seemed obsessed with the idea of “closing with the enemy” – determined to close the range, bring all their guns to bear, and fight it out – broadside to broadside. But they had no actual experience of the destructive power of the German 11-inch high-velocity rifle. And – only 3 days into the war, they had not yet seen the effect of their guns on a German capital ship. They assumed they were about to engage a “battlecruiser” – much like their own lightly armored battlecruisers. They had no way of knowing they were contemplating trading shots with a “fast battleship” – armored like a battleship. Goeben’s tough and comprehensive armor scheme could have absorbed anything Troubridge threw at her, while shooting his ships full of very large holes. Perhaps, Troubridge was not so much a villain as he was a wise and compassionate man. In retrospect, he could have engaged SMS Goeben, watched her sink or cripple one of his armored cruisers in just a few minutes, then broken off the engagement. Admiral Souchon would likely not have pressed the issue, and Troubridge would have been hailed as a Hero. But – such are the vagaries of history…… Yavuz Sultan Selim paying a courtesy port call at Malta in 1936. The crew has manned the side to salute HMS Valiant. You can just see her masts and funnels over the forward turret. POST SCRIPT: The 1st Division of the Austrian battle fleet as they might have looked moored along the breakwater at Pola – circa 1914. Left to right – SMS Prinz Eugen, Viribus Unitis, and Tegetthoff. This whole affair with Troubridge begs the question…...what, exactly, did Admiral Milne think the 1st Cruiser Squadron was supposed to fight? When Troubridge signaled he was giving chase to SMS Goeben, Milne did not even reply with instructions to proceed with caution. When the chase was broken off – Troubridge was vilified. Yet the original assignment was to blockade the Straits of Otranto to (1) prevent the Austrians from linking up with Goeben, or (2) to prevent Goeben from reaching safety in the Austrian port of Pola. While it is questionable whether Troubridge could have prevented Souchon from doing whatever he pleased, there is no doubt he would have been unable to resist an Austro-Hungarian battle fleet bearing down on his blockade line. It really makes you wonder if assigning Troubridge to the Otranto patrol line was a “fool’s errand” or an act of bravado on Milne’s part. Having recently completed sea trials, SMS Prinz Eugen has a machinist’s barge alongside while workmen complete a few minor adjustments. The Austro-Hungarian Fleet did, in fact, sortie in support of Goeben at first light on 7 August. Steaming south toward the Straits of Otranto were the 3 modern dreadnought battleships of the Viribus Unitis Class, 3 pre-dreadnought battleships of the Radetzky Class, 2 cruisers, and 19 destroyers and torpedo boats. The squadron mounted a total of thirty-six 12-inch guns. The best the elderly British armored cruisers could muster was less than half that number of 9.2-inch guns. Fortunately for Troubridge, around noon on 8 August, the Austrians were recalled when Vienna was informed Goeben was steaming east, for Constantinople. SMS Viribus Unitis is seen here preparing to coal ship. When war broke out in 1914, the ships of the Viribus Unitis Class were among the most modern in the Mediterranean. They mounted four triple turrets, all on the centreline – with gun houses specially designed by Skoda Arms Works and mounting their superb 12-inch rifles. They were fine, compact, ships with the superstructure grouped amidships and otherwise uncluttered decks. There was sufficient freeboard to keep them dry, but their metacentric height was a bit too high and resulted in a less stable gun platforms than their German cousins. The effect of torpedoes and mines was completely unknown prior to the war, and their only real weakness was underwater attack. If mined or torpedoed – they were certain to go to the bottom. Only SMS Tegetthoff and Prinz Eugen survived the war to be surrendered to Italy and France, respectively. A Thor Class tug has come alongside with a lighter full of fresh provisions for the flagship, SMS Tegetthoff. The two steam launches tied-up at the boat boom would indicate an admiral aboard. An overview of the division at their moorings. The battleship models, gunboat USS Erie (left of picture), and the steam tug Goliath (right of picture) are courtesy of Barroco Hispano. Breakwater by “Uki”. The warehouse buildings on the machinist’s barge are from “Nob’s 1905 Naval Series”. The white tugboat (at top) was “gifted” by “WolfZe”. The mooring buoys, boat booms, small boats, motor launch, barge, various lighters, and tugboats are all the detailed work of “AP”. (This “Post Script was requested and inspired, by @Odainsaker. Hope you enjoyed it, mate.) NEXT TIME…… GROSSE KREUZER J - 1910 MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful warship models. SPECIAL THANKS to my partner, @AP, for his talents, meticulous detail, colorful imagination, and wonderful models. He is, indeed, A “Gift from The Gods”. If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496