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A view of Von der Tann’s aft main battery turret. The work detail appears to be cleaning a canvas tarp – and some of them seem quite happy to have their picture taken -- circa 1912. IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN By: Dreadnought & AP Chapter 44: IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS The 2nd Battlecruiser Squadron of the Battlecruiser Fleet – HMAS Australia (flagship, Admiral Pakenham) leading, followed by HMS Indefatigable and HMS New Zealand – circa 1915. Possibly departing Cromarty for squadron training. COMPARISONS It should be remembered battlecruisers in both the Royal Navy and Kaiserliche Marine were born of the need to find a suitable replacement for armored cruisers. As a type, armored cruiser technology had reached its upper limit – they were no longer able to perform scouting duties when confronted by newer and more powerful opponents. In the Royal Navy, Admiral Jackie Fisher devised the Invincible Class battlecruisers based on the “Dreadnought Principle”. An all-big-gun cruiser with 12-inch guns and high speed – capable of overpowering any foreign cruisers, and their scouting or screening forces. The theory relied upon the battlecruiser being bigger, faster, and more powerfully armed than their opponent – and it worked well as demonstrated at the Battle of the Falkland Islands. The Imperial Navy tried to respond to this threat with SMS Blucher, but faulty intelligence led to an inadequate design. A second attempt to counter British battlecruisers, SMS Von der Tann, proved to be the template for an entire line of successful ships. The German line of development had a “structured” and logical approach, treating each successive ship as an incremental and progressive improvement upon the last – greater displacement, heavier armor, more guns, or greater speed. And it is worth noting, the German line of development began in 1907 and continued without significant interruption until the last months of 1917. The British line of development, though started earlier than the Germans, was impulsive and erratic -- suffering from slow-downs or interruptions when Parliament withheld funds -- or when the Admiralty chose battleships over battlecruisers. The more conservative members of the Board of Admiralty favored the steady and dependable battleship over Fisher’s fast and flashy battlecruisers. HMS Tiger was the last battlecruiser Fisher managed to get funded before his retirement in 1910, and no new battlecruisers were planned until he returned to the Admiralty in 1914. But Fisher’s fertile brain was the “erratic element” – fueled by whatever “brilliant” idea had captured his imagination. In the single year before he resigned from the Admiralty in 1915, Fisher ordered three battlecruiser classes totaling nine ships, of which – the two Renown’s were mediocre – the three Courageous Class useless – and the Admiralty Class was reduced to HMS Hood, a winner. SMS Von der Tann on the left – HMS Invincible on the right. Invincible was the first battlecruiser in the Royal Navy and was built on the modern “Dreadnought Principle”. At first glance, there was not much difference between them, but the difference could not be seen – the Imperial battlecruiser’s superb armor suite. Von der Tann was specifically designed to “take on” Fisher’s big “cruiser-killer” – and destroy it. Both models courtesy of "Barroco Hispano". In general, “development” was not so much a matter of “perfecting” something as it was building it “bigger, better, and meaner”. When details of Fisher’s Invincible Class became public, the Germans knew SMS Blucher was completely incapable of dealing with the new battlecruisers. Their immediate response was to design and build SMS Von der Tann – a “bigger, better, and meaner” ship. The German battlecruiser had a larger displacement, was slightly faster, and mounted guns of comparable size – with far superior armor protection. She was specifically engineered to destroy the Invincible’s. This “development” involved a 2,000 ton increase over Invincible, and nearly 4,000 tons over Blucher. In essence, the Anglo-German Naval Arms Race was not only in the number of ships built, but in the quality of the ships. Over the course of the decade-long battlecruiser competition, it quickly became painfully obvious the British would win the numbers race. By 1917, British battlecruisers outnumbered German battlecruisers 3 to 1. While the British built large numbers of ships, the Germans attempted to offset their lack of numbers by building each ship qualitatively superior to its British counterpart. Within that framework, the arms race produced progressively larger and more expensive warships based on the “tit for tat” competition -- with guns, armor, and speed being the driving factors. The British battlecruisers – envisioned by Fisher as large and powerful cruisers – became increasingly focused on big guns and high speed – at the expense of armor. The Germans, for a variety of reasons, opted for a more balanced approach – which enhanced their survival rate. Eventually, the Germans even came around to the idea of the fast-battleship. Had they not been overly constrained by political and financial restrictions, they would have done so much sooner. Fisher’s absolute obsession with speed could be said to have been THE driving factor – forcing both British and German designers to push length, power, and hull form to extreme limits. This single factor may, actually, have been the deciding factor in the growth of battlecruiser tonnage. Big guns were all well and good, but there was a limit to how many gun turrets could be placed on a “fast” ship. But when it came to speed, Fisher pushed, prodded, and badgered endlessly to get longer hulls to accommodate more and more boilers. But even Fisher was forced to admit there was a limit to length, beyond which, the contemporary science of naval architecture was unable to go. (The limit of 1916 technology was reached with HMS Hood – at 810 feet. The US Lexington Class battlecruisers were built to 850 feet, but they were converted into aircraft carriers on the builder’s slips and would never have to support the structural stresses of heavy armor.) SMS Moltke on left – HMS Indefatigable on right. Again, the deck layout is vaguely similar, with the exception of Moltke’s increased firepower aft. You’ll also notice Moltke is a bit wider in the beam. The extra width provided more structural strength, produced a more stable gun platform, and allowed for increased internal subdivision. Indefatigable is no more than a “stretched” Invincible with wider firing arcs and the same thin armor. HMS Indefatigable by "Barroco Hispano" -- SMS Moltke by "AP". Another aspect of speed has been largely overlooked by analysts and historians – speed trials. One of the crucial aspects of acceptance and commissioning a new warship involved running speed trials on a “measured mile course”. Unfortunately, the conditions under which the tests were held varied from navy to navy. The ship’s “displacement” is generally considered the weight of the ship when completely empty. The “full load displacement” is usually the weight of the ship plus a full fuel load, ammunition, fresh water, provisions, full crew, etc, etc. Most speed trials were not run under “full load” conditions, and each navy had its own trial weight standards. The British tended to run their speed trials in deep water with a minimum operating load. Invincible was rated at 24.5 knots on her “trials” – but her full “combat load” added 4,000 tons to her displacement. Under combat conditions, she would have struggled to maintain 24 knots (with a clean bottom). The Germans ran their speed trials in what they termed a “normal load” condition – which only increased by 1,500 tons for a full “combat load”. Even though a heavier load was carried, they invariably exceeded their designed speed. There was also a second factor to be considered. The British ran their trials in deep water. The ship’s hull performs more smoothly in deep water, and the propellers achieve maximum efficiency. (It has to do with ocean dynamics and interference caused by wave action over a shallow seabed.) This further indicates the British trial readings were accurate, but their “trial load” was too light – producing an inflated trial speed. The German “measured mile” courses were all in shallow water -- so their readings were effected by ocean dynamics -- and were invariably slower than the speed the ships could achieve in deeper water. Modern naval architects have calculated the “shallow water effect” and determined a correction factor of 1.5 knots should be applied to obtain accurate speed figures. For example: Von der Tann was rated at 27.4 knots, the correction factor would make her top speed 28.9 knots. It should also be noted British battlecruisers were frequently operated under combat conditions at full power, while German battlecruisers were not. The only “certifiable” instance of an Imperial battlecruiser operating in contact with the enemy at “utmost speed”, was SMS Goeben, in the Mediterranean – and she “showed a clean pair of heels” to her pursuers. SMS Seydlitz was the fourth, and last, of the original battlecruisers designed with cross-deck-firing wing turrets – she was also, by far, the most powerful of the quartet. While still armed with 11-inch guns, she was faster than her predecessors, and her armor suite and internal subdivision was vastly improved. She suffered 24 heavy shell hits, two medium hits, and a 21-inch torpedo at Jutland and survived to reach the Jade. Seydlitz was, arguably, the toughest warship built in the 20th Century. SMS Seydlitz on left – HMS Lion on right. This shows the British adopting the “big guns on the centreline” arrangement – though Lion’s stern turrets are widely separated by below decks machinery spaces. The British have also adopted the 13.5-inch gun over the old 12-inch rifle. Seydlitz still has a ten-gun, 11-inch, broadside to the British eight guns – but, theoretically, the larger British guns offset this advantage. However, Lion’s armor was sadly deficient. HMS Lion by "Barroco Hispano" -- SMS Seydlitz by "AP". As naval technology advanced, the placement of main battery turrets became another factor contributing to the increasing size of warships. A practice common to early battlecruiser designs in both navies was the placement of echeloned wing turrets amidships. This allowed four twin turrets to be placed on a warship in the shortest possible length. But in British battlecruisers, the Invincible and Indefatigable Classes, the arrangement had drawbacks – deck houses and superstructure narrowed the midships firing arcs, and cross-deck firing caused blast damage to deck plates, teak planking, and nearby fittings and superstructure. German designers solved some of these problems by spacing their wing turrets farther apart, strengthening the deck plates in blast zones, and custom-designing deck structures to open up the firing arcs. In the Moltke and Seydlitz Classes they increased the hull length and even squeezed-in a fifth superimposed twin turret aft. The goal was to provide at least eight guns in broadside fire. As superimposed turrets became more trusted, designers began placing all main battery turrets on the centreline. The British began the practice with HMS Lion in 1912, and the Germans followed with SMS Derfflinger in 1914 – but both navies superimposed the forward turrets, while separating the stern turrets with below decks machinery spaces. This design opened up all the firing arcs for the main guns and removed the problems involved with cross-deck firing. With the design of HMS Hood, the British used superfiring turrets both fore and aft, while the Germans had already used them in the Bayern Class battleships of 1916 (she was slower and required less space for machinery). But the movement of Hood’s main battery turrets to the centreline required lengthening the hull, thereby further increasing the size and tonnage. Fisher’s mania for speed had other adverse effects. The increased number of boilers required for high speed automatically required a longer hull, but existing British docks and basins would not accommodate a ship with a beam greater than 90 feet. As Fisher added boilers, ship designs got longer, but remained narrow – their length-to-beam-ratio increased. The longer the hull becomes without increasing beam width, the hull structure becomes unsound and “hogging” may occur (the ends of the ship droop down). The Invincible Class had a length-to-width ration of 7.15 to 1, and it increased to 8.77 to 1 in the Renown Class. The Imperial Navy was also restricted – by the width of the entrance locks to Wilhelmshaven harbor – some 100 feet. The Germans designed their ships to take advantage of the extra space. Their length-to-width ratio was 6.45 to 1 in Von der Tann and 7.49 to 1 in the Ersatz Yorck Class. The wider beam made the hull structure stronger and more rigid, provided a stable gun platform, allowed better placement of internal machinery, and accommodated additional internal subdivision. In a neat twist, Germans designers were able to increase their boiler-power (speed) without undue lengthening of the hull – they custom-built larger boilers to fit the available space, rather than making the space larger to fit more boilers. (Regarding internal subdivision: German warships invariably had a larger number of watertight bulkheads, and their most modern capital ships were designed with six engine rooms and six boiler rooms. British battlecruisers had only three engine rooms and three boiler rooms – a dangerous lack of redundancy in battle.) A British delegation hosted by Tsar Nicholas II aboard the Royal yacht “Standart” – circa 1909. The British sent the occasional military mission to France and Russia to keep the “Entente Cordiale” alive. The officer conferring with the Tsar is the First Sea Lord of the British Admiralty, Admiral of the Fleet John Arbuthnot “Jackie” Fisher. Fisher left his chestful of medals at home, and is lecturing the Tsar in rather, subdued, but well-tailored formal attire. One thing universally agreed upon by historians and analysts is that Imperial battlecruisers were better protected than their British counterparts. How this imbalance was permitted to occur is entirely due to a faulty operational philosophy, and its flawed application at the tactical level. FISHER’S OPERATIONAL CONCEPT: Jackie Fisher conceived the battlecruiser, operationally, as nothing more than a “large” scouting cruiser. From the first, it was based on the “all-big-gun” principle (12-inch guns) so it could kill any cruiser it came up against. And he installed steam turbines so it would have the speed to chase and run down any enemy cruiser. This great speed was also to be used to disengage when it came into contact with a more powerful enemy (a battleship). Fisher always intended his “large cruiser” to seek out the enemy battle fleet, cut its way through the enemy screening cruisers, and report back on the enemy’s position, course, speed, and force composition. His cruisers would maintain contact with the enemy, sending regular sighting reports, but staying out of range of the enemy’s big guns. Alternatively, Fisher’s battlecruisers could engage the enemy screening forces and lure their fleet toward the British battle line. In essence, the British battlecruiser was to operate just like any other scouting cruiser. The difference was simple – Fisher’s “large cruisers” would be powerful enough to destroy or scatter the enemy cruiser screens. The cruisers in commission in 1907 could not do that. Of course, the plan would not be quite that simple once the enemy built their own battlecruisers. And Fisher overlooked the most obvious flaw in the plan – human nature. BRITISH TACTICAL APPLICATION: The first flaw in Fisher’s philosophy was of his own making. Very much like von Tirpitz’ line of reasoning, he wanted his “big cruisers” to fight other cruisers – and avoid battleships. It sounded logical on paper – but it was simply not realistic. In the smoke and confusion of a fleet engagement, it was inevitable his battlecruisers would stumble into a flock of angry battleships – and usually at short range! Even if they tried to use their speed to get away – it might only require excellent German marksmanship and three well-placed salvos to sink a thin-skinned battlecruiser. So the first flaw was relying on speed, rather than armor, to protect his battlecruisers. The second flaw was a matter of tactical application of the battlecruiser. The “Old Salts” on the Board Of Admiralty had been trying to assemble a tactical “fast-wing” of the battle Fleet for years (sort of like heavy cavalry on a battlefield). But they had never been able to get the proper ship to pull off the job. When Fisher handed them a big, fast, cruiser with battleship guns – they thought they’d died and gone to Heaven, and the idea was reborn anew. A fleet commander would be able to use these fast, heavily armed cruisers to exert pressure on an enemy’s battle line – possibly break his formation, or “cross his T”. Dreams of “grand tactical maneuvering” danced in their heads. Unfortunately, this tactical concept would throw the lightly armored battlecruisers right into the path of their only known predator – the battleship. The third and final flaw was also the most impossible to control – human nature. The Royal Navy captains of the Edwardian Era had been raised at their Nanny’s knee on stories of Drake, Frobisher, and above all – Nelson. They were trained to attack – no matter the odds – and “lay their ship alongside that of the enemy”. An Admiral commanding a squadron of battlecruisers with 12-inch guns would not hesitate to engage the enemy at the first opportunity – battleships or otherwise. Not only was it his duty – it was practically written into his personal code of honor. (You might even say it was written into his DNA!) If proof of eagerness is needed – just remember Beatty dashing about the North Sea with his battlecruisers – desperate to find some Germans to shoot at. A British Admiral would hurl his battlecruisers at the enemy like a javelin – never mind there was only 6-9 inches of armor plate between him and Eternity. In the end, British battlecruisers had many flaws. Their vaunted speed was not always as great as the German’s, and in battle, they actually achieved a good deal less than one is led to believe. But Fisher’s choice to sacrifice armor for speed was the fatal flaw. SMS Derfflinger on the left – HMS Tiger on the right. Both ships were commissioned within a month of each other in the latter half of 1914. Both ships could be said to be the best battlecruisers commissioned into their respective fleets. Derfflinger is flush-decked, slightly wider in the beam, and now mounts a more powerful 12-inch main battery – all on the centreline. The Derfflinger Class ships were also the most heavily armored of all the Imperial battlecruisers. Though evenly matched in speed, and theoretically closely matched in firepower, Tiger’s armor scheme is insufficient to deal with German gunfire. Models by "Barroco Hispano". In Germany, State Secretary von Tirpitz initially took the same approach as Fisher – cruisers should only fight cruisers. But “reality” gradually reared its ugly head. Since Imperial Germany had fewer dreadnought battleships than Great Britain, the Kaiser insisted it would be necessary for battlecruisers to fight in the battle line. To fill the roll of a cruiser, the battlecruiser had to have high speed, or there was no reason for it to exist. It had to have big guns, or it would be toothless. And German thoroughness and logic dictated something vital to the battle line must be protected – so it would be armored. Unlike the British, the German naval architects would sacrifice neither guns, speed, nor armor – they would innovate and compromise. To obtain speed, they experimented with steam turbines and innovated with custom-designed boilers. They carefully crafted their designs to incorporate a “minimalist” superstructure, and the largest possible gun battery, with the widest possible firing arcs. But armor was where they excelled. They designed their waterline belt armor to resist whatever gun the British mounted. As the British increased their gun caliber – the Germans increased their belt armor. The armor suite of a German battlecruiser was meticulously calculated, placed and replaced through trial and error, and distributed around the ship in minute detail. The result was a magnificently complex and comprehensive armoring scheme. German warships invariably had a thicker armor belt – the citadel armor exceeded the thickness and area coverage of any foreign navy -- their turret armor and barbettes were generally stronger than the British – and the conning towers were far heavier than the English. But one element effected survivability more than any other – internal subdivision. Like protective coal bunkers, subdivision was not unique to the Kaiserliche Marine, but it was more extensive than that found in any other navy. German designers invariably fitted more transverse watertight bulkheads in their battlecruisers than other nations, and the degree of compartment subdivision between the bulkheads was leaps and bounds ahead of other warships. Many features – such as longitudinal bulkheads between boiler rooms – did not even exist in the Royal Navy. The only real weak spot in the armor scheme turned out to be the lightly armored ends of the ship. And though it doomed SMS Lutzow – the internal subdivision, extraordinary damage control procedures, and intensive training of the crews, saved SMS Seydlitz and Derfflinger. A critical element of the British and German battlecruisers were their main battery guns. The British started with the BL 12-inch Mk X-L/45 gun -- already the main armament of their dreadnought battleships. In 1912, the Lion Class battlecruiser were armed with the BL 13.5-inch Mk V-L/45 gun, brought into service for the new Orion Class battleships. It was a superior weapon with longer range and increased hitting power. This was followed by the introduction of the BL 15-inch Mk V-L/42 gun, specifically designed to arm the new Queen Elizabeth Class fast-battleships. This was the most successful gun ever developed for the Royal Navy, with an extreme range of 33,550 yards and a shell weight of 1,938 pounds. At the Battle of Jutland it would prove to be the most destructive gun yet seen in naval combat and would continue as a potent weapon throughout WW II. There were several reasons for the British to continually upgrade their big guns, but the motivating reason was, again, Admiral Fisher. Right next to his obsession to have the fastest cruiser – was his desire to arm it with the biggest guns science and Vickers, Ltd could devise…...”We must have the fastest ship with the biggest guns!” Like some of his extreme battlecruiser designs, he even ordered the development of an 18-inch weapon, which was largely useless -- considering the state of the 1914-1918 fire control systems. But there were valid reasons for developing bigger guns. A bigger gun provided distinct advantages – (1) It allowed the firing ship to engage a target at a longer distance, perhaps even beyond enemy gun range – (2) German warships were known to carry a heavy torpedo armament, bigger guns could engage outside torpedo range – (3) A bigger shell carried a larger and far more destructive bursting charge. The damage caused by the British 15-inch gun at Jutland was simply phenomenal. SMS Von der Tann at anchor – circa 1914. The first Imperial battlecruiser, Von der Tann, was equipped with the 11-inch SK-L/45 gun – the same one used on the first dreadnought battleships built for the Kaiserliche Marine (Westfalen Class). The Moltke and Seydlitz Classes would mount an improved 11-inch SK-L/50 rifle. In that respect, von Tirpitz armed his battlecruisers with the same gun used on the Imperial battleships – just as Fisher had done. And, in retrospect, it was an acceptable choice. The 11-inch Krupp rifle was quite capable of dealing with the British Invincible and Indefatigable Class battlecruisers – and could hold its own with the Lion’s as well. The gun had a higher rate of fire than the British, was extremely accurate, and was more than capable of penetrating the British armor – it would deliver fast and accurate salvo fire. But it was not as destructive as the 12-inch rifle Krupp was proof-firing at the time. The bigger gun would have kept Tirpitz “even” with his opponent. For the political, financial, and “policy” reasons we have already discussed – Tirpitz willingly accepted second place in the gun competition, and built four under-gunned battlecruisers. Only in 1914 would the Derfflinger Class mount the 12-inch SK-L/50 rifle. The German 12-inch was, in many respects, superior to the British 13.5-inch – a higher rate of fire – comparable range – and much improved accuracy. As a 50-caliber weapon, the 12-inch gun barrels were five feet longer – imparting higher velocity and accuracy, -- allowing a somewhat lower firing trajectory (you didn’t have to elevate the gun barrels quite so high to reach the target) -- and the shell landed on target with much greater penetrating force. The down-side was – the British shell was nearly 500 pounds heavier with a larger destructive force. The Imperial Navy would eventually design battlecruisers with 14-inch and 15-inch guns – but none of them were ever commissioned. For various debatable reasons, the German battlecruisers would fight The Great War with naval rifles one step behind the British. The disadvantages of mounting a smaller gun than your enemy are obvious, but the Imperial Navy managed to offset this to some degree with higher quality guns, better manufactured shells, better ammunition handling procedures, a more effective ranging and fire control system, higher rates of fire, and far superior gunnery skills. The Hochseeflotte had many advantages over the British, but when a German shell struck the target, it simply did not have the destructive force of the British shells. It is worth theorizing how different Jutland might have been if Vonn der Tann, Moltke, and Seydlitz had been armed with the Krupp 12-inch rifle. And – it becomes even more interesting if you imagine Derfflinger and Lutzow mounting the 15-inch gun Krupp developed in 1912. SMS Seydlitz at anchor in Schillig Roads – circa 1913. The one great advantage the British had over the Kaiserliche Marine was their numerous construction yards and seemingly endless capacity to boost construction at will. Not only could the English build more -- but they could build faster. With the advent of HMS Dreadnought, English shipyards went into high gear. The fact that Dreadnought instantly made all previous capital ships obsolete, was a virtual “green light” to builder’s yards. They knew as soon as they could launch a battleship hull, they would be able to get another contract for that slipway. In fact, their speed of construction actually increased after 1905. In Germany, it was not at all that easy. Prior to the passage of the First Naval Law in 1897, it was purely a “hit or miss” affair to get any ship funded in any given year. The Reichstag was not exactly what you would call a “free-spending lot”, and they were even less inclined to spend money on the Navy. Even with the Naval Law in place they were reluctant to vote money and would haggle over the price. (J.P. Morgan once said, about the cost of operating a yacht...”If you have to ask – you cannot afford it.”) Just for the record, the battlecruiser building cost per ton – allowing for money conversion rates – was usually within a Pound or two of each other in both Britain and Germany. That changed with the much-improved Derfflinger Class. HMS Lion – her opposite number – cost 78 English Pounds per ton, while Derfflinger rose to 107 Pounds per ton (economic inflation). Hand-in-hand with the availability of funds is the actual speed of construction. I excluded HMS Hood from these particular calculations because she was not finished until 1920 and had no effect on the events in question. In Britain, the average time for construction of a battlecruiser was 27 months from keel-laying to commissioning. The shortest building time was for HMS Repulse at 19 months from John Brown & Co, Scotland. In Germany, things were not so good. The average building time in German yards was thrown off by wartime manpower shortages, high demand for precision equipment (guns and fabricated steel plate), and scarce resources allocated to U-Boat construction. This resulted in the considerably higher average construction time of 35.8 months per battlecruiser. Even in peacetime the length of construction was considerably longer than that of the British – to such a degree that it came to the attention of His Majesty, The Kaiser. In 1910, Wilhelm II sent out memorandum urging an acceleration of the building and fitting-out processes. At that time, German construction yards normally took three years to build a large capital ship, plus six months to a year to conduct her “trials” and “work-up” the crew. The Kaiser suggested a more suitable arrangement would be two years for construction with a one year trial period. Though this sounds reasonable – it failed to take into account processes beyond the control of the builder’s yard. Most of the private companies involved in supplying parts and materials for the battlecruisers were willing to adapt to the shortened schedule. But the two most essential suppliers – Krupp Werk and Dillinger Hutte Fabrik -- were unable to comply. The big rifles supplied by Krupp could be ordered far enough ahead to be ready, but the face-hardened nickel-steel plates for the armor belts and bulkheads was another matter. The armor suite had to be custom-fitted to the hull and the manufacturing process could not begin until the design department completed the builder’s drawings. Only then could they begin the lengthy process of casting, hammering, rolling, punching bolt holes, re-heating, and face-hardening each individual plate. Krupp produced the finest armor plate in the world – but the reheating and face-hardening process, alone, took three weeks – and it required 39 months to deliver Derfflinger’s armor plate. Dillinger Hutte had been in business since 1808, but two battleships and a battlecruiser (per year) required most of their production capacity to turn out the masses of mild steel needed for inner hull platting, interior decks, and subdivision. Cutting a year off the delivery time would be impossible. There was also the financial aspects of reducing construction time, and as usual, there were numerous conflicts. German construction costs were distributed over a four year period, and changing over to a three-year cycle would require an initial budget increase of 25 million Marks. This would create a conflict with the Chancellor, who would probably have to increase taxes to cover it -- and the Reichstag would instinctively try to block the funding. SMS Moltke during speed trials in the Mecklenburg Bight. Having hit a brick wall with that idea, Wilhelm approached the problem from a different angle – asking why it took so long after his approval for the keels to be laid. On firm ground, the Kaiser cited the 12 months it took to lay down the keels for both Seydlitz and Derfflinger. Admiral von Tirpitz justified the delays because the shipyards needed to launch the hull they were finishing, clear the slipway debris, and begin accumulating materials for the next keel-laying. He further explained the British avoided these delays with their three-year distribution of funds. The English builders were in a hurry to clear their slipways because – (1) the second payment of funds was released as soon as the ship was launched – and (2) there was always another contract waiting for a slipway. The German Naval Laws were set up with the four-year system, and the final payment was not appropriated by the Reichstag until the fourth year. In Germany, it was in the best interests of the builder to keep his work gangs employed as long as possible, because new contracts were few and far between – and strictly regulated. In a contract-rich environment, the English employed up to 3,000 workmen on the building slips. In Germany, where contracts were scarce and building costs higher, only about 1,000 workmen were employed. But – there was an exception to every rule. As a matter of record – the Blohm & Voss Yards delivered both SMS Von der Tann and Seydlitz within 30 months. They hold the record for the fastest dreadnought capital ship construction in Imperial Germany. They were expert craftsmen in the construction of battlecruisers, and there was always a contract waiting for their attention. Blohm & Voss was a busy and profitable shipyard – they could afford to wait for the Reichstag to pay the bill. SMS Derfflinger at anchor in Schillig Roads, photographed from a Zeppelin – circa 1917. Finally, we come to the construction delays that could be attributed directly to the Reichsmarineamt, itself. Within weeks of a battlecruiser keel being laid, the design discussions for the next ship started. As you have seen in preceding chapters, the discussions went on for months – back and forth – and back, again. There were always diverging views among the staff of the RMA. They held too many meetings and wasted time preparing numerous rough designs and calculations before rejecting most of them out of hand. Eventually, Tirpitz ran out of time and was finally forced to make a decision. It could easily take a year and a half to get the design to the point where the Kaiser could approve it. In England, things weren’t that complicated. Admiral Fisher sent a memorandum to his hand-picked Chief Naval Constructor at H.M. Dockyard Portsmouth, giving details of what he wanted – speed, guns, minimal armor, etc, etc. Within a month, Fisher would have in hand a complete set of rough sketch plans – to include weight calculations and a cost breakdown. All Fisher had to do was call a meeting and “sell” it to the Board of Admiralty – and his high-pressure sales tactics usually overrode all opposition. With the Board’s approval, a tender for contract bidding was sent out to all shipyards while the final drawings were prepared. If Fisher got out of bed on 1 March and wanted a ship built, he could have the keel laid by 1 June. It was that simple – remarkably little “red tape” – and certainly no endless “round-table-discussions” about what to build. If the “Tirpitz Round Table” was not bad enough, there was one more bottleneck – this one in the Construction Department of the Reichsmarineamt. Under the Naval Laws, the Kaiserliche Marine was scheduled to lay down two battleships and one “large cruiser” per construction year. There were adjustments to the construction schedule from time to time – usually when the British Parliament released their own annual Naval Estimates to the Press. The point, however, was the heavy work load placed on the designers, engineers, and draftsmen of the Construction Department. It was their responsibility to simultaneously produce a design for a battleship and a battlecruiser – both of which had to work their way through Tirpitz’ tortured planning process. Every design meeting was followed by a flurry of demands for three or four more design sketches, all with weight and cost estimates. The Design Section worked long hours and was always behind schedule because they kept designing and redesigning the same ship. By the time a final design was settled upon, they were usually late getting the drawings to the builder, the gun works, and the armor manufacturer, among others. The Reichsmarineamt could have solved a lot of their problems by putting an ambitious young officer in charge of streamlining the design process, while simply hiring two dozen draftsmen. Overcoming the built-in handicap of the four-year building cycle would have been a bit more difficult since it involved the Reichstag. But the real stumbling block to accelerating the building process was the inability of Krupp and Dillinger Hutte to deliver the required armor in a timely fashion. With no possibility of significantly increasing armor production, the Hochseeflotte would steam into battle at Jutland outnumbered by nearly 2 to 1 in both battleships and battlecruisers. HMS Princess Royal, “slow ahead” off H.M. Dockyard Rosyth – circa April 1916. PERFORMANCE IN BATTLE – “Where the rubber meets the road”. The Imperial battlecruisers took a long time to build, and even longer to design – but when they steamed into battle, outnumbered and under-gunned, they proved their worth. The British Invincible’s took the applause early by destroying the two Scharnhorst Class armored cruisers off the Falkland Islands, but this led to false confidence in their abilities. During the war these early battlecruisers (Invincible and Indefatigable Classes) did not fare well under 11-inch and 12-inch gunfire, or mines, for that matter. At Jutland, SMS Von der Tann sank HMS Indefatigable in a fourteen-minute gun duel, and carried on unharmed. A little later, SMS Lutzow and Derfflinger disposed of HMS Invincible with two well-aimed salvos. Von der Tann had been designed to sink the Invincible Class battlecruisers, and she proved to be the better fighting battlecruiser. SMS Moltke fought well against HMS Lion and Tiger at Dogger Bank and held her own during Jutland – coming home as the lest damaged of the Panzerkreuzer. SMS Goeben never got the chance to test her mettle against the British, but she showed them her speed in the Mediterranean, and later withstood mine damage that would have sunk a lesser ship. SMS Seydlitz went “toe-to-toe” at Dogger Bank, suffering heavy damage – and helped SMS Derfflinger dispose of HMS Queen Mary at Jutland. But she suffered terribly under the 15-inch guns of the British 5th Battle Squadron and took one torpedo. She barely managed to make Wilhelmshaven – more sunk than afloat. At Dogger bank, SMS Derfflinger exchanged fire with HMS Lion, Tiger, and Princess Royal – sustaining little damage even though hit numerous times with 13.5-inch gunfire. Derfflinger assisted in sinking Queen Mary at Jutland and absorbed considerable numbers of 12-inch and 15-inch shells – with a lesser degree of damage than Seydlitz. SMS Lutzow’s performance at Jutland was magnificent! She led the battle line well into the early evening and was often simultaneously engaged with as many a five battleships and battlecruisers. Her gunnery was quick and remarkably accurate – quite possibly the best “hit ratio” of any ship in either fleet. She scored 12 hits on HMS Lion, alone, and joined with Derfflinger to sink HMS Invincible. Unfortunately, Lutzow took several 12-inch shells in the bow, below the armor belt, and her pumps were unable to cope with the flooding. Had the armor been a bit thicker, and reached a bit deeper, she might have survived – but cost-cutting and skimpy bow armor doomed her. On the other side, HMS Lion was mauled at Dogger Bank and even more heavily pounded at Jutland. She barely escaped sinking, proving her armor was not proof against German 11-inch and 12-inch gunfire. HMS Princess Royal received two hits early on at Jutland, and her “A” turret went out of action due to mechanical failure. She was extensively damaged by seven more hits (six by Derfflinger), with her main fire control knocked out, “X” turret disabled, the aft engine room casings damaged, and raging fires that were only put out with great difficulty. HMS Tiger (the last of “The Splendid Cats”) was also knocked-about quite badly, and though her gunnery was abysmal, her only significant damage was the loss of “Q” turret. Looks to me like one “fresh” German battlecruiser could have...“bagged the lot of ‘em”. HMS Queen Mary moored to a buoy in the Cromarty anchorage, as she might have appeared at Jutland. Battlecruiser courtesy of @Barroco Hispano. The mooring buoy, boat boom, and small boats by @AP. CONCLUSIONS -- ?? The Imperial German battlecruisers were undoubtedly better designed than their British opposite numbers. And the clash at Jutland clearly demonstrated their superior fighting capabilities. Analysts have put this superiority down to six primary reasons: (1) innovations in hull design, engines, and boilers, which saved considerable weight – thereby making more weight available for defensive protection – (2) a comprehensive and carefully distributed armor scheme – (3) a much more extensive use of internal subdivision than any other navy – (4) better quality propellant charges that did not burn if a fire occurred – (5) a more efficient and precise fire control system – and (6) far superior gunnery skills. One serious concern about the Imperial German battlecruisers was their smaller gun caliber, which meant they simply did not punch as hard as they could have. Another, and more serious concern, was their weak bow armor, which risked the potential for so much damage forward it would overwhelm the pumping and drainage systems. This exact sort of battle damage at Jutland threatened SMS Derfflinger, seriously threatened Seydlitz, and sank Lutzow. In simple, unconditional terms, any of the Imperial battlecruisers would likely have proven superior in a one-on-one encounter with any British counterpart. The German’s speed would have been equal, or a little faster than, her opponent. German armor and subdivision was far superior. And the faster rate of fire and superb marksmanship of the Panzerkreuzer would have offset the smaller gun caliber. But by the time of The Great War, single-ship combats between capital ships were no longer in vogue. Even when detached from the fleet for special duty, British battlecruisers invariably traveled in “pairs” – or more. Great Britain’s greatest single advantage was her capability to design, build, deploy, and operate a total of 14 battlecruisers between 1908 and 1918 (HMS Invincible to HMS Courageous). For the various reasons already discussed, Imperial Germany never managed to commission more than seven battlecruisers. Britain’s second great advantage over Germany was her ability to recover after battle. Jutland cost the British three battlecruisers, while Germany lost only one – but two months after the battle, Beatty could put to sea with seven combat-ready battlecruisers – Germany had only one. Simply put – “quantity” trumped “quality”. Finally, the above conclusions have to be taken in the context of the design and construction processes of both nations. Britain’s battlecruiser program was driven by the erratic genius of Jackie Fisher – occasionally constrained by the Chancellor of the Exchequer – and the results are clear. The three Invincible Class were revolutionary, but marred by Fisher’s mania for speed and complete disregard for armor. They were countered in Germany with SMS Von der Tann. The three Indefatigable’s were grudgingly funded, but Fisher was in a hurry and they were mere repeats of the Invincible’s – a bit longer, but with the same flaws – and no additional armor. The Germans countered them with SMS Moltke and Goeben. The Lion Class were a distinct improvement over the Indefatigable Class, with larger 13.5-inch guns all mounted on the centreline – but their armor was still weak compared to German standards. The Germans countered with SMS Seydlitz. HMS Tiger was the last battlecruiser commissioned before Jutland, and her design was greatly improved over the Lion Class – though her coal consumption was all out of proportion to her speed, and her armor remained the same as Lion. The German response to Tiger was the Derfflinger Class. The later Renown Class was not an improvement on Tiger. Even though they sported six 15-inch guns, and could turn 32 knots, their armor was only 6 inches on the belt. (The Courageous Class ships have always been universally judged to be of dubious value.) While the British battlecruiser program was driven by the whims of Fisher and his misbegotten armoring philosophy, the German program – ponderous as it might be – produced infinitely better results. The German approach has often been referred to as “slow”, but I prefer to think of it as “careful”. Each new design built upon the good qualities of the previous ship with incremental improvements and calculated adjustments. The design staff was able to build upon successful ideas and maintain continuity from ship to ship, rather than wasting time and limited resources chasing faulty concepts. This produced a string of homogeneous ships – each one better than the last – based on a balanced combination of speed, armor, and firepower. SMS Von der Tann was a good, solid, design – and she proved more than capable of dealing with the British Invincible and Indefatigable Classes. Moltke and Goeben improved on that design with more speed and armor, and added a fifth main battery turret. SMS Seydlitz was a “stop-gap” ship. By all the graces of a more generous God, she would have been armed with 12-inch guns, but her speed was slightly faster than Moltke, and her armor was improved. And in the end, she not only exhibited excellent marksmanship, but proved to be tougher than any other capital ship at Jutland. The Derfflinger Class was a dramatic departure from previous Imperial battlecruisers. She was the first to mount 12-inch rifles, and the first to have all four of her twin turrets mounted on the centreline. The Derfflinger’s were fast and powerful ships with main armor belts of 12-inches. It has been said they were the most handsome ships ever built, and are widely considered to be the finest warships built during The Great War Era. SMS Derfflinger at speed -- circa 1914. Battlecruisers were, and are, the most captivating warships ever built. Their existence as a warship type was brief – approximately ten years between 1908 and 1918 – and they embodied the best that technological innovation had to offer. Often larger than the battleships they scouted for, the big cruisers were the single most mechanically complex moving objects modern science could devise. Their size, speed, and massive guns – their sheer awesome presence – contributed to their allure. The long, sleek hulls rode gracefully at anchor – or took tons of water over their bows as they raced into battle with thick clouds of smoke trailing astern. Those same slim hulls trembled like a small earthquake when the huge rifles roared and sent their deadly payloads toward the enemy line. And during their years of development and splendor, the battlecruisers of the Imperial German Navy stood second to none. The true test of any warship is its’ performance in combat – and the Imperial battlecruisers always fulfilled their duty while performing far beyond expectation. The courage and valor of the battlecruiser crews was beyond dispute, and they were not only confident, but proud – of their ships and their Squadron Commander – Admiral Franz von Hipper. Hipper treated his men well, saw to their needs, and trained them to a high degree of proficiency. The gunnery scores of the ships in the 1st Scouting Group were invariably among the highest in the fleet. The North Sea engagements against the British showed the Imperial battlecruisers to be deadly opponents – though well-handled, they were frequently outnumbered. Admiral Hipper was a “sailor’s sailor” and a “thinking” officer – a superb tactician. He took pleasure in having large capital ships he could handle like fast cruisers – and knew how to get the most out of his ships. Within months of war breaking out, the Imperial battlecruisers quickly became the primary offensive arm of the Hochseeflotte. During the early skirmishes in the North Sea, the Panzerkreuzer acquitted themselves well – even when outnumbered and nearly trapped at the Battle of Dogger Bank. Their excellent shooting came very close to sinking HMS Lion on that occasion. When the opposing fleets met at the Battle of Jutland, Hipper’s ships again carried the burden of action. The German battlecruisers were outnumbered and heavily engaged during “The Run To The South” and “The Run To The North”, before the battle fleets met. During the main encounter the German battlecruisers continued to engage their British counterparts as well as becoming heavily involved with the battleships of the Grand Fleet. It should be noted the British Battlecruiser Fleet lost three of their number to Hipper’s gunnery, while their remaining battlecruisers were handled rather roughly. But – at no time were the British battlecruisers seriously engaged by the German battle fleet. Hipper’s performance at Jutland was flawless, and he handled his ships as a duelist might wield a fine Toledo rapier. He unhesitatingly offered battle to Beatty – knowing he was outnumbered -- and then hung onto his enemy like a bulldog. He kept tight control over his squadron while they delivered fast and accurate salvos on their targets, and he never lost sight of his duty to screen Scheer’s battle fleet. In the end, Hipper lost his flagship (SMS Lutzow) to overwhelming enemy gunfire, but his ships and crews fought with skill and tenacity, and covered themselves in Glory. The Age of the Dreadnought – and certainly the Battle of Jutland -- produced no admiral more able than Franz von Hipper, and the German Navy never produced a greater commander. It is, to some degree, miraculous that the finest commander on either side should have commanded the finest warships in either navy. After the loss of three British battlecruisers at Jutland, the ship type fell out of favor with other navies and was replaced two decades later with a more technologically advanced version of the “fast-battleship”. But the Imperial battlecruisers were much sought-after in their day – sailors wanted to serve in them and Kapitans wanted to command them. They were, indeed, the finest warships ever built -- and it is only fitting they have gone down in Legend. The guns fell silent at Jutland as Scheer’s battle line disappeared into the smoke and gathering darkness, and the Imperial Panzerkreuzer – battered and bloodied – did the same. At that point, the battle was, for all intents and purposes – over. But -- if you have read this entire series, your mind should be swirling with questions – and even ideas. The Nobel Prize winning author William Faulkner published the novel “Intruder In The Dust” in 1948, and among some of the most quoted prose, is this bit I have edited for brevity…… “For every Southern boy fourteen years old...there is the instant when it’s not yet two o’clock on that July afternoon in 1863, the brigades are in position...the guns are laid...and the furled flags are loosened to break out...Pickett...waiting for Longstreet to give the word...and it’s all in the balance, it hasn’t happened yet…...” That “word picture” captures the moment before “the charge” on the third day at Gettysburg. It is not about what happened – but what was about to happen – and all the “possibilities” that still existed in those few moments. The less “romantic” among us would call it a “what if” scenario. “What if”...things had been different? Amateur strategists and military men have, for centuries, used wargames to recreate the great battles of history – to see how things actually happened – or how they might have happened differently. Authors have written entire novels of what is termed “ALTERNATIVE History”. Now I have a few things for you to ponder…… (1) If the Admiralstab had pushed SMS Hindenburg’s construction to an early completion -- she would have led Hipper’s battlecruiser line. Would she have made a difference? (2) What if all three Derfflinger Class were present at Jutland – and armed with 15-inch guns? (3) What if SMS Von der Tann, Moltke, and Seydlitz had been armed with 12-inch guns instead of 11-inch weapons? (4) And the “Million Dollar Question”…...What if the Germans had “streamlined” their construction in 1910? Would two Mackensen Class battlecruisers have made a difference? Don’t get too carried-away with the “fantasy” – but it is interesting to think it over. In all probability, if the Germans had won at Jutland – they would still have lost the land war. But for me, it will always be 02:00 on Wednesday 31 May, 1916. Vizeadmiral Franz von Hipper stands motionless on the bridge in a driving rain...the signal lamps flash back along the line of hulking battlecruisers...the mighty turbines roar to life...and Lutzow increases to 18 knots, leading the way to the open sea... SMS Lutzow at speed -- circa 1916. NEXT TIME…… CUXHAVEN: THE PHOTO TOUR BEGINS MANY THANKS to @Barroco Hispano for his beautiful warship models. SPECIAL THANKS to my friend and partner, @AP, for his talents, meticulous models, colorful imagination, and extreme dedication. If you enjoyed anything – please punch the “like” button so WE will know. A comment would be even more informative. Comments and critiques requested and gratefully accepted. All questions answered promptly to the best of our ability. THANK YOU for your visit! You may wish to visit these CJ’s as well…… SERIES I: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: WILHELMSHAVEN SERIES II: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: CUXHAVEN Appearing – Work In Publication SERIES III: IMPERIAL DOCKYARDS: BREMERHAVEN Appearing -- ??? And please feel free to drop in at… THE SIMTROPOLIS SHIPYARD https://community.simtropolis.com/forums/topic/761469-simtropolis-shipyard/?tab=comments#comment-1766496